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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TASKS AHEAD*

CHARLES MCKINLEY
Reed College

A resurgent conservatism rules the day in the United States not only in public affairs but also in political speculation. Frightened by the uneasy ghost of the barbarism that was embodied in German Nazism and Italian Fascism and by the spread of Russian-spawned totalitarianism, political speculation in this and other democratic countries now shrinks from the hazard inherent in a rationalistic effort to remold the world of public affairs. Inquiry turns to the adoration of our inheritance, to the discovery of neglected or undervalued virtues in the institutions as molded by our forebears, and to the wise prevision which they, in simpler crisis times, expressed in their statesmanship.

My own fundamental orientation toward government developed in the "progressive" decade before mankind's applecart was sharply tilted, if not completely upset, by the First World War. It rested upon an act of preference for a democratic, freely thinking, and freely associating society. It therefore shared something of the "divine discontent" felt by all political innovators, to whom the wisdom of the ancestors always has seemed incomplete and often inadequate to meet the demands of a constantly changing society. The new conservatism thus comes as a healthy stimulus to reassessment. In recent months I have been trying to make such a reevaluation of my views concerning the American constitutional system and its adequacy, as it has evolved since 1910, for meeting the needs not only of our own people, but of the other nations whose fortunes are willy-nilly joined to ours. A special spur has been provided by this recent declaration of one of our most respected and learned colleagues: "I believe," he asserts, "that the government of the United States under the Constitution, is probably the greatest achievement of the entire human race up to now in the construction of a political system that will provide strong and active government for every national

* Presidential address delivered before the American Political Science Association at its fifty-first annual meeting in Boulder, Colorado, September 7, 1955.

and local need and emergency, and at the same time ensure a maximum attainable personal liberty and popular control over what government does."[1]

This appraisal by William Anderson, whose judgment I have learned to value most highly, is sharply at variance with the conclusions which I had formed at the height of the Progressive period, about 45 years ago. I believed then that the American constitutional system, despite its modification by the growth of parties, could not, without drastic revision, be made to respond adequately and responsibly to the urgent requirements of American society. Because of the courts' constricting views of both national and state powers, extensive revision seemed necessary to enable our federal system to grapple successfully with national questions. Moreover, I was convinced that the allocation of powers between the organs of national government, with their many checks and balances, often doomed us to paralysis when decisiveness was essential; that instead of providing us with what Beard in his later conservative days was to characterize as a scheme of "dynamic equilibrium," it encouraged dynamic *disequilibrium* in the social order. In this mood, searching comparative experience for models toward which the American Constitution might be remolded, I thought the basic answers were to be found in the parliamentary systems of Britain and the self-governing dominions.

Those were days when the faith in the power of reason to adapt political institutions to men's needs was still bright. The influence of John Stuart Mill with his emphasis on the rational pursuit of the ideally best form of government was widespread. Burke's historical pessimism, with its panegyric on the virtues of inherited ways and prejudices, had slight appeal; it had not yet been reinforced by the new views of human nature and of culture soon to be voiced by the behaviorists, the Freudians, the sociologists, and the cultural anthropologists. What seemed very clear was the urgent need to find means to ameliorate the pressing economic, social, and political evils that had been generated by the post-Civil War industrialization of America and its accompanying urbanization. There was, moreover, a growing belief, expressed by the many innovations in city charters and state constitutions and statutes, that modifications in the machinery of government *were* attainable and *could* inaugurate a new era of genuinely democratic government. This point of view was to be voiced on the broadest scale by the Bull Moose convention of 1912 in its call for an easier method of amending the Constitution

[1] William Anderson, *The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners?* (Minneapolis, 1955), p. xi.

so as to adapt our fundamental law "progressively to the changing needs of the people."

Looking back over the main constitutional developments of the last 45 years I have tried to see whether there are any valid remnants of those youthful convictions. It is clear that the American Constitution of 1955 is not identical with that of 1910. The psychological barriers against formal constitutional amendment which then seemed nearly insuperable were breached within three years after that date. The 16th and 17th Amendments gave us a new and fundamental fiscal resource for collective purposes and a greatly changed Senate from which the salty tides of popular opinion could no longer be filtered out by the often corrupt processes of indirect election. The deification of the formal document which had equated amendment with sacrilege seemed ending. Within a few years two more changes were made, and one of them swiftly completed the expansion of the political rights of women. A dozen years later came the depression-induced amendment which ended the "lame duck" Congresses and shortened the period between the election and installation of the President. How urgently the latter provision was needed received full demonstration in the drift toward economic chaos during the constitutional paralysis of executive leadership from November, 1932 to March, 1933.

Emotions generated by the Second World War wrought the latest formal constitutional change and provided the generative force which nearly sent the proposed Bricker amendment to the states for ratification. But the 22nd Amendment, unlike the earlier 20th-century changes, was not an *innovative* modification of constitutional powers. It restored the older constitution of custom, unbroken to 1940, which denied the electorate the right to select the same President for more than two terms. So, too, the Bricker amendment, which almost passed the Senate, was aimed at the status quo ante 1910 or, in some respects, 1787. It would enshrine in holy parchment a conception of federalism relating to the impact of foreign relations upon the distribution of national and state powers practiced under the Articles of Confederation, while simultaneously removing from presidential jurisdiction the power of making international executive agreements, exercised, with increasing frequency, almost since the beginning of American nationhood.

The 22nd Amendment and its Bricker consort, still waiting in the Senate lobby for a second try, are both antipathetic reflections of one of our two most significant constitutional developments of the past half-century. This is the great growth of presidential power. Though the popular tribune notion, with its matching assertion of presidential independence, dates from Jackson's time, the great growth in the powers

of our chief executive parallels in time the comparable phenomena of expanding executive authority among the parliamentary democracies of the West. It began with the first Roosevelt, and while there have been subsequent periods of executive lassitude, there seems general agreement in our profession that, despite the 20th-century conservatives' distrust of presidential power, we are most unlikely again to experience such a hiatus in presidential influence on domestic and international policy as that of the period between Lincoln and "T. R." Conservative incumbents of this office may yearn to sit in the cool of the White House cellar and count apples while Congress attends to the few laws desired by the leaders of "private enterprise," but there is no prospect of a return to the supposititious world of Calvin Coolidge. The electorate, and in particular the urban sector whose numerical dominance over the rural continually increases, are not likely to permit the holder of this high office to desert his leadership role in public policy with which it is now identified. It is they, and particularly the metropolitan voters, who tend to decide presidential elections. This office, unlike the Senate and the House, affords at present their best chance for effective representation in public policy. This peculiarity is not found in parliamentary systems, whose ministries and parliaments together mirror with policy sensitivity the going schemes of the constituency representation.

In appraising, therefore, the significance of the establishment of the office of the President as the principal vehicle for the crystallization of public opinion into governmental policy, we must note that though this has, in one important respect, increased the prospects of responsible democratic government in the United States, it has at the same time set the stage for increasing and continuing friction between Congress and the President.

This friction cannot be rationalized by the old argument of the need either for special class representation or for more delay to prevent precipitancy. Even though recent evidence indicates greater party cohesion in congressional voting than has heretofore been assumed, the party tie to the Chief Executive is still too weak a bond to obviate the necessity for bi-partisan support if presidential leadership on major policy issues is to be effective. And of course no matter how strong this tie might become it is of no avail, and could be a positive impediment to the requisites of governance, when as in 1910, 1918, 1930, 1946, and 1954 the midterm election produces a Congress dominated in one or both houses by the opposite party. Frequently since 1938 a bi-partisan majority, reflecting the voting dominance of rural and small city areas led by an urban business minority, has carried the major policy decisions in opposition to presidential leadership in a Congress bearing the same

party stamp as the President. This situation is likely to become more frequent, for the drift of population toward metropolitan regions continues, and the impediments to the revision of congressional electoral areas seems unremediable—permanently frozen into the Constitution, in the case of the Senate, and deeply entrenched in state constitutions and hallowed state legislative apportionment practices in the case of the House. Only in case of war or grave economic disaster, when Presidents may take on messianic attributes and assume or are clothed with dictatorial powers, will presidential leadership be consistently accepted by the Congress. Even in such critical times this acceptance is far from complete, as the stories of price control and of taxation during the Second World War bear witness.

It is an ironic fact that great presidential leadership in such critical times not only appears to breach, but in fact must at times ignore, constitutional limitations in order to serve the nation effectively. And the price we have paid for these essential services, tinged as they have often been with the taint of unconstitutionality or illegality, has been a revulsion of public opinion which has denigrated both the office and its occupant. The post-Civil War consequence of Lincoln's war leadership was visited upon the head of Andrew Johnson. It was expressed for many years in the disparagement of the presidency and in the dominance of irresponsible Congresses. More expressive of this post-Civil War mood than young Woodrow Wilson's iconoclastic study of *Congressional Government* was William Lockwood's book, published one year earlier (1884), bearing the significant title, *The Abolition of the Presidency*.

The penalty for Woodrow Wilson's leadership during the First World War was not only his subsequent repudiation by the Senate enforced by the constitutional minority, but a two-year stalemate during which the world, facing the need to organize itself internationally, drifted and extemporized until our organs of national will could recover from their paralysis—and by that time a golden opportunity had been lost.

But the price also included a postwar glorification of presidential attributes devoid of leadership talent or intent and the expression of this mood by the selection of a President whose capacities, character, and vigor were patently unequal to the demands upon that office, even in a period when the yearning for "normalcy" and the disparagment of government called for a minimum of collective action.

The aftermath of the Great Depression-Second World War crisis period is so close to us and differs so markedly from earlier periods of "let-down" that I hesitate to attempt its evaluation upon the presidential situation. The desire for relaxation from governmental interference certainly followed the familiar pattern, but respite from crisis was very

brief. The sky was quickly overcast by the march of Communist conquest, the race for atomic weapons, and the eruption of many small wars in one of which we again became the major participant. Though filled with anxiety, we have been determined to "eat our cake" as well as throw it away. We want a presidential leader who will show us how to do both. He must keep us out of war but he must not appease the Communists. He must deal skillfully with other nations, but he must fire his Secretary of State and his diplomatic staff whenever they are actively disliked by a minority of senators. He must be a good Commander-in-Chief but he must not remove a politicking general who opposes his foreign policy or misconstrues his military directives. He must keep silent when senators of his own party, even his own Senate leader, set up their own foreign offices in competition with or in opposition to his Department of State. The momentum behind the Bricker amendment has been temporarily stayed, but if it revives with a small increase in strength, we may yet see transferred to the Congress or to the states much of the responsibility for shaping our engagements with other nations.

Yet those who share my own judgment that the elevation of the office of the President to the first position of leadership has been essential to our quest for a more responsible democratic government, would gravely err if they should write down the periodic reactions against presidential powers as wholly without justification. Many political scientists, approving the leadership function by the Presidents of the last 20 years, in peace and in war, seem to fall into that myopia displayed by Harry Hopkins as he observed the differences in the operation of the presidency and the British prime ministership during the famous battleship conference that brought forth the Atlantic Charter. As Sherwood reports, the admiring Hopkins "remarked on the fact that whereas Roosevelt was completely on his own, subject only to the advice of his immediate and self-selected entourage, which advice he could accept and reject, Churchill was constantly reporting to and consulting the War Cabinet in London, addressing his communications to the Lord Privy Seal, who was then Clement Atlee." What Hopkins did not seem to sense was the relative political isolation and incomplete responsibility, and therefore contingent political weakness, in the situation of the President, because, unlike the British chief executive, he could not count on the explicit, assured backing of a body comparable to the British War Cabinet, able to speak as the united mouthpiece for all party groups within Parliament and the British nation.

There is a sense, as I have already noted, in which one man occupying a national office set apart as the only post on which the entire electorate may cast its ballot, becomes the best representative of the nation.

But this is nevertheless a precarious relationship. There is a deep-seated popular suspicion of the possession by any one man of the fundamental power of law-making or the power to bind us with obligations which may commit our lives and everything we hold dear to the catastrophe of war. To be sure, this attitude is historically identified with the status of irresponsible kingship, or its modern dictatorial counterpart. The complementary history of representative government, on the other hand, has been positively identified with multiple-membered bodies, tied by electoral processes so as to express therein the diverse interests of all significant social groups constituting the civic electorate of the polity. True, this representative relationship differs from that of pure agency though sharing the agency characteristic of the right of ultimate dismissal if the represented are sufficiently dissatisfied. It has been suggested, however, that given a democratic electoral process the presidency provides a more direct, more unified, more enterprising partial substitute for the representative function in the government of a far-flung *federal* system than does Congress. So long as Congress is actually misrepresentative in composition, or, as so often in our bicameral history, is split into two politically hostile corporate groups which either fail to reach a consensus or find agreement through bargains that greatly distort the representative process, it is hard to deny the force of this assertion.

Yet there are other objections to an institutional situation which compels primary reliance upon the President or any other single official independent in tenure of the multiple-membered organs of law-making for the basic overall representative function in a democratic nation. One man as a single psycho-physical organism has deep-seated habit and value preferences which regardless of his conscious thinking and willing processes will incline him in particular directions. Every man who reaches such eminence possesses a "political" character structure—the resultant of a configuration of political attitudes which interpenetrate and which incline his values and judgment in particular directions. But even with all his tendencies toward inner conflict and ambivalence no single personality can be an adequate substitute for a properly constituted multi-member group in the performance of the primary representative process. To bring to the surface the varied and often conflicting social interests of a heterogeneous electorate a multi-membered body is inherently superior, possessing as it does its own automatic checks and balances—provided it operates in the free market of public discussion and association and provided also that it has its *own overt integrating leadership* which stands directly exposed and accountable before the whole nation for the results of its decisions.

The American presidency, through its independent and fixed tenure

and its independent constitutional prerogatives, oscillates from unlimited legislative power in times of great crisis when Congress and the courts are frightened, to frustration or impotence when tension is over, retaining only such influence as may be exercised by the astute use of patronage, by special mass appeals over the heads of Congress to the voters, or by expansive presidential interpretations of legal authority, sometimes doubtfully possessed.

Nevertheless, the President as head of state at all times possesses potential regal attributes which limit criticism and compel a minimum of acquiescent deference. Even so great a man as Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in his relations with Franklin D. Roosevelt (so Hopkins assures us), guided his behavior by the deference due the head of state. Where criticism cannot go, irresponsibility may enter and error reign unrevealed. This aspect of the presidential office has slight importance in tranquil times, but in crisis epochs, particularly those of an international kind where the President operates also as the molder of world policy, it may, without effective public or congressional debate or understanding, decide the destiny of the human race. Passing over recent illustrations and reverting to difficult but less perilous times, we recall that twice in our relations with Mexico, President Wilson, whose temperamental horror of war has been well documented, led us to the brink of full-scale conflict in the pursuit of tortuous policies intended to determine the internal leadership of Mexican politics. These policies, as Professor Link's studies show, he failed candidly to explain either to the Congress or to the public. This royal trait of the presidential office is rendered all the more significant by the absence from our system of any method for institutionalizing a responsible opposition party leadership, or for producing a cabinet personnel or practice designed to assure the refinement of presidential judgment on the anvil of informed and sensitive political discussion.

The President may and often does select his confidants on high public policy on purely *personal* grounds. *On whom he leans may be a matter of sheerest accident*, though of the greatest potential political consequence. High policy advice may lurk within story-telling, poker-playing companionship or a speech-drafting entourage. A Wilson may permit a monopoly of his innermost thoughts by a sympathetic and astute Colonel House, or a Roosevelt may find shrewd, bold, and unselfish advice from a hero-worshipping Hopkins, but a Harding or a Grant may build the decision-making process upon ill-informed or untrustworthy private friendships.

How thoroughly out of touch with congressional opinion and attitudes presidential decisions made under these personal or private influences

can become was dramatized in 1944 by the spectacular repudiation of President F. D. Roosevelt's tax veto by the Senate and by his own theretofore faithful spokesman and Senate leader whose advice he had brushed aside. The experience of Senator Harry Truman when elevated to the presidency illustrates the fact that even "one of the boys" may quickly find that his new and different sense of responsibility and the isolation imposed by the "separation of powers" have placed him outside the immunities and good fellowship with which the Senate, as a corporate group, cushions conflicts within its own circle.

These are some of the adverse factors that still cling to the office of the President in the role of legislative leadership for the nation despite the augmentation of that role in the past 40 years.

But what of the Congress? Direct election of senators and changes in the political culture of the states have eroded the tight plutocratic, oligarchical control that ruled in the first decade of the present century. Cannonism in the House disappeared in 1910–11. Yet the displacement of these concentrations of power by dispersed centers of influence substituted for one form of irresponsibility another and more anarchic form. I can but enumerate, without reciting evidence for them, certain basic conclusions: (1) Despite the exhortation of two committees set up by this Association, those admonitions contained in the report of the Joint Congressional Committee on Reorganization and in the more limited aspirations implicit in the Act of 1946, and despite comparable suggestions for reform by a galaxy of informed critics, the houses of Congress have not acquired, either separately or in union, institutions of responsible collective legislative leadership, nor are they willing consistently to accept that of the President. Seniority, particular interests, and localism rule where party has abdicated. (2) In the control and direction of the work of the executive department, congressional influence is even more completely dispersed over administrative personnel, programs, and even detailed operating decisions not only among the chairmen of committees or sub-committees but also among individual congressmen. Here the Constitution's requirement for Senate approval of presidential appointments, whose ill-consequences were clearly foretold by John Adams and historically demonstrated by Joseph Harris' recent study, adds built-in impediments to the integrated control of "Big Administration." Great as has been the headway since 1910 in reducing the spoils system and improving the devices for merit measurement, the disintegrating and capricious influences that play upon executive agencies not only discourage development of a permanent top-level managerial corps but rob departmental and presidential management of essential coordinating influence, all plans for administrative reorganization and

central staffing to the contrary notwithstanding. Herman Somer's recent brilliant essay on this matter reminds me of the large element of truth in the second part of the satiric remark ascribed to Charles Beard to the effect that American constitutional evolution had transferred the law-making function to the President while Congress had become the chief executive. (3) Checks and balances within the bicameral system and between Congress and the executive give to the American republic many of the characteristics so widely ascribed to France. Organs of national will are frequently paralyzed when decision and action are important. With regard to many questions of national and international policy, we seem often to approximate that 18th-century ideal expressed by Hamilton when, in defending the veto power, he expressed the belief that "every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to *keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at any given period*, is much more likely to do good than harm. . . ."

Even that essential informal ingredient of democratic constitutions, the national political party, which the architects of the Constitution most feared, has undergone only slight development toward the kind of self-discipline, the improved prestige, the popular support, and the internal efficiency of management which are necessary for the workable adaptation of a check and balance system to the needs of government. The creation of a small permanent office by the national committees of the major parties since Al Smith's defeat is a gain. The use of research in the drafting of policy statements is laudable and was first copied by the Democrats from the Socialist party in 1916. But these improvements are miniscule. Our own Committee on Political Parties has fully documented the distance that must still be traversed before responsible parties become possible. Without commenting on its many proposals, or that of other advocates of increased party control over congressmen and congressional policy, I would express grave doubt of the efficacy of their exhortations in face of the obstacles to party government which are built into the present structure of the Constitution. Acts of will and conscious desire are of course essential to any deliberate reform. But a desire for and acts of will toward greater central party control and discipline are not likely to arise in the breasts of congressmen and senators or pressure group leaders so long as congressional terms of office and reelection prospects are, by constitutionally created provision, independent of the President or so long as there is no provision for a recognized leader of the opposition to play a continuous and effective role.

The most striking differences between the Constitution of 1910 and that of 1955 are the new allocation of powers between the nation and the states, and the freeing of both national and state legislatures from the

judicially constructed straitjacket of laissez-faire economic limitations. What Professor Corwin has so aptly called the "Constitutional Revolution, Ltd." worked by the Supreme Court in 1937 and the years immediately following erased the constitutional impediments which Frank Goodnow's summary of 1911 had soberly listed as lying athwart the path of necessary social reform. The Court on the one hand has "out-Marshalled" Marshall in its expansion of the scope of the commerce, taxing, and spending clauses that endow Congress with powers, and, on the other, has freed both state and national legislatures from the major limitations on economic regulation which the old Court had found lurking within the phrases of the 5th and 14th Amendments. In the economic sphere the doctrine of limited powers seems pretty well erased.

With respect to federalism, no longer does the theory of dual federalism create a no-man's land of legal impotence over economic problems. Cooperative federalism has judicially and administratively replaced competing federalism. Congress and the President may attempt to deal with any economic and social problems of national importance, despite the 10th Amendment. The state legislatures, if interested in giving reality to the experimental opportunity inhering in federalism, are now free to act. Judicial review as it was exercised by the Supreme Court in 1910 and down to 1937 has thus lost its major sting.

Moreover the principle of review does remain to give support to the exercise of precious civil liberties within the 48 states which the Court discovered, since the mid-twenties, to inhere within the seminal phrases of the 14th Amendment. Here limited government still reigns, and reigns more fully than ever before in our history. On the other hand, the Court has not yet shown comparable jealousy for guaranteeing the exercise of these personal rights as against the *national* government.

Finally, the nation's legal right to play such a role in the society of nations as the President and Senate may decide has also been so generously construed by the Court that what remains to be most prayed for is the national capacity to make up our minds wisely.

Thus the constitutional power to govern, and its allocation within our federal system as re-defined by the Supreme Court, meets today most of the criticisms leveled in its direction by those who shared my predilections in the hopefully discontented days of 1910.

But in this third quarter of the 20th century the challenges to self-government are not exactly like those of 40-odd years ago. The world of 1910 is far away. Two global wars, a most devastating and prolonged economic depression, the revival and rapid spread of dictatorship in Europe and Asia, utilizing new scientifically refined savagery in peace

as well as in war, have intervened. In the wake of these cataclysmic events we in America find ourselves snatched from our intra-continental self-sufficiency and self-absorption and not only thrown into the main stream of world events but placed at the head of one of the two great armed camps into which the world is now divided. We gird ourselves and our allies for total atomic destruction lest we be totally destroyed. In this interim of 40 years our faith in "inevitable progress" has been shattered. We ought now to realize that if we are to retain a democratic social order and remove the red scourge of war and mass destruction we shall have to earn these essentials of human welfare by the sweat of our intelligence, by our moral sensitivity and effectiveness, and by our capacity for *sustained* social and political cooperation not only among ourselves but with other peoples.

Nor do we any longer take it for granted that we shall easily command the physical resources for the tasks that lie ahead and the full life we crave. The war-revealed critical shortages in our continental supplies of strategic minerals and the approaching depletion of high quality deposits of some of our most essential base minerals—such as iron, lead, copper, and bauxite ores—create a new anxiety lest the physical base for our increasingly mechanized industrial civilization fail us. Demands upon our soil and water resources when measured by the needs of a rapidly increasing population here and in the rest of the world forecast the necessity for careful and discriminating use. It is not necessary to accept as certain the estimates of Harrison Brown, in his brilliant summation of the physical basis for prospective industrialized world society, to conclude nevertheless that as never before in modern times, social controls and public initiative in future years will have systematically to guide, modify, or supplement private decisions in resource use. Already caught up in this tendency, we shall find it necessary increasingly to use political means to assure the continued availability at reasonable cost of the material foundations for continued high living standards and for the extravagantly hungry demands of defense or war.

And finally, the Great Depression has left a heritage of conviction, shared by every consequential political party, that we must not permit its repetition. Though there may be slips between intent and performance, conservatives, liberals, and radicals, farmers and city folk seem united in the affirmation that governmental instruments must be used to halt a depression and to maintain a high level of employment.

Thus it is a very different world from that of 1910 against which we must measure the adequacy of the democratic political devices and ideas mankind has slowly and painfully wrought for social action. Nor will *this world of 1955* stand still for long. Robert Oppenheimer has

eloquently characterized the heart of our situation. What confronts the human race, he says, "is the prevalence of newness, the changing scale and scope of change itself, so that the world alters as we walk in it, so that the years of man's life measure not some small growth or rearrangment or moderation of what he learned in childhood, but a great upheaval." Yet the changing world of which Oppenheimer speaks, which moves with such acceleration, is principally the world of scientific and technical knowledge, of the artifacts, the work and other interpersonal relationships and of the economic and social institutions which rise to serve them. The world of *political* institutions, ideas, and practices, and of public convictions about such matters, born long ago of human needs and aspirations, waits far behind. We see clearly a similar situation for past epochs in Western civilization when, as in the case of the Greek city states and the Roman republic, constitutional adaptation was too slight and too slow to prevent political catastrophe. But unlike the ancient Greeks and Romans *we* possess the *technical means* of mass communication, transportation, and universal education so essential to the operative adaptation of democratic government to change.

Yet our emotional attachment to accustomed ways of operating democratic government may, by inhibiting prompt adaptation, rob us of the institutional tools with which to preserve the basic human values implicit in the democratic faith. We see this pretty clearly for example in the lag between the institutions of local government and the responsible fulfillment of the complex public tasks required by the new metropolitan communities. Nevertheless, in that sphere we have been at least able to talk freely, to criticize, and to propose without incurring undue obloquy. Not so in the realm of national constitutional problems, where, as Charles Merriam noted in the concluding essay of the 1933 landmark survey on "Recent Social Trends," proposals for change of the constitution "have been identified with treason to the state."

I know that many of my more learned colleagues in this Association believe that in the development and practice of a science of politics we are obligated only to observe accurately, describe, and generalize. Despite this view, my youthful convictions on this score are firm. The value of any science is to be found in its ultimate impact upon human welfare. I therefore believe we must search for clues from our own history and from comparative experience that may be helpful in the institutional adaptations most likely to resolve the problems of governance that lie ahead. But I have learned that the process of suitable constitutional adaptation is a much more difficult and uncertain thing than seemed to be true in 1910. I have greater appreciation for the significance of the total social matrix to the operation of formal constitutions and informal polit-

ical practices. I would acknowledge that element of truth in both Burke and Hume which stresses the constricting allegiance of historical forces upon the mental commitments of men. Yet I do *not* believe that we must remain *wholly the captives of our past,* or the creatures of those occasional changes that come when we are moved from our ideological moorings by catastrophic chance.

There is *some* freedom of choice, *some* opportunity for reasoned thought and logic to guide our collective conduct, despite the large influence of the instinctive, the non-rational, and the habitual. The new awareness of these latter motivations in our behavior may even free us to direct more effectively the strategies for our own adaptations. But this process cannot proceed with promise unless it begins by vigorous discussion, based upon a recognition of the need for constitutional modification.

If some miracle were to alter the many cultural factors that now deter many of our wisest, most talented, and most trustworthy men and women from enlisting in the transcendent tasks of statecraft that challenge us, such leadership would still be frustrated and discouraged by the fragmentization of responsibility and power inherent in our constitutionally-induced political practices. If we are to get and to keep the quality of statesmanship the times require, it will be necessary to make such revisions in the relationships and composition of the organs of national government as will increase their integration and their representativeness. If we are to win through to complex and distant goals, there must also be changes to assure promptness in decision-making when urgency presses, as well as the development of wide and sustained public understanding. As a people we shall need, as never before, the capacity for intelligent self-restraint of many kinds. Can such constitutional rearrangements be combined with democratic control and with the preservation of freedom of speech, press, and association, and of all the galaxy of precious individual choices by which the power to govern must be cushioned to make it genuinely accountable? The age-old difficulty that powers granted may be abused lies before us in an acute form.

Yet even as we hang back, afraid to bring together in some closer responsible relationship our President and the houses of Congress, power is already being gravely abused. No other contemporary mature democracy has witnessed such inroads upon its citizens' personal liberties of speech, association, and due process as have we during the trying postwar years. Our checks and balances, which split power and dissipate responsibility, have not spared us from the humiliations and terrors of the rankest invasions of privacy, of rights to employment (private as

well as public), of the incitation of son against parent, or brother against brother, or of pillory before the public—so that our friends slink away lest they too be similarly punished. Where else among the Western democracies is there a parallel to that phenomenon known as McCarthyism? Is our danger from either the internal or external menace of communism so much greater than that of the Scandinavian democracies, or France, or Britain, or of our friendly neighbor to the north, or her sister-dominions in the south seas? It is patently not so. Shall we explain this lack of nerve by some peculiar personality traits that afflict us? I do not believe it. I do think that there are elements in our pioneer traditions which make for intolerance and that these come to the fore when circumstances favor. But the favoring circumstances for our present orgy of unpatriotic patrioteering which has led to these evils seem to me in large degree traceable to the great diffusion of constitutional powers among so many centers of officialdom that power tends to be irresponsibly and abusively exercised. It is no inexplicable accident that a single senator was for years able to so terrorize his fellows as to set in motion a Gresham's law by which nearly all of them felt forced to match, in some degree, his appeal to our least decent impulses. His constitutional position frees him, whenever he wills, from the restraints of party and group ties. His constitutional immunities and his senatorial privilege of debate and committee membership permit him to assert, in such manner as to catch the headlines, any crime against anyone, and to do it day after day and month after month so long as he stays within the confines of his office. Any clever and callous senator can repeat McCarthy's performance in America in any time of great social anxiety, and such times may afflict us for the indefinite future. The only institutional check invented in democracies which can curb or minimize McCarthyism, a disease whose virus lies latent in all nationalistic societies, is that of full-fledged party responsibility. Handicapped by our constitutionally-induced separation and diffusion of power the brave steps taken toward responsible party government are still too short to reach the desired goal.

As we face the kaleidescope of civic choices which will constantly unroll before us, the quality of our decisions as voters and pressure group members and therefore of the collective civic judgment, hinges upon the quality of the discusion of public questions. The key roll, for most citizens, in this educative process, is played by *political* leaders. Issues will be imposed by events beyond any man's control. But the formulation and popularization of attitudes toward them and the wide dissemination of information about them are *major* functions of political leadership. But when the wills of political leaders are paralyzed and their

judgment corrupted by the mass hysterias which a single headline-hunting or radio-trumpeting demagogue can evoke, time is overdue to look from symptoms to causes. In that search the members of this Association carry the highest moral obligation.

Thus far our collectively-sponsored efforts have been of slight avail, partly because they have concentrated on institutional maladjustments and political practices, which are only the symptoms of more basic constitutional faults. Nor do I think that we have sought to discover, in the most likely comparative experiences, clues from other democratic systems which might provide the imaginative stimuli for adaptations within our own political and constitutional culture. We have particularly neglected, in our research, the constitutional and political experiences of the Canadian and Australian federal systems, though Louise Overacker, in her recent study of Australian federal parties, has revealed much new data which with further exploration might be of great assistance in such a quest.

I would emphasize especially the great potential value of comparative studies of Canada and the United States. We have but one thin comparative work reviewing, as entities, the Canadian and the American political systems, done over 30 years ago and chiefly from the standpoint of the constitutional lawyer. Yet in Canada are some of the most striking social and political parallels to our own society and experiences, even while there is much sharp contrast in basic constitutional arrangements. In the argument about possible parliamentary models for the United States, Great Britain is usually discounted because of its great social differences—its population homogeneity, its compactness, its absence of frontier influences, its inherited class distinctions, its mature labor movement, and its unitary character. But in Canada, outside of Quebec, social characteristics and culture closely resemble our own. Even the Quebec French Catholic culture group affords a political parallel since it, like our South, has developed a seemingly permanent attachment to only one of the major parties in national politics. From our borders came not only the early English-speaking settlers in Nova Scotia and Ontario, but a steady stream of settlers to the prairie provinces and the timbered slopes of the British Columbia mountains. Within the Dominion's continental domain are vast sectional differences with great variations in resources, sharp differences in climate, attitudes, and ways of life. Theirs also has been a history of conquering a wilderness, of seizing nature by the throat and possessing it with a similar disregard for strict legality and public ethics. Their task of creating a nation out of so much diversity and over so vast an area by means of a federal system of government has been a much more diffi-

cult one than ours, even making additional allowance for a start later by three-quarters of a century. Canadian social structure, and the tasks and problems of its government—making due allowance for differences of size, power, and world influence—closely resemble those of our own nation. Here is a situation seemingly made to order to test, so far as this term has any validity when applied to operating constitutional systems, the political and social consequences of a parliamentary federal system in comparison with our own presidential-congressional one.

Some surface indications stand out like gold nuggets as incitations to systematic exploration. Canadian political parties, for example, show many of the traits in nature and functioning to which we are accustomed in our own federal system. Thus, as the 19th century wore to a close, the differences in doctrine, as well as practice, between the Conservatives and the Liberals became as slight as between Republicans and Democrats. These similarities have continued. Yet party discipline in the Canadian Parliament has been even tighter than in Britain. When policy is set by the Prime Minister and his cabinet, his party in the Commons back him with their votes. The social explanation for the lack of sharp divergence between parties which we have come to accept in the United States holds also in Canada. Yet most of the key practices of parties in the processes of government differ fundamentally. Why is this so? We need far more careful *comparative* analysis even though much has recently been revealed by the scholarship of our Canadian colleagues—Brady, Corry, Dawson, Clokie, and Ward. If social structure is the primary determinant of political behavior, how did it happen that in Canada during the last world war the control of prices, particularly agricultural prices, was so much more successful than in the United States? Canada has a greater proportion of rural to urban voters than do we. How came it that Canada, with an economy bound to ours, handled her postwar inflation much more successfully than we did ours? Were there significant differences in the ways of mediating between group pressures in Canada, and were they related to differences in constitutional practice?

A third item suggestive of difference in political behavior induced by constitutional structure is the absence in Canada of our penchant for seeking professional military men as candidates for the highest posts in civilian leadership. Why do they escape this danger to civilian domination of public policy while we, almost alone of all the mature democracies, are continually confronted by its possibility? And finally, how account for the relative absence in Canada of that fearful, vindictive search for scapegoats on whom to vent disappointments over the errors, real and imagined, of national leaders in the late war and the fail-

ure to win an abiding peace and forestall the spread of communism?

I raise these queries as prima facie evidence, which careful comparative research might verify or disprove, that constitutional differences do produce differences of large importance in the political behavior of a people. I suspect that the relationships are often indirect, compounded of diverse habits in public expectations as well as the practices of specific political institutions. I believe that careful comparative analysis of Canadian and American politics would be valuable, not because we might be induced to "buy the Canadian model," but for the clues which might be forthcoming in devising modifications for our own constitutional system.

I think we urgently need also some intensive psychological-political studies of the tendencies inhering in the presidential office (surrounded as it is with its contradictory elements of independence and congressional check-mate), and of the leadership behavior of men holding this great office in crisis times. Why, for example, did Woodrow Wilson, whose lifetime of study of the American government gave him unrivalled knowledge of its history and structure, whose conceptions of presidential leadership were untainted by depreciation, fail so completely and at such tragic cost in the winning of the peace? Did the constitutional position of the presidency amplify his personal inclination to self-sufficiency? Did the separation of powers enhance the irreconcilability and irresponsibility of the senatorial opposition, while at the same time inflating the stubborn ego of the President? Did elements of constitutional structure exacerbate unsuitable traits of character on both sides of the contest in this whole tragic episode? Is the process of presidential colleague-ship and of advice-taking affected significantly by constitutionally-induced impulses or handicaps? Is there something in the nominating and election processes for this greatest office which tends to mistake personal eminence for great talents of political leadership? Behavior studies of the presidency should be matched by comparable analysis of the "Prime Ministers and Company"—Borden and Bennett, Laurier and King, Churchill and Atlee, and their ministerial associates. If we carefully combed the biographical literature of these men and their associates in politics we might discover whether the political relationships induced or impeded by constitutional structure and practice showed particular tendencies affecting (1) the quality of their training for political leadership or (2) the effectiveness with which leadership was expressed in reaching decisions, in educating the public, and in persuading the constitutional organs which express the national will. How do the differences in organizing and institutionalizing leadership of the opposition affect presidents vis-à-vis prime ministers? We

have numerous glib generalizations in the texts, but what does the process of interaction look like when examined in detail and what does it seem to produce in political behavior tendencies? Does it permit the correction of error by informed, cogent criticism or do decisions win acquiescence through default of responsible opposition leadership? These are a few of the questions upon which we need much more light before we may unseat hunch and intuition as determinants of some of the most important judgments about constitutional systems of government.

I find myself in 1955 still believing that constitutional structure is important in the democratic government of men, but less sure than in 1910 about how that importance will manifest itself. I am very much less sanguine about the free interchangeability of comparative institutions among peoples, even within the area of our Western culture. Despite the great improvements in the American constitutional scheme I am, at best, agnostic about Professor Anderson's eloquent statement of conviction. But to argue this has not been my purpose. Whatever its degree of perfection, it seems clear to me that our system should be markedly improved.

I believe that our own Association should authorize the creation of a committee and free it, despite the prospect of ensuing controversy, to explore carefully the character of such piecemeal amendments to our constitution as might adapt it more certainly to the tasks and needs which press upon us. Could a "package" of amendments and statutory changes be devised which would provide greater promise of responsible teamwork in the great decisions of public policy, and their fulfillment, than our institutions and practices now afford? What traditional attitudes and expectations of the electorate must also be replaced or modified if such legal and institutional revisions should succeed?

In closing, let me confess that to have watched the processes of government in the half-century since my youth, has wiped away a good many adolescent illusions about the ease and certainty of human self-mastery. It may be that all the constitutional contrivances mankind might invent will be of no avail in the effort to achieve peace and well-being for the human race—that man's modicum of rationality, wisdom, and self-control may not suffice. But that dire possibility does not foreclose the opportunity for victory. It should not palsy our effort to expand the role of reason, humane feeling, and collective self-control for these transcendent purposes. We, of all professions, have the greatest moral obligation to continue the unswerving enlistment of our minds and hearts in this grand enterprise.

PRESIDENCY AND LEGISLATION: PLANNING THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM

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Early in 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented to the Congress—and the country and his party—some 65 proposals for new legislation, over and above appropriations.[1] This presentation was a massive affair. First came six weeks of well-publicized preliminaries: cabinet deliberations, congressional briefings, press conferences, and a fireside chat. Then, in three annual messages to Congress—a State of the Union Address, a Budget Message, and an Economic Report—the President set forth his bundle of proposals, elaborating certain aspects, outlining the rest. Along with these came seven supplementing special messages, each filling in details on some particular: Taft-Hartley, farm price supports, social security, health, housing, atomic energy, foreign aid, and trade. And following the messages Administration-approved bills, conveyors of the ultimate details, were introduced in Congress.

Throughout, one theme was emphasized: here was a comprehensive and coordinated inventory of the nation's current legislative needs, reflecting the President's own judgments, choices, and priorities in every major area of Federal action; in short, his "legislative program," an entity distinctive and defined, its coverage and its omissions, both, delimiting his stand across the board. And—quite explicitly—this stand was being taken, this program volunteered, in order to give Congress an agenda, Republicans a platform, and voters a yardstick for 1954.

Thus, one year after his inaugural, Eisenhower espoused a sweeping concept of the President's initiative in legislation and an elaborate mechanism for its

[1] The exact number of these Eisenhower proposals was computed differently by different observers depending on varying definitions of what constitutes a separate item. Thus Peter Edson cited the figure 110 (*Washington Daily News*, July 14, 1954), while Cabell Phillips wrote of "over 200" (*New York Times*, May 30, 1954), and *Congressional Quarterly* reported a total of 214, reached partly by counting separately each point in the Administration's agriculture recommendations.

The writer prefers to count separately only those proposals, or groups of related proposals, which would normally be enacted and/or considered in separate bills. Exceptions are made where—as in the case of public housing, for example—the conventions of publicity and politics very sharply differentiate items incorporated in the same bill. It is on this basis that internal Executive Office status reports on the President's program are now compiled and have been in the past. Note that the total of 65, cited above, excludes not only appropriation requests, as is the general custom, but also international treaties and conventions subject to Senate ratification and those few agency proposals not called for in a presidential message but cleared in bill draft form by Budget as "in accord with the President's program" (which under present practice means *specifically* approved by the White House for addition to his program list). Both of these latter categories *are* included in Executive Office status reports which now circulate on the Hill and therefore may have been the basis for some press compilations.

public expression; developments which no one seemed to take amiss. Both in governmental circles and in the press, the whole performance was regarded almost as a matter of course, a normal White House response to the opening of Congress. The pattern, after all, was quite familiar; the comprehensive program expressed in ordered sequence, with some sort of publicized preliminaries and detailed follow-up, had been an annual enterprise in Truman's time. Indeed, while Eisenhower had undoubtedly improved upon the earlier mechanics, his 1954 procedure seemed expressive less of innovation than of reversion to accustomed practice. In 1953, he had been criticized in many quarters for failing to produce a defined program of this kind; now that "failure" was made good, a general expectation satisfied in the "customary" way.

Customary, perhaps; yet as recently as 1946 an informed observer had remarked, accurately enough, on the "absence of cohesion in the legislative program of the chief executive—absence, in fact, of a program clearly designated as such."[2] Presidential reports and recommendations to Congress were as old as the Constitution; presidential sponsorship of specific measures, highlighted in special messages and spelled out in Administration bills, had been a commonplace in Franklin Roosevelt's time and by no means unknown much earlier. But the elaborate paraphernalia of a comprehensive and specific inventory, contents settled and defined as regards substance no less than finance, *presented in detailed fashion and packaged form at the opening of each session of Congress*—this was a "custom" scarcely nine years old, a postwar phenomenon evolving under Truman and now carried forward under Eisenhower.[3]

Here is an institutional development of no mean proportions, with a great preparatory effort obviously involved in advance of every session. Three questions are suggested: First, currently, what are the mechanics of this program preparation; how is the job done and by whom? Second, historically, what gave rise to such institutionalization in the postwar decade; how did it evolve and how did it survive the change of Administration? Third, prospectively—and speculatively—what may the whole development imply regarding powers, opportunities, of President and presidency in the legislative process? This

[2] V. O. Key, "Legislative Control," in F. Morstein Marx, *Elements of Public Administration* (New York, 1946), p. 351. Lest semantic difficulties arise, note that the term presidential "program" as used throughout this paper connotes the comprehensiveness, specificity, and defined boundaries characteristic of contemporary annual presentations in the legislative sphere. This is the current connotation of the term within the government (and quite generally in press reports). As such, this is a term of art, to be distinguished from the looser usage long employed by scholars, journalists—and Presidents themselves—to cover legislative issues with which particular Presidents somehow became identified, pro or con. In the latter sense, of course, there have been presidential "programs" since Washington's time, notably under the "strong" Presidents.

[3] Note that the Eisenhower program presentation of early 1955 to the first session of the 84th Congress followed the pattern of 1954, despite the change in party control of Congress. During January and February, 1955, three annual and nine special messages, all interlocking, conveyed a defined, comprehensive, relatively integrated legislative program from President to Congress, buttressed in most instances by specific Administration bills. The message on Formosa, January 25, was, of course, a thing apart.

paper attempts answers to these questions; its starting point is the making of the Eisenhower program of 1954.

I. PREPARING THE EISENHOWER PROGRAM OF 1954

"The presentation of a legislative program," wrote Truman in his farewell message to the Congress, "falls properly to my successor, not to me . . . and I would not infringe upon his responsibility to chart the forward course."[4] This was easier said by the outgoing President than done by the incoming, with his first Congress already in session (courtesy the Twentieth Amendment). In 1953, for the first time in years, there was no "legislative program," no charting of the course in the specific sense conveyed by Truman's words and prior practice.

At the outset, Eisenhower did present to Congress his own report on the State of the Union, but he chose throughout that address to keep most of his legislative references general to the point of homily.[5] The new regime, while reducing appropriations requests—as in the case of the Air Force—forebore to present a complete new budget document and message; while revising some economic policies—as in the case of credit and controls—it attempted no new Economic Report. During the spring of 1953, a number of Administration stands on legislation were developed and expressed, piecemeal, in special messages or bills, or both. But for the most part these encompassed only inescapable necessities—like foreign aid, taxation, reciprocal trade—where scheduled expirations of authority forced the presidential hand. More characteristic were the surveys, investigations, and study groups brought forward by the President or his subordinates in lieu of action recommendations on numbers of great issues, foreign and domestic.[6]

What accounts for this lack of firm programming in the congressional session of 1953? Wherefore the failure to exploit, in action terms, the President's election victory at this, his surest time of legislative honeymoon? Ultimate explanations wait, of course, on the historians. Meanwhile, two tentative answers, superficially opposed, may be suggested here. On the one hand, note the circumstances of the new regime's accession to its seats of power in the White House and the great departments—and the Republican party. Looking back on early 1953, a White House aide remarked in private conversation:

We were prepared before inauguration only for the budget [cutting] drive and some exec-

[4] State of the Union Message, Jan. 7, 1953. This principle was followed also in the 1953 Economic Report and Budget Message (conveying the fiscal 1954 budget), which Truman submitted to Congress just before leaving office. With minor exceptions, these two messages carried no recommendations for new legislation.

[5] Address of Feb. 2, 1953.

[6] No less than 14 such surveys, undertaken with either executive or congressional authorization, were listed as matters of direct presidential concern and sponsorship in a special appendix to the authoritative Executive Office report on the status of "presidential measures at the close of the first session of the 83rd Congress." Bureau of the Budget, Office of Legislative Reference, "Legislative Status of Recommendations of the President, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (excluding Appropriation Requests)," Final Report, Aug. 8, 1953.

utive reorganization, especially in the military. It would have been impossible to plunge into a full program the first session [of the 83rd Congress]. The Cabinet people had to learn their way around and get settled in . . . the staff here had to learn the issues . . . and a lot of these things go back to the year one. . . . And the President had to lay a groundwork of personal acquaintance and persuasion on the Hill. Our people up there expected him either to push them around or lie down and be walked on. Neither one! Instead, he has made every effort to reach out, get to know, seek personal contact. . . . [7]

In these terms, program gaps become by-products of the "newness" of the Eisenhower "team"; an explanation reinforced when one recalls the time squeeze of the Twentieth Amendment together with such matters as the learning problems of a Charles E. Wilson, say, or the predominance of Taft men among the Republicans in Congress—or, for that matter, the preeminence of Senate leader Taft himself. Of course, this implies that a full-scale program presentation was consciously intended from the start, then deliberately—indeed necessarily—postponed in 1953, while education and persuasion had their day. "We always meant to have a program," said this same White House aide, "but these other things came first."

On the other hand, no such symmetry of purpose and postponement was publicly avowed in 1953; nor easily to be read into any signs and portents then emanating from the White House. Quite the contrary; this was the time when numbers of old Washington hands of both political persuasions in press corps, Congress, and the agencies explained the lack of program in terms of a fixed presidential policy stemming from some basic attitudes attributed to Eisenhower: a distaste for his predecessor's overt—and combative—exercise of the initiative in legislating; a feeling that to Congress, not the President, belonged the overt lead; an impulse to break sharply with the past by demonstrating presidential adherence to "proper" principles of "balance" between branches (or at least between the Republican President and "Mr. Republican" in the Senate leadership). These—or something like them—may, in fact, have been the President's own fixed beliefs; alternatively, their dissemination in that guise may have been engineered deliberately as an aid to "persuasion." Conviction or gambit or a blend of both—one cannot know from the outside.

But whatever Eisenhower's personal position, there seems no doubt that certain members of his entourage were then distinctly predisposed against a comprehensive program presentation along anything like Truman's lines. "We always meant to have a program," appears a considerable overstatement, at least if "we" refers to the whole White House entourage in 1953. Conciliating Congress was the order of the day; by some, apparently, this was interpreted as *not* doing whatever Truman might have done. Moreover, some of the new White House aides appear to have been seriously concerned about the constitutional proprieties; others disturbed about the range of Democratic interven-

[7] A comment made to the writer in the spring of 1954 during one of a number of interviews with members of the White House and Budget Bureau staffs, and with certain agency and congressional officials and Washington reporters. These interviews were conducted in March and May, 1953 and in April and December, 1954. The information presented in this section is drawn principally from those sources. Judgments and interpretations are, of course, the writer's own.

tion in domestic spheres; still others doubtful of the need for further emphasis on lawmaking, *per se*. Such attitudes as these add up to general bearishness toward widespread volunteering of firm presidential stands on current or prospective legislation—especially when controversial. "Let Congress struggle with it; keep us out." Here was, reportedly, an often-sounded White House theme through most of the first session of the 83rd Congress.[5]

Yet scarcely five months after that session's close, there came the Eisenhower legislative program of 1954. Whether as an outcome of deliberate plans, or of changed attitudes, or both, this represents a distinct alteration in approach from one session of Congress to the next. How did it come to pass? How was the newness tempered, the bearishness reduced, the program put together?

In May, 1953, the Bureau of the Budget sent to the multilith machines—in preparation for June 30 distribution—its annual call for estimates from Federal agencies, in this case for fiscal 1955. Included in that document as an instruction to each agency was Section 86, entitled "Legislative Program":

> A statement will be submitted [by September 15] describing the preliminary legislative program of the agency for the forthcoming session of Congress. This statement should include *all* items of legislation [other than appropriations] which the agency contemplates proposing during the ensuing twelve months. . . .
>
> The statement should be in three parts:
>
> 1. Those items in the President's legislative program which have not yet been enacted . . . limited to proposals . . . specifically identified by the President as a part of his program, or specifically held [by Budget through central clearance] to be "in accord with the program of the President."
> 2. Legislative proposals not included in part 1 . . . which would cause no increase in budgeting requirements.
> 3. Legislative proposals not included in part 1 . . . which would cause an increase in budgeting requirements . . . arranged to reflect relative priority among items on the list and also . . . with respect to other portions of the budget. . . .

[5] It is important to understand that in terms both of backgrounds and of ideologies, the aides whom Eisenhower brought into the White House—and has retained—were a rather heterogeneous group. On the legislative policy and liaison side, they included mainly: Adams, the Assistant to the President, an Eisenhower-before-Chicago man, former governor of New Hampshire and one-term Republican congressman; Shanley, the original special counsel, a New Jersey lawyer and former Stassen campaign manager; Rabb, the present Cabinet Secretary, for years ex-Senator Lodge's legislative aide; Hauge, the "economic" Administrative Assistant, a Harvard-trained economist and McGraw-Hill editor; Persons, the chief congressional liaison officer, an army careerist and long-time head of Army's legislative liaison (highly regarded as such, by the congressional oligarchs of both parties with whom it had been his job to smooth Army's path); and Persons' three original assistants—Morgan, a Washington lawyer, former Taft consultant, and long-time member of the House Office of Legislative Counsel; Harlow, former staff member of the House Armed Services Committee; and Gruenther, the General's brother, Senator Wherry's former secretary. For purposes of the 1954 legislative program, there should be added to this list the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Arthur M. Burns, Columbia economist at the time of his initial appointment to the Eisenhower entourage; also Robert Cutler, then Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Chairman of the NSC Planning Board, a Boston banker and one-time CIA representative on the Planning Board's precursor, the Truman-era Senior Staff; finally, I. Jack Martin, Senator Taft's former assistant, who joined the Persons group after Taft's death.

With respect to each item of proposed legislation, this statement should set forth (1) the subject matter . . . together with a summary statement of the objectives . . . and the need . . . (2) the state of readiness of legislative drafts and other supporting material; (3) a reference to the numbers of pertinent bills and . . . reports [in recent sessions] . . . together with a brief appraisal . . . (4) a forecast of both the appropriations and the expenditures required . . . and (5) the names of other [interested] departments and agencies. . . .[9]

This language was identical with that included in the 1952 call for estimates issued a year earlier before the close of Truman's term. Indeed, section 86 and its requirements had been a feature of each Budget call since 1949. Their renewal in 1953 marks not an Eisenhower innovation but a bureaucratic continuum, an attempted restoration of routines, an action taken on the Budget's own initiative without advance assurance as to either agency response or ultimate White House reaction.

This was a venture with no guarantees attached; it was, however, something more than a leap in the dark. The Budget Bureau's renewal of section 86 was powerfully reinforced by two other acts of initiative, one preceding, one following preparation of the new call for estimates.

The first of these involved the agencies. As early as January, 1953, the new Budget Director, Joseph M. Dodge, had corralled cabinet colleagues, one by one, for orientation briefings by his career aids. In a number of cases these sessions were held even before Inauguration Day, providing several cabinet members-designate their first glimpse from inside into the complexities of their new assignments. And at each briefing Budget staffers took occasion, with Dodge's assent, to inform the department head about "his" legislative program (compiled the preceding fall), its existence in form and fact, its usefulness for orientation, its potential for planning and control, its liability to renewal on Budget's call.[10]

Thereby, a piece of left-over machinery idling in the departmental depths was impressed on the consciousness of new department heads at a uniquely favorable moment. This had its due effect; by late summer 1953, when lower-level bureaucrats began preparing agency responses to Budget's new call, their

[9] Budget Circular A-11, "Instructions for the Preparation and Submission of Annual Budget Estimates," June 30, 1953, Sec. 86. This section also called for an indication of the "nature and status" of legislative items under discussion but not yet in firm program stage and for a report on all provisions of law "of interest to the agency" scheduled for expiration in the coming year. Note that this section has remained a feature of the Budget's calls for estimates in 1954 and 1955.

[10] An earlier article has noted the importance of Dodge's personal role in carrying the Budget Bureau's legislative staff work through the 1953 transition from the old to the new regime. Here is another demonstration of the point. Given the White House attitudes outlined above, Dodge might well have chosen to let cabinet officers discover for themselves and make what they chose of legislative programs inherited from their predecessors. Instead he chose to impress legislative clearance regulations generally, and legislative programs in particular, upon the new department heads at this first advantageous opportunity. See Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance," this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 641–71, at pp. 655–56 (Sept., 1954).

top superiors, in almost every case, were reasonably well acquainted with the departmental "program," quite acclimated to its presence as a fact of departmental life, and quite prepared to oversee its renovation and renewal in advance of 1954.

Meanwhile the Budget had taken a further act of initiative, this time involving the White House. Early in July, 1953 President Eisenhower had voiced some concern about means to bring together, well in advance, data and suggestions for his January, 1954 State of the Union message. Budget aids were asked to brief him on his predecessor's practice; they took the opportunity to urge some White House recognition for the programming requirement in Section 86 of the new call for estimates. In Truman's time it had been customary for the President to write each agency in early autumn, requesting message data and, at the same time, reiterating over his own signature the main terms of section 86. Message and program requests had long been joined; that was made clear to the new President.

The result was an identical letter to each cabinet officer over Eisenhower's signature and bearing signs of his own dictation. Dated July 30, 1953—a month after formal issuance of Budget's call—the letters asked for substantive ideas appropriate to the State of the Union Message, these ideas to be based on a "thorough rethinking of the mission of your department and the . . . means to achieve it." And, quite explicitly, that review was to "complement attention you are giving the 1955 budget and the formulation of a carefully planned, specific legislative program."[11]

If there were any doubts remaining at top departmental levels about the propriety—and the priority—of Budget's legislative call, this missive from the President appears to have resolved them. By mid-September, 1953, agency legislative programs were flowing to the Budget. By early October, departmental message memoranda were en route to the White House, many of them referencing or appending these programs to concretize suggested points of emphasis. The President had called for a "thorough rethinking." Here, in this double-barrelled presentation, was the visible response.

Cumulatively, it was an astonishing response, at least to those White House staffers disinclined toward executive initiatives in legislation. For here were departmental declarations of intent to sponsor literally hundreds of measures

[11] Reportedly the first draft of these letters was written largely by the President himself, at his volition, as a personal adaptation and improvement in his terms of the prior procedure on which he had been briefed by Budget. The mechanism of formal letters and their referencing of budget and legislative programs seem to have been direct outgrowths of that briefing. On the other hand, the call for a "thorough rethinking" appears to reflect Eisenhower's personal views on a paramount duty of his Administration, a duty stated in most unbureaucratic language in the opening paragraph (not quoted above). That opening language designedly lent a personal flavor to the whole proceeding, a flavor emphasized by subsequent presidential references in cabinet meetings. Note that non-cabinet agencies were approached in a briefer, much less personal vein, receiving requests over Sherman Adams' signature, dated July 31, 1953, for any "ideas appropriate for the State of the Union message."

great and small, *most of which the President was being asked to make his own by personal endorsement in a message*. And among these were dozens of proposals, espoused now by one or another of Eisenhower's own department heads, closely resembling—in general purpose, if not always precise form—predecessor measures urged in Truman's time and bearing then a Fair Deal label: an expansion of social security, an increased minimum wage, a revision of immigration laws, a broadening of unemployment compensation, and many more. Mostly these represented improvements in going programs long advocated by career administrators (and their clientele) to modernize or clarify the application of public policies in their charge. Agency legislative programs in 1953 were not sheer replicas of those in 1952 and earlier—some items were stricken, others added, still others revised—but their content makes plain that mixed with the rethinking from on high was a good deal of educating from below.

For eight years past—save only 1953—there had been a presidential charting of the course in Truman's terms: an executive inventory of specifics (agenda and yardstick both) for action by the Congress. Now, in October, 1953, these agency submissions forecast that some such executive charting would be done in 1954—if not by Eisenhower comprehensively, then by his cabinet members piecemeal; if not in his name, then in theirs. At his own invitation they had defined their ambitions, drawn their plans, and these now turned out to encompass controversial innovations of national concern, inextricably involving the President's position and prestige. Were he therefore to influence scope, scale, priorities, and presentation, he needs must act upon their requests for endorsement, thereby asserting his own role in program-making, *his* plans, *his* charting of the course as against theirs.

The implications were not lost for long upon the presidential staff.

Within the Budget Bureau—whose initiatives had helped bring matters to this pass—the disposition was to move no further without guidance from the White House. During October and November, 1953 Dodge forebore to channel departmental legislative programs into the main stream of estimates review. Instead the budgeteers concentrated upon going operations, leaving proposed legislation in the air for last-minute juggling independently of the balance of the budget. This was precisely what section 86's call for agency programs purported to avert, but Dodge displayed no interest in asserting *for the budget process* title to the task of reconciling the regime's first-session legislative stance with the logic of the situation these created. Having made certain that the issues would be posed, he was content to let others take first crack at them—this, anyway, under the special circumstances of 1953.

Within the White House, on the other hand, there was no escaping action upon agency submissions. By mid-October it was generally conceded that whatever major issues they might raise would have to be acknowledged in some form or fashion—negatively, at the very least—by or before Eisenhower's annual messages. This necessitated first of all a close look at the contents of the pile well in advance of message preparation. And by early November, such examination was preoccupying half the members of the White House entourage.

Their initial "look-see" became a rather elaborate affair. Under the aegis of the Assistant to the President, Sherman Adams, with his deputy, Wilfred E. Persons, and the then Special Counsel, Bernard M. Shanley, actively in charge,[12] anywhere from six to ten members of the entourage—depending on subject-matter—joined in an item-by-item review around the conference table; over a two-week period this involved some 12 meetings of two to three hours apiece.[13]

At the outset, the purpose of that exercise was educational. Every White House aide with any role to play in policies or tactics on the legislative side had a stake in developing the staff's position upon agency particulars; hence the collaborative conference approach. But up to that time none but Shanley had been exposed to the substantive aspects of anything like the range of measures reached by agency programs—the result, in his case, of nine months' contact with the Budget's legislative clearance work, especially on enrolled bills[14]—and now he and his colleagues faced a welter of substantive needs and remedies presented by the agencies, with antecedents tracing back, in the already quoted phrase, "to the year one." In consequence, these conferences assumed the aspect of a cram course on the issues, a guided tour through the past histories of agency proposals.

The guide in this case was Roger W. Jones, career chief of the Budget Bureau's Office of Legislative Reference, control center for legislative clearance. Jones took as his text a checklist of almost 300 "major" proposals, culled mostly from agency programs, and these were systematically reviewed in subject-matter groupings as staff sessions proceeded.[15] In each case it became Jones' role to sketch pre-history and pros and cons, both substantive and tactical, in "institutional" terms, leaving policy judgments and partisan aspects for his hearers to argue out among themselves. "There came about," he later recalled, "almost a fierce dedication [on the part of White House staff] to keeping me in the role of telling both sides of the story." Given the staff's spread of interests and attitudes, some of those stories sparked a great deal of question-raising and discussion. That the process was educative, there seems to be no doubt.

This seminar approach tended to generate its own next steps. As key problem

[12] General Persons had originally been appointed Special Assistant to the President for legislative liaison rather than Adams' general deputy, a change in designation (and to some extent in role) which took effect after the close of the first session of the 83rd Congress. Early in 1955 Shanley left the post of Special Counsel to become Appointments Secretary and was succeeded by Gerald Morgan, one of Persons' original assistants.

[13] Participants were drawn mostly from among the staff members listed in note 8, above. Hauge and Burns, for example, attended all sessions involving matters of "economic" significance, which included virtually everything in the social welfare field.

[14] See Neustadt, *op. cit.*, pp. 666–67.

[15] Agency legislative programs, message suggestions, and lists of expiring legislation, supplemented by Jones' informed guess-work, provided the field from which items were selected for this list. See "Checklist of Major Proposals for the 93rd Congress, 2nd Session," Bureau of the Budget, Office of Legislative Reference, Nov. 1, 1953.

areas emerged from the discussion, particular aides took up *ad hoc* assignments to dig deeper and report: checking Jones' version of the facts, sounding departmental attitudes and conflicts, judging congressional and "outside" opinion, and generally feeling out what open issues—substantive, or tactical, or sheer mechanical—remained for resolution in each case. These preliminary inquiries were not confined exclusively to items in agency programs or on Jones' list. Several matters raised within the White House were researched in this fashion at this point. (Some of them ultimately found their way into the President's January program, *e.g.*, voting at eighteen, and loss of citizenship for Smith Act violators.)

In terms of the advices thus obtained, the White House staff group turned next to determining by what means necessary steps toward resolution should be taken. At this stage there was a good deal of checking with the President. As a result, certain proposals simply dropped out of sight, at least for 1954; others were assigned to staff members for handling with the agencies and ultimate informal presentation to the President; still others were allotted to the Budget for handling and presentation alongside departmental estimates; finally, a number of complex and controversial measures, high in policy and partisan significance—among them social security, taxation, agricultural assistance, foreign aid—were earmarked for formal presentation to the cabinet (or alternatively, the National Security Council) by the sponsoring department head.

These cabinet presentations—which grew in number as the first experiments succeeded—were a striking feature of the preparatory effort on the 1954 program. Procedurally, they ran about as follows: first, each cabinet officer concerned was asked to ready a comprehensive visual presentation explaining and justifying his proposals in detail. Next, this presentation was tried out before the White House staff group (Jones still included), these "dry-runs" giving staff an opening for criticism or advice on both substance and presentation-technique. Finally, when the staff was relatively satisfied—and the President briefed accordingly—a full cabinet session was convened, the formal presentation made, discussion held, and general concurrence invited. (It was forthcoming in each case, accompanied sometimes by alterations of detail.) All told, there were some seven such full-scale presentations in the last week of November and the first two weeks of December, led off by what staff aides termed a "magnificent performance" in the social security field.[16] On each occasion Eisenhower was in the chair, not merely presiding, but actively participating; his questions, suggestions, and advice sparked most of the changes made.

This formalized proceeding had been improvised by President and staff, perhaps less out of abstract deference to the cabinet, *per se*, than as a concrete response to immediate felt needs arising in the course of program review. By this means it was hoped to check and test not alone substance, but also the sell-

[16] Note that the Cabinet Secretary's present duties of agenda preparation, decision minuting, and follow-up first took contemporary form as an outgrowth of these presentations.

ing-power of proposals and the status of their packaging for sale, each presentation being taken as a test of departmental readiness to go up on the Hill in what for many cabinet members would be their first full-scale approach to a legislative committee. By this means it was hoped as well to gain commitments at the cabinet table on which Budget could base effective interagency coordination of actual bill drafts and testimony; hoped, also, that the formal circumstances of their giving would help to keep commitments green in cabinet memories through the spring; hoped, finally, that exposure to each other's plans and problems would combat members' tendencies toward "parochial" views.

Education was the order of the day. And as an educative venture, in these several respects, this cabinet mechanism proved a handy instrument, producing results satisfying, on the whole, to its initial sponsors. "We never could have got as many things done half as well, in any other way," remarked a White House aide, " . . . those cabinet members put a lot of effort into this and it paid off. Besides they were floored by each other's presentations . . . and also by the chief's own grasp, and interventions, and ideas. . . . The whole effect was very good." Of course, one's needs and circumstances change with time. This venture was conceived and carried out by a new regime facing its first annual message season. A year later preparation of the 1955 program was marked by rather less wide-ranging cabinet consultation.

In the course of these various proceedings late in 1953—staff reviews, presidential briefings, cabinet presentations, and attendant negotiations—the White House grew increasingly committed to an Eisenhower legislative program, the more so as its practicable scope and character came clear. By the end of November there was no longer any question that a program would ensue, or that it should appear in annual messages, or that it should be at once comprehensive and concrete. Amidst the concentration on specifics, these things came to be taken for granted. In part, this is attributable to the sheer momentum of those staff and agency proceedings once started on their way. In part, it seems related to the intra-party power struggle in which Senator McCarthy had engaged with increasing directness since the death of Senator Taft the preceding summer. On December 2 and on December 16 the President at press conference took pains to assert that his own forthcoming program, *not* McCarthy's chosen issue, would measure Republican performance in the election year of 1954; this hard upon the Senator's press statements to the contrary.[17] The presidential program, once, perhaps, a questionable undertaking or a necessary chore, was now become a prime political imperative, its relative readiness a godsend, one expects, to the regime.

In this context, the work of program preparation was carried toward completion through the last weeks of December, traditional peak-period of message season. With some significant exceptions, most substantive decisions had been taken by the middle of that month. But other tasks were still far from com-

[17] For the Eisenhower and McCarthy comments, respectively, see *New York Times*, Dec. 3, Dec. 17, and Nov. 25, 1953.

plete: transforming the decisions into messages and bills, and "warming up the customers" before their presentation. These tasks now took the center of the stage.

On December 17, 18, and 19, 1953, Eisenhower formally unveiled his program to the Republican congressional leadership, in an unprecedented series of carefully staged briefings at the White House. With the President presiding, these ran a full eight hours daily, covering a subject-matter agenda fixed in advance and rigidly enforced from the chair. The Vice-President, the Speaker, the Majority Leaders, and the Whips were in attendance at all times, as were most members of the cabinet and the White House entourage. Committee chairmen and their ranking (Republican) associates participated when their subjects were discussed, arriving and departing on a pre-determined schedule; so did a number of executive officials below cabinet rank. In deference to Eisenhower's own communiques, issued each afternoon, and honoring his personal request, those moving in and out avoided detailed comment to the press; thereby, the White House got ideal publicity in presidential terms—headlines about Eisenhower and his program but no scoops on particulars.

The briefings themselves followed a set form. Typically, as a subject was reached, the President would open with some appropriate remarks, then call on the department head (or in some cases the staff member) most concerned; the latter responding with what was, in effect, a redo or refinement of his cabinet presentation (or equivalent), complete with visual aids. Everything was visual and oral; no written summaries, much less bill or message drafts, were passed around. Language, it was explained, remained in a preliminary stage, pending these consultations. During the presentation the President himself would interpose a running commentary; at its close he would invite reactions (not concurrence) from the leaders—equably calling time rather shortly, and passing on to the next subject.

In a few instances, the leaders expressed prompt and uniform concern about advancing a particular proposal at the coming session. When this occurred, the President was generally quick to accept their advice and strike the measure. (One senses that some of these may have been paraded for the purpose.) Mostly, however, the legislators looked and listened, with much to absorb, nothing to ratify, and little time for argument. This does not seem to have been inconsistent with the President's intent.

The White House did not ask that they approve. It hoped, however, that they would be impressed by what was set before them. A prime purpose of the whole affair was education, once again; this for good reason and, apparently, with good results. "Most of the people from the Hill were dazzled, very much enthused," reported an *executive* observer of these gatherings. "Some of them discovered things they hadn't known about the President . . . he was fast on his feet, and on top of the issues . . . very quick and very shrewd . . . a lot of people realized that for the first time. And then it turned out that his program had real substance and real saleability . . . something they could really use . . . packaged and ready . . . a very great attraction and they weren't prepared

for it . . . they were bowled over by it. . . . " Or, as a Democratic congressman remarked, "I wasn't there and I don't know, but [Speaker] Martin and [Majority Leader] Halleck came out and told the press they were behind the 'program' and would push it and they really must have meant that—just look at the record. . . . Certainly they got religion somewhere; maybe there."[18] Of course the chances for and profits from such formal education grew out of particulars of time and situation. A year later, Eisenhower's 1955 program was previewed for the leaders in much less elaborate fashion—consisting mainly of a presidential listing, on successive days, to the majority and minority leadership—partly, of course, because it was to go before a Democratic Congress; partly, perhaps, because its (prospective) main *new* features—aid to Asia, schools, and roads—were nowhere near "packaged and ready" by, much less before, the time Congress convened.[19]

Less than three weeks intervened between these leaders' meetings in December, 1953 and the President's State of the Union address to Congress; it was a busy season for the message drafters. In policy terms there was by this time little left to be decided, but the contents of the several messages remained to be coordinated, their relative scope and coverage fully defined, specific drafts agreed upon—or, indeed, written—and final language snarls worked out. In carrying these matters forward, actual drafting of the Budget Message was left largely to the Budget Bureau, the White House checking mainly general tone and precise wording of concrete proposals. Similarly, drafting of the Economic Report remained largely in the hands of the Economic Council chairman, himself a prime participant in earlier staff consultations. But for the psychologically most important annual message, the President's personally delivered State of the Union address, the drafting was from first to last a White House undertaking.

Initially, the work on that address was done by members of the Persons-Shanley staff group—utilizing agency submissions where they could—with Bryce Harlow, a "speech and message" Administrative Assistant, as rhetoric expert and editorial coordinator.[20] When it came to elaboration of particular proposals, a tentative division of responsibility had been planned in advance

[18] Another comment worth quotation came from a one-time Truman aide with long experience in matters legislative: "That conference with the leaders seems to have been a good show. Perhaps 'we' should have tried something like it. I wonder, though, if anyone could have gotten the comparable *Democrats* to sit still in the White House for three days."

[19] Regarding the 1955 program, Eisenhower met with the prospective minority (Republican) leadership December 13, 1954 and with the prospective majority (Democratic) leaders the next day. These meetings, relatively *pro forma* in character, followed by six weeks the mid-term elections of 1954.

[20] Harlow, a former House Military Affairs Committee aide, has functioned more recently as an additional Persons assistant on the legislative liaison side; his speech drafting and editorial duties, temporarily assumed in 1953, are now (1955) performed mainly by Eisenhower's biographer, Kevin McCann, another Administrative Assistant to the President and successor, in effect, to Emmett Hughes, of *Life* Magazine, who functioned in that capacity during the first six months of 1953.

between their product and the other annual messages, *e.g.*, taxes in the Economic Report, postal rates in the Budget Message. Even so, the first consolidated State of the Union draft was so crowded with specifics that it would have taken some three hours to deliver. In consequence, large portions were pulled out to form the first five of Eisenhower's 1954 special messages, his personal address becoming in the end a sort of preparatory note and table of contents for the supplementing documents to follow.[21]

Meanwhile, the departments concentrated on bill drafting in order that each definite proposal conveyed by these messages might be backed promptly by a detailed draft of legislation bearing an Administration label and ready for transmission (formally or not) to Congress. With most policies decided earlier and elsewhere, Jones in Budget's clearance office was enabled to ride herd on these drafts, their preparation, interagency coordination, presidential clearance, and transmission, his priorities keyed to the subject-matter emphasis of the successive messages as scheduled by the White House.[22]

Considering the number and diversity of documents involved, both messages and bills, the product of these last weeks' work was remarkably integrated: the messages reasonably consistent internally and with each other; their ambiguities mostly deliberate, not unconscious; their main affirmative proposals packaged in bill form, approved and ready-to-hand. That this was managed by a new regime to whose top echelons each operation was a new experience is tribute partly to the underlying bureaucratic structure and partly to the thoroughness of preliminary preparations—and sheer education—at staff and cabinet levels. In only one respect did final documents display a notable deficiency, or gap, in advance preparations: the logic of requests for legislation sometimes failed to jibe with that of budget estimates for going operations—on the one hand were proposed increments in present powers, and on the other budget cuts in present programs, *e.g.*, grants for hospital construction. The last weeks of December were not long enough, it seems, to synchronize in all respects the results of that separation between budget and legislative planning on which Dodge had determined, not without reason, the previous September.

[21] See State of the Union Address, January 7, 1954; Budget Message, January 21; Economic Report, January 28; also the special messages carved out of the early State of the Union compendium: Taft-Hartley and farm, January 11; social security, January 14; health, January 18; housing, January 25. Two other special messages, drafted somewhat later, completed the initial program presentation: atomic energy, February 17; foreign economic policy, March 30, this last including the substance of the Randall Committee's recommendations on tariff legislation, as well as the Administration's proposals for further foreign aid.

[22] Note one principal exception: Eisenhower's proposals for general tax reductions were not made the subject of a consolidated bill draft cleared by Budget and introduced in Congress prior to and as a basis for committee consideration. Instead, Treasury presented draft language, piecemeal, to the House Ways and Means Committee as a "technical drafting service" in elaboration of the President's proposals preparatory to the framing of a *committee* bill. This is the usual course with tax reductions as a matter of traditional committee preference (not so tax increases, where an Administration bill, as such, is usually very welcome at the start).

But if—with this exception—the documents conveying Eisenhower's program were consistent and coordinated, they were voluminous as well; if the program was coherent, it was also bulky and diffuse, devoid of single focus or outstanding theme. Among the many things proposed to be done, or not done, or held for study, none was so striking as to dominate the rest, while impacts of particular proposals were muffled by sheer numbers and diversity. And style of presentation did nothing to make up the lack; the messages were basically compendia, high in plain exposition, low in excitement.

Neither by content nor tone were documents like these well suited to the task of dramatizing for the country and his party the President's own personality and purposes. Yet if there was but little drama in the messages themselves, there was, perhaps, much to be gained by focussing attention on their presentation as a collectivity, seeking dramatic impact in the sheer fact of "program," aside from the nature or the statement of its parts. To this the White House—President and staff together, it appears—devoted a great deal of thought and care during December, 1953.

In the five weeks before the State of the Union address, there emanated from the White House a steady stream of press communiques and dope stories concerning the program's preparation. Specific plans were guarded rather carefully —the aim, no doubt, to generate suspense—but generalized official comments on the special cabinet sessions, and in particular the legislative leaders' meetings, were arranged and facilitated by the White House press office with all the fanfare usually reserved for first-rank international conferences.[23] After the conclusion of those meetings, December 19, the President removed to Georgia over Christmas, whence came almost daily stories of last-minute conferences on the impending messages with officials flown down from Washington. On January 4, 1954, all this was capped by a radio and television address to the nation, in which Eisenhower plugged his program and urged everyone's attention to its imminent unveiling. In dramatic appeal this discourse was scarcely an unqualified success; trying to reach the country in the evening hours without depriving Congress of its first crack at details, he avoided scooping his congressional address at the expense of over-generalizing. Nevertheless, the notion that something portentous impended, Eisenhower's own, received top billing once again in newscasts and the press.

On January 5, the President met minority legislative leaders at the White House for a courtesy preview of his recommendations; thereby the press got one last "program" story before the opening of Congress. Then on Thursday, January 7, came the President's State of the Union address to the Congress, another radio and television presentation, if at noon. There followed on three successive Mondays and Thursdays no less than seven of his supplementing messages, spaced for optimum press play and in a sequence obviously intended to strengthen the impression of a vast executive creation, highlight its most generally appealing features, blur the rest: Taft-Hartley and farm messages

[23] See especially the official White House communiques and participants' statements to the White House press corps during and after the three-day meeting with the Republican congressional leaders. *New York Times*, Dec. 18, 19, 20, 1953.

sent up at the same time on the same day (with a Korean defense treaty sent the Senate simultaneously); social security, health, and housing messages each featured in a separate package on a separate day; housekeeping and limited-interest requests buried by the dozen in the Budget Message; tax reduction dominant in the Economic Report.

All this elaborate staging for the 1954 program was in its way no less an educative effort than the cabinet and legislative leaders' presentations which had gone before. Like them it was improvised to meet the special needs and opportunities of the regime's first venture into legislative program-making; like them it was to be reduced in scale—of buildup, not of messages—the following year. All three were quite distinctly first-time undertakings, each aiming to inform and to convince a different audience of propositions which would hardly need such emphasis a second year: that Eisenhower had assumed a new degree of leadership in course-setting for Congress and his party, and that the course was to be, as he later termed it, "moderate progressivism," or "dynamic conservatism," its salient domestic feature a conservative consolidation of the human welfare side of the New Deal, *viz.*, 1954's social security, housing, and health proposals.

Whether by accident, accretion, or design, those propositions had emerged as something on the order of a presidential policy by the time White House staff got deep into reviewing agency programs. Subsequent cabinet sessions, leaders' meetings, press build-ups did not create a course of action but served rather to test, trim, "package," and persuade. And the fact that such processing was conceived to be necessary, indeed was actually employed, needs to be understood not merely as an outgrowth of prevailing notions on "efficiency" or "public relations," but as an attribute of the divided counsels, attitudes, traditions attendant on the first Republican Administration in 20 years, whose head —and the Republican party's head—had previously been a professional nonpartisan.

The presidential role anent Congress, cabinet, and party; the party's general posture anent oppositional gambits of other days, these things were by no means become matters of course or common understanding during 1953—not even, perhaps, in the White House at the time those staff reviews began. Yet the regime's first venture into legislative programming, while in no sense determinative on all scores, was bound to come to grips with such unknowns more directly and on a wider scale than any prior undertaking in the Eisenhower term. The form and content of the annual messages for 1954 thus became matters of considerable moment to Republican office-holders—and their clientele—of all shades of opinion at both ends of the Avenue. The very elaborateness of program processing devices suggests the amount of potential party cleavage they were relied on to contain. The very moderateness of the final product disguises a not inconsiderable amount of prior disputation among protagonists variously placed along the regime's right-left spectrum of opinion (a spectrum obviously centered to the right of that in Truman's time, or in F.D.R's, but distinctly observable nonetheless).

If a number of "liberal" projects were earmarked for further study, as with

immigration, education, minimum wage, or watered down, by prior *Democratic* standards—as with public health and housing—what remained by way of progressive measures and what failed to appear by way of schemes for "turning back the clock," both represent reportedly the fruits of hard-pressed argument "within the family" at the crucial early stages of departmental programming and White House staff review. And were the outsider to question what could have been so disputatious in the final product, how could less have been recommended by a modern President—mindful of his national constituency, facing a mid-term election—the rejoinder would seem to be that this regime began in company with all the attitudes and symbols of long opposition; their shedding was no light task.

Presumably—and pending the researches of historians—it is in this perspective that one ought to view the course of program preparation during 1953. Much of what was done procedurally becomes, then, specialized and perhaps transitory, rooted in particular times, persons, circumstances. But clearly there is nothing transient about the venture as a whole, the compilation of an inclusive bill of particulars for presentation annually by President to Congress. This is now (mid-1955) no less a matter of course in Eisenhower's time than formerly in Truman's; the practice which survives such a change of regime is likely to endure. And clearly its most institutionalized features as of now are also those whose prior presence on the scene helped signally to push a new Administration toward resuming and elaborating Truman patterns: the departmental inventorying in September submissions and the presidential inventorying in January messages. It was when caught between the actuality of agency programs and the nearing of no less than three required annual messages (inventories all, each year from 1946 through 1952), that Eisenhower's White House turned in earnest to developing his 1954 program. It was upon these pre-existing institutional foundations that there arose that programming machinery sketched in the previous pages.

This suggests an obvious question: where did these foundations come from; what brought them into being in pre-Eisenhower years? For answers it is necessary to look back at least as far as the preceding transition period, the early presidency of Harry S. Truman.

II. THE USE OF ANNUAL MESSAGES IN TRUMAN'S TIME

The first of these developments, alike in time and in importance, is that described above as presidential inventorying, the use of annual messages buttressed by special messages and bills to take specific legislative stands across the board. In its contemporary form this practice may be said to have originated in the three-year period immediately following World War II, arising out of circumstances which are now to be defined.

In January, 1944, five months before D-Day, President Roosevelt had proclaimed an "Economic Bill of Rights," a generalized statement of his postwar goals which served to reaffirm and to elaborate prewar assertions of the government's responsibility for peacetime economic development and social welfare,

as well as to dramatize the presidency as prime source of ideas and initiative in this vast area of home affairs.[24] In February, 1946, six months after V-J Day, the underlying concepts both of governmental and of presidential duty were written into law, receiving permanent institutional expression in the Employment Act of 1946:

> . . . the Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to . . . promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power. . . . The President shall transmit to Congress at the beginning of each regular session . . . a program for carrying out [this] policy. . . .[25]

Here was a pressing charge upon the postwar White House, in terms of public expectation—and of anticipated postwar needs—a mandate no less meaningful before than after its enactment into law. To F.D.R's successor in the presidency this was perforce an immediate obligation of office. For him as heir to Roosevelt's coalition it was, moreover, a political imperative. And from the moment "peace" arrived with unexpected suddenness in August, 1945, releasing all manner of public hopes and fears and expectations, Truman showered upon Congress literally dozens of recommendations, great and small, for legislative action in the economic and welfare spheres his predecessor had marked out.[26]

Beginning with his "21-point program" of September 6, 1945—which launched what became known as the "Fair Deal"—the new President sent Congress seven special messages in 10 weeks' time requesting a melange of reconversion aids, administrative improvements, and long-range reforms, their number and diversity measuring not only social but governmental changes called for, in his view, to meet the needs of peace. Then in January, 1946, at the opening of the new session, the more significant of these were rearranged and bundled together, inventory style, into a single package, presented to Congress by an enlarged Budget Message, and to the public by radio address.[27]

[24] The Economic Bill of Rights was set forth in the State of the Union Message, January 11, 1944, as a matter not of specifics but of general postwar objectives to which Roosevelt pledged himself and his regime and, as the year wore on, his party. These objectives figured prominently in FDR's fourth-term campaign, with Truman as his running mate.

[25] A glance at any Economic Report of the President since 1946—Eisenhower's as well as Truman's—will show that the Act's mandate regarding "employment, production and purchasing power" has drawn from Roosevelt's successors recommendations (of varying scope) for economic and social legislation in every area encompassed by his "economic rights."

[26] Indeed, most of the major Truman proposals had been foreshadowed by F.D.R. during the 1944 campaign, especially in his Chicago address, October 28, 1944. And Roosevelt's Special Counsel has recorded that the Truman messages on social security, education, and health grew out of preparatory work commissioned by F.D.R. before his Yalta trip. Samuel I. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt* (New York, 1952), pp. 514–15. Whether Roosevelt would have followed his own commission in so faithful a fashion remains unknown.

[27] For further observations on the content of Truman's post-V-J Day program and on the personal and political motivations behind it, see Richard E. Neustadt, "Congress and the Fair Deal: A Legislative Balance Sheet," *Public Policy*, Vol. 5 (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 349–81, at pp. 355–60.

This presentation anticipated by a month final passage of the Employment Act; the annual message of 1946 was, among other things, an Economic Report in embryo.[28]

In Roosevelt's time, the President's address to Congress on the State of the Union had usually sounded some general, introductory theme, warmly personal, even philosophic, with definite proposals left for later, piecemeal presentation when, as, and if the President chose. Now, in attempted response to the post-war push of office and constituency, Truman used that address, experimentally combined with his Budget Message, to tidy up and restate his long list of post-V-J Day particulars. And whereas Roosevelt, when the time came for particulars, was usually both dramatic and concrete, Truman confined himself to rapid-fire listing of everything at once, impacts diffused and loose ends flying. "Where Roosevelt had been criticized for sending prepared bills to Congress Truman dumped mere proposals in batches."[29] In 1946, except for international agreements there were but few bills bearing a reliable Administration label. On the generality of Truman's own proposals, authoritative information—to say nothing of general understanding—was almost wholly lacking as regards his order of priorities, his preferences and tolerances, bill by bill, his outlook on specifics urged by other Democratic spokesmen.

The presidential silence on these matters may be explained in part by reference to the former Senator—a junior in the New Deal's palmy days—who used to say, during his first year in the White House, that Presidents should state their case and then leave legislating strictly up to Congress. But something more was operating here than anybody's personal proclivity. For not alone in public were these things unsettled but in private also. Truman's "batches" of "mere proposals" had been produced, of course, in the aftermath of Roosevelt's death and enemy surrender, a time of greatest difficulty for the White House. The presidential staff was thoroughly disoriented, its composition and relationships in flux. The cabinet abounded in new faces. The government was plagued by all the woes of demobilization, reconversion, and deteriorating overseas alliances. Meanwhile, the Congress strained toward its first postwar political campaign—from which, incidentally, the President was to absent himself by urgent invitation of his party. In this situation there was scarcely room or opportunity for careful White House definition and elaboration of a presidential view on details of the varied legislation Truman felt impelled to recommend.

[28] Truman's annual message went to Congress January 25, 1946. It combined the State of the Union and Budget Messages into a single document which included gross national product analysis, discussion of the economic outlook, and a sweeping program of "economic" legislation. The Employment Act, which became law March 2, was still under consideration in Congress and it was hoped by some of the President's advisors that the example of a single, consolidated message would head off prescription of a separate Economic Report. That hope was vain and the consolidated message disadvantageous on several counts, its bulk precluding, among other things, a face-to-face report to Congress on the State of the Union. The experiment was not repeated. Since 1946 three separate messages have gone annually to Congress.

[29] Wilfred E. Binkley, *President and Congress* (New York, 1947), p. 278.

If in January, 1946 the President did little more than spread bare-bones endorsements on the record, in January, 1947 even this activity was circumscribed. There intervened, of course, the congressional elections. Under the initial impact of Democratic reverses the Administration lost, for a time, its sense of domestic direction; in home affairs all budding plans were rendered obsolete. Here was a tremendous shock for a regime which, 19 months in office, had still to catch its breath. Within the President's own entourage a first reaction was compounded of uncertainty and hesitation; twin themes which can be read between the lines of Truman's annual messages to the newly-convened—and Republican-controlled—80th Congress, documents prepared in the immediate aftermath of the election.

In January, 1947, there were for the first time three of those messages: a State of the Union Address, a Budget Message, and an Economic Report (the first under the Employment Act). In one respect at least these three, taken together, recalled their single counterpart of 1946: subject-matter ran the gamut of government concerns. But where in 1946 each subject introduced was capped by one or more demands for legislation—emphatic, if not necessarily specific—the discourses of 1947 concluded mostly with requests for "study" or "consideration," gently, even ambiguously phrased, not so much calls for action as warnings and appeals to the congressional Republicans.[20] Far less than in 1946 did these three messages—or any later statements during 1947—convey a specific presidential "program" in anything like Eisenhower's current terms.

But while 1947 began on a note of hesitation for the Truman regime, it ended with most doubts resolved. By Fall the White House was preparing to make Congress' domestic legislative record a prime issue in the coming presidential campaign. By that time also the Administration was well started on a foreign policy—bipartisan in origins and application—which would require legislative execution, via authorizations and appropriations, all through Truman's hoped-for second term. In practical effect, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan tied foreign policy to legislation and added new specifics on which Truman was now bound to exercise his constitutional authority to recommend, *thereby extending to the foreign field something approaching the Employment Act's mandate in home affairs.*

For reasons, then, of policy and politics alike, Truman's three annual messages of January, 1948 were quite different in tone and content from those of the year before, the subject-matter no less broad, but everywhere much more specific, with most affirmative proposals delineated much more sharply.[21] And where in early 1947 many presidential references had been left dangling, to be defined as anybody pleased or not at all, in 1948 an amplifying special message went to Congress almost every week, usually with an approved draft bill hard

[20] Especially was this the case with that year's pressing issues of inflation, tax reduction, and labor relations. See Address on the State of the Union, Jan. 9, 1947; Economic Report, Jan. 11; and Budget Message, Jan. 14.

[21] State of the Union Address, Jan. 9, 1948; Budget Message, Jan. 11; Economic Report, Jan. 14.

on its heels.[22] Save in foreign and defense fields, the motivation here was mainly issue-making, record-building through congressional *non*-performance on the widest possible range of liberal measures; in their domestic aspects these messages reformulated and elaborated every controversial segment of the 1946 program. On the domestic measures, therefore, no less than the Marshall Plan, it was essential that there should be clear lines, sharply drawn—with more than mere proposals needed in the record, since, if not this Congress, hopefully the next would have occasion to respond. Thus specificity became the order of the day. Despite their very different settings—and with regard to form, not substance—the prototype of Eisenhower's presentation *circa* January, 1954 was Truman's effort in the spring of 1948.

It was the rush of public needs and expectations after enemy surrender which prompted Truman's first resort to presidential inventorying in 1946's annual message. It was the Truman strategy for 1948 which renewed and confirmed this practice, at the same time transforming a previously imprecise and unelaborated presentation into a relatively defined and detailed bill of particulars. And always in the background were the postwar President's vast legislative programming responsibilities, expressed and symbolized by the Employment Act and cold-war foreign policy.

The patterns set in 1948 were to be followed—and indeed elaborated further. During Truman's second term his 1949 and 1950 program presentations tended toward more comprehensive coverage, more specificity, more rationalization of sequential messages and bills; his post-Korean presentations stabilized along 1950 lines. Politically there was, or then seemed to be, good reason every year for staking out anew—or anyway not overlooking—unenacted portions of his pre-election program.[23] And governmentally there was no slackening of social, economic, foreign-policy involvements to generate new needs for legislation in those years of initial recession, subsequent inflation, partial mobilization, military alliance-building, and dragged-out Korean war. Moreover, in the process of recurrent use the practice of presenting annual programs acquired a momentum and survival power of its own, each year more generally regarded throughout government as the accustomed way of doing business, each year more nearly built into the institutional arrangements, expectations, of Congress, agencies, and presidential staff alike. Policy and politics aside, perpetuation of the practice during Truman's second term owes much to the fast rise of institutional stakes in the game.

Nowhere was this more striking than in the case of presidential staff. In Truman's time, at least before Korea, the main thrust of Administration effort and attention was less operational than legislative; this in those notable domestic spheres where policies once cast in legislative guise remained so for lack of

[22] *E.g.*, civil rights, Feb. 2, 1948; rent control and housing, Feb. 27; reciprocal trade, March 1; European recovery and national defense, March 17; Alaska development, April 24; agriculture, May 14; social security, May 24.

[23] For discussion see Neustadt, *op. cit.*, in *Public Policy*, Vol. 5, pp. 349–81, at pp. 366–81.

commensurate congressional response; likewise in crucial foreign fields where new infusions of authority and funds were periodically required. The great issues of policy, oftener than not, revolved around what Congress should be asked to do. For White House aides and budgeteers and economic advisers there were, therefore, no better ways to reserve policy decisions to the President —or, indeed, to get them taken—than those afforded by presidential messages to Congress. Nor were there any ways more likely to bring staff facilities and talents into play; nor any better suited to set President (and entourage) astride department heads' negotiations with one another and with the Hill. The greater the spread of *presidential* requests for legislation, the wider the President's own reach as decision-maker—and the deeper staff's participation in essentials of decision-making. Protection for the President *and* for the work of staff—both motives, variously combined, helped markedly to incline numbers of key Truman aides toward ever more elaborate legislative program presentations.

The institutional factor's influence upon the course of presidential inventorying cannot be better illustrated than by reference to the growth of a related, if subsidiary, practice, where institutional concerns were paramount from first to last: with the development, that is to say, of the other of the two inherited foundations on which Eisenhower's programming was to be based, namely the *departmental* legislative programs. To that development we may now turn, its starting point not again presentation, but rather preparation of the President's program in Truman's early years.

III. THE EMERGENCE OF DEPARTMENTAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS

The custom of compiling formal agency programs as a preliminary stage in presidential program-making owes very little to procedural initiatives from the departments, deriving, rather, from White House requirements imposed upon them in the four years after World War II. Those requirements, in turn, reflect a step-by-step accumulation of *ad hoc* responses on the part of Truman's aides to various felt needs arising in the course of readying his annual messages, especially as they assumed their "inventory" cast. What were these needs, and what the character of staff response? For answers it is necessary to review some facets of the staff work at successive message seasons from 1945 through 1949.

In Roosevelt's time, the actual drafting of Budget Messages—then mostly discourses on going programs—had been left to the Budget Bureau under varying degrees of presidential supervision. State of the Union preparations, on the other hand, had remained pretty much the President's affair, with Samuel I. Rosenman, his Special Counsel, as chief continuing assistant in the process.[34] Over the years the drafting of these latter addresses came to depend in considerable part on the availability of proposed texts and of supporting data emanating from the agencies;[35] with little or no prompting, their contributions and

[34] A relationship on all major speeches which dated back to Albany. For illuminating details see Rosenman, *op. cit.*, especially Ch. 1.

[35] For illustrations, *ibid.*, pp. 262–65; 510–12.

advices flowed regularly to Rosenman through well-worn channels, part of the routine of annual message season.

That routine and those channels were not much disturbed during 1945, despite Truman's accession in mid-April and his trial combination, nine months later, of the State of the Union address with the Budget Message. For Rosenman, who had remained with the new President, was on the scene in his accustomed place during the drafting of that omnibus affair; his opposite number from the Budget side was Harold D. Smith, another Roosevelt holdover. Whatever the consolidated document's demerits, presentation-wise, its drafting under their joint management assured a single—and, to the bureaucracy, familiar—focus both for staff work and for departmental liaison.

Not so the following year. By message season 1946 both Rosenman and Smith had left the government; their replacements were new men in Washington. By then more institutions had appeared within the White House orbit: a Council of Economic Advisors under the Employment Act, and an office of Assistant to the President, residual legatee for OWMR. By then, too, there were to be three separate annual messages. And adding to the other troubles of the time—sketched in section II above—these three became the object of four quasi-independent drafting operations. The Budget, reverting to custom, held pretty tightly onto that year's Budget Message. The Economic Council tried its best to follow suit on the first Economic Report, its virgin—and uncertain—efforts being duplicated, meanwhile, closer to the throne, by what remained of OWMR. And elsewhere in the White House, State of the Union drafts were put together, cut-and-paste, by the new presidential counsel, Clark M. Clifford, utilizing diverse agency suggestions and some borrowed Budget staff.[36]

Reflecting the scatteration of these enterprises, a multiplicity of overlapping calls for plans, suggestions, and advice went from them to the various departments. On November 14, 1946, the OWMR Director—soon to be Assistant to the President—wrote all the agencies, inviting views on legislation they desired at the coming session. The next day Truman asked in cabinet for suggestions on the subject-matter of his State of the Union address; this request was conveyed later to a number of non-cabinet agencies by letter from Counsel Clifford. Meanwhile, similar requests regarding subjects for the Economic Report had gone out more informally from CEA. And in the course of budget hearings, Budget staff had asked each agency for information on its legislative plans. In all of

[36] Clifford, a St. Louis attorney before the war, was appointed Counsel in July, 1946 after a year's duty in the White House as assistant Naval Aide. Smith's successor, James E. Webb, previously a Sperry Gyroscope official and wartime Marine specialist, was appointed Budget Director that same month, after a short stint as an executive assistant to the Under Secretary of the Treasury. The original members of the Council of Economic Advisers, Nourse, Keyserling, and Clark, were not appointed until August, 1946, six months after passage of the Employment Act; of the three, only Keyserling had had previous government experience. The new Assistant to the President, Steelman, on the other hand, was a government official of long standing, who had served as OWMR's last Director, assuming his new White House post upon that agency's termination in the aftermath of the November, 1946 election, and keeping with him, for a time, a remnant of his former staff.

this and in the results of it all there was, of course, confusion and waste motion, with presidential staff-work afflicted no less than departmental. Ambiguities and uncertainties there were bound to be in the Administration stand of January, 1947. This rather gilded the lily.

Time helps, however. By the Fall of 1947, staff and personality relationships in Truman's entourage had shaken down somewhat, all parties more accustomed to their jobs, each other, and the President. By then also the regime had begun to crystallize its goals, in home affairs no less than overseas. And facing preparation of the annual messages for 1948, both President and staff were conscious of a crucial corner to be turned. The tightening of preparatory staff work was a natural result, though scarcely one preplanned.

Procedurally, that tightening began in an attempt to deal with the preceding year's most obvious mechanical defect—those tangled requests to the agencies. In September, 1947, White House and Budget aides accepted a suggestion from the Economic Council that they combine such inquiries for the forthcoming message season; the upshot, on September 26, was a formal letter from the President himself to the head of each major agency. There Truman asked that he receive by November 1 "such material as you would propose for inclusion in the 1948 State of the Union Message or the Economic Report of the President," and in addition a report "showing the character of legislation of concern to [the agency] which you anticipate may be considered by the Congress," this latter "not [to] be in great detail but [to] contain sufficient information to identify the subjects upon which legislation may be introduced or requested." And as a closing note, "the White House staff, the Council of Economic Advisers or the Bureau of the Budget may make additional requests for material or arrange for discussions with your representatives to whatever extent may be required."[37]

Here was a first approach to those elaborate calls for departmental legislative programs now issuing each year from Budget as a matter of course. This letter may be said to mark the start of annual agency programming in contemporary terms. But no one could have told that at the time, nor sense it now from the loose wordage then employed.

The imprecision of the words reflects the fact that drafters of this letter were much clearer in their minds about the need to send it than about the uses they might make of agency replies. Message suggestions were requested because it was traditional to have them, a tradition reinforced by data needs attendant on that new affair, the Economic Report. Legislative intentions were canvassed in the hope, from the White House side, that message drafters might be safeguarded against ignoring, inadvertently, items either attractive to the President or wholly counter to his aims. To complement this hope there was the notion, from the Budget side, that advance word on departmental plans might sharpen current estimates reviews and expedite next-session legislative clearances. All staffs concerned were pleased by the idea of placing agencies on record with the

[37] Quoted passages in this and similar presidential requests annually through 1954 are from texts or notes in the writer's files.

President regarding plans their bureaucrats were brewing. And institutional staffs were pleased as well by the explicit presidential recognition of their roles in message making, together with the general hunting licenses officially bestowed upon them. This last, especially; it is no accident that the initiative in presidential letter-writing came from the late-on-the-scene, least institutionally secure staff element, the Economic Council.[38]

But all of these were rather preconceptions than specific undertakings as regards the actuality of agency replies. Precisely what was to be done with them and for what purpose and by whom remained unsettled in advance, with no one in the presidential entourage sure of results to be expected or desired. The proceeding was new and the 80th Congress in its second session was an unpromising occasion for breast-baring by departments on behalf of the perhaps shortly-to-be-retired President.

Truman's 1947 letter was a fishing expedition; results are hard to classify. Most agencies consolidated answers to his two requests, blurring or ignoring distinctions between them, with legislative projects mostly buried in suggested language drafts. However, there was one thing notably concrete about these agency replies: the pile they made on White House desks November 1, or thereabouts. By that time, staff work was already underway in Budget and CEA on preliminary drafts of the two secondary messages; as for the State of the Union address, a White House-Budget drafting team had been lined up by Clifford, though not yet put to work. While there was little disposition to rely on departmental prose, *per se*, each staff engaged, or soon to be engaged, in message preparation needed to know what was contained in agency submissions—for the sake of the record, if nothing more—but none had time or means to plow straight through the pile, much less sift substantive suggestions from the rhetoric in which they were conveyed. By common consent, heartfelt if *ad hoc*, that task went to the Budget's newly-expanding legislative clearance organization, then titled the Division of Legislative Reference.[39]

There, informal appraisals were solicited from specialists in Budget and in CEA,[40] and the results highlighted in an annotated checklist of action-recom-

[38] This is not to suggest, of course, that Executive Office staffs lacked working-level channels to the agencies or informal advice on agency interest and intentions. Quite the contrary. The purpose of the quoted language in the letter of September 26, 1947 was not to obtain data otherwise inaccessible to staff, but rather to put agency heads responsibly on record pro or con departmental ideas more probably than not already known or sensed by presidential aides, while at the same time giving the latter a formal—even constitutional—rationale for their own attempts at follow-up, coordination, and review.

[39] For a discussion of that expansion and the motivations behind it see Neustadt, *op. cit.*, this REVIEW (Sept. 1954), pp. 659–63.

[40] As a matter of sheer improvisation, Legislative Reference established a number of *ad hoc* staff "working teams," drawn from other Budget divisions and to some extent from CEA, to comment on the adequacy and utility of departmental recommendations and to point up major issues of substance or finance raised by, or omitted from, agency submissions. See Budget Bureau inter-office memorandum from Elmer B. Staats, then chief of the Division of Legislative Reference, to Messrs. D. C. Stone, J. W. Jones, Martin, and Rice, Nov. 17, 1947. In two weeks' time there were prepared some 20 staff critiques

mendations, including legislative issues ignored by the agencies but not by staff critiques.[41] Here, in a single document, was an inventory for the message-drafters, a handy guide to problems needing resolution and to potential gaps or overlaps among the messages. As an aid to coordination, this mechanical contrivance was supplemented in two ways: there was much interchange of drafts —and some of drafters—among staffs working on the messages, while every phrase concerning legislation was centrally reviewed in Legislative Reference. (By these means wording was coordinated and much substance also; for it was mainly in the course and guise of actual message drafting that 1947's open issues were brought before the President for his decision.) Thereafter, once the message drafts were put in final form, White House and Budget legislative staffs—maintaining the collaboration forged in message season, seeking the new degree of specificity for 1948—joined in a review of "developmental" work still to be done, of actions needed to give full effect to presidential tone and purpose: interagency disputes to be resolved, special messages prepared, bills and amendments drafted, departmental testimony set. And with these clean-up tasks identified, those staffs turned jointly to the doing of them, utilizing in experimental fashion both legislative clearance channels and *ad hoc* staff-and-department working teams.[42]

These staff procedures and relationships evolving in the course of 1947's message season were relatively crude and unelaborated by contemporary standards. They were, however, a considerable improvement over what had gone before, sufficiently successful to attract attention and adherents for the future. Of course, the White House aides who had provided leadership and drive were scarcely bent on setting precedents nor much concerned about procedural trends. In 1948, their horizons were to be limited, perforce, by the forthcoming presidential election; their interest, time, and energy absorbed, increasingly, by preparations for convention and campaign. Within the Budget

combining agency responses into subject-matter fields. Considering the time and circumstances, these were reasonably thorough jobs of summarization and analysis, generally of higher quality, certainly much more specific, than the original agency documents. As such they served in lieu of most originals as working papers for the drafting staffs on all three annual messages. Note that in this 1947 experiment CEA's participation in the Legislative Reference "working teams" was marginal. General inclusion of CEA specialists came as a refinement the following year. For this subsequent elaboration of the procedure see Budget Bureau inter-office memorandum from Elmer B. Staats to Messrs. Stauffacher, Martin, J. W. Jones, and Gross (CEA), Dec. 6, 1948.

[41] "Checklist of Recommendations for Presidential Messages in January, 1948," Bureau of the Budget, Division of Legislative Reference, Dec. 3, 1947 (duplicated).

[42] Note that in this 1947 sequence message drafting, itself, became the central focus for policy decision as regards the legislative program, with detailed elaboration of particular policies a later, subsidiary undertaking. This more or less inverts the sequence and focus of Eisenhower's program-making during 1953. Of course, that is to compare Truman's third programming effort with Eisenhower's first. In 1947, while a checklisting of possible proposals had negative, coordinative uses, the White House was by no means faced with first-time issues new or strange or unexplored politically. Moreover, in domestic spheres the 1948 program, unlike the 1954, was not constructed with an eye to maximizing short-run congressional response.

Bureau, on the other hand—divorced from the campaign, acutely conscious of the presidency's durability, mindful of its own—the 1947 effort was regarded as a promising beginning of what ought to be a long-run undertaking; a step toward staff and agency relationships potentially of great significance for budgetary review no less than legislative clearance. And while the White House staff turned to full-time electioneering in late summer, 1948, the Budget made an effort to preserve, as nearly as might be, one concept introduced the year before: the formal annual canvass of agency intentions in the legislative sphere. To that end an innocuous inquiry was slipped into the call for estimates of July, 1948. Were the presidency to change hands, so ran the reasoning, this would already have been institutionalized, at least in theory, as part of the budget process.[43]

But on November 3, 1948, Washington officialdom awoke to find itself executor of the "outgoing" President's election victory. Truman would remain, with Democrats controlling Congress; in every Federal agency caretaker attitudes were hurried out of sight. On the legislative front, a vast array of talk-stage ideas for the coming session were recast, overnight, as current, actionable issues. In home affairs, especially, the character of Truman's campaign and election combined to rouse great expectations, in and out of government. There was no dearth of raw materials to go into a Truman program for the Congress which had shared his victory. Quite the contrary; in the 60 days between election's end and session's start the problem was not to create, but rather to rationalize, to gain some order of priority, some measure of coherence overall, some semblance of agreement on details, for inventory in the customary annual messages, topped off this time by an Inaugural Address.

Here was a heavy load for presidential aides—especially for a White House contingent just off the campaign train. To make a start, they hastily revived and amplified their improvised machinery of a year before, beginning with the presidential letter to the agencies.

On November 5, three days after election, Truman told his cabinet members to review his campaign speeches and to ready legislation on the pledges these contained. The next day he sent a formal request to all major agencies, asking advice on his messages and on their legislative plans. This was something more than a repeat performance of his 1947 letter. Reflecting the changed circum-

[43] In July, 1948, the call for estimates for fiscal 1950 requested, for the first time, some report on departmental legislative plans. The agencies were asked to include with their budget estimates, due September 15, a brief statement "calling attention to any recommendations for proposed legislation . . . which should be taken account of in preparing the Budget Message . . . or in arriving at budget totals. . . ." Information of this sort had long been wanted by the Budget for purposes of estimates review; in 1946, verbal requests at budget hearings had brought relatively few results; in 1947, agency responses to the presidential call had arrived relatively late. But nobody expected either cabinet officers or their career subordinates to go on record candidly in mid-September, 1948. This innovation in the Budget call was scarcely designed to gain much information; nor did it do so in fact. Rather, it was an expedient, a pre-election gambit, designed to give Budget a precedent for possible application in a new regime.

stances, this new document departed from its predecessor's terms in two significant respects. On the one hand, the request for message data was trimmed down in an evident desire to avoid new piles of departmental prose.[44] On the other hand, the request for legislative information was much more elaborate than in 1947, also much more precise, its wordage a first approximation of that employed by Eisenhower's Budget Bureau five years later.[45]

And as regards this legislative inquiry, it is doubtful that either before or since did any Truman broadside receive faster or more generally responsive answers. Most agency replies were relatively complete, well organized, informative, and marked by evidences of review at upper echelons. While formats varied, as did depth and specificity of information on particulars, there was, in fact—as time would show—quite general coverage of agency intentions all the way from major policy affairs to matters of administrative routine.

There was only one trouble with these departmental documents: they came too late for great effect on presidential program-making. December, 1948 was scarcely a propitious month for measured applications of staff "expertise" through paper channels. In no event was there much room for staff (or agency) debate about the general range of measures to be recommended at the opening of Congress. Past history and present circumstances made it plain that at a minimum the 81st Congress would be asked for everything the 80th had denied. As for the all-important details—how much of what to recommend, in terms of what specifics, at what dollar cost and when—deep cross-currents kept sweeping such things far beyond the reach of formal papers or their processors:[46] the military seeking more security "in being"; Budget and Treasury trying to cut "inflationary" spending and the public debt; Fair Dealers, momentarily in seventh heaven, demanding action, fast, on all their aims at once. Relatively

[44] The agencies were simply asked to name ". . . the subjects which you would propose for inclusion in the State of the Union Message and the Economic Report . . . together with a brief explanation of each. . . ."

[45] In 1948 Truman asked for "a report on the proposed legislative program of your department [which] should show (1) the subject-matter of all legislation which you desire to propose . . . [to Congress] . . ., (2) the state of readiness of legislative drafts and supporting material, (3) references to the bills and . . . reports in the 80th Congress concerning the subjects covered . . . with a brief appraisal of the adequacy of these bills, (4) your views on the timing of introduction and . . . consideration, and (5) the names of other departments and agencies . . . interested in the same subjects."

Necessarily, the time for response to this request was very limited. The President's letter asked that message suggestions be sent directly to the White House by November 29, 1948; legislative programs were to be sent him by that date "through" the Bureau of the Budget, with the proviso that supplemental listings would be accepted up to December 15; as regards that time-extension, the letter voiced an expectation that each agency program "will be fully developed by that date," a scarcely enforceable directive to make "all" mean "all."

[46] In 1948, reversing 1947's procedure, Legislative Reference had produced a "preliminary" checklist for the message drafters (based on campaign materials and staff anticipations) two weeks *before* the agency programs arrived. Elaborate working teams were drawn from Budget and CEA to review those submissions on arrival. But by that time such a review process was bound to involve more activity than result.

few of the proposals prized by high officials and their clientele were wholly free of impacts on the budget. The rest became involved in tugs of war between expansive social purpose and conservative financial policy; each view with departmental and staff advocates to jostle one another for the presidential ear by means more personal—and more emphatic—than mere submission or review of agency programs.[47] Given the time factor and the message framework, there was, perforce, a certain lack of order in this process. Inevitably, some of the results were arbitrary, mutually inconsistent, even, in the course of time, embarrassing to the regime. To take just one example, the rural telephone program—which Truman came to list in later years among his regime's great accomplishments for 1949—was kept out of his January messages and once thereafter held "not in accord" by Budget as a matter of financial stringency.

The 1948 message season, taken as a whole, left in its wake among the staffs concerned less satisfaction than frustration: White House and CEA programmers conscious of a disadvantageous tactical position on price-tag issues late in budget season; legislative clearance aides concerned lest their home institution's role as a cost-cutting advocate endanger their desired "neutral" standing and new White House links; the budgeteers bemused by failures once again to bring new legislation into focus soon enough for rational review alongside going programs. Everybody's troubles turned on timing; the cure, apparently, an earlier beginning and more integration of both plans and planners. And in the relatively simpler circumstances of 1949—a non-election year to be succeeded by a second session—an early start became the central feature of staff preparations for 1950's program presentation.

In July, 1949, the Budget call for estimates for fiscal 1951 replaced 1948's mere for-the-record inquiry on legislation with a full-blown replica of Truman's post-election request for departmental legislative programs. This time the agencies were to submit "preliminary" legislative programs to the Budget along with their annual estimates; "final" programs would then be in order later as responses to the "usual" message season letter from the President. This new feature of the Budget call—a fixture each year since—required presentation by the agencies of the same range of data specified in Truman's letter of November 6, 1948.[48] This scheme of departmental double-jeopardy on legislative programs

[47] The well-known Budget-Forrestal dispute over the fiscal 1950 military budget was, of course, a very vital background factor in the legislative program conflicts of this period. As a practical matter, only with that argument settled in Webb's favor were there funds for Fair Dealers and budgeteers to quarrel about. By the same token, universal training legislation then assumed a higher relative priority for the President than most of his supporters, in and out of Congress, were ever willing to concede it at either end of the Avenue —a circumstance since echoed in the reserve training controversy during the congressional session of 1955. Indeed, the broader conflict over military force levels since Eisenhower's accession is reminiscent in many ways of those of 1948 and 1949.

[48] To the 1948 language there were added requests for cost estimates and a listing of laws due to expire. Bureau of the Budget, *Instructions for the Preparation and Submission of Annual Budget Estimates*, June 30, 1949, Sec. 86. The purpose of the expiration list is obvious, its need made sharp by the fast-rising congressional practice of authorizing long-term programs on a short-run, review-and-extend basis. Lest this request receive less than

was motivated partly by uncertainty about prospects for change in agency intentions during the fall months, a concern proved groundless, largely, especially in 1949. And, partly, the motivation was political in bureaucratic terms: a demonstration to the agencies that no loss of "presidential" status was involved in the shift to an earlier submission on Budget's call.[49] Results were as desired; the preliminary programs which reached Budget in September, 1949 were generally no less comprehensive than had been the presentations of December, 1948—indeed, reflecting first-session turn-downs and delays, they were in large part carbon copies.

With these at hand so early in the game, the paper processing arrangements improvised in 1947 were renovated and enlarged as means of minimizing the difficulties encountered in 1948. For the first time most departmental legislative plans received considerable going-over in the normal course of estimates review, with relatively timely entré assured interested White House aides. Meanwhile, reviews of form and substance and priority outside the range of budgeting *per se* were somewhat disentangled from the chores of message drafting, defined and organized in their own terms and in advance, with all the staffs concerned drawn into working-team arrangements under White House auspices. There were, of course, but few *new* measures of a controversial cast proposed by the departments or conceived by staff for 1950's program presentation. For the most part, these preparatory efforts dealt with carry-overs previously recommended to the Congress, things easily contained in paper channels. And as regards new elements, where more intensive staff collaboration was

just due from the agencies, the Budget Director followed his formal call with an explanatory memorandum for department heads. "The request," he wrote, "is intended to give the Budget Bureau and the President as much information as possible about your plans . . . for the next legislative session in time to be considered in the early stages of budget review." With this in hand it would ". . . be possible to inform you, when we discuss your budget allowance, of the President's views on the relationship between items in your legislative program and the total budget outlook at that time." These programs, coming to the Budget in September, might be—in part—outdated by events before Congress assembled. Therefore, ". . . we anticipate that the agencies will be asked to present final legislative programs late in the year, in conjunction with suggestions for the annual messages." However, since preliminary programs were to provide better opportunity ". . . for proper integration of legislative proposals with the President's budget recommendations," agencies were urged that they ". . . should not hold back, for later presentation, any items which can possibly be foreseen at this time." Bureau of the Budget, Bulletin No. 50-5, Aug. 31, 1949.

[49] The presidential letter foreshadowed by the 1949 call for estimates followed in short order. Dated Sept. 26, 1949, the President's request for message suggestions paralleled the language used in 1948. On the legislative side, the agencies were asked to transmit through the Budget, by November 1, a "final" program which would ". . . restate and bring up to date the preliminary legislative program submitted . . . in accordance with the Call for Estimates." This was to include "all" agency desires for the coming session, as regards bills pending or to be proposed, with indications of departmental urgency and "views on the timing of congressional consideration." If a bill or proposal in December's program had not appeared in September's precursor, there was to be a statement of ". . . the circumstances which led to its addition"; this last a fine flourish, scarcely enforceable.

required, their number was so limited and time so free, relatively speaking, that procedural improvements sufficed to avert any major repetition of 1948's last-minute controversies and confusions.[50]

Under the circumstances, 1949's budget and message seasons ran relatively smoothly in terms of staff and agency relationships, the mechanics regarded in most quarters as advances on what had gone before and harbingers of better still to come. But in the event there was to be no further innovating. Every plan for planning was abruptly pushed aside by the Korean outbreak and its aftermath, both military and political.

During the budget and message seasons of 1950–52 both agencies and staffs went through the motions more or less along the lines marked out in 1949. As a matter of form, these remained frozen in their pre-Korean cast; as a matter of fact, they became every year more marginal among the key concerns of policy officials.[51] In part, such stalemating was a reflection of reduced Democratic majorities in the 82nd Congress combined with stepped-up oppositional attacks against a regime fast declining in prestige and coherence, driven to the defensive on almost every front. In part, it reflected preoccupation by both principals and staffs with complex, *ad hoc*, and unprecedented issues of economic and of military management attendant upon partial mobilization and limited war. In part, too, it reflected the attendant diminution in developmental efforts on Fair Deal particulars, once prime stimulators of programming machinery. Post-Korean advocacy of large-scale commitments lacking mobilization flavor at home or abroad—like general school construction or expansion of Point IV—met stiff resistance from the Budget and also, for the most part, from the President himself. Save for emergency measures, the presidential program, like the mechanisms for its preparation, remained relatively fixed in Truman's final years.

It may be said, then, that the departmental programming requirement now carried forward under Eisenhower emerged out of successive pressures in and on

[50] The eventual "new" features of Truman's 1950 program included official endorsement of the so-called "Brannan Plan," which the Secretary of Agriculture had presented to congressional committees the preceding spring, along with aids to small business, assistance for middle-income housing, and general revision of the internal revenue code. On these, there were arguments, of course, but relatively quietly resolved "within the family."

[51] It had been planned before Korea to eliminate eventually the duplicative factor in requests for "preliminary" and for "final" programs. After Korea, though, no easy opportunity was found to do so, nor a compelling need; the dual system continued, for lack of time or energy to change it. The Budget Bureau's call for estimates in 1950, 1951—and 1952—reiterated the terms of Section 86 in 1949's call for preliminary legislative programs, with some elaboration of reporting requirements. The language was identical with that used under Eisenhower in 1953. (See above.) Bureau of the Budget, *Instructions for the Preparation and Submission of Annual Budget Estimates* (June 30, 1950; June 30, 1951; June 30, 1952), Sec. 86. Presidential calls for final legislative programs patterned on Truman's request of 1949, with some new terminology to take account of the emergency, went forward in the form of letters from the President on October 4, 1950, asking for submissions December 1 (after the mid-term election), and on October 5, 1951, again with a December 1 date for replies. There was no *presidential* call in 1952 regarding agency proposals for the 83rd Congress.

the Truman entourage, originating as a modest part of one attempt to pull together hitherto haphazard staff work in the face of a grave test, the 1948 election-year program; expanding and becoming institutionalized, increasingly, as a departure-point for efforts to hold staff coordination firm against the strains imposed by post-election clashes of Fair Deal and fiscal policies; stabilizing and becoming routinized as government's key policy preoccupations turned more operational than legislative, while mobilization bit at home and fighting wore on in Korea. And from the great departments—executors, *not* instigators of that programming requirement—there came, in Truman's time, a comparable sequence of responses.

In 1947, the President's first, hesitant request to them was met mostly by pro-forma rejoinders compiled at bureau levels with a minimum of higher echelon review—while Budget's muffled inquiry of July, 1948, was scarcely even noticed outside departmental budget offices. But with Truman's election, the replies to his November, 1948 request received careful review, even some reconsideration and reworking, at levels up to and including the department heads themselves; this last, especially, in those domestic agencies administering or ambitious for promotional programs. Partly as a carry-over, partly in awareness of their growing use by presidential staff, the responses to Budget's first full-scale request of 1949 were also given a considerable going-over at top departmental levels. Then with Korea, and thereafter, came a tendency to treat these annual exercises as increasingly routine affairs, the more so every year.

The very fact that *presidential* inventories were by then the norm insured that departmental compilations would remain of some significance to agency executives as means to stake out claims against the President's program; "routine" does not imply sheer departmental abdication to the bureau-level bureaucrats. Rather, what was involved for most departments in the final Truman years amounted to a diminution of top-level interest in assuming the initiative on those recurrent, largely repetitive, bills of particulars. Negatively, upper echelons were for the most part relatively conscientious in their screening and consolidation into proper form of propositions annually put forward by their bureaus. Some—notably Interior's then Program Staff—tried hard to enforce department-wide standards of readiness, consistency, coherence, priority. Almost everywhere, in some degree or other, there was a certain scrutiny of what came from below. But affirmatively, there was very little innovating at the instance of department heads.

In general, then, department heads and their top staffs accepted programming responsibility in Truman's second term, but rather passively as a requirement for proper compilation, than actively as an excuse for positive coordination. To this, however, there was one notable—and natural—exception: 1947's "unified" armed forces organization, the National Military Establishment, since 1949 the Department of Defense.

There White House-Budget calls were seized on very actively indeed and used as both a weapon and a rationale to help force the three military services

into coordination of their legislative plans. This was among the most determined, if least known, attempts at unifying in the period of Forrestal's—and subsequently Johnson's—tenure as Secretary of Defense. Spurred by Marx Leva, then Assistant Secretary, their office actually extracted from the services much of the initiative and most of the control on plans for forward legislation. This was accomplished in successive stages, mainly during 1948 and 1949, its virtual completion signalled late the latter year by a combined "preliminary" and "final" Defense Department legislative program for the 1950 session of Congress, this in the form of a book of 80-odd bill drafts and justifications submitted to the Budget, not alone for message purposes but for clearance also, in one lump and before the session's start. Since 1949, such consolidated, detailed, neatly packaged presentations have been standard at the Pentagon, renewed each year as a distinctly departmental matter, for purposes alike of internal coordination, Administration clearance, and ordered presentation on the Hill.

It is no accident, of course, that this exceptional response to presidential calls should have come from the office of the Secretary of Defense, whose problems of internal coordination and control were more nearly akin to the President's own, also much more acute—this at the start, especially—than those of any other department head. For Forrestal's and Johnson's aides and their heirs and assigns, it has been natural to find in departmental programming advantages not unlike those sought by presidential staff. In Truman's time, there were a few sporadic efforts made by members of his entourage to lure or push other departments toward an equivalent response. But lacking the incentives of the Secretary of Defense there was, elsewhere, no comparable internal drive in that direction; nor, after Korea, much pressure from above. During Truman's last years, the Defense Department program remained what it had been before Korea, a unique undertaking.

While the development of departmental programming was checked on all fronts in the three years after 1949, mere repetition of that year's proceedings had significance for 1953's transition to a new regime. By 1953 the agency bureaucracies were thoroughly habituated to an annual call from White House precincts for their legislative programs; habituated, also, to conceiving of those programs as inclusive inventories of precise proposals. Repetition robbed these things, in varying degree, of interest or excitement in high places, but at the same time gave them status and tradition as among the built-in patterns of agency routine. And in the Budget Bureau, also, there were some traditions built, especially some habit-forming ways of working with the White House. Year after year its legislative clearance aides had served as back-up staff to Truman's Special Counsel,[52] drafting the programs call, checklisting agency responses, identifying open issues, stimulating working teams and acting as their secretariat, collating phraseology in message drafts, providing linkages among their drafters—all this done by the prospective interpreters of presiden-

[52] Charles S. Murphy, who succeeded Clifford early in 1950, carried on the combination of speech-and-message drafting with legislative policy duties which characterized the Counsel's post in Truman's time (and F.D.R.'s).

tial programs: the clearance agents gaining a firm footing for their clearances. Long before 1953 these Budget aides became accustomed to seek out and stimulate conflicting judgments in the legislative field; accustomed also to the role of "institutional" exponent in interchanges with the White House "politicians." That year, in his capacity as career chief of Budget's clearance operations, this was the background brought by Roger Jones to his first contacts with the new regime anent the forward course in legislation.

IV. LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP

Survival is the acid test of institutional development within the White House orbit. At this writing, in 1955, the Budget's call for estimates for fiscal 1957 has just gone to the agencies, a Section 86 included as before. The President may now abandon letters of request for message data—in 1954, a reminder at cabinet table served instead—but there is every expectation in his entourage that 1955's budget and message seasons will proceed along the lines of prior years, with January, 1956's annual messages conveying to the Congress and the country a comprehensive program presentation, Eisenhower's third—thus marking the tenth anniversary of Truman's trial compendium of 1946.

Looking back upon the intervening development, as traced above, one might easily gain a sense of busy bureaucrats entangling Presidents—Truman and Eisenhower both—in processes expressive more of institutional concerns than presidential personality, the product rather of the office than of the men. Of course, this may turn out, historically, to be but commentary on the personalities of those two Presidents. Even so, the record here presented demonstrates that year by year staff interests and initiatives have had—or, if one prefers, were allowed to have—a major, frequently decisive influence in shaping the *particulars*, the ways and means of current presidential programming.

This is not to suggest that either now or in the past have these particulars reflected *merely* needs and circumstances of the staffs as entities distinct from sitting Presidents. No doubt that brand of institutionalism plays a part in the proceedings here described—witness the Budget's interests *circa* 1948 and 1953 or CEA's in 1947—but a part powerfully reinforced at every turning-point by what then seemed a crucial undertaking in the President's own terms: Truman in 1945, attempting to discharge the trust and meet the situation he inherited; in 1948, trying to rally North and West against Republicans (and Henry Wallace); or Eisenhower in 1954, seeking, it would appear, to fix the label "middle of the road" on his own party's right-wing-dominated delegation in the Congress. If not, perhaps, the personal initiatives of Presidents, then at least their own circumstances and felt needs have markedly affected programming techniques. In that sense the personal equation is not to be discounted.

Yet in a deeper sense, neither personal proclivities nor, for that matter, bureaucratic busyness suffice to explain this development's direction overall, however much accounting for particulars. Perhaps two different Presidents, differently trained, motivated, staffed, might have proceeded in a rather different way. Conceivably, both presidential and staff needs might have been formu-

lated and expressed in terms other than those actually employed. But it is difficult to see how any postwar President—whether Truman or Dewey, or Eisenhower or Stevenson—could have avoided some kind of approach to legislative program-making on a comprehensive scale. Behind the momentary situations molding presidential conduct, there have been other pressures, far less transient: the mandate of the Employment Act, the policy of Soviet containment, and, as concomitants, perpetuation of big government, big budgets, and big debt—at home, the heritage of Roosevelt's revolution; abroad, cold war in the atomic age—all this accompanied politically by alternating Democratic and Republican majorities in coalition-dominated Congresses, along with notable discrepancies between each party's presidential and congressional electorates.

In such a context, the executive establishment was bound to generate large-scale requirements for substantive—and controversial—legislation; the presidency no less bound to take the lead. In spheres of foreign policy and of defense, the constitutional position of the President left him no room to stand aside. In home affairs there were specific statutes to compel his lead, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Employment Act of 1946, this last but formally expressive of a role which F.D.R.'s example had already rendered virtually inescapable. And only interventions by the party leader in the White House could set tone and limits for that necessary *modus operandi*, "coalition" government *without* political truce. These ultimately were the pressures on the presidency at mid-century which gave rise to the programming endeavors here recorded; that record measuring successive, improvised responses on the part of real-life Presidents and staffs in their own terms and time.

Traditionally, there has been a tendency to distinguish "strong" Presidents from "weak," depending on their exercise of the initiative in legislation. The personal appearances in the hall of the House, the special messages, the drafted bills, the public appeals, so characteristic of contemporary program presentation, have all been represented in the past—no farther back than Franklin Roosevelt's time—as signs of a President's intention or capacity to "dominate" the Congress. If these were once relevant criteria of domination, they are not so today. As things stand now they have become part of the regular routines of office, an accepted elaboration of the constitutional right to recommend; as such, no more indicative of presidential domination than the veto power, say, in Herbert Hoover's time.

Indeed, from the congressional point of view, "service," not domination, is the reality behind these presidential undertakings. In practical effect, they represent a means whereby Congress can gain from the outside what comes hard from within: a handy and official guide to the wants of its biggest customer; an advance formulation of main issues at each session; a work-load ready-to-hand for every legislative committee; an indication, more or less, of what may risk the veto; a borrowing of presidential prestige for most major bills—and thus a boosting of publicity-potentials in both sponsorship and opposition.

That Congress wants these things and finds them useful for its purposes may

be judged from the almost total absence nowadays of vocal criticism or surprise at annual presentations of the President's program; an indicator reinforced by irritated comments, privately expressed on both sides of the aisle, when Eisenhower stayed his hand in 1953. Outcries against "dictatorship" and "speeches-from-the-throne" have long been stilled in responsible quarters. In 1947, Senator Taft told a Budget aide that as a matter of orderly procedure Republican committee chairmen *ought* to have the Democratic President's own views across-the-board and in detail, else the committees would lack solid ground from which to gauge the pleadings of departments and their clientele.[53] In 1953, the very senior chairman of a major House committee reportedly admonished an Administration witness, "don't expect us to start from scratch on what you people want. That's not the way we do things here—*you* draft the bills and *we* work them over."[54]

As that remark suggests, the Congress deals not in abstract ideas but in bills. It comes to grips with substance in terms of phraseology. The process cannot start without a draft. And since executive expertise is often indispensable, while executive wishes are data to be weighed—though quite conceivably ignored—a "downtown" draft has tangible advantage as the starting point. But more than drafting service is provided by contemporary presidential programs. Annual programming serves also to identify, to render timely, in effect to choose, most *legislative* issues on which serious attention is to center at a session; the President becomes agenda-setter for the Congress, the chief continuing initiator of subject-matter to reach actionable stages in committee and on the floor, whether or not ultimately passed. Of course, as Lawrence Chamberlain and others have made plain, most major measures are the product of long germination, much cross-fertilizing. Quite so; the service of contemporary Presidents has been less creativity than crystallization; a matter less of seeding new terrain than of tracing new lines in old ground, thereby to mark the field for current cultivation.

In this respect, the presidency is performing for the Congress a task apparently beyond that body's institutional capacity to carry on its own account. When one looks at the legislative record of the last decade, the major controversial measures brought to focus, debate, and near-passage or enactment on congressional initiative *alone*, are small scatteration relative to those highlighted by—or with assistance from—the President: most prominently, perhaps, the Taft-Hartley Act, the two McCarran Acts, and the perennial Bricker Amendment.[55] Of these, at least Taft-Hartley may be ascribed actually to a reverse

[53] An observation dating from the early part of the first session of the 80th Congress, as then reported to the writer by Taft's auditor.

[54] A remark made at an executive session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April, 1953, as reported to the writer by a committee member present. In question were the new Administration's views on form and character of legislation to extend the foreign aid program.

[55] Other items which reached the point of passage include the tax reduction measures of 1947 and 1948, the first tidelands bill in 1947, and the natural gas and basing point bills of 1949. Of course, there have been infinite numbers of amendments to, adjustments in—

sort of presidential initiative—Truman choosing *not* to propose action in an area where momentary public sensitivity was certain to evoke response of some sort from the 80th Congress. Indeed, such a "reverse" initiative on issues known to generate more current heat than a Congress was likely to withstand has relevance for other instances as well, if more a matter of necessity than choice in, say, the Bricker case. Of course, where heat is less intense, a withholding of the initiative is likely to be *directly* effectual. Had Eisenhower's 1954 program called, say, for substantial reform of the immigration laws, one may assume that facing an election there would have been a ruckus in the Congress; lacking a White House lead, reformers' efforts did not make a dent. In such cases, the presidential silences no less than statements may serve to delineate the actionable issues.

But note that setting an agenda is not the same thing as enforcing it; selecting issues for consideration is not equivalent to having bills enacted into law. For evidence one has but to review the course of any recent congressional session. As a matter of fact, the most institutionalized aspects of the President's involvement in the legislative process are precisely those least concerned with actual campaigning for his program once presented: legislative programming and legislative clearance, *not* legislative in-fighting and signal-calling, day-by-day. To be sure, periodic White House meetings with congressional party leaders have become the norm; agendas prepared for the President in Truman's time; minutes kept as well in Eisenhower's. And Eisenhower has established in his entourage an Army-type liaison operation, its several staff aides covering each corner of the Hill on regular patrols.[56] But formal leaders' sessions tend to be ambassadorial encounters; organized liaison tends to create its own chores, if not, indeed, to confuse liaisoners' loyalties. So far as one can judge from the outside, it remains true in Eisenhower's time—as in Truman's and F.D.R.'s before him—that when the chips are down, there is no substituting for the President's own footwork, his personal negotiation, his direct appeal, his voice and no other's on the telephone. Naturally, such methods cannot guarantee success; to overwork them would be self-defeating; to institutionalize them may well be impossible. Yet these, not programming devices, must bear the weight, provide the test, of presidential "domination" over Congress.

Indeed, a presidential purpose to control the congressional *product* may actually be impeded, not advanced, by legislative programming as presently

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and sheer denials of—Administration proposals, over the years, as matters of distinct congressional initiative, oppositional to presidential purposes or claimed intent. But these are in a different category. The fact that Presidents are now so largely raisers of the issues does not signify that they are safe from penalties for having done so; quite the contrary, both in and out of Congress.

[56] These liaison aides also engage in special forays on particular legislative and personality problems. Rarely if ever before has White House staff coverage of congressional moods, wishes, activities, and foot-dragging spread so wide, so consistently. Of course this enterprise has yet to stand the "acid test" of repetition in a new regime. Roosevelt, in his later years, and Truman were distinctly cool to organized, continuing staff effort of this sort.

evolved. Those massive, annual presentations have a tendency to blur the public impact of particulars, scatter attention, divert interest—as with Eisenhower's messages of 1954, or Truman's, year by year. Regularized repetition tends to dilute the dramatic, focussing effects of personal appearance and appeal. White House sponsorship spread wide tends to reduce the import of each presidential label. Manifold commitments tend to complicate the task of striking particular bargains. Multi-item programs tend to encourage score-keeping by parties, press, and public, ordinarily with the result of stressing losses over gains on a strict by-the-numbers basis.

For a President pledged to adventuring in controversial areas and anxious to obtain results at given sessions, these can be handicaps; a case in point is the Truman situation *circa* 1946 (or 1949). On the other hand, of course, a President desirous of holding new departures within bounds may find sufficient compensation in a practice which permits him to stress his program's sum more than its parts, to express caution on particulars in a context of general affirmation: Eisenhower's case, apparently, in 1954. And when a President is in a position to use Congress less as action-instrument than whipping-boy, the compensations may be great indeed; so Truman found before the 1948 election.

In Truman's second term there were some unavailing doubts expressed within his entourage about the practical advantage of proceeding, post-election and then post-Korea, with a presentation technique improvised initially for 1948. But Eisenhower's aides now seem entirely satisfied. "The program layout is a good thing for a President," one of them told the writer, "it keeps him from looking too negative when he has to oppose some grandiose scheme cooked up on the Hill. This way there's his own roster of affirmative positions to point back to . . . the country knows he's not just 'agin' things." Of course in Truman's years the shoe was mostly on the other foot, the "grandiose schemes" coming from the President, expressions of resistance from the Congress. One's aims and circumstances make one's case. It is quite understandable that skepticism should have grown in Truman's entourage after 1949, while dwindling in Eisenhower's after 1953. As a commentary on programming's variable contribution to the art of presidential leadership, that difference speaks volumes.

But whether or not always advantageous in those terms, the annual presidential inventory and its attendant mechanics have now become so rooted in responsibilities of office, so customary in the view of press and public, so satisfactory to the Congress, so institutionalized in the executive, that major alteration of the present pattern, much less its permanent abandonment, would appear no light matter for a President, nor likely. The present incumbent can be presumed to lack incentive for a break-away; quite the contrary, to judge from what occurred in 1953. Of course, one or another of his successors may not turn out so comfortably circumstanced—imagine F.D.R. in his first years encumbered by such ponderous proceedings. Yet that a future President could simply shoulder them aside remains improbable on all the evidence accumulated in the last decade. The F.D.R. of 1946 would have been subject to compulsions virtually unknown (or unrecognized) in 1933, many of his own making. And these

are backed now by accustomed practices each year becoming more entrenched —not only as responses to congressional and public expectations, but as prime means to policy decision and control in the executive. To disavow them now might be to trade more flexibility with Congress for fewer hand holds on departments—this difficulty among others.

Still, in such matters these are never certainties. Conceivably, the time will come when a new President, pressing the Congress hard for measures of great moment and high controversy, finds it imperative to dramatize that enterprise by ostentatiously departing from the tradition of formal, comprehensive programs. Past Presidents have focussed national attention on their aims by introducing novelties in presentation: Wilson's recapture—and F.D.R.'s resumption—of the personal appearance before Congress; Roosevelt's special messages, bill drafts, and fireside chats. Now that all prior innovations have been lumped together into customary practice, what else remains for innovation's sake, than its abandonment? A paradox, perhaps, but paradoxes have been commonplace in the development of legislative programming.

V. PRESIDENCY AND LEGISLATION: AN AFTERWORD

In this paper, together with its predecessor on the growth of legislative clearance, an effort has been made to trace the institutionalization of certain aspects of the President's role in the legislative process, involving essentially elaboration of three constitutional prerogatives: his duty to recommend, his power to veto, and his right to the opinions of department heads. Among other things, this tracing can be taken as a case study in presidential staff development. And while that has not been the major purpose of these papers, a few notations on the point appear in order by way of addendum to them both.

Two things emerge from the whole history of legislative staff work in this area: First, there are no laws requiring a President to build or use the staff facilities as actually evolved, or any other, for that matter; the growth which has occurred and now survives has been organic, not a graft. Second, the central feature of that growth is nicely balanced interaction between an intimately associated member of the personal entourage and a particular segment of the institutional entourage, the latter constantly in touch with other segments and with agencies—on the one hand, the Special Counsel to the President, and on the other, Budget's office of Legislative Reference.

With regard to the lack of legal form, contrast the Budget Bureau as originally established in-but-not-of Treasury, or the Council of Economic Advisers, or the National Security Resources Board of recent memory, or the National Security Council, each thrust into the presidential orbit from outside, fixed in form and in form changeable only by act or acquiescence of the Congress. Experience with all those organizations suggests the relative inflexibility, sheer awkwardness, of such arrangements amidst changing circumstances, needs, and Presidents: the Budget finally dislodged from the Treasury after eighteen years of ambiguity; the CEA worked into satisfactory patterns of association after seven years of internal uncertainty and external hostility, or plain indifference;

the NSRB painfully evolving, first by statute, then attrition, finally disestablishment, from a cabinet committee to a staff unit differently empowered and differently named; the NSC growing in stature—possibly more than utility—ever since the Soviets' first atomic explosion, and thereafter subjected to much mechanical tinkering in efforts, so far vain (a judgment from outside), to make a cabinet mechanism approximate staff.[57]

That CEA's *external* relations were ultimately altered quite informally in 1953, that NSC may yet be turned, somehow, into a staff equivalent—such things would simply seem to reinforce the point. New times and new personalities are bound to call forth adaptations in the presidency's ways and means; power *without* organizational prescription makes the process infinitely easier and—to judge from legislative programming and clearance spheres—the product no less adequate. Naturally, there are numbers of pragmatic reasons why Congresses and sometimes Presidents may be attracted or impelled toward statutory forms, but one doubts there are any reasons justifying cheers from political scientists. In terms of organization for policy "development," "coordination," and "control," it might be well to let our Presidents alone; here is an instance where they have not done so badly.

Turning to that other aspect of legislative staff work, the interaction between White House and institutional aides, note the careful balancing of functions and relationships. Legislative Reference can assure the Special Counsel ample research and negotiatory assistance, ready-to-hand, for purposes of planning or reviewing legislation. He, in turn, can assure Legislative Reference a direct channel to the President, a steady source of political advice, and, as need be, political protection or a place to pass the buck. He keeps his intimacy as a personal assistant, without the incubus of a large staff; Legislative Reference keeps its distance as an institutional establishment, without losing close contact. Legislative Reference also retains independence as executor of its own (technically, the Budget's) presidential mandate, serving other members of the

[57] The Budget Bureau, originally created in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, was formally transferred to the newly-established Executive Office of the President by congressionally-approved reorganization plan in 1939. The Council of Economic Advisers, established under the Employment Act of 1946, was revised by reorganization plan in 1953 to the extent of vesting administrative powers and advisory responsibilities in the chairman rather than the membership. Some changes in CEA's external relationships were accomplished less formally at the same time. The National Security Resources Board, created by the National Security Act of 1947, was altered by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 which transferred all administrative and advisory powers from the ex-officio departmental members to the presidentially-appointed chairman. In December, 1950, NSRB's post-Korean coordinating powers were transferred by executive order to the Office of Defense Mobilization, established for the purpose by the President. In 1953, remaining NSRB functions went to ODM by reorganization plan. The National Security Council was also established by the National Security Act of 1947. Its heightened activity after 1949 followed a significant legal change, reduction of the Pentagon's statutory membership from four to one (and statutory addition of the Vice-President) by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. Since then, there have been various non-statutory elaborations of working membership and methods.

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are backed now by accustomed practices each year becoming more entrenched —not only as responses to congressional and public expectations, but as prime means to policy decision and control in the executive. To disavow them now might be to trade more flexibility with Congress for fewer hand holds on departments—this difficulty among others.

Still, in such matters these are never certainties. Conceivably, the time will come when a new President, pressing the Congress hard for measures of great moment and high controversy, finds it imperative to dramatize that enterprise by ostentatiously departing from the tradition of formal, comprehensive programs. Past Presidents have focussed national attention on their aims by introducing novelties in presentation: Wilson's recapture—and F.D.R.'s resumption—of the personal appearance before Congress; Roosevelt's special messages, bill drafts, and fireside chats. Now that all prior innovations have been lumped together into customary practice, what else remains for innovation's sake, than its abandonment? A paradox, perhaps, but paradoxes have been commonplace in the development of legislative programming.

V. PRESIDENCY AND LEGISLATION: AN AFTERWORD

In this paper, together with its predecessor on the growth of legislative clearance, an effort has been made to trace the institutionalization of certain aspects of the President's role in the legislative process, involving essentially elaboration of three constitutional prerogatives: his duty to recommend, his power to veto, and his right to the opinions of department heads. Among other things, this tracing can be taken as a case study in presidential staff development. And while that has not been the major purpose of these papers, a few notations on the point appear in order by way of addendum to them both.

Two things emerge from the whole history of legislative staff work in this area: First, there are no laws requiring a President to build or use the staff facilities as actually evolved, or any other, for that matter; the growth which has occurred and now survives has been organic, not a graft. Second, the central feature of that growth is nicely balanced interaction between an intimately associated member of the personal entourage and a particular segment of the institutional entourage, the latter constantly in touch with other segments and with agencies—on the one hand, the Special Counsel to the President, and on the other, Budget's office of Legislative Reference.

With regard to the lack of legal form, contrast the Budget Bureau as originally established in-but-not-of Treasury, or the Council of Economic Advisers, or the National Security Resources Board of recent memory, or the National Security Council, each thrust into the presidential orbit from outside, fixed in form and in form changeable only by act or acquiescence of the Congress. Experience with all those organizations suggests the relative inflexibility, sheer awkwardness, of such arrangements amidst changing circumstances, needs, and Presidents: the Budget finally dislodged from the Treasury after eighteen years of ambiguity; the CEA worked into satisfactory patterns of association after seven years of internal uncertainty and external hostility, or plain indifference;

the NSRB painfully evolving, first by statute, then attrition, finally disestablishment, from a cabinet committee to a staff unit differently empowered and differently named; the NSC growing in stature—possibly more than utility—ever since the Soviets' first atomic explosion, and thereafter subjected to much mechanical tinkering in efforts, so far vain (a judgment from outside), to make a cabinet mechanism approximate staff.[57]

That CEA's *external* relations were ultimately altered quite informally in 1953, that NSC may yet be turned, somehow, into a staff equivalent—such things would simply seem to reinforce the point. New times and new personalities are bound to call forth adaptations in the presidency's ways and means; power *without* organizational prescription makes the process infinitely easier and—to judge from legislative programming and clearance spheres—the product no less adequate. Naturally, there are numbers of pragmatic reasons why Congresses and sometimes Presidents may be attracted or impelled toward statutory forms, but one doubts there are any reasons justifying cheers from political scientists. In terms of organization for policy "development," "coordination," and "control," it might be well to let our Presidents alone; here is an instance where they have not done so badly.

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COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF NON-WESTERN COUNTRIES*

GEORGE MCT. KAHIN, *Cornell University;* GUY J. PAUKER, *Harvard University;* AND LUCIAN W. PYE, *Princeton University*

There is wide recognition that in the non-Western world profound social and cultural changes are taking place as traditional societies have been exposed to the ideas and the ways of the West. There is also general agreement that new political patterns and relationships are evolving in these countries. However, with respect to most non-Western countries, it remains difficult to foresee whether the consequences of social change are to be stable, viable political practices or endemic instabilities in government. In many cases, it is still an open question whether the future will bring them a liberal democratic form of politics or some type of authoritarian rule such as communism.

This state of affairs can be a challenge to the comparative method of political analysis. This is particularly so because most of the non-Western political systems have many features in common. They are generally the product of a traditional past in which the administration of government was the preserve of a select few. Many show the influence of a previous colonial rule, some even that of the same country. More important, they are often quite self-conscious about the problem of moving from a definite past to an idealized future. In looking to the future, most of them see themselves developing in the same general direction: toward some variant of the Western model of government and politics. All of them feel it necessary to have in time parliaments, cabinets, political parties, and institutions which had their origin in the West. Even when not impressed by Western ideals, they seek to adopt concrete Western practices and techniques. To the student of comparative politics, this suggests such questions as: Why does one country tend to develop in one direction and another in a different one? Why are some Western practices or institutions more fully followed than others? And why in some cases are there roughly congruent patterns of development?

The pace of change in most of these countries during the last decade has been such as to make these questions matters for empirical investigation and not just speculation. The fact that many of these societies have set for themselves targets of achievement makes more conspicuous the actual record of their progress. Of course, it is not for the student of comparative politics to set up the model of Western politics as the standard these countries ought to follow.

* This paper was prepared by a sub-committee of the Committee on Research in Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. While Guy J. Pauker and Lucian W. Pye acted at different times as rapporteurs, the paper resulted from group deliberations and all three authors shared equally in producing it.

By the term "non-Western" the sub-committee has in mind those areas of the Far East, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America which are in various stages of reaction to the introduction of Western institutions and practices.

However, he can find methodological advantages in the fact that many of these societies have accepted particular Western institutions and practices as their explicit goals for development. At the same time, the researcher must be aware that the Western model is far from an unambiguous one. His task, as will be seen, includes discovering the numerous ways in which the West has been perceived by different peoples.

The distinctive characteristic of the non-Western societies is not just that they are in a process of change. Indeed, the incidence of change in many fields may be far greater in Western industrial societies. The important fact is that outside the West the transitions are far more abrupt and the contrasts with the recent past are far sharper. For several generations, Western influences have been working on the traditional societies and the results are cultural conflicts that have as yet not been resolved. In most of the non-Western societies, there are spheres in which Western influences dominate, while there are others that have hardly been touched. Change has thus been a far from uniform process; it has produced divisions and cleavages which affect the political life of the entire country. An extreme example of such a division, to be found in most of these societies, is the attempt by people who speak and think in a Western language to share a common political destiny with tradition-bound peasants.

This is, of course, the problem that makes the politics of non-Western countries a distinct category for study. It is, however, only at the most general level that we can speak of the non-Western societies as having this common problem. At such a level of generality, it is necessary to ignore the rich varieties of traditional cultures and also to overlook the numerous different ways in which Western influences have been introduced into these societies. Thus, although the basic category of tradition-oriented societies can be of great help in posing the essential problem for comparative study, once analysis begins it is necessary to become sensitive to the differences among cultural heritages. Traditional forms have a life of their own and certainly by no means all of them have been weakened by Western influences. The old is not simply being replaced by the new; the resilient forces of tradition are capable of rejecting and modifying many Western patterns.

Likewise, the particular historical conditions under which Western methods and ideas have been introduced in the different non-Western societies are relevant in explaining comparative developments. There are, first of all, differences in the auspices under which Western influences were introduced. In some cases, the agent was Western rule in the form of colonialism; in others, it was the activities of private Western individuals and organizations. In still other cases, the Western impact was mediated through a native elite. There are, secondly, differences in the spheres of life in which the Western influences were most clearly felt. In some cases, it was directly at the level of government; in others it was mainly in such fields as education, commerce, or religion that Western practices and ideas made the initial inroads. Thirdly, there have been differences in the intensity and the duration of Western influences. Some traditional societies have been exposed to Western ideas for a long period of time,

but only in a mild form, while in others the impact has been of a vigorous character over a short span of years.

Such differences as these must be respected in attempting comparative studies of the current politics of particular non-Western societies. They are the first factors that must be recognized in seeking to understand the different patterns of development.

I. THE POLITICAL PROCESS

We have suggested that the comparative method may be most fruitfully employed in the task of understanding differences in the developmental tendencies of non-Western countries. We would now like to suggest that the researcher concerned with this general problem can best proceed by viewing the politics of the different non-Western countries as a process in which definite groups and individuals have various political roles. The direction in which the politics of a country will develop over time is likely to be determined largely by the day-to-day interaction of the various elements that make up its political processes. This is not to deny the value of more specialized studies of particular institutions or political groups. However, in order to foresee the general direction of development in such countries, it is necessary to appraise the significance of such particular elements in the total complex of their political life.

In proposing that studies be made of the total political processes of non-Western countries, we are encouraging an approach that has been of value in understanding Western politics, and more especially American politics. At the same time, we would like to indicate that there are some differences between the political process in the West and that in the non-Western societies. These differences should guide the researcher and condition his expectations.

In the first place, the political process in most non-Western countries is characterized by a high rate of recruitment of new elements into political activity. These societies are developing out of a past in which their governmental activities were limited primarily to the actions of traditional autocratic rulers or the few practitioners of colonial rule. Under these conditions, there was restricted participation in the making of political decisions, at least above the village level. Popular discussion of the values and ends for which the administrative machinery might be legitimately used was not sanctioned. In the traditional autocratic societies, officials were guided primarily by inherited values and considerations. In societies with a colonial past, major decisions were made either in the mother country, by a government responsive to a different political process, or by colonial administrators who viewed themselves as technicians of government and not as politicians. In both cases, there was no formally recognized arena for the discussion of public policy or for the open clash of political forces. There was instead a quite informal and highly personal form of politics, characterized by family solidarity, a high degree of nepotism, forms of favoritism, intrigues, cliques, and "getting the ear" of officials who controlled the administration.

At present, these societies are experiencing an expansion of the area of

recognized political activity. Increasingly, people who do not belong to the administrative apparatus are becoming involved in influencing public policy. Many of them have new ideas about the direction in which their societies should develop and on how the machinery of government should be employed. Differences in the conditions under which the new participants are being introduced to political action can lead to differences in attitudes among them.

This leads to a second characteristic of most non-Western political processes: the lack of consensus about the legitimate forms and purposes of political activities. The fundamental cultural conflict between traditional beliefs and Western influences has gone far toward destroying the earlier bases of political consensus, and the increasing number of participants complicates the conscious attempts at developing a new consensus.

One of the basic problems for the researcher, then, is to analyze the forces that may be most significant in contributing to or disrupting the evolution of a new pattern of consensus. He will be concerned with discovering the distribution of attitudes and behavior which may in time become institutionalized, and which will provide compatible orientations on the appropriateness of means and ends of political activity.

It should be noted that in some non-Western societies having Westernized leaders there may appear to be a stronger basic consensus than actually exists. The disappearance of a particular leader may reveal that the people have been held together only by their common response to a charismatic personality. In several of the newly independent countries of South and Southeast Asia, we may be observing a high point of political stability now. In the future, as charismatic leaders die or their charisma wears thin, there may be a period of greater fluctuation before a more impersonal form of consensus can be achieved.

The prevalence of charismatic leaders is a third characteristic of most non-Western political processes. There are several reasons why charismatic leaders are likely to appear in such societies. The cohesive force in the nationalist movement in the newly independent countries often requires such a form of leadership. At a more fundamental level, the process of breaking from a traditional past creates attitudes that are strongly inclined toward accepting charismatic leaders. Indigenous ruling houses and aristocracies are rapidly losing, or have already lost, an authority sanctioned by supernatural beliefs. A withering of the deep emotional roots of respect for traditional authority is taking place which leaves habits of obedience free-floating, in search of new attachments. In the meantime, the slow spreading of education of a rational character and the scarcity of media of mass communication retard the development of a new consensus based primarily on intellectual persuasion. In such periods of transition, charismatic leaders are likely to fill the vacuum.

A fourth difference between the political process in the West and that in non-Western societies is that in the latter there is likely to be a lower degree of integration in the actions of the participants. Indeed, in some non-Western societies there appear to be several nearly autonomous political processes. In particular, there may be little relationship between the political activities that

take place at the village level and those that occur at the national level. Communications may hardly exist between the national elite and the local leaders, and the great masses of the population may only vaguely comprehend the policies of the national goverment. However, as the scope of governmental activities broadens, more policies expressing the political roles of the urban elite are likely to have an impact on the life of the villagers. The area of decision-making that was previously based on local consensus may be narrowed. In the absence of direct participation of the masses in the political process at the national level, the pressures from the central government and the capital are likely to clash with the local forces. These clashes may, however, be absorbed and reconciled by an intermediate group of leaders, adept at understanding and mediating between the two sets of positions. The researcher should give particular attention to the role of these "middlemen."

A fifth general difference is that the actors in the political process in Western societies are likely to have more clearly defined and more specific roles than those in non-Western societies. In the latter, with less complete divisions of labor, there is generally a high degree of substitutability of roles. Thus, in some such countries military elites can become governments, while in others scholars —regardless of their field of competence—become rulers and administrators. The researcher should be aware that in non-Western societies many of the politically active people do not necessarily act according to a narrow definition of their functional roles. In non-Western societies, particular individuals may have many different and even apparently contradictory roles, and thus it is often difficult to predict how such individuals are likely to behave with respect to specific issues.

Another closely related difference is that the political process in the West is generally composed of more formally and explicitly organized interests than is the case in non-Western countries. For example, in American politics there are few interests that are not formally represented by some form of organization. In contrast, the researcher should expect to find in non-Western countries a far greater degree of informality and many interests unrepresented by concrete associations.

Finally, a general characteristic of the political process in non-Western countries is that all the potential political elements do not usually manifest themselves in a continuous manner. There is thus an element of latency in the politics of such countries, with many aspirant elites able to enter the political arena only in a sudden, erratic, and often violent way. The possibility of unorganized and generally inarticulate segments of the society suddenly finding expression contributes to the potentially explosive nature of politics in some non-Western countries. In the West, regardless of how weak they may be, most potential interests are manifest in the political process and thus a continuous form of adjustment of relative power is possible. In some non-Western countries, the peasants, for example, have no way of constantly indicating their political demands, and the result can be sporadic peasant revolts of great violence, reminiscent of the *Jacquerie* in earlier European political development.

Similarly, mob action can occur in urban centers. Once these forms of political behavior have spent themselves, they may again disappear from the active political arena.

These, then, are some of the distinctive characteristics of the political process in non-Western countries. They may serve as helpful hypotheses for guiding the researcher. They suggest that, in general, he will find the political process in such countries less stable and less predictable than the form of politics he knows in the West. In his field work, he will be concerned with discovering how these systems tend to operate and what their future course of development is likely to be.

II. THE FIELD WORKER'S PROBLEM: A STARTING POINT

The question of the desirable training a researcher should have before he goes into the field is beyond the scope of this paper. Presumably, he is a political scientist interested in comparative politics. His general intellectual equipment should include a familiarity with the theories and techniques of modern social science. He will benefit from an awareness of the insights and logic of legal and institutional analysis, and the theories and methods of anthropology and sociology. Most important of all, he should be familiar with the recent literature dealing more specifically with political behavior.

In terms of the particular area he intends to study, the more he knows of its geography and history, its political, economic, and social organization, and its literary heritage, the better. Such background preparation should permit him to spend the period of initial adjustment in the field in reviewing his knowledge and testing his stereotypes against the impressions conveyed by reality.

After this early start at getting the "feel" of the country, the question arises as to what would be the most useful starting-point for the study of the political process. Several considerations suggest that it might be desirable to begin by a survey of the governmental structure. Since traditional political science was concerned primarily with such matters, it may be presumed that in the literature on the country he will already have been introduced to its general outline and its historical antecedents. He will now be trying to determine the place of the formal government and its administrative apparatus in the country's political life. He will, of course, be fully aware that the governmental structure may have little relationship to the main currents of politics in the country. There is, indeed, in most non-Western countries, a façade quality about governmental structures, particularly those that have been adopted from the West. Structures can be copied—and often are, owing to their formal attractiveness—but in most cases it remains to be seen whether they will perform the same functions in the new settings. The researcher should try to ascertain to what purposes the formal institutions are in fact being put. In particular, he should be alert to the variety of functions to which similar structures can be adapted in different countries. Thus, for example, cabinet appointments in one country may be used for the same patronage purposes that postmasterships or ambassadorships are in another, with the result that the function of the cabinet is something other than

the making of important decisions. Parliaments need not perform a representative role; they may be a helpful device for facilitating the personal politics of an elite.

Notwithstanding these considerations, the researcher should seek to ascertain the actual role that the formal government does play. Regardless of how weak these structures may be, it is still of great importance to determine what their real role is in the making of decisions. In the case of former colonial countries, many of them did have highly-developed administrative services. These were often directed by technicians concerned primarily with rational efficiency, in terms, of course, of the colonial power's interests. The question arises as to what changes may have taken place in their operations with the increase in popular participation in politics. The effects of such general political activities on the administrative apparatus may foreshadow the direction of future developments.

There are three techniques which the researcher may find helpful in trying to understand the place and function of the formal structure of government in the political life of the country. By using any of these techniques, the researcher should also be able to accumulate data that will be of value for a more detailed study of the country's political process.

The first approach is that of making a few simple case studies of how important governmental decisions have been or are being made. It is not expected that he should make a detailed or complete appraisal of all the forces that may have played a part in producing the decision. Rather, he will be seeking to determine how those in the government as such and competent outside observers explain the way in which the decision was made. From such case studies, the student will be able to form a better estimate of the actual importance of officials and departments of government. He will also be learning about the important sources of political influence outside the government.

The second technique can be called the line approach, in which the field worker seeks to determine the fate of a policy decision through the channels of administration. In particular, he will be concerned with the relationship of officials at the national level with those at the provincial and the village level. Through such an exercise, the field worker may learn something of the extent to which affairs at the local level proceed independently of actions at the national capital. He may also discover the ways in which the local officials are responsive to both grassroots opinion and the dictates of national politics. Thus he may begin to test hypotheses about the existence of several almost autonomous political processes and the possible relationships among them. He will be in a better position to appraise the extent to which the national elite is representative of the local elements.

A third approach for estimating the place of the formal government in the broader politics of the society is that of testing the actions of the government against the social functions governments generally are expected to perform for a society. One such function is the maintenance of law and order and the guarantee of a degree of basic physical security for the individual. Another function is

that of providing various forms of public services and carrying out programs of public works. Certain problems of social welfare are also usually considered a concern of governments. With a list of such functions in mind, the researcher may observe the extent to which the particular formal government he is studying actually performs these functions for the society, and the extent to which they are taken care of informally outside of governmental channels. It is as dangerous to underestimate the role of formal government in some non-Western countries as it is to overestimate it. As a result of his appraisal of what functions the formal government does or does not perform, he will have a better idea of its position in the total society.

III. GROUPS AND INSTRUMENTALITIES

Having mapped the governmental structure and observed it in action, the researcher will have prepared himself for an examination of the broader political process. He must now turn to the people who through their behavior will determine not only the fate of particular institutions but also the future form of political development in the country. To do this, he must identify the important actors or groups who make up the political process. He should be guided by his previous knowledge about the particular society, his awareness of the types of groups which political scientists have generally found to be important in other societies, and what he learns from observation once he arrives in the field. It can be expected that he will start with the groups which are most conspicuous in the political life of the country, and in the process of his more detailed investigation he may come across others that are more important than is generally recognized.

By groups we mean not only special interest groups but also functionally or analytically distinguishable elements in the society that are composed of individuals who because of their roles, their functions, and their backgrounds are likely to have a common orientation toward politics. A group may be formally organized or not even informally united. Indeed, as indicated above, one of the characteristics of the political process in most non-Western countries is that there are few explicitly organized and fully manifest groups.

In many non-Western countries, it is necessary to consider as forming politically active groups those persons who hold positions in what are viewed in the West as the relatively neutral instrumentalities of government. Armies and civil bureaucracies may seek to dominate directly the country's political life and not recognize any limits to their role in making decisions. Outside the government, there may be few institutions that seek a politically impartial role. Even the ideals of an unbiased press or a non-political school system may not be recognized. Thus the distinctions between pressure groups and the agencies or instrumentalities of government may not exist.

In most non-Western societies, there are groups that are not to be found in the West. And, of course, groups named after their Western counterparts may have quite different political roles. The list of groups the researcher makes will depend upon the country he is studying. Researchers in different countries

need not adopt the same list; the purposes of comparison will be satisfied if the same general approach is used. The following groups are cited for illustrative purposes.

Westernized intellectuals and students. Westernized intellectuals may be assumed to be of peculiar importance as the transmitters of new ideas and attitudes in non-Western societies. It is thus of particular significance to determine how they are employed in the society and whether they constitute a generally recognized element in the country's political life. It should be noted that in spite of their exposure to Western ideas, they may not always be in direct conflict with the traditional elites. Also, a sense of personal frustration can be a major factor in determining their political activities. Through their introduction to Western knowledge, they may have been imbued with democratic ideals for their country's development but may in time have become discouraged and impatient with persisting conditions. The inability of the society to absorb them on the basis of their talents and skills can encourage them to champion extremist movements. Also, in many non-Western societies, university students have an active role in influencing the general climate of political opinion and occasionally in the actual making of political decisions. Strengthened by the culture's deference to learning and knowledge and often coming from well-to-do families, students of such countries have a more direct role in politics than do their Western counterparts.

Parliamentarians. In many non-Western societies, those who held elective posts or who have been appointed to legislative positions may not play the role of representing public opinion or of participating in policy-making in any direct sense. However, their actions in attempting to give weight to their positions may do much to determine the fate of representative institutions in the country.

Party leaders and professional politicians. The task of organizing and holding together political parties appears to be a peculiarly difficult one in many non-Western countries. The attempt to make parties into something more than just the personal followings of individuals requires the acceptance of impersonal standards of allegiance that may be foreign to the culture. Indeed, the basic cultural conflict within these societies (and within the minds of the individuals who make them up) means that those who would organize democratic parties must have extraordinary skills. They must seek to communicate their values and their policy views in a way that is meaningful to the diverse elements in the society. The difficulties in creating political parties are emphasized by the fact that few non-Western countries have effective opposition parties to challenge those who control the government.

Military and police. It is, of course, generally well recognized that in most non-Western countries the military and the police play a far more important political role than do their Western counterparts. Army leaders have few of the organizational and allegiance problems of party politicians. The very nature of a military organization means that the army is often the only disciplined group in the country capable of effective action.

Civil servants and bureaucrats. The process of change that has brought about increased public participation in politics has placed the civil officials in many

non-Western countries in an ambivalent position. Many of them were trained to their roles under conditions of autocratic rule. Their personal prestige was maintained by the power of a colonial government or an autocratic ruler. In redefining their sense of loyalty, they may look outside the structure of the government service. It will be important to determine how the relationships within the bureaucratic hierarchy are conceived. The extent to which these are mainly of either a personal or an impersonal nature can suggest much about the likelihood of the country's developing a politically neutral civil service.

Village leaders. These may be appointed headmen, traditional chiefs, or simply informal leaders. The importance of looking for the differences between their attitudes and those at the national level has already been mentioned.

Communicators. These are the people who perform functions in the mass media or who in the semi-literate areas have the role of providing information about public affairs. The manner in which they tend to structure issues and their points of view are important factors in the political process. It should be noted that in many non-Western countries there are several communication systems, since the mass media do not directly reach large segments of the population. Moreover, in the West the mass media generally can perform the function of presenting information about issues, so that both the masses and the more politically sophisticated can to a significant extent form their own judgments in spite of differences in the manner in which they conceptualize about politics. Of course, there are exceptions, and among both intellectuals and non-intellectuals there are those who feel insecure until they learn the position of particular journalists or newspapers. However, in many non-Western countries, where particularistic attitudes are common, many more people tend to depend upon certain definite sources of information for their opinions. Also, language barriers within a country and high rates of illiteracy may make the mass media incomprehensible to large numbers of people, who have to depend upon more informal sources for their information.

This is only a partial list, suggesting the types of groups we have in mind. Other equally important groups include the peasantry, the educators, religious leaders, the nobility, economic elites, the merchants, labor leaders, trade guilds, and the secret societies. A group important in one political setting may not be essential to the political process in another; thus the groups to be studied cannot be determined except by finding out empirically which ones do in fact have roles which make them a significant part of the political process.

After the field worker has identified the important groups, he will want to analyze the manner in which each of them is oriented to politics. To do this, he will have to obtain answers to the following types of questions:

1. How do they view their own role in politics?

How do they identify their own interests? What values do they seek through political action? What sacrifices do they feel they are making by being politically active? What is their sense of political responsibility? How do they conceive of the gap between aspiration and reality? Whom do they consider to be their political enemies, and why?

2. How do they understand the operation of the political process?

How do they explain political developments? Is it the work of a few men behind the scenes? The work of "fate"? Of moral law?

3. What is their concept of "skill" in politics?

What means of influencing others do they consider to be most effective? Who do they think has to be influenced? What are the foolish kinds of political acts? What are the socially unpermissible ways of behaving politically? What ways have social sanction?

Here again we are only suggesting the types of questions that the researcher will be interested in answering. In order to obtain his answers, he will have to observe the behavior of the various groups in terms of their responses to current and actual political issues. His first lead is how members of the various groups stand on the issues. He should try to determine what the "logic" is behind their position. It is to be expected that he will be interviewing members of the various groups and that, in doing so, he will seek to find out what their expectations are about the behavior of the members of other groups. From such questioning, he will obtain the data necessary for understanding how they view the political process.

A second major category of questions to be asked about the identified groups has to do with the means by which they command influence. It goes without saying that unless a group does have some ways of influencing others, it can have little effect on the country's political development. It should also be noted that the means a group does have for influencing others may be a major factor in conditioning its entire orientation toward politics. The fact that a particular group is unable to command any of the recognized and institutionalized means of political influence in the society may encourage it to adopt extreme and unpredictable measures. One of the characteristics of many non-Western societies is that there are only a few generally recognized instruments of political influence and these are the monopoly of a small elite. The researcher should be particularly sensitive to the fact that with the changes in social and class structure now taking place in many non-Western areas, there are likely to be many changes in the form and types of influence on the society. Certain techniques of influence may be losing their effectiveness, while others are now possible. Increases in literacy can bring about changes in the ability of various groups to capture a mass following.

With these considerations in mind, the researcher will seek to answer the following types of questions: At what levels of the administrative apparatus do the different groups seek to influence policy decisions? Do most of the groups seek to bring pressures to bear at the same general level, or do some groups work mainly at one level, while others work at another? Is it significant if most people ignore the legislators in order to concentrate on particular members of the bureaucracy? Do most groups ignore the formal apparatus almost entirely and seek to maintain their influence and realize their objectives by other means? Are some groups seeking to develop new forms of influence? Who controls the media of mass communication? Who has command of the various forms of violence?

Since we are interested in the future development of politics in the country being studied, we are also concerned with the stability of the particular groups and the expectations that they will in time change their character. This means that the researcher should be concerned with the recruitment processes of the separate groups. Thus, although certain traditional groups may at the moment still have great influence, the researcher should be careful to note whether these groups are still able to obtain suitable recruits and whether these young recruits have the same orientation as the older leaders. Also, for the more Westernized groups, there may be great differences between those who first became politically active and those who are following in their footsteps. For example, it might be expected that those political groups formed by Westernized leaders during the period of colonial rule might change their character as in time they fall under the control of others who have been Westernized but were not a part of the struggle against the colonial power.

The manner in which new members are recruited into the various groups is particularly significant in those non-Western societies where there is an increasing demand for popular participation in political activities. How easy is it for individuals to become recruited? How strong a commitment is expected? How knowledgeable about political matters do they have to be in order to become active? It should be recognized that the conditions under which the individuals are introduced to the idea of political action may have an effect on their subsequent political behavior. Those who are introduced to political action through the exigencies of war and social chaos are likely to have somewhat different notions about politics than are those who learn about proper standards of political behavior in civics courses.

IV. THE DYNAMIC FACTORS

It will have been noted that in the above discussion we have been interested in the characteristics of groups both as a means for understanding the behavior of particular groups and as a guide to the more general characteristics of the political process as a whole. This follows from our initial assumption that the nature of a country's political process is determined largely by the interaction of the various actors in it. Thus, out of the behavior and attitudes of these groups in their relationships with each other come the patterns and norms that make for distinctive types of political processes.

We would like now to suggest four particular attributes of groups which appear to be the most significant in producing different types of political processes. We feel that these four dynamic factors may be critical in shaping the future form of politics in most non-Western countries, and that an analysis of them can assist the researcher in foreseeing what are likely to be the "rules of the game."

First, there are the *interests* which are basic in determining and defining the actors. Second, there are the *issues* which appear to be of predominant importance in the country at the time of study. The field worker will be looking for those issues which evoke the maximum sense of involvement and which few

groups or individuals who are significant in the political process feel are unimportant. Third, there are the *values* which are conceptions of the desirable, influencing the behavior of individuals and groups who are or might become significant in the political process. Fourth, there are the political *styles* of those active in the process. These are blends of the rational and the emotional which characterize the approach of individuals or groups to political action and which influence the techniques and skills that they develop in trying to realize political success.

Interests. In the process of identifying the groups, the field worker will have been determining what types of special interests are represented in the country's political process. The types of interests and the terms in which groups tend to define their interests can suggest a great deal about the kinds of political relationships that are likely to appear in the society.

In the case of non-Western societies, it is particularly important to note whether the interests that are most effectively represented in the political arena are mainly those common to the traditional social order or those that are the product of social change. The emergence of new social and economic classes as the result of the Western impact may create interests that are still unorganized. Thus, for example, an industrial wage-earning class may not as yet have effective trade unions to represent its interests, and the workers may continue to see their political interests in terms of more traditional associations.

If important groupings in the society view their interests in terms of ascriptive considerations, such as racial or ethnic differences, or according to strict class distinctions, there may be great difficulties in achieving harmonious adjustment. These concepts of interests may lead to rigid attitudes and deep tensions that can dominate the political life of the country.

In many non-Western countries, the interests of a national elite in creating a greater degree of centralization can clash with sectional interests and produce separatist movements or demands for greater local autonomy. The underdeveloped nature of communication and transportation systems in some countries may serve to strengthen traditional provincial loyalties. Thus, in spite of strong nationalistic currents among the urbanized elites, there may be less apparent but equally significant counter-forces in the areas distant from the capital.

The ability of groups to conceive of their interests as transcending narrow class or personal considerations can also affect the operation of the political process. The researcher should be particularly alert to the tendencies of groups to conceive of their interests in relation to generalizable objectives that may directly benefit more than just the immediate members of the group. In many non-Western countries, the hope for a democratic form of politics depends largely upon the appearance of more groups capable of respecting such broader interests while at the same time working for the well-being of their members.

Issues. When we ask the field worker to ascertain the issues important to those who are politically involved in a country, we do not have in mind that he should be searching for the fundamental problems which may be common to

all societies. Rather, we have in mind the problems which at a particular time generate the concrete questions that dominate the political life of the country. Therefore, we expect that he will find the issues which the greatest number of people have the strongest feeling about, and which affect either the setting of the political process or important elements in it.

The particular issues themselves may sometimes be of great importance in understanding and predicting developments in a country's political life. In such cases, the researcher would be interested in analyzing how these issues have arisen and how they are likely to be resolved. For example, the issue may concern the organization of the formal apparatus of government, a constitutional problem. The very existence of such an issue can become a primary factor in determining an important feature in the future political setting. On the other hand, an issue regarding a course of policy which, if carried out, would destroy the political power of particular groups may be of equal intensity.

However, whether or not the people in a society feel that they are faced with issues of such dimensions, it is still important for the researcher to try to isolate those questions which are recognized as most important. He will need to do this in order to be able to collect his data on how individuals and groups are oriented toward politics. In most cases, people can express their attitudes and expectations about politics only by discussing concrete issues. Thus, in carrying out interviews, it is usually necessary to question respondents in terms of particular issues meaningful to them. From their responses it is possible to discover evidence of what kind of logic they use in thinking about political action and how they tend to formulate their conclusions.

In addition to the significance of particular issues for analyzing political behavior in general, the very quantity of important issues may be a significant factor in characterizing the political process. The prevalence of a large number of apparently minor or secondary issues may mean that certain fundamental questions which sharply divide the society are being avoided, at least for the time being. Many potential interests are not effectively organized while, of course, existing elites may artificially create issues as one of their means of maintaining power.

Values. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of value theories. However, since the distinctive feature of non-Western politics as a field for study is the basic cultural conflict taking place in these areas, the researcher must be especially sensitive to problems related to changing value patterns in the society. He should realize that these changes may be only imperfectly and irrationally mirrored in the political life of the country.

The problems of studying values empirically and systematically have been covered in the recent literature of anthropology. Only a few points of guidance to the field worker can be attempted here.

The researcher should be aware that the value patterns of a culture may not always form systems and can be just congeries. Thus, when he finds certain changes in some spheres of behavior which suggest the adoption of Western values, he should not come to the conclusion that in other spheres traditional

values have necessarily been greatly weakened. What appear to the researcher as anachronisms may or may not be the source of real tension.

The researcher will be aided if and when symbols and slogans have been formulated and are currently used in making the values explicit. Yet he should not be misled by their currency or their absence. Some values may be deeply felt without much or any explicit articulation. With the spreading of media of mass communication and their utilization for propagandistic purposes, the circulation of slogans and the diffusion of symbols may acquire a great velocity without necessarily indicating much about the scope and intensity of the values they express. *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité* or the Republic of Indonesia's *Pantja Sila* may or may not accurately reflect the French or Indonesian value-system.

Indeed, it might be surmised that human beings have a tendency to shelter, by leaving implicit and unarticulated, some of their most securely held central values. It is not an easy task to determine the relationships of those values that may be articulated in the political life of the country and those that are deeply implanted in the culture. For example, what for one generation may be an issue, perhaps strongly controversial and eliciting serious social tensions, might later be accepted and transmitted by society as a value. What was concrete and immediately present may thus become an abstract standard, influencing orientations toward other issues.

To illustrate, equal representation may be a hotly disputed issue in a political system practicing a restricted franchise. Intensive political action may precede its elimination in favor of universal suffrage. Equal representation may then cease to be a political issue, but will remain operative as a standard usable in solving some other issues.

Also, value changes can take place without the direct support of any particular group. Democracy or welfare may become operative ideals in a society with no particular group explicitly championing them. Only indirectly will new issues ever be introduced and realignments take place among the groups as the result of widespread acceptance of the new values.

The findings of anthropologists on the values of the culture being studied can be of great help to the researcher, but he will often have to use them with care. There may not be a simple and direct expression of such social values in the political arena. For example, the ideal of harmony and moderation has been basic to many features of Chinese culture, yet the prevalence of violence has dominated the history of modern Chinese politics.

In spite of these difficulties, the researcher cannot ignore the question of the relationship between the political process he is studying and the general culture and ethos that surround it. In particular, with countries where the division of labor is not highly advanced along functional lines, the importance of general cultural values in guiding political behavior is likely to be greater than considerations that are directly related to specialized activities.

Styles. By political styles, we mean the manner in which political action is carried out, both as it is affected by the actors' rational understanding of the nature of politics and as it is affected by his emotional responses to the political

situation. Political style is influenced by expectations about what kinds of behavior are likely to be effective and what kinds are self-defeating. It is also influenced by the non-rational factors which condition human relations in general. Presumably, certain groups—depending upon how they are oriented toward politics—are more likely to rely upon one political style than another. However, at the level of characterizing total political processes, it is possible to distinguish certain dominant political styles.

It should be noted that styles include far more than just the means by which a group seeks to achieve predetermined goals. Often a group's style can determine its goals; the content of a politician's ideology can be a function of his calculations of what kinds of programs are likely to be effective.

There are several reasons why political styles may be particularly important in studying the politics of non-Western countries. Where the very character of political action is undergoing change, political styles are less likely to be ritualized and emergency styles can set the future tone of politics. Also, in Western politics most of the participants represent quite clearly defined interests; hence it is not too difficult for them to predict each other's major actions. In non-Western countries, with group interests less clearly organized and functional differences less of a factor in determining political roles, groups are likely to be less stable and thus actions less predictable. The participants are often inclined to employ highly elaborate calculations in trying to determine how the others are going to behave. Out of these calculations can come political styles which dominate the very character of the group.

We are not now prepared to set up a typology of political styles; we can only attempt to make the researcher sensitive to this dynamic factor by suggesting some examples and why they may be significant in understanding a particular system and in comparing it with others.

Since most of politics is related to conflict, the question of violence may often be near the surface in any political process. Thus, it is possible to distinguish among various political styles according to the presence or nonpresence of violence. One political style may seek in every respect to minimize and eliminate any action which might be suggestive of violence, as is the case with much of British politics. Another style may be characterized by a high degree of symbolic violence but never include physical violence. Such is the style of many American politicians, who speak of "fighting," "throwing out," and the like, without in fact physically attacking their opponents. Again, there is a political style which accepts physical violence and even encourages it, but always for a definite purpose and with selected targets. This style is to be found in some Communist behavior, in earlier periods of Mexican politics, and in some phases of Chinese politics. It is the actors themselves who, on entering the political arena, accept the expectations that they are assuming personal risks. There is also the indiscriminate form of violence: instigating mob actions for their demonstration effect, without singling out opponents as specific targets.

At another level, there is the distinction between the highly manipulative

style and the "steam-roller" style. In the first case, the expectation is that political objectives can best be gained through narrowly focused and highly discrete maneuvers. By influencing a few key elements, results can be obtained; by slight adjustments and the minimum of direct force, major changes can be made. The steam-roller style is based on the assumption that great force is necessary for limited objectives, and that too much pressure is never a danger because people never change their positions unless forced to, an outcome which can best be achieved by placing them on the defensive.

Related is the difference between the style which concentrates on realizing only a limited number of objectives, which are given the highest priority, and the style which seeks to work on many objectives so as to have support for those that are most important.

There is also the difference between the political style associated with a highly personal approach to politics and that associated with an impersonal one. In the personal approach, the emphasis is on the development of and reliance upon quite personal relationships. Without personal contacts, one cannot have political influence. In the case of the less personal approach, it is assumed that general issues and values are enough to get political support.

There is also the difference between the style of those who employ a highly elaborate set of calculations about the operations of politics and those who accept a more straightforward explanation of political developments. One may seek to "over-interpret" and place great importance on things which are irrelevant, while the other may "under-interpret" and hence ignore important considerations.

A very important political style is that employed by those who view politics as a bargaining operation in which every *quid* has its *quo*. Shrewdness in making deals and trades is prized and there is an expectation that one must give up something to get something else. In contrast, there is the political style based on the assumption that any bargaining is immoral and that negotiations are likely to result in "deals." One's political posture should be determined by more absolute values. Thus virtue is identified with steadfastness.

There is the difference between the style of those who assume that what shows on the surface has little relationship to the inner workings of politics, and the style of those who respond almost entirely to the open issues. In the one case, silence and inconspicuousness are prized, while in the other it is the dramatic and vocal that are important. There is the political style which is characteristic of an aristocratic form of politics, in which the actor seeks to indicate his detachment from the masses and thus gain their respect and support. In contrast, there is the style in which the actor seeks to minimize any differences between himself and the masses.

It is for the field worker to determine the political styles that are dominant in the particular country he is studying. It may be noted that in general some political styles are more likely to be common to non-Western countries than others. In particular, personalized forms of relationships are more likely to be trusted than impersonal ones. The bargaining techniques of the market place

are often accepted as being politically respectable. There are often strong tendencies to "over-interpret" and to attribute openly devious motives to others. Grandiose public promises may be easily made, while private pledges are scrupulously observed.

V. THE SYNTHESIS: TYPES OF PROCESS

An analysis of the various groups or actors according to these four dynamic factors should reveal the extent to which there exist certain common standards that guide the behavior of most of the participants in the country's political process. At this stage we come to another aspect of the political process in most non-Western countries which deserves special consideration—that of consensus. As we indicated earlier, there is generally a high rate of new recruitment in the political life of most non-Western countries, and this raises the important question of the extent to which these participants have a sense of identity with those who are making important decisions.

Political consensus, as we use the term, denotes the condition of *conscious* involvement in the political process, where members of a territorial group or community feel the right and/or obligation to participate in the determining of a particular political decision. It manifests itself as a common denominator of attitudes felt to be *consciously* arrived at by and acceptable to the group or community as a whole. In the establishment of this collective decision the role of the individuals of the group or community will vary greatly, and their influence will generally be highly disproportionate. However, some sense of participation in its formation will be felt by the membership as a whole, even though the initiative and major impulse behind the decision derive from the activities of a very few, or conceivably of a single individual.

The areas of decision-making where political consensus is operative may vary greatly from group to group, and from community to community. In other words, the area of consensus-based decision-making traditional within one group or community may be quite different from that in another. The more authoritarian the character of a group or community, the smaller its area of political consensus is likely to be. Our knowledge of the limits of the area of consensus in a group or community can shed light on the extent to which its inner articulation is authoritarian, and likewise can be helpful in assessing the distance between elite and mass within it.

At the village level it may sometimes be possible to plot the area of decision-making in which local political consensus is operative with sufficient precision to warrant the delineation of a sort of profile of political consensus. It is possible that some of these profiles will be sharp enough to allow of comparison among villages.[1] Similar, though less complete, data should be obtainable for urban areas, where effective sampling techniques can be developed. If ultimately suitable examples can be obtained of the operation of political consensus at both village and urban levels within a country, it may be possible to derive from the

[1] Research carried out in Java during 1954–55 with which one of the authors has been associated suggests the possibility of this.

sum of this data reasonably valid generalizations which provide some understanding of the character of that country's overall pattern of political consensus. Once such a pattern has been delineated, it should be possible, insofar as it is accurate, to deduce from it some understanding of certain related aspects of the country's political process. Also, it may prove that the consensus patterns of different countries can be compared.

In addition to establishing the *areas* of political consensus, the researcher will have a major interest in ascertaining the *process* or *system* of consensus formation. In what way are consensus-based decisions arrived at? In a great many non-Western societies, particularly at the village level, this process—though well institutionalized—is often more subtle and difficult to observe than is the case in the West. Here the Western-trained researcher is likely to encounter consensus-based decisions which resemble more closely the Quaker "consensus of the meeting" idea than the simple numerical majority decision usual in the Western environment. In fact, to many non-Western groups accustomed to decision-making based upon unanimous accord, it is difficult to understand how majority decisions are compatible with the minimum degree of inner harmony required by the group or community. The process of consensus formation above the village level will generally be more difficult to trace, especially in those societies where it is not highly institutionalized. However, where it is feasible this approach may yield rewarding insights into the overall political articulation of the society.

The general approach we have outlined is one that can provide a framework for cumulative studies leading to comparative analysis at several levels of complexity. Individual researchers may attempt the study of only one or more of the political groups in particular countries. By conceiving of their subjects as actors in a process, they will be able to examine hypotheses about the factors which condition their orientation to political action. The results of the individual studies will be in a form that will make possible meaningful comparison with other studies along the same line. It will then be possible to explain better the variety of political orientations that groups with similar social functions may have in different settings. Differences among the behaviors of the Westernized intellectuals, the economic elites, the military, and other groups in different non-Western countries will be better understood. Hypotheses about the conditions that lead to changes in political orientations will be tested. The relationship between social and economic change and political expectations will become more clear.

As more field work is carried out in particular countries, it will be possible to get a better understanding of the total operations of their political processes. If we can say for any given country at any given time: these are the issues that matter, these are the potentially or currently active groups, these are the guiding values, this is the political style, much of significance will have been accomplished. We might then be able to relate all this to the actual functioning of the governmental apparatus, and perhaps even predict how this will affect the lives of individuals and the stability of the system.

As this is done with respect to more countries, it will then be possible to compare total political processes. This can be done by developing typologies that cover the various kinds of political processes that have been studied. These will be empirical typologies based on empirical analysis—not the product of speculation. At present, we are able to characterize the politics of non-Western countries only by such vague and general terms as "unstable" and "unpredictable." It may be expected that on the basis of research along the lines suggested here, we will be able to distinguish various kinds of "instabilities" and thus better predict the directions of political development.

Once we are in a position to compare the various non-Western systems with each other and with the different Western systems, we may have the basis for a more general theory of politics. Such a development could do much to reinvigorate the discipline of comparative politics.

In the nineteenth century, the comparative method was widely, though crudely, applied. The reason is fairly obvious. Social scientists worked with broad evolutionary schemes. Comparisons were used to illustrate developmental sequences. This came to an end with the accumulation of overwhelming evidence proving that unilinear evolutionism was not defensible. Deeper philosophical currents favored pluralism as against monism. An emphasis on the uniqueness of human events as contrasted with the repetitiveness of phenomena studied by the natural sciences reinforced the swing of the pendulum. Cultural relativism was only one result of this intellectual climate, although perhaps the most interesting. All this led to an excessively monographic approach. Tribes, communities, or nation-states were and still are studied as isolated entities. What were and still are presented as comparative studies or textbooks amount to little more than an editorial assemblage of discrete studies or the impressionistic use of comparisons and contrasts for purposes of illustration.

The traditional strength of comparative politics lay in its early development of such categories of governments as monarchies, aristocracies, and republics. Once these original typologies no longer seemed so meaningful, new ones were not developed. Attention shifted to particularistic studies or philosophical analyses of ideologies. Advances in the behavioral sciences have been accepted by students of comparative politics, but the result has not as yet been a major reorientation of the field.

As we said at the beginning, we feel that the study of the political process of non-Western societies can be a challenge to comparative politics. These are political systems that are undergoing conspicuous changes. While we no longer expect to arrange social and political systems in an evolutionary sequence, we are vitally concerned with the patterns of political development in societies that have set as their goal the liberal democratic model of politics. Thus both a scientific and a moral-political purpose may be served by the development of a systematic comparative politics.

A SUGGESTED RESEARCH STRATEGY IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS*

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If one compares the literature on American government and politics with that which concerns continental Europe, it is quite evident that the two fields of study in the last decades have proceeded on somewhat different assumptions as to the scope and methods of political science. This divergence is of relatively recent origin. Before World War I a substantial number of leading American students in this field had their training in European centers of learning, and brought back with them the rich tradition of European historical, philosophical, and legal scholarship.

With noteworthy exceptions the study of continental European political institutions still tends to be dominated by this historical, philosophical, and legal emphasis. The continuity of scholarship in the continental European area has been broken by the two world wars, by totalitarian regimes, by enemy occupation, and by the persistence of internal antagonism and cleavages. With the exception of a few years in the 1920's, the entire era since World War I has been one of catastrophe or the atmosphere of catastrophe in which scientific inquiry and the renewal of the scientific cadres could be carried on only for short periods, under the greatest handicaps, and with inadequate resources.

In the United States, beginning after the First World War and stimulated in some measure by the great European innovators such as Ostrogorski, Bryce, Weber, Pareto, and Michels, the conception of the scope of political science began to undergo a significant change. This development occurred in an experimental and pragmatic way, and with little theoretical explication. As American political scientists discovered that governmental institutions in their actual practice deviated from their formal competences, they supplemented the purely legal approach with an observational or functional one. The problem now was not only what legal powers these agencies had, but what they actually did, how they were related to one another, and what roles they played in the making and execution of public policy. In this respect they were plowing more deeply into ground which had been broken by such English political scientists as Bagehot and Bryce.

Once having departed from the legal framework and method, they began to probe into the non-legal levels and processes of politics, and a substantial literature developed including—in addition to realistic and functional analyses of the presidency, the courts, the Congress, and the bureaucracy—studies of non-legal or semi-legal institutions and processes such as political parties, pressure groups, public opinion, and political behavior.

* This report was prepared by a sub-committee of the Committee on Research in Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. Gabriel A. Almond acted as rapporteur.

While this impairment of the unity of the Western European-American tradition of political science is of relatively recent origin and is by no means irremediable, its consequences at the present time are to make comparisons of political institutions and processes as between the European and American areas most difficult. With all its breadth and technical resourcefulness, the branch of political science dealing with American government and politics has been unable to escape a kind of parochialism in which the insights into our own process which can come only from comparison tend to be lost. And with all the refinements of European legal scholarship, the richness of the European historical tradition, and its philosophical and theoretical sophistication, that branch of the political science discipline which deals with continental European government and politics has not been able to escape a certain alienation from reality which always results from too great an emphasis on the formal aspects of institutions and processes.

There has indeed been a continual process of communication between American, British, and continental European scholars, and the contributions of the many European political scientists now teaching in American universities have gone far toward bridging the two fields and combining the merits of both. But a fair appraisal of the state of the two fields cannot escape the conclusion that a great deal more can be done toward reestablishing a common approach and a more effective sharing of methods and insights.

At another level the impulse for this memorandum arises from more urgent and practical considerations. The survival of parliamentary and democratic institutions on the European continent is by no means to be taken for granted. The political communities of the major Western European countries—France, Germany, and Italy—are fragmented into exclusive ideological movements. Large bodies of opinion appear to be alienated from the West, politically apathetic, or actively recruited to communism. The legal-historical-philosophical approach, which characterizes the scholarship dealing with these countries, is not by itself adequate to discover how serious these cleavages and alienations are, for by admission the basic problems of civic loyalty and political cohesion lie in large part outside of the formal governmental framework. Other methods and approaches are necessary if we are to have a proper understanding of the causes of the persistent evils of continental European government and politics—instability, stalemate, and the alienation of large elements of the population from the political community.

What is proposed here is not a sharp innovation, but rather the strengthening of tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic which are already moving in this direction, increasing the resources available for this type of research, concentrating such resources as are, or may become, available more effectively, and facilitating a more effective exchange of insights and skills. Thus both European and American students in this field are already moving into these unknown and partly known areas, and demonstrating the richness and usefulness of this approach. What we suggest here is a broad research strategy which may multiply those efforts and give them more coherence than they now have.

I. MAJOR TYPES OF RESEARCH NEEDS

In appraising the state of knowledge on the continental European area we may distinguish a number of different types of research needs. First, there are legal institutions and processes, about which literally nothing is known. Second, for the most part our knowledge of formal governmental institutions is primarily historical and legal in character, and there have been relatively few studies of the actual functioning of these institutions. Third, there is the whole field of the non-legal political institutions and processes—parties, pressure groups, public opinion—where research is only in its beginnings. And finally, these areas of ignorance, differences in approach, and unevennesses of development make difficult if not impossible those higher levels of comparative analysis without which genuine understanding is impossible. The comments on these types of research needs which follow are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.

Areas of ignorance. While much is known about public administration in the United States, England, and to some extent in France, only the barest legal essentials are known about the contemporary administrative and judicial systems of Germany and Italy. On the European continent, with noteworthy exceptions, the whole field of legislative organization and procedure is a *terra incognita*. At this level of the simple absence of any knowledge whatever, the situation varies sharply from country to country. Most is known about English governmental institutions, but surprisingly enough the state of knowledge in most of the Commonwealth countries is extremely inadequate. In Germany and France we are beginning to get studies of legislative procedure and organization, but in Italy not even the elementary facts of legislative organization are known. Of all the great powers on the continent, Italy presents the most massive gaps in knowledge, due, no doubt, to the 20-year Fascist interruption of research and training.

Thus, a scholar concerned with comparing even on a purely formal basis the organization of governmental powers for the continental European countries would find whole areas in which the basic data are lacking on the legal structure, and where the simple leg-work of drawing such information from working manuals and legal and administrative codes is still to be done.

The functional approach. Once one begins to ask about the actual role and functioning of the executive, the bureaucracy, and the legislature, and their interrelations in the continental European countries, an even more serious research need becomes obvious—the absence of realistic studies of the operations of governmental institutions. This is only in part to be explained by the fact that France, Germany, and Italy are all operating under postwar constitutions, and that the continuity of their scholarship has been interrupted by the events of the last 30 years. The work now being done, with noteworthy exceptions again, is still dominated by the historical and legal-analytical approaches. The task here is not simply that of reconstructing legal structures from codes of one kind or another, but of looking at these constitutions in a different way, of employing observational techniques, and of making case

studies of the legislative and administrative processes. While this approach is relatively new in the United States and England, there is nevertheless a rapidly accumulating monographic literature describing the internal organization and functioning of governmental institutions, their interrelations with one another, and the impact of the party system on them. On the European continent the scholars employing such techniques stand out by their uniqueness. Here the research need is one not only of the accumulation of data, but also of the sharing and development of skills.

Non-legal institutions and processes. There are significant phases of the political process in the major countries of Western Europe which have been studied hardly at all by European or American scholars. In the United States studies of public opinion, political communication, pressure groups, and political parties are relatively well advanced both in methodological sophistication and substantive findings. European scholarship has a strong tradition only in the study of parties and electoral sociology, and even here there are serious limitations of resources and of trained personnel. Studies of pressure groups are only in their beginnings, and modern methods of public opinion research have not as yet found widespread acceptance in European university circles.

Thus the scholars who deal with European political systems are seriously handicapped in dealing with the causes of cabinet instability, the fragmentation of the legislature, and the general problem of political *immobilisme*. They lack the scientific tools which would be required to trace the extent of fragmentation of the political community, beyond the legislature and party system into the network of social groupings, and the attitudes of the general population. They tend to stop with the political parties and to extrapolate these tendencies into the political community itself. Some evidence suggests that such speculative conclusions are unsound. To take the French case as an illustration, the percentage of the vote received by the French Communist party has held up since the end of the war, while membership in the party and in the Communist-dominated CGT and the circulation of the Communist press have dropped drastically. This would suggest that a large part of the Communist vote is a negative, or protest vote, and that there is at least the possibility of breaking the hold of the Communist party upon a large part of its following. But our thinking about this problem is seriously hampered by lack of fundamental knowledge of the distribution of political attitudes and the characteristics of political organization in France. We suffer from the same lack of basic information on Italy. And while the problem is of a different kind, our ignorance of political attitudes and political organization in Germany also prevents us from making sound estimates as to future possibilities.

There has thus far been no effective effort to utilize the substantial accumulation of public opinion data on France, Germany, and Italy. With all of its limitations the analysis of this type of material in the United States has demonstrated how useful it can be in suggesting hypotheses as to the structure of public opinion and its ideological characteristics and potentialities. Some of this material has already suggested the special meaning of Communist party

affiliation to the French and Italian working class and peasantry. Needless to say, if this whole body of data is analyzed together and compared with American and British patterns, it may yield a substantial number of new insights into the political processes in both the Anglo-American and continental European areas. If these data are analyzed in conjunction with studies of pressure groups and political parties, they may tell us something of the relationship between organized and articulate opinion, and latent feelings and moods in the population. It is from studies of these relationships between the moods and attitudes of groups in the population and the organized expression of group opinion and policy that speculation about the future of politics in these countries may become more informed and reliable, and a sounder appraisal be made of various efforts to effect these developments.

In this field of the newer "research technology" adapted to the study of political attitudes and processes American scholarship has the most to offer, just as it has most to learn from the European tradition of historical scholarship, philosophical depth, and theoretical refinement.

II. RESEARCH APPROACHES

These types of research needs may be met only by the application of a variety of methods, often used in combination, by a greater concentration of resources than is now available, and by a closer cooperation between European and American scholars. Obviously these needs cannot be met by a single research design. Some of the problems seem to call for fairly large-scale research efforts; others seem to lend themselves more appropriately to the efforts of individual scholars. There may be some value, however, in enumerating the main types of methods which might have their place in a broad program of research intended to fill these needs.

Historical studies. What has been said above should not by any means be construed as suggesting that historical research has no place in a research program on the Western European area. On the contrary, any research program which failed to place contemporary political developments in continuity with the past would lose one of the most essential dimensions of understanding. It would be hard to find a more important work in the literature of political parties than Ostrogorski's historical-sociological classic *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties.* Unfortunately, there is nothing comparable to it in the historical dimension for the continental European countries. Certainly the history of European parties and political institutions is one of the most essential areas of research. But here the methodology and tradition are already strong, and the problem is mainly one of resources.

Institutional studies. The institutional approach is familiar to students of government and politics both here and abroad. What is suggested is a greater concentration of resources for the making of such studies, and the improvement of standards. The role of a particular institution or class of institutions such as the executive, the legislature, the bureaucracy, the courts, the political parties, and pressure groups, can be understood only if the institution is placed in the

context of the total political system of which it is a part. Hence, to understand the role of the political parties in a given country it is not enough to know their history, ideology, and internal organization. It is also essential to see them in their connection with the electoral process, the pressure groups, their constituencies, and their access to the agencies of governmental authority.

For the major countries of the European continent, while what is available is generally of high quality, there is only the beginning of a monographic literature on governmental and political institutions. The student of European government and politics is greatly handicapped by the absence of intensive studies of cabinet systems, bureaucracies, legislatures, executive-legislative relations, patterns of administrative regulation and adjudication, to say nothing of monographic studies of parties and pressure groups. Indeed, the research needs are so great that only an intensified process of scholarly training, and a large increase in the resources available for research, can begin to fill in these glaring gaps in the literature.

Process studies of public policy decisions. It has been found in American studies that one of the most effective ways of describing the functions or operational roles of political institutions is through the case study approach. What is meant by a process study of this type is an effort to reconstruct—through analyzing the documentation and the interviewing of participants—what actually happened in the course of consideration of a legislative enactment, what roles were played by the executive, the bureaucracy, the political parties, pressure groups, the media of communication, and public attitudes and behaviors, in other words, how all of these relevant factors interplayed to produce the particular legislative result. If through time we can accumulate a representative collection of such reconstructions of the political process in a given country, we can begin to develop a set of propositions about the general characteristics of the process, and the particular properties or roles of the institutions and agencies which are involved in it. Certainly our understanding of American politics has been greatly enhanced by such process case studies as those of Schattschneider, Bailey, Latham, Riggs, and Harold Stein. Case studies of this kind may be one of the most useful ways of developing our present knowledge of political institutions and processes on the European continent from its present formal limitations to a more faithful representation of reality.

Attitude studies. Students of European politics with noteworthy exceptions have been more reluctant than those concerned with American politics to utilize the methods and findings of public opinion research. Recent studies of elections and of attitudes towards various aspects of public policy in the United States in which such methods have been used have demonstrated convincingly that public opinion research can give us a dimension of the political process which is otherwise unobtainable. Thus the impressive studies of electoral sociology in France leave some of the questions unanswered as to the meaning of the political phenomena which they describe. Survey methods are among the most appropriate devices to gain insight into the condition of the political community. To be sure, the method is expensive. But it does not appear to be cost

which stands in the way of the use of this material; there is already available a huge accumulation of public opinion data in England, the Commonwealth countries, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Germany, and Italy which political scientists here and abroad have hardly touched. It would be an unsound procedure to undertake new surveys of political attitudes in these countries until the accumulation of this material is carefully processed and analyzed. The main barriers to its use would appear to be those of skill and tradition. To overcome these barriers two techniques may be useful. First, studies demonstrating the insights and hypotheses which can be derived from these materials may have the effect of encouraging imitation. Second, collaborative studies undertaken by European and American scholars may facilitate the process of training in this particular method of studying political phenomena.

Community studies. If studies of political attitudes through the use of public opinion surveys represent an assimilation of social psychological methods and insights into political science, community studies represent an effort to employ social-psychological, anthropological, and sociological methods in combination to enrich our knowledge of the political process. Studies of community political organization and of attitudes are still relatively new in the United States, where the technique and approach developed. Where they have been done in Europe it has been the result of American initiative. What recommends their use, despite the fact that the approach is still largely experimental, is that they make possible "microscopic" investigations of the actual impact of political parties and other types of organizations, and of the meaning of party affilatition and of electoral behavior, at the grass roots level. A community study combines analysis of political institutions at the local level with direct observation of the functioning of the political process and with studies of the distribution of attitudes within different strata of the community. In other words, the scale is sufficiently small to make possible intensive study of the place of politics in the life of the community and of the significant groups which make it up. Obviously, an intensive method of this kind is costly and has to be used selectively. Its use is clearly suggested in problem areas such as Southern Italy, or the "Communist zones" in France and Italy, or in areas in Germany where nationalism or neo-Nazism are strongly entrenched. Studies of such communities will yield the best results if control communities are investigated at the same time, in order to isolate the significant variables.

* * *

This brief discussion of research needs in the European area and of the research methods appropriate to meeting them is obviously not a "research project," but rather a statement of a research strategy, and a series of suggestions as to possible tactics or methodological approaches. Some of the approaches suggested are novel and still experimental in the United States, but by and large the approaches proposed are familiar to both European and American scholars specializing in the European area.

Two main lines of action flow from these proposals. First, the above statement of research needs represents the considered views of only a small group of scholars concerned with the field. It will be essential to explore the views of other members of the profession both here and abroad in order to check on the validity of these views and the merits of the proposals. Here, seminars and conferences in which both European and American scholars would participate seem to be indicated. This procedure would have the merit of stimulating research along these lines, as well as enlisting the best minds in the field in a process of self-improvement and development. A second line of action would be the stimulation of research efforts on an individual scale, and of larger-scale comparative research designs where the problems lend themselves to this type of research effort. The Committee on Research in Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council hopes that both lines of action may be stimulated by this statement.

TRADE UNIONS AND THE BRITISH LABOR PARTY

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Almost all the recent work on the British Labor party has been concerned with analysis of the party's electoral performance or possibilities, interpretation and reinterpretation of party policy, or discussion of the ideological forces currently at work in the party. These studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of the policy of the party. But there have been only one or two recent works on the organization and composition of the Labor party,[1] and hardly any on the organizational and policy-making importance of the affiliated trade unions which make up its electoral and financial strength.[2] This is understandable in view of the fact that the trade union elements, unlike those in the party's political wing, have not generally provided the policy controversy upon which both publicists and academicians feed. But the strength and stability which the trade unions provide for the party are probably of more long-term importance than are the topical conflicts of the "political side."[3]

It is the purpose of this article to discuss the organization and functions of the British Labor party in terms of the formal and informal interrelations of the political and industrial elements, mainly during the years 1945–1953. Policy and policy conflicts are subordinated here to an institutional and statistical analysis of these interrelations.

I. THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS

The Trades Union Congress was one of the initiators of the Labor party in 1900, but it is not formally affiliated with, or part of, the Labor party. Rather, the T.U.C. is what might be called a confederation of affiliated trade unions[4] that has among its objectives the very wide mandate "to promote the interests of all or any of its affiliated organisations or anything beneficial to the interests of past or present individual members of such organisations."[5] Some little confusion arises from the fact that the organization as a whole is known as the

[1] The best and most recent is R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties; The Distribution of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties* (New York, 1955).

[2] Two exceptions, both British, are: G. D. H. Cole, "The Labour Party and the Trade Unions," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 24, pp. 18–27 (Jan.–Mar., 1953); and Ben C. Roberts, "Trade Unions and Party Politics," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 6, pp. 387–402 (Apr., 1953).

[3] Party initiates speak of the "political side" of the labor movement as the constituency labor parties and the Parliamentary party, and of the "industrial side" as the organized trade unions.

[4] In 1951 the 183 unions in the T.U.C. had 8,020,079 (84.6 per cent) of the 9,480,000 British trade unionists within their ranks, and the T.U.C. had close understandings with non-affiliated unions claiming a total membership of over 700,000. Thus about 92 per cent of organized labor is directly or indirectly related to the T.U.C. H.M.S.O., *Ministry of Labor Gazette*, Vol. 60, No. 11, p. 375 (Nov., 1952).

[5] "Rules and Standing Orders," in Trades Union Congress, *Report of the 84th Annual Congress, September 1 to 5, 1952*, p. 560. Hereafter the annual report of the T.U.C. will be cited as *T.U.C. Report*, followed by the year.

Trades Union Congress and the annual meeting of delegates from the affiliated unions has the same name. The important elements of the T.U.C., in addition to the yearly Congress, are the General Council, and the General Secretary and his immediate staff.

The General Council is at present composed of 35 members, who are elected each year at the Congress. The fact of annual election, however, is of not much more than nominal importance. The "prescriptive right to office" is strong among the trade unions, and the elections are conducted under a system which insures that the nominees of the large unions will generally be successful; long tenure is therefore the rule.[6]

The Council, within the limits and directions established by the Annual Congress, has complete power to carry out the objectives of the T.U.C. and to protect its interests and the interests of its affiliated members. Among its specific "duties" as set forth in Rule Eight of the Constitution is the following:

> It shall have authority to invest and administer the funds of the Congress and to make grants to any organisation or person, whether in Great Britain or abroad, for such purpose as it deems desirable, but in so doing it shall have regard to the directions, if any, from time to time given by Congress. It shall also have authority to raise funds for any special purpose and to invest and administer such funds and to make grants therefrom.

On the whole it can be said that the General Council uses its wide powers with confidence. There was no occasion during the 1945–53 period when action by the Council (as distinguished from advice of the Council) was repudiated by the Annual Congress—and only a few occasions on which the advice of the Council was ignored. The Council is composed, for the most part, of the top officials of the most powerful unions,[7] and it usually has much more time than the delegates to present its case at Congress.

The General Secretary is the chief executive officer of the T.U.C. and the head of its bureaucracy at national headquarters. He is ex-officio a member of the General Council and "his salary and conditions of service shall be determined by the General Council." He is initially elected by the Congress, but "he shall remain in office so long as his work and conduct give satisfaction to the General Council and to the representatives attending Congress,"[8] and in practice his position is even more secure than is that of a Council member.[9]

Walter (subsequently Sir Walter and then Lord) Citrine was General Secretary from 1926 until 1946, and it was the strength of his personality, combined with the carefulness and precision of his intellect, which made the position not only a powerful executive arm, but also an increasingly important source of policy-making. Sir Vincent Tewson, Assistant General Secretary under Citrine and now General Secretary, seems likely to maintain the power and prestige

[6] Of the 31 members who left the Council between 1945 and 1952, 18 had served for nine or more years, and the average length of service for all 31 was 10.2 years.

[7] Of the 35 members of the 1953–54 Council, 25 were general secretaries of their unions. *T.U.C. Report 1953*, p. 3.

[8] "Rules and Standing Orders," *T.U.C. Report 1952*, p. 565.

[9] In the 60 years between 1893 and 1953 there have been only six General Secretaries, and one of the six held office for only three years.

of the position. Unlike the Labor Party Secretary, who is not generally encouraged to present the Executive Committee's views at Conference, the T.U.C. General Secretary very often speaks for the Council on matters of the highest importance. It is not without significance that Sir Vincent's articles in *Labour* (monthly organ of the T.U.C.) are recognized as being the official policy of the organization.[10]

The Annual Congress is, nominally, the policy-making body of the Trades Union Congress. In practice, it reviews policy already made by the General Council and the Secretary, and lays down directives of varying specificity, within which the Council and Secretary carry out the business of the following year. This is, of course, the role which annual "policy-making" bodies normally fill, but it is well to emphasize that from the point of view of determining what shall be said or done in the name of the T.U.C. at any specific time or on any specific issue, the Council and Secretary are more important than the Congress.

Representation at the Congress is on the basis of one delegate for each 5,000 paid-up members of an affiliated union, and one vote is allowed for each 1,000 paid-up members. There is no prohibition of splitting the vote within a union's delegation; but the bloc vote, by which all the union's votes are given to the majority view in its delegation, would appear to be as frequently used (though not as frequently criticized) as it is in party Conference. Assuming the bloc vote, the concurrent-majority of the Big-Six unions (see Table I) would command slightly more than half of the total possible voting strength at the Congress; but in the T.U.C. as in the party the potential strength of the Big-Six is seldom seen because they do not normally agree on the important and controversial issues.

The number of motions submitted to each Congress is staggering, and most receive no discussion whatsoever. But the Council and the General Purposes Committee (the Congress steering committee) make every effort to encourage the delegates of the unions which have put down similar resolutions to formulate composite motions. There does not appear to be much criticism of the selection of subjects to be discussed.

II. THE TRADE UNIONS IN THE LABOR PARTY

The Constitution of the British Labor party provides for two classes of members, affiliated members and individual members. Affiliated members consist of: (a) trade unions affiliated with the Trades Union Congress or recognized by the General Council of the Trades Union Congress as bona fide trade unions; (b) cooperative societies; (c) socialist societies; (d) professional organizations which, in the opinion of the National Executive Committee, have interests consistent with those of other affiliated organizations; (e) constituency Labor parties and central Labor parties in divided boroughs; and (f) county or area federations of constituency Labor parties.

Individual members are any persons who "accept and conform to the Constitution, Programme, Principles, and Policy of the Party"; they join their local

[10] Conversation with Mr. J. A. Walton, T.U.C. Press Officer, Nov. 23, 1953.

constituency party directly. They must, according to the Constitution, belong to a "bona fide Trade Union" if eligible. Although this requirement is difficult to enforce, it is likely that a large percentage—perhaps a majority—of the individual members (numbering 1,287,000 in 1952) are also trade union members. But this is not to say (a) that the individual members who are also trade unionists represent the official view of their respective unions, or (b) that the same persons will have leadership roles in both the party and their unions, or (c) that it is not possible, on some issues, to determine a clear divergence of view between the unions affiliated en bloc and the majority constituency members. For it must be remembered that the union's view includes a consideration of the views of all its members,[11] only a minority of whom in most cases will also be individual members of constituency parties, and that the individual members who shape the constituency parties' policy, even if trade union members, will not be thinking or acting primarily as trade unionists. Thus Aneurin Bevan is both a member of the National Union of Mineworkers and an individual member of the Ebbw Vale Constituency Labor party.[12] Bevan's case is clear: even though a member of the union and one of its candidates (because he is electorally popular and because, on most matters, he *is* a faithful representative of the miners), he represents the view not of the right-wing N.U.M., but of a large segment of the constituency parties. But for other individual members, whose views are given less publicity than Mr. Bevan's, it is much more difficult to assess the relevance of trade union membership.

And the question of trade union influence at the bottom of the organizational pile raises the more fundamental question of how much individual members, who are no more than members at the lowest level, share in making policy. This perennial riddle can be partially avoided by saying—as seems to be the case, but has never been proved—that trade union influence at the constituency level, stemming from dual membership, is negligible. The words "stemming from dual membership" are added because the unions can associate themselves with constituency parties in such a way as to influence policy. Local branches of trade unions affiliated with the national party may, and often do, affiliate at the constituency level; they may then send delegates to the party meetings and management committee. But the use made of this arrangement varies greatly from union to union. As one careful student of the movement says:

> In general it would be true to say, with perhaps the exception of certain mining districts, that there has been no attempt by the unions to use their local organisations and officials for the purpose of dominating constituency Labour Party activities.[13]

At the regional level there are, on the purely political side, federations of Labor parties, and also regional councils (10 in 1952), which are consultative

[11] This is no place for a discussion of the representative nature of union policy; however arrived at, the views of non-party members as well as of party members must be considered.

[12] Bevan has his campaign financed in part by the N.U.M. and also receives £150 a year from the union. *The Times* (London), March 24, 1955, p. 7.

[13] Ben C. Roberts, "Trade Unions and Party Politics," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 6, pp. 387–402, at p. 393 (Apr., 1953).

and coordinating in character and which include both the constituency parties and bona fide trade union branches or regional groups that wish to affiliate on that level. But these have little or no representation in policy-making bodies and it is safe to say that, whereas the federations (political only) may have some little influence on the party's policy, the regional councils (political and industrial) have almost none at all.

Passing from the individual members and geographical groups, we come to the areas in which the trade unions, as recognizable bodies, do have a large role to play in the making of party policy. The cooperative societies, socialist societies, and professional organizations may be quickly dealt with. Only one cooperative society (Royal Arsenal, with about 28,000 members) was affiliated during the period, and four socialist societies: the Fabian Society with 3,200 members in 1952; the Jewish Socialist Labor party with 2,200; the Socialist Medical Association with 1,600; and the National Association of Labor Teachers with 300; the total membership of these societies was 7,300.[14] No doubt these groups, especially the Fabian Society, exercise power well beyond their numerical significance in the party, but the trade unions neither need to nor, presumably, want to use them as their own vehicles of influence.

It will be seen, then, that as far as policy-making is concerned, the importance of a union's affiliation to the party consists in (a) its right to representation at the party Conference on the basis of one delegate for every 5,000 votes and one vote for every member for whom an affiliation fee is paid, and (b) its right to elect, along with other unions affiliated, 12 of the 27 members of the National Executive Committee of the party.[15]

Annual Party Conference. It should be said again that the Trades Union Congress is, itself, not formally affiliated with the Labor party. It is in many ways closely associated with the party and besides being a parent of the party it is probably true that the T.U.C. General Council, on any matter wherein it is not itself fairly closely divided, could generate enough indirect pressure to keep the party in line. As G. W. Thomson, 1947 Chairman of the T.U.C. General Council, said at a party Conference:

> To bring fraternal greetings from the T.U.C. to the Labour Party is very much like shaking hands with oneself. In the debates that have taken place here this morning there is a remarkable degree of similarity with the attitude of mind displayed in the T.U.C.[16]

Roberts goes even further in saying that "The most important source of trade union influence on the Labour Party . . . stems from the T.U.C. which is independent of the Party."[17]

[14] Labour Party, *Report of the Fifty-First Annual Conference of The Labour Party*, 1952, p. 233. (Hereafter cited as *Party Report* [year]).

[15] There are now 28 members, but for the period considered here the Executive consisted of 12 trade unionists, seven persons representing the constituency parties, five the women's sections, one from the socialist societies, the Treasurer, and the Leader of the Parliamentary Labor party as an ex-officio member. In 1953 the Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary party was given ex-officio membership on the Committee.

[16] *Party Report 1947*, p. 145.

[17] Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 393.

Yet the T.U.C. has no formal role in making party policy. The answer to this paradox is, of course, that the same unions—all the large ones and many of the small ones—which control the T.U.C. also have a controlling interest in the party. In 1951 there were 183 unions with a total membership of 8,020,079 in the T.U.C.;[18] in the same year 82 unions with a total affiliation of 4,937,427 had 82.2 per cent of the voting power at the party Conference.[19]

The figures in Table I give an indication of the strength of the largest unions. The 15 T.U.C. member unions which had over 100,000 members each in 1951 had 69.6 per cent of the membership of the T.U.C., and at the 1952 party Conference they held 62.1 per cent of the votes. More than that, the six largest unions had 52.5 per cent of the membership of the T.U.C. and 50.5 per cent of the votes at the party Conference. But before the importance of this situation is discussed, the figures on party affiliation in relation to T.U.C. affiliation should be considered briefly.

The percentage of the total membership which the unions affiliate is a product of two decisions. One is taken by the individual union member when he determines not to "contract out" of paying the political levy,[20] and the other is the unions' decision to pay party affiliation fees, at sixpence per member, on that portion of their levy-paying members which they choose. Thus the percentage of members which a union affiliates to the party might be an indication of the value which that union places on political, as distinguished from purely industrial, activity. But there are apparently so many factors which go into a union's decision on how many to affiliate that it is impossible to generalize. The left-wing unions do not seem to affiliate more than the right-wing (though it is true that left-wing unionism has not always identified itself with political action—indeed, the anarchist and syndicalist currents have opposed it), nor do the Big-Six seem to present a different pattern from the other eight which do affiliate. One might say, considering the non-affiliation of the Civil Service Clerical Association and the low affiliation of the National Union of Public Employees and the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, that the unions in the public service do not affiliate as large a percentage as the others, but then what could explain the very high affiliation by the Union of Postoffice Workers? And of course the miners are now in the public service and their affiliation level is the most baffling of all.[21] It is clear, however, that the trade unions have the voting strength at Labor Party Conferences to determine

[18] *T.U.C. Report 1952*, p. 62.

[19] *Party Report 1952*, pp. 34, 59.

[20] Under the terms of the 1927 Trades Disputes Act the individual member had to "contract in"—that is, sign a separate form to allow the union to use part of his dues, the "political levy," for political purposes. Since the repeal of this provision by the Labor Government in 1946, a member must "contract out" if he does *not* want to pay the political levy.

[21] The N.U.M. is said to claim that it declares its membership for the T.U.C. on the average number of members for the given year, but pays party fees for all members who pay any dues at all during the year. The suspicion is, however, that the large affiliation is an effort to increase its influence in the party.

TABLE I. THE FIFTEEN LARGEST UNIONS IN THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS AND THEIR AFFILIATION TO THE LABOR PARTY, 1947 AND 1951, AS PERCENTAGE OF THEIR T.U.C. AFFILIATION

Union	Total Members Affiliated to T.U.C., 1951	Total Members Affiliated to Party, 1951	Party Affiliation as % of T.U.C. Affiliation	
			1947	1951
Transport and General Workers Union	1,285,196	835,000	63.3	65.0
National Union of General & Municipal Workers	808,533	400,000	48.0	49.5
Amalgamated Engineering Union	756,149	586,246	82.0	77.5
National Union of Mineworkers	613,118	659,607	110.0	107.6
National Union of Railwaymen	396,257	316,898	62.7	77.2
Union of Shop, Distributive, & Allied Workers	347,737	317,000	87.5	91.2
Electrical Trades Union	197,958	120,000	19.2	61.7
Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers	196,200	129,256	61.3	65.9
National Union of Public Employees	175,000	45,000	32.1	25.7
Union of Postoffice Workers	155,602	146,959	101.1	94.4
Civil Service Clerical Association	146,904	(Does not affiliate to Labor Party)		
National Union of Agricultural Workers	135,000	70,800	54.8	52.4
National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers	134,517	25,000	(Affil. 1948)	18.6
National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers	131,525	97,452	69.6	74.1
Iron and Steel Trades Confederation	102,447	84,383	81.7	82.4

all party policy. The system of bloc voting (generally but not invariably used) only aggravates the possibility of union-made majorities.

While the potential power of the unions in the making of policy decisions at the Annual Conference is considerable and should not be underestimated, it is probable that the indirect influence on policy exercised by union control of the party's National Executive Committee is even greater. For, besides the likelihood that the Executive Committee makes more policy than the Conference, there is also the suspicion that it is easier for the top union leadership (e.g., the T.U.C. General Council members) to assure the election of their 12 candidates to the party executive—and once elected influence their opinions and voting—than it is for them to keep their several hundred delegates in line at the party Conference (in the face of the enthusiasm and rhetoric of the constituency delegates).

The National Executive Committee. The Labor Party's National Executive Committee meets monthly, or oftener, and makes policy decisions within the

general lines established by the Annual Conferences. When necessary it also makes new policy in the form of specific statements which, almost as a matter of course, receive the endorsement of the next Annual Conference,[22] and in the form of comprehensive policy statements which serve as the basis for Conference deliberation and are invariably approved, though they may be significantly amended.[23]

There is no doubt then that the Executive Committee is the heart of the mass Labor party (*mass* Labor party to distinguish it from the *Parliamentary* Labor party). Of its 27 members during the period under discussion here, 12 were directly elected by vote of the unions at the party Conference, seven by vote of the constituency labor party delegates at the Conference, and the five women representatives plus the Treasurer by whole vote of the Conference. (The single member elected by affiliated socialist and cooperative bodies, and the *ex officio* leader of the Parliamentary Labor party complete the 27.) Thus the trade unions, besides electing their 12 directly, have an 80 per cent majority in the votes for the five women members and the Treasurer.

It is likely that, during most of the period 1945–53, the trade unions did not exercise their latent power of controlling elections to, and voting within, the N.E.C. After the Bevanite group of six N.E.C. members began to emerge in 1951, however, the trade unionists came to think of themselves as a counter-bloc; and the 1952–53 situation was aptly described by one trade union member of the Executive when, commenting on the Bevanites, he said: "They filibuster for a while, and then we vote them down." Another indication of the seriousness of this split came to light when Mrs. Eirene White, a six-year member of the women's section of the Executive, refused to stand for re-election in 1953 because, as she charged, the trade union bloc would not tolerate any middle-roaders on the Committee.[24]

It is generally thought that the largest unions have an informal agreement as to representation on the Committee. Of the 15 largest affiliated unions, seven had representatives on the N.E.C. during the whole period, from 1945 to 1953, one for seven years, one for five, and two more for four of the eight years. Of the Big-Six, only the more left-wing A.E.U. did not have a representative on for the whole period. Of the 96 member-years, the largest 15 unions (18.3 per cent of all unions affiliated) held 76 (79.2 per cent).

In terms of longevity on the Executive, the union members have a slightly shorter average for the period—the 23 trade unionists with their total of 96 years had an average of 4.17 years, while the 24 non-trade union members with 104 years had an average tenure of 4.33 years. In a sense this is surprising, since the tradition of long tenure is stronger, in general, in the trade unions than in

[22] See, for example, *Party Report 1949*, p. 24, for Conference approval of the Executive's statement on United Europe Committee, and *Party Report 1950*, p. 164, for approval of the statement on the Schuman Plan.

[23] *E.g.*, "Challenge to Britain," 1953; "Labour and the New Society," especially p. 223 of *Party Report 1950;* "Labour Believes in Britain," 1949, especially p. 212 of that *Report;* and "Let Us Face the Future," 1945.

[24] Statement by Mrs. E. White, as given in *The Times* (London), Sept. 7, 1953, p. 4.

the party. But it may be explained largely by the party's constitutional prohibition of T.U.C. General Council members' holding seats on the Executive Committee. This arrangement is a reflection of both trade union and party feelings that the job of the General Council is largely industrial and that of the Executive largely political (with, of course, obvious overlapping). It results in the placing of what might be called second-string men (in authority, not necessarily in ability) on the Executive when the first-string union leader is on the General Council. Thus when T. Williamson of the N.U.G.M.W. was elected to the General Council of the T.U.C. in 1947 he was replaced on the party Executive by Mark Hewitson of that union; when W. J. P. Webber became Secretary of the Transport Salaried Staffs Association (T.S.S.A., before 1951 called the Railway Clerks Association) and was elected to the General Council in 1953, his place on the Executive was taken by his subordinate, J. Haworth; when Sir Lincoln Evans left the Secretaryship of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, and H. Douglass moved up to that post and to the General Council, his place on the Executive was taken by D. H. Davies. If this promotional ladder did not exist, it seems very likely that the trade union seats on the N.E.C. would be a much longer-term proposition than the constituency seats. But in the given situation, seniority can scarcely be a factor in the relative power of Executive Committee members.

III. THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY LABOR PARTY

The Parliamentary Labor party consists of all Labor and Cooperative party[25] M.P.s who accept "the decisions of the Party Meeting." They are expected to participate in the organization of the party within Parliament, to consult with the "Officers of the Parliamentary Party before tabling any motion, amendment or prayer, or other proposal which may involve Party policies or decisions," and to vote according to the party majority view except that they may "abstain from voting on matters of deeply-held personal conscientious conviction."[26]

The Parliamentary Party and the National Executive Committee. The P.L.P. is an autonomous group, not under the control of the Annual Conference or the National Executive Committee of the mass Labor party. It may, and occasionally does, adopt a policy at variance with that of the mass party. This is a matter of considerable importance, not only because of its bearing on the nature of British constitutional practice and the essence of the two-party system, but also because there is a long history of confusion, misstatement, and

[25] The Cooperative party puts forward only candidates who are acceptable as Labor party candidates and who are generally indistinguishable from other Labor candidates both before and after the election. In the 1951 General Election there were 16 such Members elected.

[26] All quotations from "Standing Orders of the Parliamentary Labour Party (revised, March 1952)," in *Party Report 1952*, Appendix VII, p. 201. During Labor's first term, 1945–50, Standing Orders were suspended in view of Labor's large majority and the individual members enjoyed a maximum of freedom.

wishful thinking within the party itself.[27]

According to British theories of representative democracy, the party in Parliament must be independent of extra-parliamentary control because it represents 14,000,000 Labor voters, and not just 1,000,000 party members or, at best, 6,000,000 members and affiliated trade unionists. According to constitutional practice a party, when in power, makes its own decisions upon which it stands or falls before the electorate.

The independence of the Parliamentary Labor party was won during the 1920's and was a necessary preliminary to any effective Labor Government—if, that is, the traditional theory and practice were to be maintained. But from the 1920 Conference, when young Emmanuel Shinwell proclaimed that the Parliamentary party was the "property of the Labour movement,"[28] up to the Laski affair of 1945, when that controversial professor, as chairman of the N.E.C., issued a statement which at least implied that the leader of the Parliamentary party was subject to the control of the Executive,[29] the issue has been, to say the least, unclear. However, there is now no doubt of the Parliamentary party's independence, even though the mass party enthusiasts and bureaucrats may not often proclaim this fact openly.[30]

In practice the matter is not generally important, except as it may be used for political speechmaking, as it was in the Laski case. Or it might be better to say that it is wrongly framed; the question of the relations between the mass party and the P.L.P. is not usefully thought of in the sense of their legal independence. The essence of it is the fact that the same men, with the same problems and the same organized support, electorally and financially, control both parties.

Each year since 1945 a substantial majority of the N.E.C. have been Members of Parliament—and surely they are some of the most influential members of the Parliamentary party. As is evident in Table II, a large percentage of the M.P. majority on the Executive were ministers or ex-ministers, while the much smaller percentage of M.P.s in the trade union section, taken alone, included no persons of ministerial rank.

This is of some interest and is worth a brief comment. Without any doubt the greater political experience and knowledge of the constituency members and

[27] Thus John Parker, himself a Labor M.P., says: " . . . the Annual Party Conference lays down the policy of the Party and its instructions must be carried out by its Executive, affiliated organisations and representatives on local authorities and in Parliament." John Parker, *Labour Marches On* (Penguin, 1947), p. 42.

[28] *Party Report 1920*, p. 148.

[29] For a good account of this see Kingsley Martin, *Harold Laski* (London, 1952), pp. 169–72.

[30] But the party's 1951 *Handbook*, p. 301, states the case unequivocally: "The Parliamentary Labour Party is an autonomous body, with its own Standing Orders, and electing its own leaders. Labour M.P.s, like other members of the Labour Party, accept the principles and programme of the Party and are, of course, elected on that basis. But the conduct of Government and Parliamentary proceedings, including all measures necessary to carry out the Party's programme, are entirely within the discretion of the responsible Ministers and the Parliamentary Party."

women members of the Executive, and of the Treasurer and the Parliamentary leader, tend to take the initiative and leadership in policy-making away from the trade unionists. This is probably more likely in foreign policy, where the union members come under the double handicap of not having their everyday work focussed on international affiairs and not having relevant information and expert opinion to the degree which would be available to the M.P.s and especially to the ministers. But in consideration of domestic policy it is likely that the trade union members provide a very large part of the discussion and argument.

TABLE II. MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ON THE LABOR PARTY NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 1945–1953*

Year	No. of M.P.s on N.E.C.	Of Min. Rank	M.P.s as % of N.E.C.	M.P.s in T.U. Sec.	M.P.s as % of T.U.
1945–46	16	6	59.3	3	25.0
1946–47	16	9	59.3	3	25.0
1947–48	15	8	55.5	3	25.0
1948–49	15	7	55.5	3	25.0
1949–50	16	7	59.3	3	25.0
1950–51	18	8	66.7	3	25.0
1951–52	18	7	66.7	3	25.0
1952–53	18	5	66.7	3	25.0

* The leader of the parliamentary party is included as an *ex officio* member.

Trade Unionists in the House. At each General Election a number of the Labor candidates are "sponsored by" affiliated trade unions. Sponsoring means the contribution by the union of some sizeable part of the candidate's election expenses. He is then officially identified by the party as a trade union candidate[21] and, if he is successful, it is common for the union to pay him some yearly fee while in office, often by allowing him to draw his salary from a regular union job.

This matter of paying the M.P. an annual stipend originated in the early days of the party when Members were not paid and when, therefore, no laboring man (no one, in fact, except the financially independent) could afford to run. The practice has continued in many cases in order to attract men who could not support themselves and their families on an M.P.'s pay unless it were supplemented from outside sources. Whatever one may think in general of the systematic payment of legislators by a private pressure group, it is a tribute to

[21] But there are trade unionists in the House who are not official union candidates: "The number of active trade unionists is, of course, much higher. For instance, N.U.D.A.W. had a panel of seven 'official candidates,' all returned, and a further eleven members returned for other seats." *Labour Research*, Vol. 34, pp. 134–35, p. 134 fn. (Sept., 1945). " . . . the Railway Clerks Association in addition to the 9 official candidates on its parliamentary panel had 13 other members contesting seats as Labour candidates, and 6 were elected." *Labour*, Vol. 7 (N.S.), p. 351 (Aug., 1945).

the British political sense of fair play that it has resulted in little or no demonstrable corruption.

Between 1931 and 1945 a very large section of the P.L.P. consisted of trade union candidates. These of course were the safe seats which were held after the debacle of 1931, when only 46 Labor Members were returned, and the election of 1935, in which only 154 Laborites were successful. It was during this period that criticism of trade union M.P.s and of the method of selecting candidates arose. As McCallum and Readman put it:

> . . . it has been alleged that too often a senior and undistinguished Trade Union official has been chosen to the neglect of the younger professional men of the party or younger and more active Trade Unionists, that, as the critics put it, the Unions *retire* their officials to the House of Commons.[32]

The practice is for the constituency labor parties to select their own candidates either from local talent or from approved lists kept at Transport House. If they select someone not on Headquarters lists, they must get approval from the national party to adopt that person as the official candidate; approval is almost always given, although there have been a few cases in the last eight years of national rejection of prospective candidates because of their pro-Communist connections. But this veto is apparently not, on the whole, a serious impediment to local selection of candidates. If there is anything to the criticism which McCallum and Readman describe (and they point out that in 1945 there seemed to be little ground for it), it is because a financially hard-pressed local party may be tempted to pass over an able young aspirant for a mediocre and middle-aged trade union official who comes with a fat union check in his pocket. But one gets the impression from informed party people that even this mild form of persuasion is not widespread.[33]

In 1945 the trade unions sponsored 125 candidates, of whom 120 were elected (96 per cent as compared with 65 per cent of all Labor candidates). In 1950 the pattern was quite similar: the trade unions sponsored candidates in 140 constituencies and saw 110 of them elected (79 per cent as compared with 51 per cent of all Labor candidates).[34] At the 1951 election the trade unions sponsored 137 candidates and 104 were elected (76 per cent as compared with 48 per cent of all Labor candidates).[35]

[32] R. B. McCallum and A. Readman, *The British General Election of 1945* (London, 1947), p. 74.

[33] As a matter of fact, the trade unionists frequently complain that their potential candidates are ignored by the constituency parties. See the report on the 1954 Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers' conference at which "speaker after speaker" charged that trade union candidates "were being pushed into the background in favour of 'barristers, solicitors, and pseudo-intellectuals'."—*The Times* (London), May 8, 1954, p. 2.

[34] H. G. Nicholas, in *The British General Election of 1950* (London, 1951), p. 62, says that 111 of 140 trade union candidates were successful; but his table on p. 61 lists 110, the figure given by the party in *Party Report 1950*, p. 5.

[35] D. E. Butler, in *The British General Election of 1951* (London, 1952), p. 42 fn., says that 103 of 137 were elected. The *Party Report 1952*, p. 5, says it was 105 of 139, but the full list as given in *Party Report 1951*, pp. 185–203, indicates that the figures were as above—104 of 137.

The figures for all three elections make it abundantly clear that the trade union candidates are in the safe seats. Nicholas has given some figures on the median per cent of the vote which trade union candidates received as compared with all Labor candidates in the 1950 election. The overall median per cent of the vote for the Labor party candidates in the 617 constituencies fought in that year was 45.8, while the candidates supported by the N.U.M. (all 37 of whom were elected) received 73.0 per cent of the votes, and all the union candidates received 56.0 per cent.[36]

One can explain the near-impregnability of the miners (one N.U.M. candidate was defeated in 1951) by the nature of the industry and of the union; N.U.M. members are concentrated in mining constituencies instead of being widely scattered as are, for instance, railwaymen, engineers, and agricultural workers. But why the other union candidates have such good records is not at once apparent. Many factors seem to be involved.

Probably the most important is the unions' understandable reluctance to support a candidate who has little or no chance of winning;[37] thus union candidates would tend to be those fighting safe or marginal seats. That the unions support candidates in marginal seats is suggested by the fact that they seem to share the losses of these seats with local parties; in the 1951 election, for example, the unions lost 22 constituencies which the constituency parties had fought and lost on their own in 1950, and constituency Labor party (C.L.P.) candiates lost the same number which the unions had lost in 1950.

Also one must not overlook the possibility that the safe seats may have apathetic local parties which may be glad to accept trade union candidates rather than try to build, periodically, party finances for certain winners. This likelihood is given support by the Hemsworth C.L.P. delegate to the 1952 Conference:

> As a Party which had the honour of returning an M.P. with the largest majority in the country [an N.U.M. candidate], it may be news to you that we are among those with the smallest individual membership. That is not due to the fact that we have not the Labour backing; it is due to the fact that our people feel that they are already in the Labour Party through their Unions.[38]

The next delegate to the rostrum added to the argument:

[36] Nicholas, *op. cit.*, p. 61. J. R. Clynes, writing in 1937, maintained that "Trade Union Candidates enjoy no preference with regard to the choice of constituencies described as 'safe seats,' except in a few areas where the coal industry provides almost the sole occupation. Even there, many candidates have been chosen because of their personal merits and qualities, in fair competition with men who have been miners." J. R. Clynes, *Memoirs 1924–1937* (London, 1938), p. 278.

[37] Allan Flanders, in *Trade Unions* (London, 1952), p. 142, says: "On the whole the trade union-sponsored candidates tend to get the safer seats because the unions are disinclined to spend their members' money on supporting a candidate whose chances are slight."

[38] *Party Report 1952*, p. 65. Hemsworth is a constituency in the West Riding of Yorkshire.

Unlike the previous speaker, we have a Tory Member of Parliament, but we have one of the biggest memberships in the country.[39]

This is no place to discuss the general matter of safe constituencies and local party apathy (though it would seem to be worth some study), but if there is a positive correlation it may be an important factor in determining where trade union candidates stand.

The matter of union support during elections opens the much wider question of the extent to which successful candidates then think of themselves as union representatives. Where the union's aid goes beyond the election subscription to the direct or indirect payment of the M.P. (whether or not he holds formal office in the union), there can be little doubt that the union thinks of the M.P., and he thinks of himself, as in some sense a spokesman for union views and policies. Indeed it is not uncommon for trade union Members to refer, on the floor, to their special status as representatives of trade unionists, or even of a particular union. Thus Tom O'Brien, head of the National Union of Theatrical and Kine Employees and chairman of the T.U.C. General Council 1952–53, speaks of himself as the "representative of thousands of men and women in the British film industry."[40]

On the other hand, where trade union support does not go beyond election expenditure it is dangerous to assume that the successful candidate inevitably thinks of himself as a representative of that trade union in particular or of organized labor in general. It may be assumed, probably, that the overall views of a supported candidate are consistent with the financing union's policy, since no union leadership will back a candidate who is unknown or with whom it thoroughly disagrees. But this is not to say that any candidate so financed will not be free on each issue to think and speak (and, within the limits of P.L.P. discipline, to vote) as he chooses. This point of view is given weight by the fact that of the 160 union-supported Members who sat in the House from July 26, 1945 to September 30, 1953, nineteen were supported at one or two of the three general elections by local parties, and 13 of those 19 were twice re-elected for the same seat in spite of this change of backing. It may be assumed, therefore, that the official listing of a candidate as trade union-financed or C.L.P.-financed makes little difference to the voters; he is the Labor candidate and it is probable that his intra-party support is not known to the electorate, or even to any but the most active party workers.

On parliamentary matters which directly affect the trade unions and their interests there seems to be some effort to exact cooperation and unity from trade union Members. For this purpose the trade unionists have periodic meet-

[39] *Ibid.* Morgan Phillips, the national Secretary, in replying to these two delegates said: "Unfortunately it is in our safest seats that we have our smallest membership. It may be that they have not the same incentive for developing their individual membership" (p. 66).

[40] *H.C. Deb.*, Vol. 476, 5s, col. 2523 (June 29, 1950). O'Brien's union was not affiliated to the party (until May, 1952) and he sits as a C.L.P. candidate from a Nottingham constituency.

ings and some kind of group organization in the House. Although the T.U.C. is not directly represented, there is a liaison link through Victor Feather, Assistant Secretary of the T.U.C., who normally attends these meetings. The members supported by a given union (the 36 miners, the 14 T.G.W.U. members, etc.) also attempt to keep some kind of formal or informal contacts and group life.[41]

It should not then be assumed that trade union sponsorship is necessarily an indication that when such an M.P. speaks he is giving the "trade union point of view." Only if there is other evidence, either explicit or implicit, that he is speaking *as* a trade unionist or *for* trade unionists, should importance be attached to it.

IV. INFORMAL INFLUENCE OF THE UNIONS ON THE LABOR PARTY

The discussion up to this point has been concerned with the formal relations between the trade unions and the Labor party. That, of course, is only part of the picture. What is perhaps more significant is the informal influence which the trade unions can bring to bear on the party leaders and machinery.

In the widest sense the trade unions contribute a complex of realism which both conflicts with, and is complementary to, the dominant idealism of the constituency parties. In part this is simply the trade unionists' matter-of-factness, their uncomplicated what-shall-we-do-next? approach, which distinguishes them from their more sophisticated brothers on the political side.[42] But trade union realism is more than this; it is an understanding of the importance of power and also of the necessity for loyalty to leadership and majority decisions.

That the trade unionists have a clear understanding of the role of power in foreign affairs has been evident since the middle thirties when Citrine and the late Ernest Bevin led the T.U.C., and finally the party, to break their long disarmament traditions.[43] Thus George Brown, who claimed to be "in British political life first and foremost as a trades unionist and as a representative of organised workers," declared that it was "childish" to talk about "a distinctive socialist foreign policy" because this is not an "absolutely perfect world and when we have said what we want to do, someone else gets in the way, so that we cannot do it."[44] And another trade union Member of Parliament said in 1948

[41] *The Times*, in commenting on the trade union group's initiative in urging a debate on Government economic policy in early 1954, had this to say about its influence in the Parliamentary Labor party: "There was a time when the trade union group exercised a considerable influence, but since 1940 they have been a dormant force. If a revival is in prospect it may well have an important effect on the balance of power within the movement." *The Times* (London), Feb. 5, 1954, p. 3.

[42] See a speech by Jack Jones of the iron and steel workers "on behalf of the ordinary rough-necked back benchers. . . . " *H.C. Deb.*, Vol. 518, 5s, col. 1598 (July 30, 1953).

[43] The best account of this is in Samuel Davis, *The British Labour Party and British Foreign Policy 1933–1939*, unpub. diss. (Univ. of London, 1950), pp. 360 ff.

[44] *H.C. Deb.*, Vol. 430, 5s, cols. 566 and 569 (Nov. 18, 1946). Brown's was the major loyalist speech in the debate on the left-wing foreign policy "rebellion" of November, 1946.

that the need for armaments "is regrettable, but I think everyone should realise that we have to stand together on both sides of the House against even those who may be amongst us who talk about being neutral pacifists."[45]

The trade unionists also contribute to Labor party organization a strong sense of loyalty and respect for majority opinion. On this point more than any other the dominant trade union leadership is at odds with the Bevanite faction in the party. Of course it might be said that this is no more than a reflection of the distribution of power within the party—that the trade unionists respect the majority view because they are the majority. But the trade unionists' insistence on loyalty is also a matter of their history and traditions—and surely it was indispensable in the early years of the movement.[46] On the other hand, it is undesirable to perpetuate an extreme sense of loyalty when it is no longer necessary for the survival of the labor movement, and McKenzie observes that, at the present time, "the Labour Party appears to lean towards a dangerously rigid conception of party discipline."[47] Whatever may be one's judgment on this point, the trade union influence has been overwhelmingly on the side of loyalty to leaders and disciplined support for majority decisions, and from the point of view of party effectiveness this is a matter of considerable importance.

With respect to the day-to-day influence of the top level trade union leaders on party officers and bureaucrats, the fact that the T.U.C., the T.G.W.U., and the National party all share the same building could hardly be overemphasized. Members of the staff of both the T.U.C. and the party, while affirming that a good deal of "cross-fertilization" goes on in executive and administrative matters, seem either reluctant to discuss it or unimpressed by its significance. However, when discussed as one of the readjustment problems to be faced when the T.U.C. relocates in its new headquarters now being built, some of the administrators are frank to admit that it will make considerable difference in the ease and thoroughness with which T.U.C. and party activity can be coordinated. There is a great difference between an inside telephone and an outside telephone, as one T.U.C. offical put it.[48]

But cooperation based upon propinquity and convenience is only part of the picture. Also to be considered are those personal contacts and opinion-sharings between, say, Morgan Phillips of the party, Tewson of the T.U.C., and Tiffin

[45] *H.C. Deb.*, Vol. 457, 5s, col. 135 (Oct. 27, 1948). See also A. E. Tiffin, then Assistant General Secretary of the T.G.W.U., who declared in 1949 that pacifists were actually warmakers because they aided aggressors. "Democracy and Defense," *T.G.W.U. Record*, Vol. 29, p. 94 (Sept., 1949).

[46] Francis Williams, in his biography of the most powerful trade union leader of the 1940's, declares: "It is not possible to begin to understand Bevin without understanding the strength of his loyalties and his sense of outrage when these loyalties seem to him to be set aside. . . . [His] insistence upon their absolute importance was his own greatest single contribution to the Labour Party." *Ernest Bevin; Portrait of a Great Englishman* (London, 1952), p. 197. For a more critical evaluation of Bevin's demanding loyalties see Roy Jenkins, *Pursuit of Progress* (London, 1953), pp. 32–33.

[47] McKenzie, *British Political Parties*, p. 586.

[48] Conversation with A. E. Carthy, Assistant Secretary of the T.U.C. International Department, Oct. 22, 1953.

of the T.G.W.U. And these are only the big three of several dozen party and trade union leaders who are continually exchanging and discussing the facts and opinions out of which policy and program are made. This is the heart of any study of "influence," and it is not the least of a researcher's disappointments that it must always be, to a large extent, a mystery.

V. CONCLUSION

It may be said that the real strength of the Labor party—in terms of both money and votes—lies in the trade unions of Great Britain, and more specifically in those less than 200 unions which make up the industrial affiliates of the party and the T.U.C. The leaders of these unions, especially of the two dozen or so largest, have direct, predominant influence in policy-making for both the Labor party and the Trades Union Congress, and have indirect (but predominant) influence in making policy in the Parliamentary Labor party. The formal ties between the party and its affiliated unions, and the informal relations of the party and the T.U.C., provide the channels by which the "labor movement" as a whole makes its policy and resolves its conflicts.

Both the T.U.C. and the party officials deny, of course, that one group has a share in the policy making of the other—and indeed in the most literal sense they do not. The T.U.C. appears to be concerned, somewhat more than the party, in combating the fairly general view that the two are organically linked. From the point of view of its relations with the British Government, and especially with a Conservative Government, it is vital to stress its independence from the party.

For the primary functions of the T.U.C. in British domestic politics are, on the one hand, the providing of guidance and mediation facilities for its member unions, and on the other hand the forwarding of the claims of organized workers in all branches of the government of the United Kindgom. For one part of this second function (legislative activity) it produced and nurtured the Labor party. But to be identified too closely with that party would inevitably make all of its activity more difficult—for even a Conservative majority in Parliament has been known to produce legislation favorable to trade unionists. To give the Labor party their moral support and encouragement, and closely to consult with it, knowing that its good fortune is, by and large, also their good fortune, and at the same time to maintain independence of policy and action is the task which the T.U.C. leaders set before themselves.[49] This requires a great deal of care, and often a little equivocation, but on the whole it seems to work; at least no more promising arrangement has been proposed.

[49] It is said that some T.U.C. officials have privately confessed that they would rather negotiate with a Conservative than with a Labor Government, because the latter says that it also represents, and knows what is good for, millions of working class people, whereas the T.U.C. does not have to share with the Tories its right to speak for the working class. This is, of course, not susceptible of proof, and is probably not a widely-held view among trade unionists.

ORGANIZATION OF THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS*

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Last September 29th, with over forty million voters eligible,[1] Indonesia initiated its first parliamentary election since independence. Although the election of the 260-member, unicameral Parliament concluded November 29th, December 15th sees the voters again casting their ballots—this time for a 520-member constituent assembly charged with drafting Indonesia's first permanent constitution.[2]

The struggle to carry out elections has been a difficult and protracted one. It has required a decade of strenuous effort characterized by armed struggle, domestic insecurity, shortages of trained personnel and equipment, problems of communication between the nation's hundreds of islands scattered over 3,000 miles from east to west, an overwhelmingly illiterate electorate and, recently at least, reluctance on the part of certain influential groups to hasten matters.

Whatever may be the outcome, the intent to hold elections has been present ever since the Indonesian Republic proclaimed its independence from the Netherlands on August 17, 1945. In a decree issued on November 3, 1945, for example, the Government of the Indonesian Republic avowed its intent to execute "the elections for members of the peoples' representative bodies in the month of January, 1946." The decree in question was issued for the unique purpose of urging the formation of political parties.[3]

While by any ordinary standards this might seem singularly like urging an increase in locust swarms, there was valid justification. During the Japanese period (1942–45) political parties had been prohibited so that the Proclamation of Independence found no organized means of political expression available. A short-lived attempt to establish a unified one-party system was officially ended by the decree of November 3, 1945.[4] In the decree the Government, announcing its acceptance of the suggestion made by the provisional legislature for the formation of political parties, stated: "The Government approves the

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[1] In July of this year the Interior Minister reported that over 42 million potential voters had been registered of, whom over 30 million were on the island of Java alone. No estimate was given of the total number legally eligible for registration. This would be of particular interest since the election lists were summarily closed in September, 1954, five and a half months behind schedule, while registration was still admittedly incomplete.

[2] This constitution, although the first permanent one, will actually be Indonesia's fourth. The others were that of August, 1945, when the first (Jogja) republic was proclaimed; that of January–August, 1950, during the period of the United States of Indonesia; and the present constitution, in effect since August, 1950.

[3] Subagio Reksodipuro, *Pemilihan Umum* (Medan, Indonesia, 1951).

[4] George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, 1952), p. 154.

emergence of political parties since, with parties in existence, guidance can be given to the direction taken by the various currents of opinion in existence among the masses." The decree concluded with the hope "that these parties will be organized before the execution of the election of members of the Peoples' Representative Bodies during the month of January, 1946."[5]

These elections, however, proved impossible to hold. The reasons were not hard to find. Most importantly, the infant republic was already engaged in an armed struggle for survival, not terminated until May of 1949, against the efforts of the Dutch government to reestablish its colonial rule. Then too, the staggering difficulty of the technical problems involved in organizing the elections in the scattered territories controlled by the Republic, coupled with the desperate shortage of competent personnel and the lack of any precedents, all combined to make the original plan impractical.

As a result of these (and later) difficulties, Indonesia until now has had a legislature whose members hold their offices by presidential appointment and the representative character of which is therefore dubious, to say the least. Initially the appointive nature of the legislative branch was regarded as an emergency and temporary device pending elections. Within a few weeks after the declaration of independence, a Central National Committee, composed of 150 members, was appointed to aid President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta, both of whom have remained in office ever since. This committee, chosen by the President and Vice-President to give representation to all currents of opinion, was enlarged in October, 1945 to 188 members and vested with legislative powers pending the election of a House of Representatives.[6] Subsequently, to insure a Government majority on various agreements with the Dutch, the membership was increased to a total of 535 members. As early as October, 1945, however, the unwieldiness of the Central National Committee had led to the creation of a "Working Body" with a membership one-tenth that of the Central National Committee. This group performed the legislative functions of the Central National Committee whenever the exigencies of the situation made it impossible for the full Central National Committee to meet.[7]

Although a law providing for election of the legislative branch by an indirect system of electors chosen by the general public was enacted in 1948,[8] it was never possible to put it into effect and when the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to Indonesia on December 27, 1949, no elections had yet taken place. Independent Indonesia was initially organized on a federal basis with a bicam-

[5] Quotations translated from *Kepartaian di Indonesia* (Kementerian Penerangan, Djakarta, 1953), p. 4.

[6] *What is Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat?*, Secretariat, Indonesian Parliament, undated, mimeographed, pp. 2–4.

[7] The inspiration for this unique body apparently came from the "Working Committee" of the Indian Nationalist Congress which served as the executive and policy formulating body in between the annual congresses. But this, of course, was merely an administrative device of a private organization. See also Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

[8] Law No. 27 of 1948 as amended by Law No. 12 of 1949—Subagio Reksodipuro-*Pemilihan Umum* (Djakarta, 1951), p. 10.

eral legislature. Its constituent parts consisted of a Senate of 32 members (two representatives from each of the 16 federal states) and a House of Representatives composed of 150 members, of whom 50 came from the former legislative body of the first Indonesian Republic and 100 were appointed by the governments of the other federal states.[9]

When, six months later, Indonesia's short-lived experiment with federalism was ended, the third and still valid constitution, promulgated on August 15, 1950, established a unicameral legislative branch.[10] Its total membership of 236 representatives was drawn mostly from the personnel of the former Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Indonesia, the Working Body of the Central National Committee of the First (Jogja)[11] Republic, and also from its High Advisory Council.[12] It is this People's Representative Council which has functioned since then as the parliament of the unitary Indonesian Republic. Inevitably, it has become progressively less representative. Under a law enacted in December, 1953 (No. 37 of that year), vacancies caused by death or resignation of members are filled by presidential appointment. In the case of former party members, the party proposes a candidate to the President. For former independent parliamentarians, the President has complete freedom of choice.[13]

The 1950 Constitution did, however, lay the legal foundations for both parliamentary and constituent assembly elections. Article 56 established the ratio of one representative for every 300,000 citizens and Article 57 states: "The members of the House of Representatives are elected in a general election by Indonesian citizens who fulfill the conditions and in accordance with rules laid down by law."[14] Articles 134 through 139 provide for a Constituent Assembly, chosen on the basis of one representative for every 150,000 citizens, which, on the basis of a two-thirds majority, is, "together with the Government," to "enact as soon as possible the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which shall replace this Provisional Constitution."[15] It is further provided that if by the time the Constituent Assembly is chosen there has been

[9] *What is Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat?*, p. 4.

[10] "Provisional Constitution of the Indonesian Republic (1950)", Chapter II, Section II, Articles 56–77, *Indonesian Review*, Vol. 1, pp. 144–47 (Feb.–March, 1951).

[11] Usually known as the "Jogja" Republic since the capital was at the town of Jogja in Central Java.

[12] See Chap. IV, Article 16, "Constitution of the Indonesian Republic" (1945), *Indonesian Review*, Vol. 1, p. 138 (Feb.–March, 1951). The inspiration for this "High Advisory Council" may well have come from the pre-war Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) which served as an advisory council to the Dutch Governor-General. Not to be overlooked as another possible source of inspiration is the Japanese Genro or group of Elder Statesmen, although it will be remembered that the Genro was throughout its existence an extra-constitutional body. In the three and a half years of Japanese occupation (1942–1945) there was ample time for the Indonesian nationalist leaders to become well acquainted with all aspects of the Japanese administrative system.

[13] *Ichtisar Parlemen* (*Parliamentary Summary*), Nr. 206, 31 Dec., 1953, pp. 1203–5.

[14] "Provisional Constitution," *Indonesian Review*, p. 135, cited in note 10.

[15] Article 134, *ibid.*, p. 152.

no election for members of the House of Representatives, the Assembly shall take over the functions of the provisional House of Representatives, which, by implication at least, then ceases to exist. In a fashion reminiscent of the Working Body of the Central National Committee of the Jogja Republic, the Assembly is to discharge this responsibility by selecting an "Executive Body" on the basis of one member for every ten in the Assembly. This "Body," responsible to the Assembly, is charged with executing the normal legislative functions until such time as the Constituent Assembly has determined on the permanent form of the legislative branch and the members of this branch have been elected to office following ratification of the constitution.[16]

From 1950 on, elections held high but vain priority on the program of all successive Indonesian cabinets. In November, 1950, for example, Foreign Minister Roem, while in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, told the press: "In the next few months the Republic of Indonesia will hold its first general elections since the transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949. The Government formed through this election will be able to formulate policies that are longer lasting than those possible today."[17] Two years later the then Prime Minister (Dr. Wilopo) was to say in a press interview on June 25, 1952 that general elections would be held that year and the constituent assembly formed by April 1, 1953.[18]

This too-facile optimism aside, the brief existence of Indonesian cabinets between the formation of the unitary state and August, 1953 handicapped election preparations.[19] There was barely time for the ministers concerned with the problem (most directly, Interior and Justice) to assume office and become acquainted with their duties before their particular cabinet was forced to turn in its mandate. Then too, each new group of ministers had different ideas on how the elections should be organized. To compound the confusion, the Ministers of Justice and Interior in any one cabinet never belonged to the same party so that, added to the lack of continuity within each ministry's handling of the problem, there was constant sparring for position between ministries.

Endlessly debated was the problem of whether the voters should directly elect members of the parliament and constituent assembly or whether they should vote for electors who would then do the actual selecting. In 1951 the Sukiman Cabinet offered a draft election bill providing for election in stages but withdrew it when it became apparent that the general preference in Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat) was for a system of direct elections. The parliamentary report on the subject criticized the Government's proposal for indirect elections on the grounds that it limited too severely the franchise for the actual choice of representatives and would be unnecessarily expensive. It was pointed out, for example, that under the system proposed by the Govern-

[16] Articles 138–39, *ibid.*

[17] As quoted in *Report from Indonesia*, Vol. 2, No. 12, November 22, 1950, p. 2, Indonesian Information Office, New York.

[18] *Antara News Bulletin.*

[19] Periods of office varied from seven to 14 months with eight being the overall average.

ment of one elector for every 250 voters, the actual elections would be carried out by an electoral college of 300,000 individuals in a country with a total population in excess of 75,000,000.[20]

That same year, in the only two district elections ever held under the present Indonesian Republic, both systems were tried out. In one area, with a high literacy rate, a direct system was used. In the other, much closer to the Indonesian norm, with a very low literacy rate, an indirect system was used. The result of these experiences confirmed the impression that a direct system was both more democratic and less expensive. As a result, observers from the Central Election Office were sent to study election methods in several countries, including the United States, Australia, Iran, Ceylon, and India. Particularly from the observation of the last three, it was concluded that a direct election was feasible even with a largely illiterate electorate.[21]

In 1952 the Wilopo Cabinet assumed office in April with the acceleration of election preparations as one of the principal priority items on its program.[22] As always, the Justice and Interior portfolios were held by different parties. The Cabinet's somewhat leisurely preparation of a new draft election law, covering the election of both a parliament and a constituent assembly, was considerably accelerated when in mid-October there occurred in Djakarta a mass demonstration of somewhat violent character aimed in part at the non-representative nature of Parliament and demanding its dissolution and the immediate holding of elections. Since, according to the constitution, elections must be held within 30 days after legislative dissolution,[23] this was impossible. The so-called "October 17th Affair" did, however, have the salutory effect of accelerating the Government's time schedule and in late November a new draft election bill was presented to Parliament.[24]

Government spokesmen hopefully forecast that parliamentary discussions would be completed by the end of January, 1953. Actually, it was not until April 4 that the President promulgated the election bill as Law No. 7 of 1953. While there had been substantial modification of the original Government draft and divergence of opinion among the various party groups, this was not the full explanation for this or the many other delays to which election preparations in Indonesia have been subjected.

It has long been a political commonplace that the enthusiasm of many In-

[20] *Laporan Panitia ad hoc Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia mengenai Rantjangan Undang-Undang tentang Pemilihan Anggauta-Anggauta Konstituante* [Report of the ad-hoc Committee to the Peoples Representative Council (Parliament) of the Indonesian Republic concerning the draft law for election of members of the Constituent Assembly], mimeographed, June 30, 1951, pp. 2–3. Present population (with rate of increase estimated at 1.5 per cent) is probably in excess of 80,000,000.

[21] *Ichtisar Parlemen, Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Sementara* [Parliamentary Summary, Peoples Provisional Representative Council], No. 3, pp. 10–12, Jan.–June, 1953.

[22] *Report on Indonesia*, May 22, 1952, Vol. 3, No. 22, pp. 1–3.

[23] "Provisional Constitution," Chapter III, Sect. I, Article 84.

[24] Robert VanNiel, "Indonesian Political Developments," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 22, pp. 84–87 (June, 1953).

donesian political groups for elections is dubious, to say the least. The 232 members of the unicameral parliament are divided among some 22 different groups whose memberships range from over 40 to one representative. Many, if not most, of the minor groups will disappear once elections are held. But while the present "temporary" parliament survives, they can continue to enjoy the perquisites and privileges of office-holding. No Indonesian cabinet from 1950 to the present has had fewer than nine political groups represented in it. Thus, with the political atomization of parliamentary representation, a high price must be paid to secure the support of even a small bloc of five or six votes. The fact that some "important" (i.e., eight- or nine-member) political groupings in parliament have no outside support whatsoever is immaterial. Their support must still be solicitously courted.[25] On the other hand, political groups with considerable popular support but lacking the good fortune to have had representatives appointed to the legislative bodies from which the present "House of Representatives" is descended, are quite powerless to influence the course of events and are never offered cabinet posts.

Commenting on this situation last October when a cabinet crisis threatened, one of the leading opposition papers wrote:

> At the present time, parties without fractions in Parliament cannot influence political conditions. Parki [descended from the Pasundan Association], for example, has great influence in West Java but in Parliament it doesn't have a single representative so that until now Parki has never participated in a government. The Indonesian Peoples' Party of "Brother" Tomo has a strong voice outside Parliament but doesn't constitute an important factor because it has no parliamentary representation. On the other hand, the Democratic and Progressive Fractions in Parliament, which have no parties of their own, are political factors and their members can become ministers. . . .[26]

Nor has the reluctance for elections been confined solely to the shadow parties. Indeed, the Indonesian Nationalist party (PNI), leading party of the current opposition with its 42 parliamentarians, has long been considered as fearing that elections would give it a poor second place compared to the Masjumi (Moslem) party, which leads the present Government and counts 44 members in its parliamentary representation.

It was with this background in mind that, at the time the Wilopo Cabinet initially presented the draft election bill for legislative action, an independent Djakarta daily pointedly observed:

> Various groups intend to delay the general elections as long as possible, therefore the electoral laws have so far been neglected. Many parties fear general elections; they are afraid of losing their present unreal positions. It is certain that the general elections will remove many parties from both Parliament and the Cabinet.
>
> Some of the 'big' parties are already wavering, the Indonesian Nationalist Party for example. To gain the votes of the people in the villages, the Nationalists face the Masjumi

[25] The Indonesian parliament has all too many examples of what Duverger terms "personality parties," i.e., minor parties, of which he says, "Many of them are nothing more than trade unions of aspirants for office." Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, trans. Barbara and Robert North (London, 1954), p. 293.

[26] *Abadi*, Djakarta (editorial), Oct. 23, 1954.

against which they must put up a hard fight. To win the votes of the workers they face the Communists and they have to fight the Socialists to acquire the votes of the intelligentsia. Especially for the small parties, it will be very hard to maintain their present positions.[27]

As finally completed, the election law is a lengthy document of 139 paragraphs filling 28 closely-typed legal-sized pages.[28] Its final form represented weeks of often heated discussion and the modifying influence of (at a minimum) several score amendments.[29] Aside from the fixing of the actual provisions of the election law, the most important basic principle to emerge from the parliamentary discussions was the decision to carry out elections virtually simultaneously (within a ten-week period) for the unicameral Parliament and the Constituent Assembly. This decision was taken in spite of the general knowledge that parties and groups (most notably Masjumi) favoring the drafting of a constitution which would establish a bicameral legislative branch were very likely to be in control of the Constituent Assembly. The adoption of such a constitution would, of course, necessitate the dissolution of the unicameral Parliament elected simultaneously with the Assembly and the expenditure of considerable time and money in the election of the new legislature.

Nevertheless, there were valid reasons for the decision to hold the elections in rapid succession. As a member of the Interior Ministry's Committee on General Election Instruction summarized the development of parliamentary thinking:

> Initially there was a current of thought which preferred the Constituent Assembly elections first, while another opinion preferred that the parliamentary elections be carried out very much in advance. Neither of these methods was considered effective and, for this reason, the elections were made simultaneous.
>
> For if the Peoples' Representative Council (D.P.R.) has not yet been formed when the Constituent Assembly election takes place then, according to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Provisional Constitution, the work of the D.P.R. would be entrusted to a Working Body of the Constituent Assembly, composed of one-tenth of its total membership. This would be also only one-fifth of what the total membership of the D.P.R. ought to be. Yet the work of the D.P.R. is entirely too important to entrust to so small a council.
>
> Drafting the proposed constitution will require a lengthy period, and during this time we would not yet have a D.P.R. as is necessary. If the D.P.R. is organized first, when would we form the Constituent Assembly to draft a valid constitution? Thus the situation proves that our country is not yet on a fully constitutional basis!
>
> After the exigencies of the situation were explained by the Government, agreement was reached that the Constituent Assembly and Peoples' Representative Council had to be chosen simultaneously!
>
> In actual practice, the word 'simultaneously' will mean that the Constitutent Assembly and Peoples' Representative Council elections are encompassed within a fixed

[27] *Indonesia Raya*, Djakarta (editorial), Jan., 1953.

[28] The following summary of the Election Law's provision is based on the Indonesian text as given in *Undang-Undang No. 7, Tahun 1953, tentang Pemilihan Anggota Konstituante dan Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat*, published by Kementerian Penerangan, R. I. [Information Ministry of the Indonesian Republic], 1953, 44 pp.

[29] All the following references to parliamentary discussions are based on the official transcripts as given in *Ichtisar Parlemen, Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Sementara*, No. 1–77, pp. 1–384, Jan.–June, 1953, *passim*.

period. Clearly the Constituent Assembly and Peoples' Representative Council will not be chosen simultaneously one right after the other since that would confuse the voter; however, the two elections can be carried out as quickly as possible within the same period, for example the first day choose the Constituent Assembly and the following, the Peoples' Representative Council. Also this method, among other things, would offer economies in the use of the ballot boxes.[30]

The election law itself comprises four main sections. The first (and longest) is divided into eleven chapters of 103 paragraphs and outlines the essential provisions for the organization and conduct of elections. Section II (Chapters XII through XIV, paragraphs 104 through 112) deals with the qualifications for members of the Constituent Assembly and Parliament and the disabilities involved. Section III, consisting of Chapter XV only (paragraphs 113 through 129) outlines penalties for election violations, and the final section (Chapter XVI, paragraphs 130–139) is concerned with "Concluding and Transitional Provisions."

The law provides suffrage for all Indonesian citizens who are at least 18 years old or are "already married" if under 18. The only ones disfranchised are those who are not properly listed, those of unsound mind, or persons convicted of a penal offense. If, however, such conviction has occurred under the "Law of War and Siege" covering offenses against the public peace and national security, there is no disfranchisement. Although some political groups had wanted separate provisions for members of the armed forces and the national police, the law provides that, even if on active duty away from their residence, they may forward absentee ballots. Indonesian citizens abroad will be permitted to vote at their embassies. Within Indonesia, however, individuals other than members of the armed forces and police must cast their ballot within the district where they normally live.

One of the most hotly debated questions had been that of the number of electoral districts. Small parties, such as the Catholic and Protestant Christian, for example, with adherents scattered everywhere, were anxious to have all of Indonesia constitute one election district so that they could make every vote count in the division of seats. At the opposite extreme was the interesting proposal of the Indonesian Socialist party (PSI). This party suggested the creation of almost 40 election districts based on ethnic principles so that every important racial element would be guaranteed a voice.[31] Several of the very small groups in parliament which draw their strength from one or two geographical areas only also favored a large number of election districts, particularly in their own sections of Indonesia. The large parties with nationwide membership and influence, such as the Masjumi (Moslem) or the Indonesian Nationalist party

[30] Mohammed Suba-Wiguna, *Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum*, N. V. Pustaka & Penerbit "Endang", Djakarta, 1953 (booklet), pp. 3–4.

[31] This would not have meant that subdivisions of an election district would then be scattered all over Indonesia. Most racial groups are found in one compact geographical area. In Java, for example, the Sudanese occupy the province of West Java and the Javanese that of Central Java and part of East Java, while the Madurese occupy the rest of the province and, of course, the island of Madura itself.

(PNI), were indifferent as to how the problem was solved. Probably as a result of this attitude, the Government's original proposal to divide the ten provinces of Indonesia into fifteen electoral districts was adopted, with the slight modification that an additional district was created for Djakarta as the capital city. Interestingly enough, included as a separate election district in both the draft and final versions of the bill is Netherlands New Guinea, which the Indonesian Government has been claiming as Indonesian territory under the name of Irian Barat ever since December, 1949 and whose surrender it has vainly demanded of the Dutch.[32]

An involved administrative organization for carrying out the elections was outlined. At its peak is the Indonesian Election Committee, located in Djakarta. Its nine members, appointed by the President for four-year terms, are charged with the overall responsibility of "making the preparations, guiding the conduct of and carrying out the election of members of the Constituent Assembly and of the Peoples' Representative Council [Parliament]." Below them, located in each of the sixteen electoral districts, are Election Committees composed of seven members appointed by the Minister of Justice for four-year terms, which have similar responsibilities on the district (provincial) level.

Next come approximately two hundred Sub-Provincial (Regency) Election Committees, composed of seven members appointed by the provincial governor acting for the Minister of Interior Affairs. These committees in turn appoint the Voting Committees composed of five members with the local sub-district head as the *de jure* chairman. The area supervised by these committees, of which there are some 3100, includes three or four villages and corresponds with the boundaries of the lowest provincial administrative unit.[33] This committee authenticates the voting lists prepared in the villages and is charged with general supervision of the election preparations and actual conduct. Finally, in every village, with the village head as chairman, are some 21,000 Voting List Committees. These three-man committees compile the election lists and supervise all local election activities.

These village committees were, in essence, charged with nothing less than taking the first census in Indonesia since 1930.[34] Under the terms of the law complete lists had to be made of all "Indonesian citizens"[35] in each village and then transmitted through the ascending administrative hierarchy to the Indonesian Election Committee so that, on the basis of total population figures, it could determine the number of members of the future parliament on the basis of one representative for every 300,000 citizens and the constituent assembly

[32] See L. Metzmaekers, "The Western New Guinea Problem," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 24, pp. 131–42 (June, 1951).

[33] See Lawrence S. Finklestein, "The Indonesian Federal Problem," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 24, pp. 284–95 (Sept., 1951).

[34] The 1930 census was the last decennial census under the Dutch regime. Since then no census has been taken.

[35] The term has never been officially defined although the last cabinet, for the first time since independence, presented Parliament with a draft citizenship bill in early November, 1954.

in the ratio of one to 150,000.[36] (Actually, it did not prove possible to complete this task until October 30, 1954, when the total population of Indonesia was announced by the Election Committee as comprising 77,987,879 individuals, thus establishing the membership of the constituent assembly at 520 and of the parliament at 260.[37]) Conditioning this distribution of representation, however, are provisions (Articles 32 and 33) designed to insure adequate representation to such a geographically important but underpopulated area as Borneo (Kalimantan). It is provided that regardless of its actual population no election district shall have less than six representatives in the constituent assembly and three in the parliament.

One of the most interesting chapters of the election law is Chapter VI, "Concerning Candidacies." This crucial section of the law was debated in Parliament almost sentence by sentence and word by word. Of particular importance was the problem of defining the terms of eligibility for participation in the elections. Should participation be limited to political parties only or should the Government proposal to permit political parties, "other organized groups," and individuals to enter the lists be adopted? Or should only "legitimate political groups" and individual independents be permitted to contest for election, as the Communists proposed? Also discussed in detail were such related issues as the minimum number of names for nominating petitions, whether candidates should post a bond, and what eligibility requirements should be met.

The final draft of Chapter VI embodied the initial Government proposal virtually unchanged. Most parliamentarians had been won over by the argument that comparatively few potential voters were actually enrolled as members of political parties and that to insure the widest possible representation to all sections of public opinion it was therefore necessary that not only political parties and independent candidates, but also any organized groups able to muster sufficient signatures to validate a nominating petition be permitted to participate. By thus widening the range of electoral participation, it was argued, representation would be given to economic, social, and cultural groups lacking any specific political orientation.[38]

However praiseworthy the intent, the result has been to compound confusion. In addition to numerous independent candidates and those of some twenty-odd political parties, the voter is now also confronted with weighing the merits of those sponsored by such varied groups as the Humanist Society,

[36] *Provisional Constitution, 1950*, Articles 56 and 135. See also the Election Law (Undang-Undang No. 7, 1953), Paragraphs 32–35.

[37] As reported in Abadi, Djakarta, November 1, 1954. Since the Constituent Assembly's task of fixing Indonesia's basic law is of such grave importance, it was considered necessary that it be twice the size of Parliament to insure the widest possible representation.

[38] The final solution represents a curious melange of representational theories stemming from such varied (and disparate) backgrounds as those of the European proportional representation systems, the Anglo-Saxon individual candidate, and overtones of German and Italian Fascist corporate theories.

the Indonesian Younger Generation Association, the Organization of Prosperous Peasants, the Union in Defense of Indonesian Independence, the Executive Council for Minangkabau Customary Law (Adat), the Retired Pensioners' Association, and many others. The result is that in virtually every election there are between 40 and 50 political parties, private individuals, and other organizations which have qualified for a place on the ballot.

All independent candidates and the number one candidate on lists must qualify for nomination by presenting petitions signed by at least 200 eligible voters. Each succeeding list candidate must have the signatures of an additional 25 voters who indorse his personal candidacy. No list may offer more candidates for either Constituent Assembly or Parliament than the total number of seats allotted the district in question for either body and in no case may any list contain more than 20 names. Since the representation allotted the 16 election districts ranges, to take the parliamentary figures only,[39] from East Java's 58 seats, based on its estimated population of 17,950,000, to Southeast Borneo's "guaranteed" (see above) three seats, the purpose of the 20-candidate limit for any one list, one suspects, has motives behind it other than the obvious one of attempting to shorten the ballot. In particular, in thickly populated Java, the three election districts of which (excluding Djakarta) account for 162 of the 260 members of Parliament,[40] the effect is to limit categorically the number of representatives that any one party or group can hope to get regardless of how strong its rank and file support may be. Most likely to be penalized by this are the two largest Islamic parties, the Masjumi and the Nahladatul Ulama, which otherwise might reasonably be expected to make a virtual clean sweep of the areas outside the handful of urban centers on Java. However, a provision permitting the combining of lists (Paragraph 37 of the Law) within the same election district would tend to overcome this handicap.

Individual candidates are restricted to presenting themselves on only one list and that in the election district where their legal residence is. Further, they must be 25 years of age and in possession of full citizenship rights. A Government proposal that the initial candidate on each party and organization list as well as independent candidates should post a guarantee bond of 250 rupiahs (about $28.50) and each succeeding list candidate 100 rupiahs was defeated.[41] Interestingly enough no proposals were made, along the lines of the present German electoral system for example,[42] to provide any procedure for eliminating parties with a very small vote from the distribution of seats. As a result, there may be all too many minuscule groups, consisting of one or two members, sitting in both Parliament and the Constituent Assembly.

[39] Constituent Assembly representation, of course, is precisely double this.

[40] *Antara News Bulletin*, Djakarta, Nov. 1, 1954.

[41] This was more a matter of principle than any feeling that someone might be barred from participation by the necessity of posting this bond. Even in such a low average income country as Indonesia, anyone at all likely to be a candidate would not be deterred by so modest an amount as R. 250.

[42] James K. Pollock, "The West German Electoral Law of 1953," this *Review*, Vol. 49, pp. 107–30 (March, 1955).

One of the most important provisions of the Election Law is contained in Article 41. Here indeed is the key to the successful conduct of an election in a country with 55 to 65 per cent illiteracy. Provision is made for each party and organizational list and individual candidate to register an election symbol with the Central Election Committee. It is by this means that an illiterate voter will be able to punch a hole in the ballot opposite the list or candidate of his choice. Forbidden for use as symbols are the coats of arms of Indonesia or any foreign country, the national flag, individual pictures, or pictures which offend the "Indonesian sense of modesty." No party or organization may have more than one symbol and in the event of two groups picking the same symbol, its assignment is decided by lot.

The choice of symbols has shown a wide range from the easily predictable hammer and sickle of the Communist party to the lightning bolt chosen by an independent candidate in the election district of West Java. The Masjumi (Moslem) party is using a star and crescent moon in white against a black background. The Nationalist (PNI) party, which, together with the Communists, constitutes the present opposition, has a bull's head enclosed within a triangle adorned with the motto, "Proletarian Front" (Front Marhaenis), while the "Association of Police Officials of the Indonesian Republic" is offering its candidates to the voters under the symbol of a torch.[43]

Between May of last year and this January considerable controversy ensued over the Indonesian Communists' registering their symbol as that of the "Indonesian Communist Party and Non-Party Individuals." This was bitterly attacked by the Masjumi and other Moslem groups, and also by the Socialists, as a subtle trick intended to gull the unwary and naive. The Communists defended themselves on the grounds that (ostensibly) independent candidates generally sympathetic to their aims should have the right to register themselves under the hammer and sickle emblem if they chose to do so. The issue was finally resolved when the Central Election Committee on January 27, 1955 requested the Communist party to remove the "and Non-Party Individuals" from its banners and other election advertising. At the same time the Masjumi party was requested to remove the slogan "For the Islamic Believers" from its election material since there are at least three other Islamic religious parties participating in the elections.[44]

Under the Constitution (Article 61) membership in either the Constituent Assembly or Parliament is considered to be incompatible with the offices of President, Vice-President, Attorney-General, membership in either the Supreme Court or the Audit Department,[45] or the Presidency of the Bank of Issue. To these categories the election law adds the posts of secretary-general

[43] *Pengumuman No. 3*, Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia [Announcement No. 3, Indonesian Election Committee], Mimbar Penerangan, August, 1954, No. 8, pp. 652–55.

[44] *Antara* (semi-official Indonesian News Agency), Jan. 28, 1954.

[45] Article 44 of the 1950 Constitution lists "the General Audit Department" as one of the "organs of the state" ranking with the President and Vice-President, the Ministers, the House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court. The concept apparently was adopted from the Netherlands Constitution (Article 179), which lists the Accounting Chamber (Rekenkamer) as one of the basic organs of government.

or director-general of any ministry; chairman, vice-chairman, or member of the Army Supreme Court; Judge Advocate General of the Army; judge of a superior court; the Commander and Assistant Commander of the National Police; all armed forces officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel and above; membership in any legislative bodies above the village council level; and the principal executive post in a province or an autonomous area. To protect the interests of the non-Indonesian minorities, the Constitution provides (Article 58) that the Chinese, European (virtually all Dutch), and Arab minority groups "shall be represented in the House of Representatives by at least 9, 6 and 3 members respectively." For the Constituent Assembly, of course, these numbers are doubled. In accord with its desire to have only one group of electors, no separate elections are provided for these groups. However, on the various party and group lists provision is made for candidates of these particular racial origins to have the fact noted in parentheses after their names. If, on the basis of the election results, the constitutional quotas have not been met, the President is authorized to remedy by appointment even though the total of the Constituent Assembly and Parliament may as a result exceed the respective 520 and 260 membership limits.

The method prescribed for the division of seats is a variant of the d'Hondt system of proportional representation. The voter will exercise his franchise either by piercing his ballot through the symbol for an independent candidate or a party list, or he may, in addition, cast a free ballot by piercing the name of any particular candidate on a list. Through the ascending hierarchy of committees, the ballots in each district are forwarded to the Central Election Committee located in Djakarta. For the first-round division, each of the sixteen electoral districts is dealt with separately. The grand total of votes cast in the districts is divided by the total number of seats allotted to determine the election quotient. Seats are then allotted initially to individuals and lists which meet or exceed the election quotient. Groups or individuals whose total vote is less than the quotient are passed over on this first-round division.

For the second and final round of dividing the seats, all the unallotted seats are grouped together and all "unused votes"[46] received by a party or group in any of the 16 election districts are added in one grand total. Then, on a country-wide basis, the total remaining vote is divided by the total number of left-over seats and the new quotient established. It is on this basis that the final division of seats is made. If any seats still remain after allotments have been made to all the lists meeting the quotient requirements, they are assigned in order to those lists which have "the greatest number of votes."

Within any individual list—this applies to both the first and second rounds of division—the total number of votes cast for the list is divided by the number of seats available to get the list quotient. Then, in contrast to Dutch practice,[47]

[46] "Unused" in the sense that they were in excess of the total number of votes needed to equal the district election quotient.

[47] See Articles 102–104 of the Netherlands Election Law (*Kieswet voorzien van Marginale Annteekeningen*, Vijfde Druk, April, 1946, Alphen ann den Rijn, N. Samson, N. V., 1946).

candidates are declared elected, not in accordance with their position on the list, but on the basis of their meeting or exceeding the list quotient. Next in precedence come those candidates whose total individual vote is "at least half that of the list quotient." It is only after this group has been dealt with that the factor of precedence plays a role. If any further seats remain, the highest-ranking of the remaining candidates in order of precedence, regardless of the number of individual votes received, is elected.[48]

The election law concludes with a series of penalty clauses providing from two to five years imprisonment for those guilty of corrupt practices or of impeding the conduct of elections. Provision is also made in this concluding section (Paragraph 134) for the Government to appoint members for both the Parliament and Constituent Assembly from districts where "at the present time the elections cannot be carried out." This provision is intended to ensure representation for such areas as those in Western Java, Northern Sumatra, or the Central Celebes which are controlled by anti-Government guerilla groups. Under this provision representation is also ensured for the election district of "Irian Barat" (Netherlands New Guinea) where, for obvious reasons, it is also impossible for the Djakarta Government to hold elections.

Within two months after the passage of the election bill, the Wilopo Cabinet was forced to resign over an issue of land reform policy. It was not for another two months that a new cabinet, headed by the then Indonesian Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Ali Sastroadmidjojo, was formed. This cabinet was notable for the fact that for the first time in the political history of Indonesia the Masjumi, Socialists, Catholics, and Protestant Christians were excluded. The cabinet also had the somewhat unenviable distinction of being supported in Parliament by the influential bloc of the Communist party and its allies, to which, in addition to the President's patronage, it owed its surprising longevity.[49] Elections, of course, were one of its priority program items. In its implementation of the election law, the cabinet, dominated by the Nationalist party but based on a motley and patchwork coalition of splinter parties, had inspired neither confidence in its administrative abilities nor faith in its intent to apply the law for the benefit of both Government and Opposition.[50]

Indeed, when the appointment of the highly important Indonesian Central Election Committee was finally announced on November 7, 1953, its chairman was one of the principal leaders of the Nationalist party; among its other eight members the opposition was given one place by the appointment of a representative of the small Protestant Christian party.[51] Among the other seven

[48] Considering how small a percentage of the voters even in the completely literate and politically sophisticated countries of Western Europe ever exercise their option of individual choice in connection with party lists, these elaborate provisions of the Indonesian election law can be regarded as little more than windowdressing.

[49] The Ali cabinet set a new Indonesian record by remaining in office from August 1, 1953, until July 24, 1955. As did the other four cabinets since 1950, it resigned prior to a vote of no-confidence.

[50] See Herbert Feith, "Towards Elections in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 27, pp. 236–55 (Sept., 1954).

[51] *Antara News Bulletin*, Nov. 8, 1953.

members, all of whom represented Government parties, were included representation for the Communist-dominated Indonesian Farmers' Association, which boasts two members in the temporary Parliament, and for a small and regional Moslem religious party which has one parliamentarian.

The appointments drew angry but vain protests from the opposition parties. As reassurance, President Sukarno stated, when he formally installed the Committee in late November, that Masjumi and the other opposition parties would be guaranteed full representation on the district election committees.[52] An examination of the party affiliations of the individuals appointed to the district election committees[53] would seem to indicate that the Government adhered to the letter of the President's promise, if not the spirit. However, while it is true that each opposition party was given as much representation on most of the committees as any one Government party or group, in no case did the Government lack a majority, if the Communist representation is added in, even in districts where, by every expectation, the Masjumi and its allied parties command overwhelming popular support. The opposition's reaction to these Government tactics did not adhere with any noticeable closeness to the Interior Minister's suggestion in July, 1954 that "in the Asian manner they should confine themselves to polite criticism during the election campaign."[54]

Initial expectations for the implementation of the elections were, of course, pitched on a highly optimistic level. In an expansive mood, the then Justice Minister announced in December, 1953 that parliamentary elections would take place on January 5, 1955, and that the constituent assembly would be chosen five days later. The official time-table outlined by the Government early in 1954 in its Government Regulation No. 9 of that year[55] was more conservative, but the actual pace of developments showed that even this estimate was entirely too optimistic.

In Regulation No. 9, for example, April 1 was set as the date for the completion of the electoral rolls. On September 15 this task was arbitrarily declared completed over the anguished protests of the opposition and amidst charges that the results of the abrupt cut-off would "disfranchise millions."[56] July 1 was fixed as the date for the official announcement by the Central Election Committee of the total membership (and district division) for the constituent assembly and parliamentary elections. This, as mentioned above, actually took place on October 31.[57]

In late January, 1955 it was announced that, "due to lack of time, distance

[52] *Antara News Bulletin*, Dec. 1, 1953.

[53] See *Antara News Bulletins*, Jan.-March, 1953, *passim*.

[54] *Antara*, July 13, 1954.

[55] *Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia* No. 18, 1954. *Pemilihan umum. Peraturan Pemrintah* Nr. 9 tahun 1954, tentang penjelenggaraan Undang-undang Pemilihan Umum. (*Decree of the Indonesian Republic*, No. 18, 1954. *General Election*, Government Regulation No. 9, year 1954, regarding the execution of the General Election Law, 84 paragraphs, 41 pages.)

[56] *Antara News Bulletin*, October 10, 1954. Unofficial and unpublished estimates of the number thus arbitrarily disfranchised run as high as 10,000,000.

[57] See p. 171, par. 4.

and other factors," the closing date for the submission of candidate lists for both parliament and constituent assembly had been moved back from January 31 to February 28.[58] Originally the cut-off date for parliamentary nominations had been August 15 and for constituent assembly nominations September 15. The projected timetable after the closing date (September 15, 1954) for constituent assembly nominations had been as follows:

Sept. 17—Completion of the examination of the nominating letters for the parliamentary elections by the District Election Committee (Panitia Pemilihan).
Oct. 17 —Same procedure for the constituent assembly elections.
Sept. 17–Oct. 2—"Opportunity to improve the candidates' list for the parliamentary elections."
Oct. 17–Nov. 2—Same for the constituent assembly nominations.
Oct. 9 —Completion of compiling the provisional candidate lists for the parliamentary elections by the Central Election Committee.
Nov. 9—Same for the constituent assembly elections.
Nov. 7—"Completion of the examination of the provisional candidates' list for Parliament by the Central Election Committee" as organized on the basis of "each election district."
Dec. 31—Same for the constituent assembly candidates' lists.
Nov. 30—Final date for the public announcement of the official candidates' list for the parliamentary election by the Central Election Committee.
Feb. 15, 1955—Same for the constituent assembly.
Feb. 1—The parliamentary elections.
April 15—The constituent assembly elections.[59]

In November of 1954, a Government spokesman gave May, 1955 as the new target date for the parliamentary election.[60] It was not, however, until April of this year that the Government issued an official revision of the election timetable. At that time the Chairman of the Indonesian Election Committee, the top body in the electoral hierarchy, announced that the parliamentary election would begin on September 29 and the constituent assembly one on December 15.[61] There now seems every reason to anticipate that these will take place as scheduled. It was reported in early August that by the middle of the month some 47,000,000 ballots and other election material would be completely distributed and all technical preparations completed.[62]

But more important even than this advanced state of the mechanical preparations is the attitude towards elections expressed by the new cabinet, formed on August 11 of this year. This highly able cabinet, dominated by the Masjumi, comprises those parties which are pledged to prompt and honest elections. However, even with every desire to make them succeed, the administrators of the elections face problems of considerable magnitude.

[58] *Antara*, Jan. 26, 1955.

[59] *Lembaran-Negara Republik Indonesia* Nr. 18, 1954. *Pemilihan Umum. Perturan Pemerintah* Nr. 9, pasal 34–41, pp. 15–18.

[60] *Antara*, Nov. 26, 1954. Interior Minister Sunario in interview at Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam.

[61] This was embodied in a government regulation the text of which had not as yet reached this country as of mid-August.

[62] *Antara*, Aug. 10, 1955.

One source of difficulty is the complicated election machinery outlined in the basic legislation. While on the lower levels it does intermesh with the already existing corps of provincial civil servants, it calls for the services of literally tens of thousands of other individuals to serve on the various committees. And this is quite aside from the clerical assistance that will be needed. The staffing problem involved would tax the resources of the most literate of nations, let alone one with Indonesia's very high illiteracy rate and already crucial shortage of trained personnel. Additionally, if and when the Parliament and Constituent Assembly are chosen, they will require virtually the full-time participation for a two-year period at least of the nation's 800 or so "best minds." (At least it can be devoutly hoped that this will be the intellectual level of these two bodies.) This in turn will have a cumulative effect on governmental administration and a number of private activities.

The basic source of all the various difficulties lies, of course, in the law itself with its curious, possibly even fatal intermingling of disparate and contradictory theories and ideas from varied sources. One suspects, although the writer has never seen any statement on it, that the members of the temporary parliament felt duty-bound to produce a "model law" which would testify to the extent of their studies of foreign governments and election procedures. The result, while it indicates all too vividly the catholicity of the research, has not fitted too well into the framework of actual Indonesian political and social conditions.

This reason aside, the Ministers of Interior and Justice, in several statements made before parliamentary committees, have listed various difficulties involved in organizing the elections. In July, 1954, for example, both ministers appeared before the parliamentary committee on interior affairs to discuss the reasons for the already drastic lag in the election timetable.[63] While admitting that preparations were running considerably behind schedule, the ministers remained hopeful that both elections would be completed before the end of May, 1955.[64] The parliamentary committee was told that the registration of voters (scheduled for completion by April 1) had not been completed by mid-July in any of the sixteen election districts. The registration of voters was summarized "as at the present time still in process with some areas doing well, some not so well and some that have not as yet started at all." The main difficulties were given as being those of transportation, lack of personnel and equipment, and inadequate funds due to the "bureaucratic methods" of the Finance Ministry, which was accused of "greatly hindering the payment of Government funds." The entire election budget was stated to be Rupiah 301,000,000 (approximately $265,000), with the Ministry of Interior Affairs expending Rupiahs 261,000,000. The balance was intended for even division between the Justice and Information Ministries. (The latter ministry has been charged with the responsibility of explaining elections to the people in an effort to arouse public interest.)

[63] *Antara*, July 21, 1954.

[64] *Merdeka* (daily paper), Djakarta, July 17, 1954.

The just-concluded parliamentary election is much too recent and information still too scant to permit analysis. Reportedly some 31,000,000 voters, approximately 70 per cent of those eligible, participated. Most of these cast their ballots on September 29, the first day of the election. However, areas hampered by poor communications or the activities of terrorist groups were given until November 29 to complete the election. On the whole, the election seems to have gone off about as well as could be expected for such a pioneering effort. One blot on the record, however, has been the widespread charges of fraud and coercion by various political groups. Indeed, in Central Java this resulted in some 3,000,000 voters being ordered to recast their ballots.

The election's indicated results have come as a surprise to both Western and Indonesian political observers. It had long been axiomatic that the Masjumi (Moslem) party would emerge as victor. Its leaders on election eve were confidently anticipating from 55 per cent to 75 per cent of the vote. Instead the results indicate that the new parliament will see the Nationalists and the Masjumi virtually tied with sixty-odd seats each, the conservative League of Moslem Teachers (Nahdataul Ulama) represented with a probable fifty seats, and the Communists in fourth place with a surprising forty seats—twenty-three more than their representation in the present temporary parliament. Apparently the remaining forty-odd seats will be scattered among approximately twenty splinter groups.

If such are indeed the results, the expectations of many observers, who had hoped that the parliamentary election would result in a stabilization of political life, will be disappointed. Instead of the four or five large, and solidly based, political groupings which it was hoped would emerge, Indonesian political activity is apparently doomed to continue under the curse of a polyparty system. So evenly balanced are the two leading parties that neither can form a cabinet without the other unless prepared to pay a high price for splinter-group support. It is not encouraging in this connection that, at the time of the formation of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet in 1953, the Nationalists showed a willingness to do precisely this. Indeed, the parliamentary alliance they made with the Communists at that time against the Masjumi undoubtedly aided the Communists in scoring their sweeping election gains. It can only be hoped that the sinister implications of this Communist success will strengthen the hand of the moderate group within the Nationalist party, which eyes the Communists askance and favors cooperation with the Masjumi. Unfortunately, this group has wielded but little influence in the past few years.

One conclusion, however, seems all too probable. The election, long anticipated as a possible panacea for the ills of the body politic, has actually changed little. Indonesian political life seems destined to continue in an atmosphere of embittered and atomized partisanship offering little basis for sober and constructive action. The election results would seem to confirm the ironic truth of the old proverb, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose!*

JUSTICE HARLAN AND THE USES OF DISSENT

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The appointment of John M. Harlan of New York to the Supreme Court bench came not only as something of a surprise, but as a rather timely and significant one.[1] It is not merely that he is the first justice who is a direct descendant of a previous member of the Court, but that in a fitting sense his appointment may be regarded as a long-overdue tribute to the services his grandfather rendered to the Court and to the nation, and to the causes which the elder Harlan so ably represented.

Of all the more prominent justices in Supreme Court history, John Marshall Harlan of Kentucky has been, for no obvious reason, the most neglected. The recently published biography of Justice William Johnson[2] has restored to his place in history the only other justice who perhaps could compete with Harlan in the lack of attention paid a significant career.

This neglect can be illustrated in several ways. In the first place, despite the spate of excellent judicial biographies which have been published in recent years, none has ever been written on Harlan, although one is said to be in progress.[3] In the second place, there has been little law review comment on him, though in the past few years this deficiency has been somewhat remedied.[4] Third, those who have commented on his career have often regarded him as rather unimportant or even peculiar. One writer criticizes his vehemence in the income tax dissent.[5] Justice Brewer, his intimate on the Court for many years, remarked caustically that Harlan "retires at eight with one hand on the Constitution and the other on the Bible, safe and happy in a perfect faith in justice and righteousness."[6] Justice Holmes, who knew Harlan only in his later years, compared his mind to "a powerful vise the jaws of which couldn't be got nearer than two inches to each other."[7] At another time Holmes remarked that he had no need to go far in a dissent because the majority opinion was written by "old Harlan who simply rolled off the cases."[8] And Justice Frankfurter has

[1] Harlan was nominated on January 10 and confirmed by the Senate on March 16, 1955.

[2] Donald Morgan, *Justice William Johnson, The First Dissenter* (Columbia, S. C., 1954).

[3] By Professor David Farrelly of the University of California (Los Angeles).

[4] The more important recent articles are: Edward F. Waite, "How 'Eccentric' Was Mr. Justice Harlan?", *Minnesota Law Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 173–87 (Feb., 1953); David G. Farrelly, "Justice Harlan's Dissent in the Pollock Case," *Southern California Law Review*, Vol. 24, pp. 175–82 (Feb., 1951); Richard F. Watt and Richard M. Orlikoff, "The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan," *Illinois Law Review*, Vol. 44, pp. 13–40 (1949); Document, "The Appointment of Mr. Justice Harlan," *Indiana Law Journal*, Vol. 29, pp. 46–74 (Fall, 1953).

[5] Alpheus T. Mason, *Brandeis and the Modern State* (Washington, 1936), p. 120.

[6] Quoted in Waite, *op. cit.* n. 4, pp. 180–81.

[7] *Holmes-Pollock Letters*, Vol. 2, pp. 7–8 (April 5, 1919).

[8] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 157–58 (Jan. 7, 1910), referring to Harlan's concurring opinion in *Kuhn* v. *Fairmont Coal Co.*, 215 U. S. 349 (1910).

said that Harlan was merely "an eccentric exception" in his views on the Fourteenth Amendment.[9]

These offhand comments add up to a picture strangely at variance with the apparent realities about Harlan, who was reportedly well liked by all his colleagues except Chief Justice White and perhaps Holmes;[10] who wrote several of the most respected majority and dissenting opinions that appeared during his tenure; who sat on the bench longer than any justices except Marshall and Field;[11] who was the real Great Dissenter (not only in the number but in the quality of his dissents);[12] and whose opinions have stood the test of time perhaps better than those of any justice of his time.

The occasion of the appointment of Harlan's grandson, in conjunction with the recent Supreme Court decision in the school segregation issue, provides a timely opportunity to correct the neglect and counter the invidious comment. The present article does not attempt to assess Harlan's character or personality. What is attempted is to indicate the viability of the man's judicial opinions: the box score on Harlan is perhaps higher than that of any man who has ever occupied the bench. Most of these opinions were expressed in dissent, and consequently Justice Harlan is the best possible illustration of the effectiveness of the dissenting opinion. Justice Brown once wrote that "if the authority of the Court is weakened by a dissent, it is probably because it ought to be weakened." A dissent is an appeal to the conscience of the future: it is thus to be judged on whether it correctly divined that conscience. In this regard Harlan's dissents rank high. Surprisingly enough, his majority opinions do not hold up as well. Where he was a child of his time he was judged wrong by later generations; where he criticized his own times we moderns have adopted his views—often, however, without giving him credit for them.

The following classification of Harlan's opinion is not exhaustive, but is limited to those the author regards as the most important in the context of today. It seems well to begin with the segregation issue, since this is the most recent to be dealt with by the Supreme Court.

I. RACE DISCRIMINATION

It seemed obvious to Justice Harlan, as it does to anyone who reads the entire Fourteenth Amendment in the light of its wording and the reasons for its adoption, that if the amendment means anything at all, it means to protect the freed Negro from the external signs of bondage. Justice Harlan, however, carried this idea farther than any other member of the Court. He was the only justice to dissent in any of the great race cases arising during his tenure. In the

[9] In *Adamson* v. *California*, 332 U. S. 46 (1947), concurring opinion.

[10] See Robert E. Cushman, "Harlan, John Marshall," *Dictionary of American Biography*, Vol. 8, p. 269.

[11] 33 years, 10 months and 25 days.

[12] He wrote 316 dissents, according to Carl Swisher, *American Constitutional Development* (New York, 1954), p. 564.

Civil Rights Cases, oddly, he was the only Southerner on the bench even as he was the only dissenter.

The *Civil Rights Cases* mark Harlan's most extreme statement of his reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.[13] Essentially, the question presented by these cases was: Can Congress, under the Fourteenth Amendment, act affirmatively to protect the civil rights of Negroes? The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Bradley, held that Congress was limited to laws correcting state legislation, and could not pass affirmative laws touching the actions of private persons. The cases concerned the denial of accommodations in hotels, theaters, and on a railroad; and the effects of the decision were to invalidate Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and to perpetuate discrimination in privately owned public facilities. The burden of Bradley's opinion was that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to touch private, but only state, action, and that the section of the amendment empowering Congress to enact enabling legislation was limited to state action: in other words, to correcting the effects of prohibited state acts. No congressional activity may take place until some state act violating the amendment has been taken. Bradley was careful not to exclude state court action; in fact, he implied that if the civil rights cases had been prosecuted originally in state courts, Congress might be able to legislate against the state court decisions. But he did not consider the possibility that under the doctrine of *Munn* v. *Illinois* public utilities might be considered as being to some extent state agencies.[14] He also ignored the possibility that state *inaction* —that is, the failure to correct discrimination—might be considered the equivalent of affirmative action.

Justice Harlan strongly castigated the majority for "proceeding upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial," and sacrificing the "substance and spirit" of the Fourteenth Amendment "by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism." His view was that the amendment was intended to protect Negro rights, and that the Court's decision made such protection impossible. He felt that the Court had paid insufficient attention to the intent of the framers of the amendment. He proceeded on the broad grounds that the national government "has the power, whether expressly given or not, to secure and protect rights conferred or guaranteed by the constitution." Harlan argued that the Thirteenth Amendment as well as the Fourteenth permitted legislation such as the Civil Rights Acts. He made much of the point that the courts had always considered common carriers as exercising a public function, concluding:

> Such being the relations these corporations hold to the public, it would seem that the right of a colored person to use [them] . . . is as fundamental in the state of freedom . . . as are any of the rights which my brethren concede to be so far fundamental as to be deemed the essence of civil freedom.

As to hotels, he made substantially the same argument: innkeepers are given special privileges by the state, and have certain duties to the public, one of

[13] 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
[14] *Munn* v. *Illinois*, 94 U. S. 113 (1877).

which is to extend their accommodations to all comers. The theater question he covered by arguing—with somewhat less force—that they are licensed by the state representing the public, and that Negroes are part of the public and must be treated on an equal basis. Consequently, in all the cases here involved, Harlan found state action where Bradley had found only private action. "In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the fourteenth amendment . . . [these occupations] are agents of the state, because amenable . . . to state regulation."

The acceptance of the Court's opinion would, Justice Harlan continued:

> lead to this anomalous result: that whereas, prior to the amendments, congress, with the sanction of this court, passed the most stringent laws—operating directly and primarily upon states, and their officers and agents, as well as upon individuals—in vindication of slavery and the right of the master, it may not now, by legislation of a like primary and direct character, guard, protect, and secure the freedom established, and the most essential right of the citizenship granted, by the constitutional amendments. I venture, with all respect for the opinion of others, to insist that the national legislature may, without transcending the limits of the constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship, what it did . . . for the protection of slavery. . . .

Harlan also argued strongly that the grant to Congress was affirmative and not merely corrective; the corrective power would automatically be possessed by the courts and exercised by them. Why then, if corrective power alone was meant, would it be given to Congress?

The substance of Harlan's dissent, then, was that the Fourteenth (and Thirteenth) Amendment was intended to, and did, give Congress an affirmative power to prevent by legislation any discrimination either by states or by agencies which could be considered as agents of the state—and this was to be broadly interpreted. Not only was no other justice willing to go this far, but none even expressed any dissatisfaction with the majority opinion.

The second of these cases, *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*,[15] is so well known at the moment because of the publicity attending its recent reversal—so far as public education is concerned—in the *School Segregation Cases*,[16] that extended comment is hardly necessary. The case itself concerned segregation—by state law this time—in railroad trains. The doctrine of the *Civil Rights Cases* would almost certainly have called for a denial of the power of the states to pass such laws, but the Supreme Court by 1895 was even more conservative than in 1883. Again an eight-man majority ruled against the Negro rights, this time on the basis of the famous "separate but equal" doctrine: segregation is not discrimination if the facilities provided are equal. Justice Harlan wrote a ringing dissent, saying that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit any public authority "to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights." He based his argument on the grounds—surely realistic—that segregation is in itself discriminatory and implies the inferiority of the Negro race,

[15] 163 U. S. 537 (1896).

[16] *Bolling* v. *Sharpe*, 347 U. S. 497 (1954); *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).

even if the facilities are equal (which, it seems, they seldom have been). And he pointed out that even if segregation was desired by private individuals, the interests of the nation "require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law."

The final case in this series was the *Berea College Case*.[17] The case turned on the interpretation of a Kentucky law requiring private school corporations to segregate their pupils. The Court—again eight members of it—found that the law was merely an ordinary corporate regulation and thus did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It is significant to note that, as in *Plessy*, the Court ignored the grounds of its decision in the *Civil Rights Cases:* that only state action was prohibited. For in both of the latter cases, state action was specifically involved.

Harlan's dissent in the *Berea College Case* was one of his strongest. He criticized the Court for its assumption that the Kentucky legislature regarded the non-segregated teaching of pupils as somehow different when conducted by a corporation than when carried on by a non-incorporated school. It was obvious, he said, that the law as written was intended to prohibit non-segregated instruction by *any* kind of school:

> It is a reflection upon the common sense of legislators to suppose that they might have prohibited a private *corporation* from teaching by its agents, and yet left individuals and unincorporated associations entirely at liberty, by the same instructors, to teach the two races. . . . There is no magic in the fact of incorporation which will so transform the act of teaching the two races in the same school at the same time that such teaching can be deemed lawful when conducted by private individuals, but unlawful when conducted by the representatives of corporations.

Harlan concluded with a searching question: "Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of race that an American government . . . can make distinctions between . . . citizens in the matter of their voluntary meeting for innocent purposes, simply because of their respective races?"

What is the present status of these three cases? In the strict legal sense the *Civil Rights Cases* still stand. But the courts have largely assumed the powers there denied Congress, and the *Civil Rights* decisions have been seriously undermined by more recent holdings. The *Henderson*[18] and *Morgan*[19] cases have used the commerce clause to rid the transportation system (in its interstate phases) of segregation. *Shelley* v. *Kraemer*[20] has made it plain that state court decisions upholding segregation are extremely suspect. And the broadened scope of the public utilities concept in recent years has made it rather doubtful that the Court's holding that private persons may discriminate would be applied today to railroads and hotels, if not theaters. It should also be noted that many

[17] *Berea College* v. *Kentucky*, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).

[18] *Henderson* v. *U. S.*, 339 U. S. 816 (1950), dealing with segregation on interstate dining cars.

[19] *Morgan* v. *Virginia*, 328 U. S. 373 (1946), dealing with segregation on interstate busses.

[20] 334 U. S. 1 (1948).

Northern states have enacted laws expressly prohibiting segregation or discrimination in all businesses which extend their services to the general public; particularly has this been true of hotels, restaurants, and transportation facilities.

The *Plessy* case has been expressly overruled in its application to public education. Its vitality in other fields is extremely doubtful. Attempts have already been made to apply the doctrine of the *School Segregation Cases* to public facilities of all sorts, such as parks, golf courses, and swimming pools, and there is little to indicate that such attempts will not eventually be successful.[21] It is almost true to say, then, that the separate but equal principle is dead.

As regards the *Berea College Case*, it has never been expressly overruled. But it seems almost beyond doubt that if the states cannot require segregation in public schools, neither can they in private ones. Were the *Berea* case to be adjudicated today, there is little doubt that Harlan's dissent would be the opinion of the majority.

Other race cases decided during the tenure of Justice Harlan were of less significance than those discussed above, but should perhaps be mentioned. Two cases involved state laws regarding segregation in transportation facilities. In *Hall* v. *DeCuir*,[22] the Court struck down a Louisiana law forbidding discrimination, calling it an interference with interstate commerce. The decision was unanimous; while it could be interpreted as an anti-Negro decision, Harlan's vote was more likely based on his deep belief in the plenary powers of the federal government in the field of interstate commerce. Such a construction of his attitude is given color by his dissent in *Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co.* v. *Mississippi*[23] some years later. In this case the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brewer, held valid a state law *requiring* segregation on railroad trains. The Court distinguished the two cases by saying that the Mississippi law applied only to intrastate travel. Harlan would have none of such distinctions: if it was unconstitutional to forbid segregation on an interstate carrier, it was also unconstitutional to require it. Both are regulations of interstate commerce and as such infringe on the constitutional powers of Congress. In the recent case of *Bob-Lo* v. *Michigan*,[24] the Supreme Court unconvincingly distinguished the *DeCuir* case while at the same time depriving it of its logical basis; and it is obvious that such other cases as the *Henderson* and *Morgan* cases have pretty much destroyed the force of *Louisville, etc.* v. *Mississippi*.

Two cases involved the Fifteenth Amendment and Negro voting rights. In *Giles* v. *Harris*[25] the Court refused to extend its protection to a Negro who had been denied the right to register to vote—Justice Holmes saying that the federal courts could not supervise elections. Harlan, Brewer, and Brown dissented. Harlan was concerned at the obvious weakening of the Fifteenth Amendment resulting from the decision. At the same session, the Court ruled unconstitutional a federal law making it a federal crime to use bribery to prevent people

[21] See Robert B. McKay, "Segregation and Public Recreation," *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 40, pp. 697–731 (Oct., 1954).

[22] 95 U. S. 485 (1878). [23] 133 U. S. 587 (1890).

[24] 333 U. S. 28 (1948). [25] 189 U. S. 474 (1903).

from voting. The grounds for the decision were the specious ones that the law failed to limit its application to national elections: the Court refused to construe the law so as to make it constitutional.[26] The peculiarity of the case was that it *did* involve a federal election, so that the Court's ruling was based on a hypothetical situation rather than on the facts of the case before it. Justices Harlan and Brown dissented without opinion. The distinction between state and national elections has been pretty well washed away in recent years by the white primary cases, and there is little doubt that the same is true of *Giles* v. *Harris*.

Four jury cases were decided, three of them in a single session of the Court. *Strauder* v. *West Virginia*[27] found a statute unconstitutional which restricted jury service to whites. *Virginia* v. *Rives*[28] held that a particular jury panel need not contain any Negroes even though the defendant is a Negro. *Ex parte Virginia*[29] ruled that a judge's actions in excluding Negroes from jury service were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harlan voted with the majority in each case. The fourth case, *Neal* v. *Delaware*,[30] found him writing the Court opinion in a holding that the exclusion of Negroes from grand and petit juries (by jury commissioners) was a violation of the Constitution. These cases still state the law on the subject, although the courts have recently been more sophisticated in their approach: they now look behind the face of the law and judge by the historical *practices* of the states.

Another case involving legal rights was *U. S.* v. *Harris*.[31] The case concerned a lynching party which had forcibly removed several Negroes from custody and beat them up, killing one of them. Federal law at the time made it a crime to participate in a private conspiracy to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws. The Court declared the law unconstitutional—in a clear forerunner of the *Civil Rights Cases*—saying that the Fourteenth Amendment could reach only state, not private, action. Harlan, however, did not dissent, for reasons not known. Possibly he felt that the traditional criminal law was state law and that the Fourteenth Amendment had not changed that situation, but this is merely speculation.

The last of the race cases in which Harlan took part also found the justice taking a position which is difficult to fit in with his general views on the subject. In *Cumming* v. *Richmond County Board*[32] he wrote the majority opinion in a holding that a school district may devote its funds to a white high school without maintaining a Negro high school. The decision was technically based on the legal grounds that injunction was not the proper remedy. It appears that Harlan was greatly influenced by two factors present in the situation: first, that the school board, with limited funds at its disposal, had felt that it had to choose between maintaining a high school for 60 Negro students, or three grade schools for 300 Negro students, and had chosen the latter; second, it appeared that private high schools were available to Negro students at no higher cost than the

[26] *James* v. *Bowman*, 190 U. S. 127 (1903).
[27] 100 U. S. 303 (1879).
[28] 100 U. S. 313 (1879).
[29] 100 U. S. 339 (1879).
[30] 103 U. S. 370 (1881).
[31] 106 U. S. 629 (1883).
[32] 175 U. S. 528 (1899).

public one. Harlan obviously felt that the Negroes of high school age were not being very greatly discommoded. It seems likely, however, in view of the recent school segregation ruling, that the Supreme Court would take a different attitude today, especially since the public high schools no longer charge tuition.

Summing up the race cases, it appears that in the overwhelming number of them, and in the most important of them, Justice Harlan correctly assessed the future attitudes of the courts and, indirectly, of public opinion. His dissents in the *Civil Rights* and *Plessy* cases, particularly the latter, have been regarded as classics for some years now, and the latter was directly and highly influential, one may assume, in the *School Segregation Cases*.

II. THE POWER TO TAX

Justice Harlan was a giant of a man, with a temper. At times it boiled over even in the courtroom, although only in cases of extreme provocation. He was criticized in the press for allowing his feelings to get the better of him on two principal occasions: that of the *Income Tax Case* in 1895, and that of the *Standard Oil Case* in 1911 (which will be discussed below). The *Income Tax Case*[33] reveals Harlan as a most human individual; he is said to have shaken his forefinger and shouted angrily while delivering his dissent, looking at Justice Field as he did so. Attorney-General Knox remarked, "I should hate to use any such language about the Court as it said about itself yesterday."[34] Harlan himself, not unnaturally, denied that he had been that excited, and also claimed that Field had deliberately whispered, shuffled papers, and in general acted discourteously during the delivery of Harlan's opinion.[35]

The issue in the income tax litigation was, more clearly than is usual, whether the Court's ideas of wise policy take precedence over those of Congress. Justice Harlan and three other dissenters saw this clearly, but the others confined their dissents largely to the legal merits. Harlan, in addition to an exhaustive legal analysis, went to the root of the issue by baldly accusing the majority—and particularly Field—of adjudicating on the basis of its preferences, and of deliberately seeking a means by which to declare the income tax invalid. Field had not bothered to disguise his dislike of the law; he had agreed with counsel who had asked the Court to "stand in the breach" against the "advancing hosts of Socialism." Field had concluded, "the present assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the stepping-stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of the poor against the rich."

Such arguments received short shrift from Harlan: "With the policy of legislation of this character, the court has nothing to do"; if this decision is to stand "the American people cannot too soon amend their Constitution."

The story can be concluded briefly. The American people agreed with Harlan and the other dissenters, and the Sixteenth Amendment was passed in 1913 giving Congress a power which Harlan had maintained it had possessed all along.

[33] *Pollock* v. *Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.*, 158 U. S. 601 (1894).
[34] See Farrelly, *op. cit.*, n. 4. [35] *Ibid.*

III. THE COMMERCE POWER

Harlan's deep belief in national power (he had been a strong Unionist during the Civil War), already illustrated by his attitude on the race question, was nowhere more pronounced than in his attitude on the scope of the commerce clause. While he was by no means, as will be emphasized further on, an economic radical, he did believe strongly that the commerce power was plenary in nature and broad in scope. This has already been noted in connection with the cases involving segregation in transportation facilities. But perhaps the best illustration is his stand on the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and its amendments. The Court for some years, although it found the act itself constitutional, engaged in a process of construing away many of the powers there granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission, using the simple means of restrictive statutory interpretation. Harlan, on the other hand, felt that the statutes should be interpreted liberally so as to give the ICC the actual power to carry out the purposes for which it was created. Brief mention of the principal cases should suffice to bring out this point.

In *Texas and Pacific* v. *ICC*[36] the Court ruled that the ICC had no power to impose on railroads moving goods in foreign trade the same rates they charged for similar goods moving in domestic commerce. As Justice Harlan pointed out in dissent, such a construction would leave such a wide loophole in the act that it would be ineffective: Congress could not be assumed to have intended such an interpretation. In *ICC* v. *Cincinnati, etc., Ry.*[37] the Court went even further in its emasculation of the Interstate Commerce Act, holding that the ICC had no power to prescribe rates; it could only adjudicate them after the railroad had put them into effect. To the same effect was *ICC* v. *Alabama Midland.*[38] Harlan's dissent averred that the ICC was left practically powerless to accomplish its purpose.

> Taken in connection with other decisions . . . the present decision, it seems to me, goes far to make the commission a useless body, for all practical purposes, and to defeat many of the important objects designed to be accomplished by the various enactments of congress relating to interstate commerce. . . . It has been left . . . with the power to make reports and to issue protests. But it has been shorn . . . of authority to do anything of an effective character. It is denied many of the powers which, in my judgment, were intended to be conferred upon it.

In another case along similar lines, Harlan dissented without opinion to a ruling that competitive factors may sometimes justify discriminatory rates, and that the railroad may change its rates to meet such factors without gaining the previous consent of the ICC.[39]

In an opinion by Justice Holmes,[40] the Court held that the ICC could not require testimony except in connection with violations of the Interstate Com-

[36] 162 U. S. 197 (1896).
[37] *ICC* v. *Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co.*, 167 U. S. 479 (1897).
[38] 168 U. S. 144 (1897).
[39] *East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Ry. Co.* v. *ICC*, 181 U. S. 1 (1901).
[40] *Harriman* v. *ICC*, 211 U. S. 407 (1908).

merce Act, or in investigations for suspected violations, "these being the only matters contemplated by the provision . . . giving the Commission power to require testimony 'for the purposes of this act'." Harlan concurred in a dissent written by Justice Day.

The Hepburn Act of 1906 was intended to clarify the powers of the ICC and restore to it some of those taken away by court decision. But the Court used the same constricting interpretations as before. In a rather amazing decision[41] the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice White, held that the Hepburn Act's provisions prohibiting a railroad from handling any goods "manufactured, mined or produced by it, or which it may own in whole or in part, or in which it may have an interest, direct or indirect," in spite of the coverall nature of the wording, was not intended to apply to the ownership of stock. Stock ownership "is not the 'interest, direct or indirect,' . . . forbidden, . . . but only a legal or equitable interest. . . ." Just what the difference between a "legal or equitable" and a "direct or indirect" interest is, the Court did not get around to explaining. Harlan took the Court to task for not seeing the obvious—that such a construction of the act "will enable the transporting railroad company, by one device or another, to defeat altogether the purpose which Congress had in view, which was to divorce, in a real, substantial sense, production and transportation, and thereby to prevent the transporting company from doing injustice to other owners of coal."

History, of course, has largely vindicated Justice Harlan's reading of the commerce act. Congress has passed amendatory acts giving clearly to the ICC most of the powers withheld by the earlier restrictive decisions of the majority of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the powers how held by the Commission go far beyond even what Harlan might have contemplated.

Another important statute passed under the commerce power was the original Pure Food and Drugs Act. Here again the majority made some attempt to keep the powers given by the act to a bare minimum. *U. S.* v. *Johnson*[42] presents an example. Here Justice Holmes—who, as is well-known, did not believe in the efficacy of government regulation, and whose strict judicial neutrality seems to have deserted him in commerce clause cases—wrote an opinion for the Court which held that false statements on the labels of patent medicines are not misbranding so long as they apply only to the curative effects of the medicine rather than to its ingredients. Justice Hughes dissented with the concurrence of Justices Harlan and Day, pointing out that the act could as well be construed to include all misbranding, of whatever nature.

The tendency of the majority in all of these cases is clear: it did not like the laws involved. It may have felt that if Congress had meant to give such powers as those discussed to the agencies, such grants of power would have been unconstitutional. In other words, the majority saved the constitutionality of the laws by reading out of them all possible grants of (in its view) unconstitutional powers. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, thought of the commerce power in

[41] *U. S.* v. *Delaware & Hudson Co.*, 213 U. S. 366 (1909).
[42] 221 U. S. 448 (1911).

the broadest terms, at least when it was applied to commerce which was beyond doubt interstate. And when it came to the crux—when Congress specifically added the powers which Harlan had maintained had always been granted—even the majority found itself unable to call them unconstitutional.

Harlan was, nevertheless, a child of his time. There were strict limits, to his mind, separating interstate commerce from that which was not interstate. Here, in his conservatism, Harlan had more in common with his brethren and less in common with 1955 than in the cases we have so far discussed. Thus in the *Adair* case[43] he spoke for the Court in invalidating a federal law forbidding a requirement of non-union membership, or discrimination against union members, in the railroad business. To Harlan the right to sell one's labor was a basic right, and in addition he could see no connection between membership in a labor organization and the carrying on of interstate commerce. Even in such cases, however, Harlan construed the law so as to give Congress as much power as possible, as was illustrated by his dissent in the *First Employers' Liability Cases*.[44] Here the Court held void an employers' liability law for railroads because of the impossibility, in its view, of separating the interstate from the intrastate aspects of the railroad business. Obviously, thought the Court, such a law could apply only to those railroad workers who were actually engaged in interstate commerce. Three justices dissenting, Harlan, Moody and McKenna, agreed that the law could not reach workers not directly involved in interstate commerce; but they felt that Congress should be the judge of the separability of one from the other, and that the act should be allowed to stand as applied to those workers who *were* so involved. Ultimately Congress had the last word, passing a new statute doing what Harlan said the old one did. The Court's decision, in other words, merely—and for no good reason—postponed the inevitable.

IV. THE SCOPE OF THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS

Another extremely important aspect of the commerce clause was presented by the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890. As is well known, this act prohibited all combinations which were in restraint of interstate commerce. As the first part of Harlan's career had been largely identified with the struggle over discrimination, the latter portion was to be concerned with the proper interpretation of the Sherman Act. A series of important cases attest to the length and bitterness of the struggle, climaxed by the *Standard Oil Case* in the last year of Harlan's life. This case produced a concurring opinion which was criticized for its unjudicial and angry tone much as his earlier dissent in the *Income Tax Case* had been. This bitterness was in large measure the fruit of the long and apparently partly personal battle between Harlan and White, which went back as far as Harlan's service on the Louisiana Commission of 1877,[45] and in which one of the major issues was the meaning of the Sherman Act. Harlan

[43] *Adair* v. *U. S.*, 208 U. S. 161 (1908).
[44] 207 U. S. 463 (1907).
[45] Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes* (New York, 1951), Vol. 1, p. 277.

for some years held the upper hand, but as new personnel came to the bench —particularly the influential Holmes—the ascendancy was gained by White, and the contrasting opinions of the two (with Harlan now in a minority) are well shown in the *Standard Oil Case*. The climax of the bitterness had come only shortly before with the elevation of White to the Chief Justiceship by President Taft. Harlan had coveted the position, regarding it as a fitting capstone to his long service on the Court;[46] and there was probably no other justice whom he would have accepted as his chief more reluctantly than White. This series of cases also presents the one major example of the defeat of Harlan not only on his own Court but in the future; for the "rule of reason" against which he battled long and valiantly is still in use by the courts today, as the recent Du Pont decision illustrates.[47]

The first case interpreting the Sherman Act set, even if temporarily, a narrow construction of the act which practically at one stroke defeated the intentions of its framers.[48] The case involved a practical monopoly of American sugar refining, and the Court was called upon by the government to apply the anti-trust law and break up the monopoly. Chief Justice Fuller, in his opinion for the Court, however, concluded that refining and manufacturing are not commerce, and that here refining did not affect commerce directly enough to make the act applicable. A monopoly in manufacturing might interfere with interstate commerce incidentally through control of sales, but this was not the aim of the monopoly, and incidental effects of a legal act were not illegal. Redefining "commerce" to mean almost nothing but "transportation," Fuller effectively barred the application of the Sherman Act to the major type of business for which it had been intended.

Justice Harlan, in a powerful dissent, called attention to the restriction of the act performed by the majority. But more important, he took issue with Fuller's definition of commerce. "It is the settled doctrine of this court," he pointed out, "that interstate commerce embraces something more than the mere physical transportation of articles . . . and the vehicles or vessels by which such transportation is effected. . . . It includes the purchase and sale of articles that are intended to be transported from one state to another—every species of commercial intercourse among the states and with foreign nations." Further, the activities of a manufacturing monopoly cannot realistically be said to have only an "incidental" effect on commerce: for the whole aim of manufacturing is sale, and sale is commerce.

> It is said that manufacture precedes commerce, and is not part of it. But it is equally true that when manufacture ends, that which has been manufactured becomes a subject of commerce; . . . Whatever improperly obstructs the free course of interstate intercourse and trade, as involved in the buying and selling of articles to be carried from one state to another, may be reached by congress . . . [That this monopoly does restrain trade is

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 278.

[47] *U. S.* v. *E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., et al.*, 126 F. Supp. 235 (1954). While Judge LaBuy's decision held there was no restraint of trade in this case, he also remarked (at p. 335) that the Sherman and Clayton Acts "broadly condemn conspiracies [etc.] . . . that result in monopoly or *unreasonable* restraint of trade" (my italics).

[48] *U. S.* v. *E. C. Knight Co.*, 156 U. S. 1 (1894).

undeniable:] restraint is felt in all the states, for the reason, known to all, that the article in question goes, was intended to go, and must always go, into commerce among the several states. . . .

In thus upholding the power of the national government, as was his wont, Harlan spoke for the future. For in no succeeding case has the Court fully accepted the doctrine of the *Knight* case. Indeed, within ten years it was distinguishing away the substance of the doctrine. Harlan lived to see his dissent largely vindicated in fact if not in admission, and in more recent times the decision has been completely and explicitly overruled. In *Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.* v. *U. S.*[49] the Court unanimously applied the Sherman Act to a manufacturing monopoly, distinguishing it speciously from the *Knight* case by pointing out that the companies involved were engaged not only in manufacturing but also in the sale and transportation of the product. Harlan was silent, but no doubt enjoyed his victory. And in the *Swift* case in 1905[50] Holmes spoke, again for a unanimous Court, in applying the act to the stockyards business, speaking of it as a throat through which commerce must pass, but again distinguishing the *Knight* case. (But is not manufacturing also a throat through which commerce passes?)

In 1948 Justice Rutledge, in a long survey of the history of the Sherman Act, clearly regarded the *Knight* case as a dead letter since at least 1937.[51] "The artificial and mechanical separation of 'production' and 'manufacturing' from 'commerce,' without regard to their economic continuity [or] the effects of the former two upon the latter . . . ," he said, "no longer suffices to put either production or manufacturing and refining processes beyond reach of Congress' authority or of the statute."

Justice Harlan did not fare so well on the other important aspect of the Sherman Act, the so-called "rule of reason." The Court in its first decisions applying the act, with Harlan in the majority, denied that there were any limits to its application if the fact of restraint of trade was granted. Whether the restraint was reasonable or unreasonable, and whether it would have been legal under common law, the Court felt was outside its jurisdiction to decide. The act applies to "every" combination in restraint of trade, and the early majority took the word "every" literally. Three times within a year the Court argued the question, each time deciding there was no rule of reason under the Sherman Act, and each time by the same vote of 5–4 (5–3 after Justice Field's death). In the *Trans-Missouri Freight Case*[52] it was specifically rejected; at the same term a petition for rehearing was denied after argument. And the next year, in the *Joint-Traffic Case*,[53] the Court once more heard argument on the rule of reason, only to reject it once more. Both opinions were written by Justice Peckham with Harlan voting with the majority. Harlan himself took over the argument in 1903 in the *Northern Securities Case*.[54] He won the case but lost his majority:

[49] 175 U. S. 211 (1899). [50] *Swift & Co.* v. *U. S.*, 196 U. S. 375 (1905).
[51] *Mandeville Island & Farms* v. *American Crystal Sugar Co.*, 334 U. S. 219 (1948).
[52] *U. S.* v. *Trans-Missouri Freight Association*, 166 U. S. 290 (1897).
[53] *U. S.* v. *Joint-Traffic Association*, 171 U. S. 505 (1898).
[54] *Northern Securities Co.* v. *U. S.*, 193 U. S. 197 (1903).

it was a 5–4 decision with a famous dissent by Holmes, but Brewer, one of the majority, wrote a concurring opinion in which he refused to reject the rule of reason as Harlan had done in his majority opinion. It was, consequently, only a matter of time until the rule of reason would be used. The dislike between Holmes and Harlan may stem from this case, for Holmes was not the man to conceal his intellectual arrogance, and it is not unlikely that Harlan found out that Holmes had little respect for the opinion the Kentuckian (Holmes called him "the last of the tobacco-spittin' judges") had written. Lerner has called Holmes' dissent a "fit counterblast to Harlan's majority opinion."[55] But it is well known that Holmes never had much faith in the efficacy of the anti-trust laws: he was a firm believer in the survival of the fittest, and felt that such attempts to interfere with nature's course were foredoomed to failure. There seems little doubt that this attitude influenced his approach on the Court to anti-trust cases. For all his belief in judicial neutrality, Justice Holmes was only human and could not completely subdue his own prejudices. In retrospect it seems that Holmes had the better of the practical argument—the anti-trust laws have not been over-effective (but perhaps partly due to the Court's reluctance to enforce them); but it seems equally clear that Harlan had the better of the legal argument—as he pointed out, if the Sherman Act did not apply to cases such as the Northern Securities project, it would be difficult to find situations to which it *did* apply.

The two famous cases[56] in which the rule of reason was finally applied came at the very end of Harlan's long judicial career. An old and disappointed man, he may be forgiven for being rather irate in his concurrences, especially in view of the casuistical tactics of White's majority opinions. The new Chief Justice apparently felt that it was impossible to overrule the earlier cases in which the rule of reason had been rejected (he had dissented in all three), probably because he thought such a course would lose the majority he wished to command. So he adopted the tactic of denying that a court majority had ever rejected the doctrine. Harlan was perhaps not so angry at the dropping of the earlier rule of construction as he was at the Court's denial that it was doing any such thing. He referred to the *Trans-Missouri Case* as holding the direct opposite of the holding in the *Standard Oil Case*.

Logically, Harlan again had the better of the dispute: there seems no doubt whatever that the Court in 1897 and 1898 had specifically—three times—rejected the rule of reason. White's denials were completely unconvincing. At the same time it must be admitted that the rule of reason had a great deal of public and political appeal: Teddy Roosevelt sponsored it, and there was no doubt that it made the anti-trust laws much more palatable to the business interests of the nation. Then too, the doctrine fitted in well with the *laissez-faire* preconceptions of a Court which, from 1890 to 1935, had no objections to substituting its views of reasonableness and desirable public policy for those of the political authorities of the government. This Court did not believe in judicial self-

[55] *The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes*, ed. Max Lerner (Boston, 1943), p. 218.

[56] *Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey* v. *U. S.*, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); *U. S.* v. *American Tobacco Co.*, 221 U. S. 106 (1911).

restraint, nor did it believe in government interference with American business, except perhaps in flagrant cases of abuse such as had been presented by the *Swift* case. It was also true that by 1903, when the *Northern Securities Case* was decided, the opposition to the use of the rule of reason had lost its majority; by 1911 only Harlan was left to object to its use, and by 1912 even Harlan was no longer there. So the rule of reason crept into anti-trust law; it has not yet been dislodged, and perhaps never will be.

V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

At least until the accession of Justice Holmes to the bench, Harlan was the nearest thing to a liberal on the Supreme Court. This does not mean, however, that he was able to divest himself of all the *laissez-faire* doctrines so prevalent in his day. On the contrary, he was an enthusiastic exponent of the use of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause to protect private property interests from interference by state governments. While he was a firm believer in the doctrine that powers given to the national government were plenary in nature (even though he might not like their use in specific instances), he was not willing to grant the same latitude to the state governments in their use of the police power. He believed that there were certain things which the states could not do, even though there might be no specific constitutional prohibition, and was willing, like Field and Brewer, to use the due process clause to annul such actions.

Yet Harlan was not as extreme in his use of this doctrine as were some of his brethren. Field particularly, and perhaps Peckham, were willing to prevent almost all state action, while of all the judges on the Court after 1890 and before Holmes' appointment, Harlan was the most moderate in his use of due process. A survey of his opinions—necessarily incomplete—will indicate this fact.

Harlan's first opinion dealing with substantive due process came in *Mugler* v. *Kansas*[57]—a case which is sometimes regarded as one of the important steps in the development of the concept. While the Court, speaking through Harlan, here upheld a Kansas prohibition law, Harlan went on to make the following comment:

> It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of [morals, health, and safety of the public] is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the state. There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go. . . . If . . . a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to these objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts so to adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution.

Thus, while upholding the particular law, Harlan briefly stated his approval of the whole concept of substantive due process.

It seems, however, that neither at this time nor later was Harlan able to make up his mind as to the validity of the concept he had so lucidly stated; either this, or he did not really understand it. For the very next year his opinion in the *Powell* case seemed diametrically to contradict the *Mugler* opinion. The

[57] 123 U. S. 623 (1887).

Powell decision[58] upheld a Pennsylvania law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine, with a dissent by Justice Field on the due process issue. But the importance of Harlan's majority opinion was his seeming retraction of all he had said about due process in the *Mugler* case. The aggrieved party, he said, could not offer proof that the legislation was without substantial relation to the police power, for this is a question of "fact and of public policy" which belongs "to the legislative department to determine." Thus he returned to the legislature the very powers he had denied it in the *Mugler* case.

This liberal approach to the police power was continued by Harlan in *Leisy* v. *Hardin*,[59] in which he dissented from a Court decision voiding certain parts of an Iowa prohibition statute. The dissent was written by Justice Gray, with Harlan and Brewer concurring. In *O'Neil* v. *Vermont*[60] he again dissented, but this time to a Court ruling *upholding* a prohibition law; here, however, his dissent was not based primarily on the due process clause (as was Field's separate dissent) but rather on the immunity from cruel and unusual punishment.

But the Justice swung back to conservatism in his famous and much criticized opinion in *Smyth* v. *Ames*,[61] in which future profits were considered as a form of property, and the rate of profit a constitutional question. In the *Smyth* case Harlan returned to the substantive idea earlier expressed in the *Mugler* case, using the following words:

> The question whether [rates] are so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property . . . without due process of law, cannot be so conclusively determined by the legislature of the state, or by regulations adopted under its authority, that the matter may not become the subject of judicial inquiry.

This opinion Justice Harlan apparently retained to the end of his life, but even so he was never dogmatic or extreme in his ideas of its proper application. Although he wished to see the evidence justifying the state's action, it was at least possible to convince him with the evidence: the Brandeis brief found him a willing listener. This was illustrated by his long dissent in the *Lochner* case,[62] in which he examined the evidence of conditions in bakeries on which the New York maximum hours law was grounded, and concluded that there was enough evidence that baking was an unhealthful occupation to justify the statute. And in the *Jacobson* case,[63] decided the same year, Harlan wrote the Court's opinion, upholding a Massachusetts compulsory vaccination law against due process claims, echoing once again his *Powell* idea of legislative choice.

Thus it is apparent that Harlan, while believing in the concept of substantive due process as applied to property cases, did not carry it to excess. At the same time he was willing to apply the substantive concept to liberty cases as well —a development of due process which was far ahead of the other judges of his day, who were much more concerned with the protection of property than with the maintenance of liberty. This aspect of due process, which mixes procedural and substantive considerations, will now be considered.

[58] 127 U. S. 678 (1888).
[59] 135 U. S. 100 (1890).
[60] 144 U. S. 323 (1892).
[61] 169 U. S. 466 (1897).
[62] *Lochner* v. *New York*, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
[63] *Jacobson* v. *Massachusetts*, 197 U. S. 11 (1905).

VI. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

While most justices on the Court were willing to stretch every constitutional point to protect corporate property interests in the period under discussion, they were not nearly so interested in the protection of the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. After the *Slaughterhouse* decision[64] made it impossible to use the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the only constitutional hook remaining for such protection was the same clause as that used for property: the due process clause. In view of the specific guaranties of the Bill of Rights, it would have seemed more logical to use substantive due process for individual liberty rights than for those of property. But the Court majority consistently took the view that federal court protection of civil liberties was a drastic change in the federal system which the Fourteenth Amendment could not have been meant to accomplish. In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended, said the majority, to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. We have since 1920 seen a change in this attitude at least to a partial degree; this change was foreshadowed by the dissents of Justice Harlan, which Frankfurter has belittled by calling them the words of an eccentric exception. It was probably true, and Harlan probably realized, that the due process clause was *not* intended to cover the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment; but the privileges and immunities clause possibly was. Since the latter clause had been read out of the amendment in the *Slaughterhouse* holding, the purpose of the amendment could be achieved only in some other way. Harlan chose the due process clause.

Again without attempting to cover all the cases, Harlan's attitude may be brought out by citing the more important ones. *Hurtado* v. *California*[65] saw the Court holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the states to use indictment by a grand jury even for capital crimes. Justice Harlan, in a "scholarly and exhaustive" dissent,[66] concluded with the remark that the Fourteenth Amendment "evinces a purpose to impose upon the states the same restrictions, in respect of proceedings involving life, liberty, and property, which had been imposed upon the general government." This statement epitomizes the approach of Harlan to the amendment: if it could be used to protect property, it could also be used to protect civil liberties.

The *O'Neil* case, mentioned earlier, presented an example of cumulative punishment for violation of a Vermont prohibition law. The sentence mounted up to $6,638.72 or 19,914 days in prison. Harlan regarded this as an extreme penalty for a relatively minor offense, barred by the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

> . . . since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, no one of the fundamental rights of life, liberty, or property, recognized and guarantied by the constitution of the United States, can be denied or abridged by a state in respect to any person within its jurisdiction. These rights are principally enumerated in the earlier amendments of the con-

[64] *Slaughter-House Cases*, 16 Wall. 36 (1873).

[65] 110 U. S. 516 (1883).

[66] See Thomas J. Knight, "The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Harlan," *American Law Review*, Vol. 51, pp. 481–506 (1917).

stitution. . . . Among those rights is immunity from cruel and unusual punishments secured by the eighth amendment against federal action, and by the fourteenth amendment against denial, or abridgement by the states.

Another case of trial without a grand jury indictment, and this time with an eight-man trial jury, came up to the Court in *Maxwell* v. *Dow*.[67] The Court affirmed the conviction. Justice Harlan presented perhaps the most complete examination of the Fourteenth Amendment that has been seen on the Court, in a dissent that anticipated Justice Black's famous dissent in the *Adamson* case. He first went back to the privileges and immunities clause, strongly criticizing the *Slaughterhouse* holding that privileges and immunities of United States citizenship did not apply to the liberties contained in the Bill of Rights.

Without attempting to enumerate them, it ought to be deemed safe to say that [privileges and immunities] . . . embrace at least those expressly recognized by the Constitution . . . and placed beyond the power of Congress to take away or impair. . . . It seems to me that the privileges and immunities enumerated in these Amendments belong to every citizen of the United States.

But it was obvious that the Court was not going to overrule the *Slaughterhouse* decision then any more than it is today; consequently Justice Harlan passed on to the due process clause, the interpretation of which was not at the time quite as settled. He strongly castigated the Court for being more interested in property rights than in individual rights.

If, then, the "due process of law" required by the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow a state to take private property without just compensation, . . . but does allow the life or liberty of the citizen to be taken in a mode that is repugnant to the settled usages and the modes of proceeding authorized at the time the Constitution was adopted and which was expressly forbidden in the national Bill of Rights, it would seem that the protection of private property is of more consequence than the protection of life and liberty of the citizen.

Then, as he often did, Harlan invoked the argument *ad horrendum*, citing the possibilities of what a state might do without falling afoul of the Supreme Court. In an interesting anticipation of the type of question which has since come to the Court, he asked what would happen should the state of Utah establish Mormonism supported by taxation. "Could its right to do so, as far as the Constitution . . . is concerned, be gainsaid under the principles of the opinion just delivered?" He concluded by combating the "partial inclusion" principle which has become the established interpretation of due process since the Cardozo opinion in *Palko* v. *Connecticut*.[68] All the rights of the Bill of Rights

are equally protected by the Constitution. No judicial tribunal has authority to say that some of them may be abridged by the states while others may not be abridged. . . . There is no middle position, unless it be assumed to be one of the functions of the judiciary by an interpretation of the Constitution to mitigate or defeat what its members may deem the erroneous or unwise action of the people in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment.

If some of the guaranties of life, liberty, and property, which at the time of the adoption of the national Constitution were regarded as fundamental and as absolutely essential to the enjoyment of freedom, have in the judgment of some ceased to be of practical value, it is for the people of the United States so to declare by an amendment of that instrument.

[67] 176 U. S. 581 (1899). [68] 302 U. S. 319 (1937).

The famous case of *Twining* v. *New Jersey*,[69] resurrected by both majority and minority in the *Adamson* case, provided the occasion for Harlan's last great dissent on this subject. This case held that the privilege against self-incrimination was not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Harlan, of course, felt that it was. Again in an anticipation of future questions of constitutional law, he spoke specifically of the First Amendment freedoms, and then went on to say: "as I read the opinion of the court, it will follow from the general principles underlying it . . . that the Fourteenth Amendment would be no obstacle whatever in the way of a state law" allowing the rack or thumbscrew, censorship, unreasonable search, or double jeopardy.

This line of thought has never, of course, been completely accepted by the majority of the Supreme Court. It has, however, been resurrected by Justices Black and Douglas in recent years, and it has also been largely vindicated in that the processes of Cardozo's "partial inclusion" have come more and more to mean "full inclusion." Most of the specific guaranties of the Bill of Rights have by now been brought under the Fourteenth Amendment at least to some extent. In his interest in civil liberties, Justice Harlan is strikingly modern, particularly since this interest came, as has been indicated, at a time when everyone else on the Court was distinctly uninterested. If there is any field typical of the post-1937 Supreme Court, it is precisely this one. Harlan would feel very much at home on the modern Court in this respect as in so many others.

VII. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

Harlan's interest in human liberty was also shown in another field. The Thirteenth Amendment, of course, prohibits slavery. Since slavery is a relatively well-defined institution, there has been little litigation concerning this aspect of the amendment. However, in addition, the amendment bars "involuntary servitude," a phrase with a much less precise meaning, which the Supreme Court has at times been called upon to interpret. As was true of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court for some years had a tendency to construe the Thirteenth narrowly, and here again Justice Harlan stood out against the tendency.

Only one case is of importance in this connection. The Court, in *Robertson* v. *Baldwin*,[70] held that compelling seamen to serve out their contracted terms was not involuntary servitude. The opinion was based on the feeling, as stated by Justice Brown, that merchant seamen had traditionally been regarded as occupying a position somewhat analogous to that of soldiers and sailors, and were thus not affected by the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. Harlan dissented, refusing to accept the analogy and averring that this was just the kind of situation to which the amendment might be expected to apply.

Judging by the future course of events Harlan had the better of the argument. In *Bailey* v. *Alabama*,[71] concerning Negro farm workers, the opposite decision was reached, although the Court did not overrule the *Robertson* case. But more important, the Court was overruled by Congress, which in 1897 repealed the

[69] 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
[70] 165 U. S. 275 (1896).
[71] 219 U. S. 219 (1911).

law under which seamen could be forced to stay with their ships, and in 1914 in a new seamen's act provided that they could not be so compelled.

VIII. LIBERTY IN THE TERRITORIES

Justice Harlan believed in liberty for all subjects of the United States, regardless of their location. The famous *Insular Cases* gave him opportunity to dissent on this issue, for the Court held in general that the federal government need not observe the fair trial provisions of the Constitution in the newly-acquired territories after the Spanish-American War. For instance, in *Hawaii* v. *Mankichi*[72] he dissented to a Court ruling that grand jury indictment and jury trial are not necessary in unincorporated territories, and again in *Dorr* v. *U. S.*[73] he dissented on the jury trial issue. Congress has since seen fit to extend most of the Bill of Rights by law to the territories, but apparently the majority principle still stands as law, even though it may be doubtful (as indicated by *Duncan* v. *Kohanamoku*[74]) that the present Court would uphold it.

The foregoing survey of Justice Harlan's major dissents furnishes a striking illustration of the usefulness of the dissenting opinion in Supreme Court practice. The dissenting opinion provides an argument opposing that of the majority which may be seized upon by lawyers and urged in succeeding cases with some hope of success. It calls attention to defects in the position of the majority forcing a rethinking and perhaps strengthening of that position. It further calls the majority to the bar of public opinion and enlightened legal opinion. The rather dramatic nature of the dissenting opinions of Justice Harlan is reinforced by the fact that many of them were *single* dissents. Never, perhaps, has one judicial dissenter had such success in forecasting the future course of constitutional law. The famous dissents of Holmes and Brandeis were often written in tandem, and often supported by other members of the Court. The single dissents of Justice William Johnson were—and are—largely forgotten.

What was there about this man Harlan that led him in this path and thus gave us dissenting opinions that still live in constitutional law? His success as a dissenter seems to rest on two major factors. The first was his firm belief in a strong national government with ample powers to carry out the activities assigned to it by the Constitution. Later events—the course of economic development, the world wars, the great depression—have made the necessity of such a strong government so obvious that few are left to dispute it seriously today. Second was his great humanitarian heart, which led him to a belief in human dignity and freedom surpassing that held by any other justice of his day, not even excluding the doughty Justice Holmes. Harlan was not, perhaps, a great jurist: he was not notable, like Gray or Holmes, for his legal learning. His logic was not always constitutionally impeccable. But his heart led him to sound conclusions even when his logic and legal knowledge failed him. If anyone in American judicial history really deserves the title of "The Great Dissenter," Justice John Marshall Harlan of Kentucky is the man.

[72] 190 U. S. 197 (1903). [73] 195 U. S. 138 (1904).
[74] 327 U. S. 304 (1946).

A NEW LOOK AT THE CONSTITUENCIES: THE NEED FOR A RECOUNT AND A REAPPRAISAL

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Well-established "facts," scholars know, are sometimes overtoppled by research. The "Piltdown man" is a recent case in point. So is the "Jukes family," whose value to hereditists has collapsed under scientific scrutiny. Of considerably smaller magnitude is a case, just discovered, relating to the putative election of state legislators in single-member districts.[1]

I. WHAT THE AUTHORITIES SAY

"Popular election from single-member districts is the prevailing method by which individual legislators are chosen," a Committee of the American Political Science Association reports.[2] Every other authority concurs. Multi-member elections, all agree, are atypical.

"With few exceptions," Ogg and Ray informed students, "senators and members of lower houses are chosen in small, single-member districts." Among other writers of the older texts, John Mathews cited "the prevalent system of . . . single-member districts." Charles Beard asserted that "the rule of one member to each district is generally applied." The same assertion was made by the Willoughbys, Lindsay Rogers, James Garner, and others. "For the purpose of choosing their own legislatures," Willoughby and Rogers noted, "the states are divided into senatorial and representative districts from each of which one senator or one representative is elected."[3]

Present-day authors impart the same information. If the reader will pick at random a recent textbook which treats, even briefly, the election of state legislators, he is apt to find single-member districts described as "the general rule for both houses." More than likely he will read: "State legislatures are organized on a basis paralleling Congress." "On the state level we elect only one legislator from a given district." This is "the most striking characteristic of

[1] A leave of absence granted by Western Reserve University enabled the writer to complete this and several related studies aimed at testing the common assertion that single-member districts foster two-party politics.

[2] American Political Science Association, *American State Legislatures: Report of the Committee on American Legislatures*, ed. Belle Zeller (New York, 1954), p. 63. See also pp. 38, 46, 62.

[3] Frederic A. Ogg and P. Orman Ray, *Essentials of American Government* (New York, 1952), p. 591, and *Introduction to American Government* (New York, 1951), pp. 820, 821; John M. Mathews, *American State Government* (New York, 1934), p. 222, also p. 229 (footnote); Charles A. Beard, *American Government and Politics* (New York, 1936), p. 577; Westel W. Willoughby and Lindsay Rogers, *An Introduction to the Problem of Government* (New York, 1921), p. 421; James W. Garner, *Political Science and Government* (New York, 1935), p. 632; William F. Willoughby, *The Government of Modern States* (New York, 1936), pp. 300 ff.

American legislative elections." "Only Illinois departs seriously from this practice."[4]

No one, apparently, has checked the relevant data in more than half a century. The Council of State Governments has "not made a general survey" and is "unable to find any compilation which gives this information for all of the states."[5] On what sources, then, do the authorities rely? The answer, perhaps, is anybody's guess. About 75 years ago a student of representation, Simon Sterne, wrote that in state legislative elections, "as a rule, but one member is elected from each district." The notable exception, he observed, is Illinois with its cumulative voting in three-member districts. Sterne was wrong.[6] But his error survives in the similar assertions of more recent writers. Their statements are at best misleading and at worst mistaken.

The exceptions to the so-called "rule" are many, not few. They are so many, indeed, that the term "rule" is inappropriate. To assert that single-member state elections are "normal" or "usual" or "general," as the authorities do, is to assert what may be said of multi-member elections too.

II. A RECOUNT OF THE CONSTITUENCIES

Only nine states choose all legislators in single-member elections: California, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island,

[4] For example, William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner, *American Government* (New York, 1953), p. 510, and *State and Local Government* (New York, 1951), p. 342; Wilfred E. Binkley and Malcolm C. Moos, *A Grammar of American Politics* (New York, 1951), p. 189; James MacGregor Burns and Jack W. Peltason, *Government by the People* (New York, 1954), p. 342; Robert K. Carr, Donald H. Morrison, Marver H. Bernstein, and Richard C. Snyder, *American Democracy in Theory and Practice* (New York, 1951), p. 168; Charles Cayley, "The State Legislature," Ch. 36 of *An Introduction to American Government*, ed. Paul S. Jacobsen *et al.* (Harrisburg, 1954), p. 456; James A. Corry, *Elements of Democratic Government* (New York, 1951), p. 230; John H. Ferguson and Dean E. McHenry, *Elements of American Government* (New York, 1954), p. 542; Cullen B. Gosnell and Lynwood M. Holland, *State and Local Government in the United States* (New York, 1951), p. 185; W. Brooke Graves, *American State Government* (Boston, 1953), p. 156; William V. Holloway, *State and Local Government in the United States* (New York, 1951), p. 134; Claudius O. Johnson, *American Government: National, State and Local* (New York, 1951), p. 800; Robert E. Lane, *Problems in American Government* (New York, 1952), p. 69; Joseph E. McLean, *State and Local Government* (New York, 1953), p. 77; Jewell Cass Phillips, *State and Local Government in America* (New York, 1954), p. 144; Clyde F. Snider, *American State and Local Government* (New York, 1950), p. 168; Daniel Wit, *Comparative Political Institutions* (New York, 1953), pp. 194–95, 213.

[5] Henry A. Goodman, Research Assistant, The Council of State Governments, in a letter to the writer, Sept. 14, 1953.

[6] Simon Sterne, "Representation," in *Cyclopedia of Political Science, Political Economy and U.S. Political History*, ed. John J. Lalor (Chicago, 1883), Vol. 3, pp. 581–95, at p. 586. Little more than a decade later both John R. Commons and George H. Haynes produced evidence that Sterne was wrong. So did counsel for Wrightson in *State v. Wrightson*, an 1893 New Jersey case contesting the single-district system. See George Haynes, "Representation in State Legislatures," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 15, pp. 204–36, 405–26 (1899) and Vol. 16, pp. 93–120, 243–73 (1900); John R. Commons, *Proportional Representation* (New York, 1896), pp. 266–68; 56 *New Jersey Law Reports* 126 (1895).

and Wisconsin. Formerly, such states were fewer; most of the time, nonexistent.[7]

The states have used single-member elections chiefly to compose their senates. Of 1,841 senate seats in 1954 only 221, a trifle over 12 per cent, are contested in multi-member ballotings. But these overall figures, lumping together 48 legislative bodies of different sizes, conceal the number, proportion, and identity of states which elect senators on a multi-member basis. There are 16 such states. These, as Table I discloses, vary widely in the percentage of

TABLE I. STATES WITH MULTI-MEMBER SENATE ELECTIONS*

State	Total of Senators	No. from Multiple Dists.	% from Multiple Dists.	State	Total of Senators	No. from Multiple Dists.	% from Multiple Dists.
So. Dak.	35	4	11.43	Utah	23	7	30.43
Indiana	50	6	12.00	Arkansas	35	11	31.42
Tennessee	33	4	12.12	Oregon	30	13	43.33
Wyoming	27	4	14.81	Ohio	33	19	57.57
Virginia	40	7	17.50	No. Car.	50	34	68.00
Colorado	35	8	22.86	Maine	33	27	81.82
Mississippi	49	12	24.49	Vermont	31	27	87.09
Louisiana	39	10	25.64	Arizona	28	28	100.00

* This tabulation counts only those cases where two or more senators are chosen by the same district *at the same time*. Those cases are not counted in which staggered terms—e.g., one senator elected every two years in a two-member district—in effect produce single-member elections.

senators chosen in multiple elections. Twelve are located in the South and West. If Alaska enters statehood with its present legislative forms, it will end Arizona's distinction as the only state electing all senators on a multi-member schedule. Hawaii chooses just one of 15 senators in a single-member election.[8]

[7] For most of the data on legislative constituencies in the states today the writer is indebted primarily to the secretaries of state or, in some instances, to members of their staffs. The writer's inquiry was carried on largely by mail, with the information usually supplied by personal letter. Most of the data were checked against documentary sources.

[8] Before 1954 Arizona had 19 senators, 10 of them elected in multiple districts, nine in single. An amendment adopted in 1953 increased the total to 28, representing 14 two-member districts, each district voting for both its senators simultaneously.

Alaska is divided into four senatorial constituencies, each represented by four senators, chosen two at a time at biennial elections. In Hawaii also, senators are chosen for staggered terms at biennial elections by four constituencies—the First being represented by four senators, the Second by three, the Third by six, the Fourth by two. In the Second District two senators are elected in one biennium, one in the other. (Letters to the writer from J. F. McKay, Executive Director, Legislative Council of Alaska, Dec. 7, 1954; Farrand L. Turner, Secretary of Hawaii, Dec. 6, 1954; Congressman A. L. Miller, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, Dec. 15, 1954; Stewart French, Counsel, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U. S. Senate, Dec. 28, 1954.)

Most multi-member senate constituencies elect two or three at a time; half a dozen or so elect four. Six senators representing Cuyahoga County in the Ohio legislature comprise the largest bloc chosen at a single election by any one senatorial district in the United States.[9]

References to the misnamed "rule" of single-member state elections relate primarily to the more numerous part of the legislature, usually called the house

TABLE II. STATES WITH MULTI-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVE ELECTIONS

State	Total of House Members	No. from Multiple Dists.	% from Multiple Dists.	State	Total of House Members	No. from Multiple Dists.	% from Multiple Dists.
Iowa	108	18	16.66	Mass.	240	144	60.00
				Oklahoma	123	74	60.16
Maine	151	41	27.15	W. Virginia	100	62	62.00
No. Car.	120	33	27.50	New Hamp.	400	249	62.25
				Alabama	106	69	65.09
Indiana	100	34	34.00	Oregon	60	40	66.66
Minnesota	131	45	34.35				
Louisiana	100	36	36.00	New Mexico	55	42	76.36
Michigan	110	41	37.27	Mississippi	140	110	78.57
Virginia	100	38	38.00	Connecticut	279	220	78.85
Arkansas	100	40	40.00	New Jersey	60	50	83.33
Texas	150	61	40.66	Wyoming	56	48	85.71
Georgia	205	84	40.97	Nevada	47	41	87.23
Idaho	59	25	42.37	So. Car.	124	111	89.51
So. Dak.	75	32	42.66				
Ohio	136	59	43.38	No. Dak.	113	105	92.92
Penna.	210	97	46.19				
				Illinois	153	153	100.00
Tennessee	99	50	50.50	Maryland	123	123	100.00
Florida	95	51	53.68	Washington	99	99	100.00
Montana	94	53	56.38				
Colorado	65	38	58.46	All	4,486	2,616	58.31

of representatives. A panoramic view of the 48 houses, including Nebraska's single chamber, reveals that what the authorities term a "few exceptions" add up to more than 45 per cent of the seats—2,616 of 5,762—and are distributed among three-fourths of the states. The 12 states which elect no multiple-district

[9] Multnomah County in Oregon, represented by seven senators, elects five one time, two the next. Denver's eight senators are elected four every two years; Salt Lake City's seven, four at one election, three the next; Indianapolis's five, four at one time, one the next. Vermont has two four-member districts, Maine one. In three-member elections three senators are chosen in Arkansas, 15 in Maine, six in Mississippi, three in Ohio, three in Utah, nine in Vermont, three in Virginia. All other multiply-elected senators are chosen in pairs.

representatives are the nine first named above, plus Arizona, Utah, and Vermont.[10]

Among the 36 states which contain them, the 2,616 "exceptions" amount to more than 58 per cent, outnumbering nearly three to two the 1,870 representatives elected in single-member districts. There are, as Table II shows, broad variations from state to state in the proportion named by multiple elections. Sectional variations, exhibited in Table III, are narrower. Within sections, however, diversities are considerable. In the West, the Middle West, and the Border, the percentage of multi-member representation varies from zero in some states to 100 per cent in others. Among the Eastern and New England

TABLE III. SECTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MULTI-MEMBER HOUSE ELECTIONS

Section	Total of Representatives in Section	Number Chosen in Multi-member Voting	Percentage Chosen in Multi-member Voting
West	755	386	51.12
South	1,339	683	51.00
New England	1,416	654	46.18
Middle West	1,194	487	40.78
Border	638	259	40.59
East	420	147	35.00
All	5,762	2,616	45.40

states the range swings from zero to 83.33 per cent. In the South, the only section where the electoral map of every state is a jigsaw of single and multiple districts, variations are smaller than elsewhere.

Table IV shows that the great majority of the 2,616 multiple-district choices are picked by twos and threes, with the ratio between double- and triple-district representatives roughly two to one. A sizable number, 426, located in 26 states, speak for four-, five-, or six-member districts.

Twenty-nine constituencies, represented by 265 legislators in 17 states, choose seven to 17 members each. From those electing seven, voters send to the capitol of Texas 21 members, Montana 14, Oklahoma 14, and Alabama, Maine, Tennessee, and Virginia seven each. Eight-member elections, returning 40 in all, take place in Arkansas, Montana, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas.

[10] These 12 states account for 1,276 of the 3,146 single-district state representatives. In other words, more than 40 per cent of *all* single-district state representatives are concentrated in just a dozen states. The distribution numerically is as follows: Arizona, 80; California, 80; Delaware, 35; Kansas, 125; Kentucky, 100; Missouri, 157; Nebraska, 43; New York, 150; Rhode Island, 100; Utah, 60; Vermont, 246; Wisconsin, 100. (In the absence of a second chamber in Nebraska, that state's 43 single-district unicameral legislators—officially styled "senators"—are counted here a second time. Without them, the overall proportion of single-district representatives would of course be somewhat less than here indicated, that of multiple-district representatives somewhat greater.)

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES AMONG MULTIPLE DISTRICTS IN 36 STATES

State	No. of Reps. Elected in Districts with 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or More Members						State	No. of Reps. Elected in Districts with 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or More Members					
	2	3	4	5	6	More		2	3	4	5	6	More
Ala.	52	6	4			7	N.H.	92	63	52	30	12	
Ark.	22	6	4			8	N.J.	6	9	8		6	21
Colo.	12	3	8			15	N.M.	30	6			6	
Conn.	220						N.C.	16	9	8			
Fla.	36	15					N.D.	44	48	8	5		
Ga.	60	24					Ohio	6	6		15	6	26
Idaho	12	9	4				Okla.	36	24				14
Ill.	153						Ore.	12	3	4	5		16
Ind.	6	12		5		11	Pa.	62	15	20			
Iowa	18						S.C.	38	18	8	10		37
La.	26	6	4				S.D.	14	6	4			8
Mne.	16	9	4	5		7	Tenn.	37*				6	7
Md.	14	15	16		78		Texas	12	12	8			29
Mass.	96	48					Va.	22	3			6	7
Mich.	20	21					Wash.	78	21				
Minn.	38	3	4				W. Va.	10	15	16	10		11
Miss.	110*						Wyo.	10	18	8		12	
Mont.	16	6	4	5		22							
Nev.	14		8			19	Totals	1,925*		204	90	132	265

* Because Mississippi and Tennessee elect "floaterial" representatives—i.e., representatives shared and chosen by two or more districts voting together—the writer has not yet been able to determine precisely the number of two-member as distinct from three-member constituencies. The combined total of two- and three-member-district representatives, counting "floaters," is 110 in Mississippi, 37 in Tennessee and, as indicated, 1,925 for the 36 states together.

Bigger districts, numbering a baker's dozen, are distinctly an urban phenomenon. Nevada's nine- and 10-member districts center around Las Vegas and Reno. The Hudson and Essex County constituencies in New Jersey, represented by nine and 12 members respectively, radiate out from Jersey City and Newark. South Carolina's three largest constituencies, controlling the choice of 29 legislators, focus upon Charleston, Greenville, and Spartanburg. At the heart of the 11-member districts in Indiana and West Virginia are Indianapolis and Charleston. Colorado's 15-member district has its hub in Denver, while Oregon's 16-member district in Multnomah county revolves about Portland. The nuclei of the two greatest districts in Ohio—nine representatives for Hamilton county, 17 for Cuyahoga—are Cincinnati and Cleveland. Until 1954 Detroit's 21-member district was the giant of the giants. The Michigan legislature, armed by a constitutional amendment in 1952, has chopped this giant into bits and pieces which now elect but two or three members each.[11]

[11] The mammoth district had grown up under the protection of Article IV, Section 3, Michigan Constitution of 1850, later Article V, Section 3 of the 1908 Constitution provid-

Exceptional features mark the apportionment in several of the 36 states. In Connecticut and Iowa no electorate votes for more than two representatives. Illinois apportions seats entirely on a three-member schedule. New Hampshire, first in the number of multiple state elections, contains a third of all five-member, more than a fourth of all four-member districts. Maryland's house, based over 63 per cent on six-member districts, is unique in its preponderance of lawmakers sitting for large constituencies. Almost 50 per cent of South Carolina's representatives, over 40 per cent of Nevada's, and 35 per cent of New Jersey's are chosen by districts of eight or more members.

Hawaii and Alaska, like three of the states, name all representatives in multiple elections. Districts of four or more are the rule, the only exception being a three-member district in Alaska. Hawaiians elect 30 members, three districts returning four each and three others six each. Alaskans choose 24 in districts of three, five, six, and 10 members, respectively.

III. THE HISTORICAL PREDOMINANCE OF MULTIPLE DISTRICTS

The multiple district is no departure from the good old days and the tried old ways. It is not, as giants of the type might lead one nowadays to think, a makeshift arrangement inspired by urban agglomerates. Neither the multiple district nor its widespread use is an emergent of recent times. It is the single-member district that stands outside of history, an alien to the past, a new-fangled and upstart thing.

The constituencies of England during most of Parliament's long career were the natural, undivided communities of everyday life—the shires, the towns, the boroughs. To represent them in the House of Commons these constituencies each elected two or three, not often more, knights for the shires, burgesses for the towns and boroughs. Such, from the thirteenth century to the nineteenth, were the electoral units of England. Gladstone hated to see them go in 1885, the year the single-member plan came to England largely in response to clamorings for minority representation. Ancient communities were hacked into two, three, or more "districts." Gladstone's sense of history and community was wrenched.

As so often happened in the development of English government, the historic

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ing that "no township or city shall be divided in the formation of a representative district. When any township or city shall contain a population which entitles it to more than one representative, then such township or city shall elect by general ticket the number of representatives to which it is entitled." Faced with the further enlargement of Detroit's 21-member district, the legislature in 1952 secured the adoption of an amendment providing "that when such township or city shall be entitled to more than 5 representatives, then such township or city shall be divided into representative districts . . . with not less than 2 nor more than 3 representatives in any 1 district." As a practical matter this amendment affects only Detroit.

In the 1954 general election the voters of Oregon adopted a constitutional amendment permitting the legislature to subdistrict the larger counties. Subsequently, during the 1955 legislative session, Multomah county was subdivided into four districts, each of which will choose four representatives at the 1956 general election.

In September, 1955, the voters of New Mexico approved an amendment which allows the legislature to number the seats in a multi-member district. This requires the candidate to specify the seat he is contesting and thus, in effect, sets up single-member elections.

system of multiple representation began as a spur-of-the-moment, pragmatic solution to an immediate, practical problem. In the thirteenth century roads to London were lonely, rough, and bandit-ridden—two or three men would afford each other company and protection. Besides, once the men were safe in London the arrangement might best serve constituents—the men could watch and check each other.[12]

Perhaps considerations of a similar kind, certainly the promptings of tradition, caused the London Company to have summoned for the opening of the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1619 "two Burgesses from each Plantation freely . . . elected by the inhabitants thereof." From this time on, throughout the colonial years, representation in the Old Dominion, like representation in the mother country, was founded mainly upon the multiple district. Sometimes a district's representatives numbered as many as eight.

The story is the same in the other colonies. Multiple districts were the rule, single ones the exception. A colonial act of Maryland, citing the English example, fixed at four the representation for most constituencies. A Delaware statute instructed each county to elect at large a minimum of six. A majority of North Carolina's legislators represented five-member, others mostly two-member districts. Members of Georgia's house usually spoke for two-, three-, and four-member constituencies. South Carolinians then as now voted in districts often remarkable for size. Their 10-member constituencies today continue a history beginning in 1683 when Berkeley and Colleton counties each sent 10 representatives to the colonial assembly.[13]

Among the middle colonies New Jersey at times outdid even South Carolina, with Burlington and Gloucester counties choosing at large 20 each, Salem 10, and Cape May five. Later, counties and towns were assigned two members apiece. In Pennsylvania the colonial assembly was drawn wholly from four- and six-member districts. In New York, too, representatives typically came from multiple constituencies. Without exception the plural district formed the dominant pattern of election in all New England colonies. Massachusetts allotted two representatives to every town, New Hampshire two or three. In Connecticut under the Fundamental Orders three or four deputies represented each constituency. Subsequently the colony's charter of 1662 set up a two-mem-

[12] *Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform* (London, 1910), pp. 1–3; Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence* (London, 1910), pp. 78, 91, 93; Simon Sterne, *Representative Government* (Philadelphia, 1871), pp. 31–33; Charles Seymour and Donald P. Frary, *How the World Votes* (Springfield, 1918), Vol. 1, p. 64; Norman Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel* (London, 1953).

[13] Except as otherwise indicated, the sources for this section are contained in *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America*, 7 vols. (Washington, 1909), ed. Francis N. Thorpe.

On the colonies, see also Albert E. McKinley, *The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America* (Philadelphia, 1905); Elmer C. Griffith, *The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander* (Chicago, 1907); Elmer I. Miller, *The Legislature of the Province of Virginia* (New York, 1907); William H. Fry, *New Hampshire as a Royal Province* (New York, 1908); Edwin P. Tanner, *The Province of New Jersey* (New York, 1908).

ber system largely still intact. Towns in Rhode Island sent two, four, or six members each to their colonial assembly.

For nearly a century and a half after the Declaration of Independence the American states elected by far the greater part of their lawmakers in multiple constituencies. The first 13, following colonial precedent, established popular assemblies wholly or predominantly on a multi-member basis.[14] So did two of the three new states admitted to the Union before 1800, Kentucky and Tennessee. The fourteenth state, Vermont, was first to organize—apparently in 1785—a popular assembly on a single-member footing.[15] This state thus holds the record for the largest experience with single-member elections in American politics—probably in any politics.

Another early advance of the single-member principle took place in the composition of senates, then comprising usually a dozen men or less. As of 1800 seven of the 16 states had apportioned their few senators to an equal number of districts. Other states thereafter applied the single-member principle more commonly to senate than to house elections. Even so, it was 1848 before the number of such states passed the halfway mark. By 1870 twenty of 37 states, by 1912 thirty of 48 had formed their senates on the single-district plan. Since then, two more states have reconstructed their senates on this basis.[16]

Meanwhile, few states have completely adopted the one-member principle for house elections. In 1842 the Whig party pressed through Congress a law requiring single districts for the national House of Representatives. At this time, with 26 in the Union, not one state elected all senators and representatives

[14] Seven Revolutionary constitutions—those of Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina—provided for the election of all representatives in multi-member constituencies. Rhode Island, continuing government under its colonial charter, apparently elected all representatives on a multiple basis too. The five other original states elected most, in some cases nearly all, the same way.

[15] According to Robert Luce, New York in 1846 was the first state to put its popular house on a single-member basis. See *Legislative Principles* (Boston, 1930), p. 381. However, this writer found a provision in the Vermont Constitution of 1793 (Ch. II, Section 7) requiring establishment of single-member districts for all members of the lower house. Checking further, he was informed of the following by Edward A. Hoyt, editor of the Vermont state papers, in a letter of Dec. 17, 1954: "The Journal of the General Assembly . . . under date 13 October 1785 makes it evident that only one member was chosen from each town for this session. As far as I am able to determine, only one member from each town was actually chosen from this time forward despite Constitutional provision apparently to the contrary." The constitutional provision referred to first appears in the Constitution of 1777 authorizing all towns with at least 80 taxable inhabitants to choose two representatives each.

[16] As of 1800, the seven states with single-district senates were Georgia, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. By 1848, with 30 states, the seven had been increased by Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. By 1870, with 37 states, North Carolina and Virginia had deserted this company; but the total was raised to 20 by the addition of Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, and West Virginia. By 1912, with 48 states, these 20 had been joined by California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Washington. This number has been raised to 32 since 1912 by the addition of Nebraska and New Mexico.

in this fashion. Vermont was still alone in choosing all representatives one to a district. Maine selected more than half this way. Elsewhere, all or most representatives won their seats in multi-member districts.[17]

Among the 37 states of 1870, house members from multiple districts continued to outnumber those from single. Six states, pictured in Figure 1, appor-


All multiple districts
Mixed, multiple dists. predominant
Half single, half multiple elections
All single districts
Mixed, single dists. predominant
Mixed, but predominant form undetermined

FIG. 1. Representative Districts in the 37 States of 1870.

tioned representatives exclusively on a multi-member schedule. Four others did practically the same—South Carolina had but one single district, Nevada two, Oregon six, Florida a few more. At least 11 other states named most representatives in multiples of two, three, four, or more. Vermont, however, no longer was distinctive. Since 1846 four states had adopted the single-district principle for both houses.[18] Eight other states now elected most representatives in one-mem-

[17] Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and, probably, Rhode Island still had all representatives mending their fences in multiple constituencies. Virtually in the same class were South Carolina and Georgia which, respectively, named but one and two representatives in single-member districts. Rhode Island's new constitution that year, like some other state constitutions, warned explicitly that "no town or city shall be divided into districts for the choice of representatives."

[18] New York in 1846; Wisconsin, 1848; New Jersey, 1852; Kansas, 1858.

ber constituencies. Uniquely, Virginia's house was filled half from single, half from multiple districts.

The one-member principle, thus advancing, suffered in 1893 a reversal in New Jersey. The state's highest court held that the legislature had no constitutional authority to subdivide counties, as 40 years earlier it had, into single



FIG. 2. Representative Districts in the 48 States of 1912.

districts. In his winning argument the complainant reviewed multiple- and single-member systems then prevailing. "In spite of the supposed popularity of this last plan," he observed, "it does not include the greater number of states."[19]

When the forty-eighth state entered the Union in 1912, multiple-district representatives still dominated numerically the popular houses of at least half the states, possibly more.[20] In the interval since 1870, however, all-single-member states had come to outnumber, nine to four, all-multi-member states.

[19] Complainant's brief, *State* v. *Wrightson*, 56 *New Jersey Law Reports* 126, p. 154.

[20] "Possibly more" because Arkansas, Ohio, and Texas, not included in this generalization, may have had more multiple- than single-district representatives in 1912, but the writer does not have precise information for these states at that time.

Figure 2 portrays this and other aspects of the electoral-district map in 1912.[21] Outside the nine states with all-single-member houses, representatives elected by multiple districts continued to be, as they always have been, more numerous than those chosen singly. Subsequently, the nine states have grown to 12, augmented by Arizona in 1918, Nebraska in 1921, Utah in 1938.

IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DATA

The number of members to be elected by legislative districts has long engendered controversy—among politicians as well as academicians. Back in colonial times men were occasionally provoked to violence by such controversy. The defenders of five-member districts in North Carolina before the Revolution exchanged shots more than once with the stalwarts of smaller districts. More prudent men in later times held their fire to sharp words and wounding phrases, their fusillades rending the air and filling the records of almost every state convention in the nineteenth century and ricocheting afterward through many a legislative hall and campaign forum.

The size of a district's representation is, in short, one of the tough perennials of group and party conflict. Michiganders fought about it only a couple of years ago. As these lines are written Republican leaders of Ohio have stirred up a fracas by proposing to do to Cuyahoga county what Republican leaders of Michigan succeeded in doing to Detroit. They want to carve Ohio's—and the nation's—biggest district into smaller pieces. Unfailingly this kind of surgery incites political warfare and inspires purple bombast—"an artificial anatomy," as one embattled politician of the nineties put it, is being lopped from the quivering flesh "of a living county hewn into *disjecta membra*."[22] The issue is by no means confined to American state politics. The localities are frequently embroiled in the question whether councilmen shall be chosen by the ward system or by general ticket. In British and Continental politics, also, the relative merits of single and of multiple elections comprise an historic and recurring issue.[23]

Political scientists, too, think that single- and multi-member ballotings are

[21] Among the five states entering the all-single-member category between 1870 and 1912, Missouri did so after 1875, California in 1879, Kentucky in 1890, Delaware in 1897, Rhode Island in 1909.

[22] Complainant's brief, *State* v. *Wrightson*.

[23] Robert Luce has observed aptly that "The most difficult and most controverted problem of apportionment concerns the number of members to be elected from a district." See his *Legislative Principles* (Cambridge, 1930), Ch. 17. Also: Raymond Leslie Buell, "Political and Social Reconstruction in France," this REVIEW, Vol. 15, pp. 27–52 (Feb., 1921); Phillip Carr, "Electoral Systems and Reforms in France," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 129, pp. 325–33 (March, 1926); Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (London, 1954), pp. 59–60, 356 ff.; James W. Garner, *op. cit.*, pp. 629–36, and "Electoral Reform in France," this REVIEW, Vol. 7, pp. 610–38 (Nov., 1913); Robert K. Gooch, "The Antiparliamentary Movement in France," this REVIEW, Vol. 21, pp. 552–73 (Aug., 1927); A. Lawrence Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe* (Cambridge, 1896); Vol. 1, pp. 157–61, 204 ff.; Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, *Minutes of Evidence* (London, 1910).

significantly different. Generally they believe that single districts produce better results. This is largely hypothesis. Perhaps the chief value of the data offered here is the opportunity revealed for testing some widely held assumptions. Are these more reliable than the "rule" of single-member districts?

How valid, for example, is the common assertion that only one-member elections foster two-party politics? According to the accepted theory, diverse political elements, hot to share the single prize, are compelled to moderate demands, compromise differences, and work together for a common victory. Two rival formations, each hopeful of a majority, emerge, and minor parties are squelched. This theory, vouchsafed by many a textbook, has taken hold so generally that in 1948 the Research Committee of the American Political Science Association suggested the time might be ripe for an attempt at empirical verification.[24] If so, data on multiple districts would be relevant.

The Research Committee also recommended that "the representative unit" be studied "from the point of view of the groups most benefited and least benefited."[25] This writer's investigation shows that rural interests and their allies almost always spearhead the drive for single districts while urban elements put up resistance. Comparison of single and multiple districts might disclose the power differentials, if any, at stake. Questions of apportionment obviously are involved. In 1951 a special committee of the Association, reporting a study made for federal agencies, referred to one-member elections as "this desirable requirement," apparently on the assumption that single districts yield the more democratic representation.[26] Where is the evidence? Is apportionment more nearly equal in, say, New York than Massachusetts, Wisconsin than Illinois, California than Washington? The supreme court of New Jersey concluded years ago that single districts, compared with multiple, provide greater opportunities and temptations to gerrymander. More recently political scientists have suggested, unfortunately without proof, that equal representation is technically more feasible with multiple districts.[27] Comparative studies would, clearly, be useful.

Such studies, moreover, should interest the friends of party government. In political debate critics and champions have agreed that one-member elections work against party cohesion. Here again, though, evidence is scant. The single

[24] Research Committee, American Political Science Association, *Research in Political Science*, ed. Ernest S. Griffith (Chapel Hill, 1948), p. 37.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[26] Committee on Reapportionment of Congress, American Political Science Association, "The Reapportionment of Congress," this REVIEW, Vol. 45, pp. 153–58, at p. 154 (March, 1951). Though the Committee addressed itself to congressional elections, its language suggested a general endorsement of the single-member principle. The historic fact is, indeed, that the federal example has been responsible for encouraging the spread of single districts to state elections. Cf. Walter F. Dodd, *State Government* (New York, 1928), p. 153; V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York, 1952), p. 330.

[27] Lashley G. Harvey, "Some Problems of Representation in State Legislatures," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 2, pp. 265–72 (June, 1949); David O. Walter, "Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts," *Illinois Law Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 20–43 (1942).

district, critics say, is the answer to a pressure group's prayer. The representative for such a district, they contend, is more at the mercy of factional power than the several spokesmen for a multiple district. Upon him alone the group can concentrate its fire. He is a lone wolf soon made into a sitting duck. After Britain's switch to single districts Arthur Balfour complained that "small, persistent, and selfish interests have now too much power." This is "inevitable in single-member constituencies." What is more, critics argue, the representative tends to develop a narrowness of outlook, a preoccupation with local concerns, a passion for the logroll and the porkbarrel. An assembly based on single districts, Gambetta was convinced, is a "broken mirror" in which a community cannot see its own image. Duverger's observations tend to support these contentions.[28]

Champions of the single district, on the other hand, claim that the voter's control is strengthened, his power of choice enhanced. They rejoice that one-member elections break up "caucus combinations" and focus attention upon "the man rather than the party." For this reason, they insist, "better" men enter the race and win. Earlier, Montesquieu offered a similar argument, asserting that single districts encourage the electorate to choose with discrimination. Nowadays good-government reformers as well as the textbooks echo this assertion.[29]

It has not gone unchallenged. Bryce, Luce, and other competent observers have testified that multiple districts, embracing sizable constituencies, are the more likely to recruit men of breadth and eminence—men who may be passed over or repelled by the triviality and localism of single-district politics. Bryce deplored the spread of one-member elections, charging that in the American states "the composition of the legislature has declined ever since. . . . The area of choice being smaller, inferior men are chosen." Furthermore, others have maintained, "the damage done by the single district is greater here than it is abroad because of our practice in restricting choice to the residents of the district."[30]

[28] Duverger, *op. cit.*, and other references in footnote 23.

[29] This type of argument has been part of the stock-in-trade of single-district advocates for more than a century, with examples to be found in the proceedings and debates of practically every state constitutional convention. See, for example, *Debates and Proceedings in the New York Convention* (Albany, 1846), especially pp. 291–332, 347–60; also *Proceedings of the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844* (1942, Writers' Project ed.), pp. 282 ff.; *State* v. *Wrightson*, *op. cit.* esp. pp. 157–76; Luce, *op. cit.*; Garner, *op. cit.*, pp. 632–35; Anderson and Weidner, *American Government*, pp. 510–11; James D. Barnett, "Unitary-Multiple Election Districts," this REVIEW, Vol. 39, pp. 65–68 (Feb., 1945); *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 18.

[30] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London, 1889), Vol. 1, pp. 463–64; Luce, *op. cit.*, p. 392 and ch. 17 passim; Garner, *op. cit.*, p. 635.

In New York, politicians of such diverse temperaments as Thurlow Weed and Horace Greeley were agreed that the legislature, especially the senate, had sunk in the quality of its personnel since the adoption of the single-member system. A Pennsylvania governor, pleading with his state's constitutional convention in 1873 not to establish single districts, cited New York as proof that legislatures decline under the one-member system. This convention discussed the matter extensively.

Midst the claims and counter-claims, only one thing is certain. The virtues of the one-member district—"this desirable requirement"—are not beyond dispute. The data presented here, rescuing from limbo the historic type of multiple district still in common usage, divulge an opportunity to examine the issues and assumptions empirically.

A study of legislative tenure by Charles Hyneman might serve as a pilot. How well a lawmaker knows his business, Hyneman pointed out, depends considerably upon the length and continuity of his tenure. Surveying 10 selected states Hyneman observed that "legislators . . . from multi-member districts seem . . . to survive a bit longer than those who stand as the lone representatives of their constituency." On the basis of this limited study, he cautioned, "it would be rash to conclude . . . that the creation of multi-member districts is a sure path to legislative longevity."[31] Though restricted in scope, the study nonetheless affords a sample of the kind of inquiry which can be undertaken and which may prove more instructive than *a priori* speculation.

Of course, so long as political scientists take for granted that multi-member elections are "the exception" among the states and single-member districts "the rule," few such inquiries will be thought of, much less carried out.

[31] Charles S. Hyneman, "Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel," *The Annals*, Vol. 195, pp. 21–32, at p. 28 (Jan., 1938). Hyneman pointed out that "the experience of Pennsylvania has been quite opposite." States surveyed were California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. See also the study by Hyneman and Houston Lay, "Tenure and Turnover in the Indiana General Assembly," this REVIEW, Vol. 32, pp. 51–67, 311–32 (Feb., Apr., 1938), wherein the authors conclude that in Indiana during the period covered "neither transience nor permanence is peculiar to either type of district." *Ibid.*, p. 313. Robert Luce has written: "It is probable that on the whole the group system makes it easier to keep in office during a series of terms men especially qualified for work of lawmaking—one of the most important needs of our public life." *Legislative Principles* (Cambridge, 1930), p. 393. Cf. also George S. Blair, "Cumulative Voting: An Effective Electoral Device in Illinois Politics," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 34, pp. 3–19, esp. pp. 6–8 (March, 1954).

A TWO-DIMENSIONAL SCHEME FOR CLASSIFYING THE STATES ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

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The student of American politics has displayed an increasing interest in the states as units of analysis. Since the states share a common institutional framework and cultural base, and at the same time differ in respect to economy, politics, and social structure, they provide excellent material for comparative studies. The political scientist has at hand a group of political units in which some of the most elusive variables are held constant. In the comparative study of American state politics, then, there is the promise that hypotheses about politics in general may be formulated and tested.

The first stage of analysis is classification. Since competition between political parties for public office is a basic concept in the study of American politics, the nature and degree of party competition provide important criteria for a classification of the states. It is the purpose of this paper to point up the difficulties involved in formulating a classification of the states according to their party systems and to suggest possible categories of party competition which such a classification might include.

There seems to be general agreement on the criteria for a competitive party system.[1] The fundamental criterion is that in the long run there are at least two parties (and only two if it is to be a two-party system) which are viable means to political office. A neophyte in politics should be able to say to himself, "In my generation in politics I will have a good chance to get into office either as a member of party A or of party B." Since in any immediate sense only one party can hold office, the concept of competition deals with the likelihood of change of control in the future, or in other words it is a long-run concept. Because all of our data deal with the past, however, any such classification is necessarily limited to a description of party competition in a state over a particular time period.

A major difficulty in devising a scheme which will reflect realistically the degree of inter-party competition in the states arises from the fact that the states' electorates do not react uniformly to all political offices. A state which is competitive when voting for president may have a one-party record in voting for governor or senator. The reverse may also be true. Which, if any, of these elections best represents the party configuration within the state?

In one recent attempt to classify the states according to degree of party competition, the electoral results in each state for the offices of president, gov-

[1] See Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 477–85 (June, 1954). Also the statement of conditions requisite for a two-party system in Leslie Lipson, "The Two-Party System in British Politics," this REVIEW, Vol. 47, pp. 337–58 at p. 338 (June, 1953).

ernor, and senator were combined.[2] The combined results formed the basis for classifying the states as two-party, modified one-party, and one-party. Such an approach, however, glosses over the important differences in the way states vote for each office. By combining the votes for all three offices, any existent differences cancel each other out. The net effect of the scheme was to overestimate the degree of competition to be found in the states. The conclusion was reached that there are as many as 26 of the states which are "two-party."[3] In this scheme, Wisconsin, which has given its governorship to a minority party only five times since 1870 (12 per cent of the elections) is equated as "two-party" with Ohio, a state which has given the governorship to the two major parties equally. In respect to the presidency, Ohio has been a much less competitive state, Wisconsin a much more competitive state. That is to say, Ohio voters tended to vote predominantly for the candidates of a single party for the presidency while dividing the vote more equally for the governorship. The reverse is true of Wisconsin. To combine the votes in these states for both offices only distorts the picture of competition existing within the states for any individual office.

One way out of the dilemma caused by discrepancies in the votes for several offices is a classification of the states according to their votes for specific offices, such as governor or president. Such a scheme allows us to determine the extent to which there is a relationship between various offices; it does not prejudge the existence of such a relationship. In fact, the differences in the relationships between offices which occur in the states indicate important characteristics of their political systems. A state which is more competitive for the presidency than for the governorship may have a very different form of political organization from one in which the reverse is true. And presumably neither one should be equated with states which are competitive for both the presidency and the governorship.

A corollary of such a classification is the assumption that parties are organizations for the capture of specific offices rather than highly integrated combinations of men working together for all candidates bearing the same label. It is possible that there are as many organizations operating under the same party label as there are offices to be filled. A realistic picture of inter-party competition in a state, then, can best be achieved by examining competition for a single office. Relationships between organizations for different offices will also be readily discernible. The use of this conception of party organization necessitates a slight modification in the definition of inter-party competition stated above. It should read now: there is a competitive situation for a *specific* office if a man may expect to achieve that office as a member of either party A or party B.

One way of determining the existence of a competitive situation is to examine the division in party control of a particular office over a given time period. The more equal the number of elections won by two parties, presumably the more

[2] Ranney and Kendall, pp. 482–84.
[3] *Ibid.*

competitive the state. This measure of competition we shall call the overall dimension.

There is a second dimension which must be considered in the concept of political competition, and that is the rapidity with which the parties alternate in their control of an office. Perhaps the rate of alternation is even more important in giving the participants a sense of competition than is the overall division of victories. For example, in national presidential politics since 1872 the overall division of victories has given the Republicans 12 elections and the Democrats nine. The two parties are, thus, highly competitive in respect to the overall dimension. But as is immediately apparent, there has been a low rate of alternation between the parties, for there have been periods of as long as 20 years, or an entire political generation, in which either the Republicans or the Democrats have had continuous control of the presidency. Competition has been sporadic. The measure of such periods of one-party control, or the rate of party alternation, we shall call the cyclical dimension.

The following scheme takes into account both of these dimensions for the office of governor: the overall degree of competition between the parties for the office, and the cyclical character of that competition. Both of these characteristics have been plotted on a graph (Figure 1). Along the horizontal axis the overall picture of competition for the period 1870 to 1950 is plotted, i.e., the percentage of victories in gubernatorial elections for the dominant party. (The party with the majority of such victories is considered dominant.) For pur-



FIGURE 1

* The percentages for the southern states have been computed for the post-Reconstruction period rather than from 1870.

poses of clarity, the states in which the Republicans have been dominant have been separated from the states where the Democrats have dominated, and the two graphs placed next to each other. The horizontal axis, then, shows the extent of dominance of the state by one or the other party.[4]

Along the vertical axis the cyclical dimension has been plotted, i.e., the percentage of elections in the same period in which there was an actual change of party control of the governorship. Thus the higher on the vertical axis a state appears the shorter have been the periods of alternation between the two parties. The heavy lines mark the outer limits of possibility of one-party dominance as the cycles become shorter. Thus the more rapid the rate of alternation, the more competitive the state must necessarily be in terms of the overall dimension. If any state were so competitive that there was a change in party control with each election it would fall at the apex of the diagram, or the point where the two outside lines would intersect (50–50 competition, 100 per cent election changes). States which fall on the line of outer possibility as we move down the diagram are those in which the minority party has never been able to win two gubernatorial elections in a row. This we see is the case in Kansas, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire on the Republican side, and North Carolina and Maryland[5] on the Democratic side. The further in a state is from the outer lines, the longer are the cycles of alternation within the state. For example, Delaware and Wyoming are equally competitive in overall terms, but Delaware has experienced much longer periods of one-party control over the governorship.

What is striking is the low rate of alternation generally in all of the states. Even in the most competitive states, such as Ohio, Wyoming, and Colorado, there is a change of party control in only about half of the elections, indicating that a party can control the governorship for an average of two consecutive terms. For the great majority of the states the rate of change is even less. However, a party change in 40 to 50 per cent of the elections is not inconsistent with our notions of an operating two-party system.

A second conclusion evident from the diagram is the preponderance of states in which one party is strongly dominant. Well over half of the states gave the governorship to one party in 70 per cent or more of the elections between 1870 and 1950. In almost half (21) of the states the governorship was in the hands of one party as much as 80 per cent or more of the time.

The major utility of the diagram is that it makes possible the establishment of categories of competition based upon the cyclical as well as the overall dimensions. This may be done by observing the way in which the states group

[4] A number of different sources were used to gather the data upon which the diagram is based; the *World Almanac and Encyclopedia* (New York, published annually since 1885), George Gallup, *The Political Almanac 1952* (New York, 1952), Council of State Governments, *The Governors of the States 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1948), and *White's Conspectus of American Biography*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1937), provide electoral information for the period covered.

[5] In Maryland the Republicans gained a second consecutive victory for the first time in 1954 with T. R. McKeldin.

into a number of clusters. The following categories seem to reflect best the varieties of competition found by this method.

1. *Competitive* states are those which fall at the center and upper portion of the diagram. In overall terms the dominant party has won 65 per cent or less of the elections. Of equal importance is the fact that there has been a relatively high degree of alternation between parties for control of the governorship, a change occurring in 40 per cent or more of the elections. These states are Wyoming, Colorado, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Indiana, and Idaho. Connecticut would appear to be part of the same cluster, although her rate of alternation is slightly less than 40 per cent. The marginality of Connecticut is shown by the fact that twice in the period from 1870 to 1950 it experienced periods as long as eight consecutive elections without change of party. Even such a highly competitive state as Colorado has had six consecutive elections without change and Ohio has had seven. Nevertheless, in these states the minority party has continuously provided a serious challenge for the control of the governorship and the periods of one-party dominance have been relatively few and brief. These, then, are the states which conform most closely to the ideal conception of a competitive party system.

2. *The cyclically competitive* states are those which are competitive in respect to the overall dimension, but which have had long periods of domination by a single party. These are to be found at the center and lower portion of the diagram, New York, Utah, Delaware, and West Virginia. The most competitive of these states is New York, which experienced some four cycles of long term one-party control, Democratic from 1882 to 1894, Republican from 1894 to 1910, Democratic from 1922 to 1942, and Republican again from 1942 to 1954. Both parties are recurrently strong in New York, yet the ability of one party to hold the governorship for extended periods distinguishes its political system from the more continuously competitive states found in the first category.

The cycles in Utah, Delaware, and West Virginia are somewhat longer than in New York, and probably reflect a shifting toward one-party dominance rather than a truly competitive system. Delaware had Democratic governors consecutively from 1870 to 1894, and Republican governors from 1900 to 1936. In Utah the party shift was in the opposite direction, with Republican control from 1896 to 1916 and Democratic control from 1924 to 1948. Three cycles characterize West Virginia politics, a Democratic cycle from 1870 to 1896, a Republican cycle from 1896 to 1916, and again a Democratic cycle from 1932 to 1952. The long time span selected enables us to see the major political shifts which make these states sufficiently different from either the competitive or the one-party states to warrant a separate category. The long period of control granted to each party also differentiates the cyclically competitive states from the next category.

3. *The one-party cyclical* states are those in which one party has overall a clear predominance in number of victories, but in which a minority party has been able to win short periods of control, usually as many as two or three consecutive victories. On the Republican side these states are Nebraska, North Da-

kota, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. Their Democratic counterparts are New Jersey, Arizona, and New Mexico.

Although one party has been predominant, the fact that the minority party has been able to capture office consecutively is evidence of some persistent strength for the minority party. For example, in Massachusetts the Republicans have been clearly predominant in the long run, but throughout the period the Democrats have had moments of success. They won three consecutive elections from 1890 to 1893; they elected five governors consecutively from 1910 to 1914,[6] and four from 1930 to 1936. Democratic voting strength in the cities and the continuity of Democratic organization in urban areas make it a truly competitive party within the state. The urban trend may even have given to the Democrats a dominant position within the last decade, although the resurgent strength of the Republicans in 1952 and 1954 cautions one against reaching this conclusion. A similar situation exists in Rhode Island, although the Democrats have demonstrated more continuous strength there in later years.[7] Typologically, the length of the time periods for which the minority party has held office makes these states more competitive than the next category.

4. *The one-party predominant* states are similar to those of the preceding category in terms of the overall dimension of competition. They differ in that the minority parties fail to succeed themselves very often, although they win single victories. On the Republican side these are Illinois, California, Michigan, Kansas, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Maine, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Iowa. On the Democratic side they are Kentucky, Montana, Missouri, Maryland, Tennessee, and North Carolina. In none of these states between 1870 and 1950 was the minority party able to capture the governorship for more than two successive terms, with two exceptions. The Democrats held the governorship for three consecutive terms in Iowa from 1932 to 1936, as did the Republicans in Missouri from 1920 to 1928. Otherwise the minority party has had only brief periods of control. As noted above, the states that fall on the outer line of the diagram have never permitted any successive victory for the minority party.

It is clear that the distinction between the one-party predominant and the one-party cyclical states lies in the position of the minority party. In the former states, the lesser party gives every evidence of being fragmentary and weak in organization. When it wins, it is most likely to be purely by default, due to some sudden vulnerability of the majority party, a major national trend, or a split within the major party. The electorate is not irrevocably wedded to the

[6] Massachusetts held annual elections for governor until 1917.

[7] Recent secular trends away from traditional voting behavior in some states will necessarily be obscured in the present scheme. The long time span used in classifying the states will cause the averaging out of such recent developments, so that Rhode Island or Michigan are classed as strongly Republican despite an apparent shift to the Democratic party in the latter years. This is a fault which cannot be eliminated, for any period selected will affect the results. The cyclical dimension introduced in the present scheme does have the advantage of revealing past secular changes; the advantage, however, declines the closer such secular changes are to the 1950 end of the series.

dominant party; a majority of the voters can bring themselves to vote for the opposite party. But the minority organization is so weak that it is unable to follow up its momentary advantage, frequently because of its inability to present attractive and capable candidates.

Such would appear to be the case, for example, in Maine, where Republican predominance is legendary, but where the Democrats have been able repeatedly to win single elections. In 1878 they elected a governor with the support of the then powerful Greenback party after the failure of a single party to win a majority sent the election to the legislature.[8] In 1879, the final election took place within the legislature. This time, however, a Republican-controlled legislature named a Republican governor. In 1880 the Democrats joined with the Greenbackers again, and were successful. Later the Bull Moose Progressive split within the Republican ranks gave the Democrats victories in 1910 and 1914.[9] Not until 1932 and 1936, at the depths of the depression, were they able to win again. Their victory in the fall of 1954 has been attributed within the state to internal cleavages in the Republican party, and particularly to dissatisfaction with the incumbent governor.[10]

There has been a similar political situation in Kansas. There the Democratic party has enjoyed six victories, in 1882, 1892, 1912, 1922, 1930, and 1936. These have all been single victories and may in most instances be attributed to splits within the Republican ranks caused by such early radical movements as those of the Greenbacks and Populists, and later by the division between the Bull Moose Progressives and the standpatters.[11] The Kansas electorate, when provoked, has shown itself willing to vote Democratic, but not for very long. The fact, however, that the electorates of these one-party predominant states do show some willingness to vote for the lesser party makes them typologically different from the one-party states.

5. *The one-party* states need little in the way of definition. Their salient characteristic is the minority party's inability, up to the present, to win the governorship. On the diagram they are to be found at the outer points, the states of the solid South and Vermont. Their internal variations and similarities have been examined elsewhere.[12]

For purposes of comparison, we have used the same scheme for examining the votes for President in the states (Figure 2). Had we used this office as the basis for classifying the states originally, it is evident that we would have had different results. Immediately apparent is the fact that the states have been more competitive, generally, for the presidency than for the governorship, tending to cluster more towards the center of the diagram. But this trend is not

[8] Fred E. Haynes, *Third Party Movements since the Civil War* (Iowa City, 1916), p. 133.

[9] Elizabeth Ring, *The Progressive Movement of 1912 and the Third Party Movement of 1924 in Maine*, University of Maine Studies, 2nd series (Orono, 1933), pp. 20–21.

[10] New York *Times*, September 15, 1954.

[11] Joseph A. Schlesinger, *"The Emergence of Political Leadership, A Case Study of American Governors,"* unpub. diss. (Yale University, 1954), pp. 151–53.

[12] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949) and Alexander Heard, *A Two-Party South?* (Chapel Hill, 1952).



FIGURE 2

universal. For example, Ohio and Indiana, which were exceptionally competitive when voting for governor, are much more Republican in their vote for President. Cyclically, however, the two states do not move together, for Ohio has far longer cycles in its presidential voting than Indiana.

A comparison of the two diagrams tends to confirm our observations about the cyclically competitive states. New York, which did not fall in the competitive category for the governorship because of its relatively low rate of alternation, is highly competitive with respect to the presidency. In this case the length of periods of one-party control over the governorship can probably be attributed more to the personal appeals of a particular series of governors than to deepseated shifts of allegiance among the electorate. On the other hand, the three states with a very low rate of party alternation for the governorship—Delaware, Utah, and West Virginia—reveal also long periods of one-party dominance with respect to the vote for the presidency. In all likelihood a more complete study of their histories would reveal basic realignments in economy and social structure which would have taken place within the modern period.

Again, comparing the two diagrams with respect to the highly competitive states, we find that there are very few instances in which states have been competitive for both the governorship and the presidency. Only Wyoming, Colorado, Nevada, Washington, and Connecticut have been highly competitive on both scores, and Connecticut is a borderline case in both gubernatorial and presidential elections. The Western Mountain States thus appear to have a higher degree of political volatility than is to be found elsewhere. One explanation may be that their relatively brief political histories have not yet seen the

development of traditional voting cleavages which characterize older areas. Settled for the most part after the Civil War, they have not felt the impact of the political divisions deriving from that conflict. Nor has there been any other major cataclysm which has left a permanent imprint upon their politics.

Rapid fluctuation in party control of political office, as seen in the Mountain States, however, does not necessarily imply the existence of a strong two-party system, at least in the classical sense. We would be sorely disappointed if we expected to find in these states two highly organized parties, well disciplined, vying for the majority vote. In fact the opposite frequently appears to be the case. In Nevada, Democratic Senator Pat McCarran's active support of the Republican candidate for the Senate, George W. Malone, was indicative of the personal rather than the party character of the state's politics.[13] In Montana, a man such as Burton K. Wheeler could construct for himself machines within both the Democratic and the Republican parties.[14] Such personal politics seem to be characteristic of states with small populations scattered over large areas and with mining economies which tend to create social and economic tensions.

The two-dimensional typology described in this paper is not meant as a final classification of the states' party systems. Much more intensive analysis of electoral behavior, particularly in primary elections, is needed in order to reveal the variety of political organizations that exist in the United States. Comparisons of voting behavior for additional offices would also reveal other significant factors. It is hoped, however, that the scheme presented here at least suggests the lines which a complete classification of the states' party systems might follow.

[13] See A. J. Liebling's article, "Out Among the Lamisters," *New Yorker*, March 27, 1954, pp. 63–75, for discussion of McCarran's position within the Democratic party in Nevada and the support he gave to Malone in 1952.

[14] Joseph K. Howard, "Decline and Fall of Burton K. Wheeler," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 194, p. 228 (March, 1947).

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

A SURVEY OF SELECTED LITERATURE ON THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF BRITISH WEST AFRICA

In contemplating the problems of government and political development in contemporary Africa one is struck by the very unique position of the territories of British West Africa: the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Nigeria. Here we find situations not dissimilar to those found in Libya and Sudan—but very much unlike the rest of Africa—wherein new African states are emerging under exclusively African leadership. This is in a large measure explained by such special factors as earlier and more intensive contact with the West, the absence of politically conscious white settlers, and—because they are British territories—the legitimacy of African self-government as an operative ideal. This has meant that despite the fact that these territories are noncontiguous the peoples involved not only share a colonial and historical experience, but today they also confront a range of fairly common political problems. This in turn has meant the existence of a considerable body of common literature, including particularly current and continuing sources.

Many of the general works on British Africa discussed in the "Survey of Background Material for the Study of the Government of East Africa," by Roland Young and J. Gus Liebenow, Jr., which appeared in this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 187–203 (March, 1954) are also applicable to the study of political developments in British West Africa. Despite the great diversity characteristic of British territories south of the Sahara—a diversity preserved and strengthened by British policy—there has been a tendency in many fields, such as education or "native administration," to approach problems on a continent-wide basis. Nevertheless there is a "Great Divide" separating the political problems of the West African territories from those of the rest of British tropical Africa. In East and Central Africa, these problems involve the refinement of techniques of what is still very much "colonial" administration, or they focus upon experiments with novel formulae for representation in multiracial societies. In British West Africa the relevant political problems are increasingly noncolonial in character. They include the construction of electoral machinery for systems of universal suffrage; representation in majoritarian parliamentary institutions; the development of political party systems assuming as an ideal a strong majority party with a responsible opposition; the development of a public service in which recruitment is local, open, and based upon merit; and the territorial distribution of power between local government units, regional groupings, and central government in what are intended to be modern democratic states.

I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES

West Africa is not yet sufficiently well-established as an area to command extensive bibliographical coverage. A fairly complete listing of available bibliog-

raphies will be found in *A Bibliography of African Bibliographies* (Capetown, 1948), which has both a territorial and a subject system of classification. A useful supplement to this is the selected annotated reading list edited by Margery Perham, entitled *Colonial Government* (London, 1950), which is Colonial Reading List No. 1 of Nuffield College. In her introduction, Miss Perham gives a short but illuminating account of the status and availability of source material on the subject. The fifth in the Nuffield College series, edited by C. K. Meek, is *Colonial Law* (London, 1948), particularly helpful not only because of attention given to traditional legal systems but also because of the inclusion of important journal articles. For the earlier period the most exhaustive bibliography is contained in Volume I of Evans Lewin, *Subject Catalogue of the Library of the Royal Empire Society* (London, 1930).

At the territorial level there are relatively few bibliographical compilations. Arthur N. Cook's *British Enterprise in Nigeria* (Philadelphia, 1943) and Margery Perham's *Native Administration in Nigeria* (London, 1937) contain useful bibliographies covering political developments up to the date of their publication. More recent sources are *The Nigeria Handbook* (Lagos, 1953), pp. 272–88, and *Nigerian Publications, 1950–1953* (Ibadan, 1953). For the Gold Coast there is A. W. Cardinall, *Bibliography of the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1932), issued as a companion volume to the census report of 1931. Recent short bibliographies are found in F. M. Bourret, *The Gold Coast*, 2nd ed. (London, 1952), and in David Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton, 1955). The only published bibliography on Sierra Leone is Sir H. C. Luke's *A Bibliography of Sierra Leone*, 2nd ed. (London, 1925). A shorter and more recent reading list is contained in Roy Lewis, *Sierra Leone* (London, 1954).

There are several excellent journals which serve as continuing sources of current bibliography on various aspects of government and politics in West Africa. Foremost among these is the quarterly "Bibliography of Current Publications" contained in *Africa*, the very useful journal of the International African Institute. Another important source of selected bibliography is *African Affairs*, the quarterly journal of the Royal African Society. One of the most fruitful sources of continuing information is *The Colonial Review*, published by the University of London Institute of Education, particularly its "Notes on Articles, Book Notices, and Studies and Reports Received." The quarterly Belgian review, *Zäire*, carries an extensive current bibliography, useful for comparative purposes, under the heading *Sciences Politiques, Administratives et Sociales-Droit*. The most exhaustive recent listing of continuing sources of current information is *Research and Information on Africa* (Washington, 1954), compiled by the Reference Department of the Library of Congress. A more specialized *Bibliography of Periodical Government Publications of Selected African Countries and Territories* has been prepared by the staff of the African Research and Studies Program at Boston University and is currently available in mimeographed form. A valuable supplement to this is the mimeographed *Monthly List of Official Colonial Publications* prepared by and obtainable from the staff of the Colonial Office Library in the United Kingdom.

The *Bulletin analytique de documentation politique, économique, et sociale* (Paris) is a very useful continuing source for specialized English-language publications as well as for articles in foreign periodicals.

II. GENERAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL

Many of the problems of government and political development in West Africa are inexplicable without some knowledge of the general setting or context, including especially certain basic aspects of the geographical, demographic, and historical background. The physical environment has been of decisive significance in determining the scale of traditional social and political organization, in limiting and frustrating pre-colonial efforts at state-building, and in sharpening the cultural—and latterly political—cleavages on a horizontal plane that stretch the whole length of the Guinea Coast. Some of these important geographical determinants are discussed in a stimulating chapter on Africa in Derwent Whittlesey's study in political geography, *The Earth and the State* (New York, 1944). Two more recent works devoted in part to the political geography of West Africa are L. Dudley Stamp, *Africa: A Study in Tropical Development* (New York, 1953), and R. J. Harrison-Church, *Modern Colonization* (London, 1951). The problems of political development arising from arbitrary imperial boundaries are examined in a small pamphlet by E. A. Boateng entitled *Tomorrow's Map of West Africa* (London, 1952). At the territorial level are the following: H. R. Jarrett, *A Geography of Sierra Leone and Gambia* (London, 1954); D. T. Adams, *A Gold Coast Geography* (London, 1941); and C. T. Quinn-Young and T. Herdman, *Geography of Nigeria*, 2nd ed. (London, 1949). The political implications of certain aspects of Nigeria's geography are critically appraised in two admirable articles by Professor Keith Buchanan: "The Northern Region of Nigeria: The Geographical Background of Its Political Duality," *The Geographical Review*, Vol. 43, pp. 451–73 (Oct., 1953); and "An Outline of the Geography of the Western Region of Nigeria," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, pp. 9–24 (Oct., 1953).

Knowledge of the racial, tribal, and religious composition and distribution of the populations of the West African territories is essential for a sound understanding of the nature and potentialities of separatist movements and other problems of political integration. A helpful annotated bibliography is *Population Censuses and Other Official Demographic Statistics of British Africa*, prepared by H. J. Dubester (Washington, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1950). *A Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire: Vol. I, West Africa* (London, 1948), by the late R. R. Kuczynski, is the principal general reference source. The latest census of the Gold Coast was completed in 1948, that of Sierra Leone in 1953, and that of Nigeria in 1954. All have been published and are obtainable from the Government Printer in each of the three territories.

The historical setting is of crucial significance in the study and analysis of the West African political situation; yet there are few historical works that can

be commended as tolerably objective or comprehensive. Such historical literature as there is can be roughly related to three historical phases: (a) the pre-contact or pre-colonial period, (b) the period of early contact and imperial acquisition, and (c) the colonial period.

Pre-contact—the Disputed Era. There are sharply divergent views on the nature and level of development of African culture and political institutions in the pre-colonial period. In part these differences are the result of the relative paucity of written historical evidence (European or African) for that period. They are also the direct product of the highly significant political implications the issue has acquired. The contemporary political relevance of African prehistory has been very critically examined by Dr. K. Onwuka Dike, one of Nigeria's leading historians, in an illuminating series of articles entitled "African History and Self-Government," which appeared in the weekly journal *West Africa* during February and March, 1953. The core of this "Great Debate" involves the legitimacy of African claims to self-government. Africans understandably reject the proposition they feel has been advanced by ethnocentric Europeans, and used by imperial governments, that "no African history = African incapacity for self-government." On the other hand some Europeans are understandably concerned over the degree of license objective archaeology and historiography will grant African nationalism in its reconstruction and glorification of the African past.

Several works concerned with Africa's past are clearly tendentious efforts made by Africans or American Negroes to correct prejudiced European interpretations and to inculcate racial pride and self-confidence. Examples of such works include Carter Woodson's *The African Background Outlined* (New York, 1868); W. E. B. DuBois' *The World and Africa* (New York, 1947); Raymond Michelet, *African Empires and Civilisation* (Manchester, Eng., 1945); R. E. G. Armattoe's *The Golden Age of West African Civilization* (Londonderry, 1946); and, most recently, Amanke Okafor's "West African Background: An Outline," in Basil Davidson and Adenekan Ademola (eds.), *The New West Africa* (London, 1953) and J. C. de Graft-Johnson's *African Glory: The Story of Vanished Negro Civilisations* (London, 1954).

In another category are the serious contributions made by African authors which appear in such literary outlets as the *Transactions* of the Historical Society for the Gold Coast and Togoland; the quarterly *Africana*, published by the West African Society in the United Kingdom; *Sierra Leone Studies*, edited by J. D. Hargreaves and published twice yearly by Fourah Bay College, Freetown; and *Odù: Journal of Yoruba and Related Studies* (Ibadan). There is also an increasing number of tribal histories being written by Africans. Some of these are slanted, others quite objective, but all are important. They include such works as J. U. Egharevba's *A Short History of Benin* (Lagos, 1963); Samuel Johnson's monumental *The History of the Yorubas* (Lagos, 1937); J. Sylvanus Wartemberg's *São Jorge d'El Mina* (Ilfracombe, 1951); H. Kwakume's *Précis d'histoire du peuple Ewe* (Lome, 1948); Nii Kwabena Bonne III's *Milestones in*

the History of the Gold Coast (London, 1953); and Dr. Saburi Biobaku's scholarly article, "An Historical Sketch of Egba Traditional Authorities," *Africa*, Vol. 22, pp. 35–49 (Jan., 1952).

In still another category are the historical studies by visitors and foreign scholars. The several ethnographic studies which have been produced by western scholarship during the past fifty years, some of which will be noted subsequently, have normally included a sketch of the history of the cultural group concerned. The literature on the medieval kingdoms of the Western Sudan provides considerable insight into the processes of state formation in pre-European West Africa. E. W. Bovill's *Caravans of the Old Sahara* (London, 1933) is still the most comprehensive work in this field. The observations of Ibn Battuta during his visit to the Western Sudan in 1352 appear in H. A. R. Gibb (translator), *Ibn Battuta: Travels in Asia and Africa* (London, 1953). The most illuminating contributions regarding this period are those of Professor Raymond Mauny of the *Institut Français d'Afrique Noire*, which have the merit of being based on recent archaeological field work in the Western Sudan. A recent article entitled "The Question of Ghana," *Africa*, Vol. 24, pp. 211–12 (July, 1954), is particularly instructive; moreover, it contains a fairly complete bibliography. Another recent work, somewhat broader in scope and based primarily upon an extensive accumulation and classification of documents, is Professor Dietrich Westermann's *Geschichte Afrikas: Staatenbildungen südlich der Sahara* (Köln, 1952). The best brief sketch of early state formation in precolonial West Africa is Daryll Forde's "The Cultural Map of West Africa: Successive Adaptations to Tropical Forests and Grasslands," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 15, pp. 206–18 (April, 1953).

The European Intrusion. Although the literature on early explorations and contacts on the West Coast is not inconsiderable, there are tremendous gaps. Both European archives and local records in Africa remain largely unexploited. The latter, with certain exceptions, are rapidly deteriorating or becoming lost, according to Dr. K. Onwuka Dike in his recent *Report on the Preservation and Administration of Historical Records and the Establishment of a Public Records Office in Nigeria* (Lagos, 1954). His appointment as Supervisor of Public Records, like the designation of Mr. C. H. Fyfe as Government Archivist in Sierra Leone, reflects recent official efforts to preserve what remains of written historical evidence regarding the early contact period. Our knowledge of this period will be considerably enhanced with the publication of Dr. Dike's *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, 1950, now in press), and Mr. Fyfe's exhaustive study of the history of Sierra Leone.

The accounts of early explorers are covered briefly and, for most purposes, adequately in Margery Perham and J. Simmons, *African Discovery* (London, 1943), and C. Howard (ed.), *West African Explorers* (London, 1952). The delightful and penetrating observations of Mary Kingsley, the intrepid woman explorer, appear in her famous *West African Studies* (London, 1899) and *Travels*

in West Africa (London, 1900). Other useful works covering the early contact phase for West Africa in general include: E. C. Martin, *British West African Settlements, 1750–1821* (London, 1927); Hakluyt Society, *Europeans in West Africa, 1450–1560* (London, 1944); J. W. Blake's *European Beginnings in West Africa, 1454–1578* (London, 1937), and L. G. Green, *White Man's Grave: The Story of the West African Coast* (London, 1954). For Nigeria in particular, there are the following: Lady Lugard, *A Tropical Dependency* (London, 1905); Volume 1 of P. A. Talbot, *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria*, 4 vols. (London, 1926); C. K. Meek, *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria*, 2 vols. (London, 1925); Dorothy Wellesley, *Sir George Goldie, Founder of Nigeria* (London, 1934). For the Gold Coast, the early contact period is covered by Carl Christian Reindorf's *The History of the Gold Coast and Asante*, 2nd ed. (Basal, 1953); Sir William Brandford Griffith's *The Far Horizon* (Ilfracombe, 1951); W. E. F. Ward, *A History of the Gold Coast* (London, 1948). For Sierra Leone, there are Averil Mackenzie-Grieve, *The Great Accomplishment* (London, 1953), and Captain F. W. Butt-Thompson, *The First Generation of Sierra Leonians* (Freetown, 1952); for the Gambia, Lady Southorn's *The Gambia* (London, 1952) and J. M. Gray, *A History of the Gambia* (Cambridge, 1940). There falls in a somewhat different category a useful work describing the international machinations that finalized the "European intrusion": S. E. Crowe's *The Berlin West African Conference, 1884–1885* (London, 1942). The most recent short history of this early period is J. D. Fage, *An Introduction to the History of West Africa* (Cambridge, 1955).

The Colonial Period—the Nonage. We are limited in our knowledge not only of African prehistory, but also of the colonial period itself. In this latter case, however, the difficulty is not ignorance or neglect, but rather the fact that most historical literature is heavily colored in one way or another by the preconceptions of writers regarding the legitimacy or the virtue of the colonial relationship. As a consequence existing historical studies give us not integrated perspectives, but narrow one-dimensional interpretations tending either to justify or to condemn the historical situation. Indeed, it is quite striking that three of the more useful historical studies covering the West African colonial period were written by non-British scholars, two of whom had never visited Africa. Reference is made here to the chapters on Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria in Volume 1 of Raymond Leslie Buell's masterful and comprehensive *The Native Problem in Africa* (New York, 1928), F. M. Bourret's *The Gold Coast*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, 1952), and A. N. Cook's *British Enterprise in Nigeria* (Philadelphia, 1943). Each of these contributions has the added virtue of including fairly complete bibliographies.

With allowance for limitations, a few territorial histories of a general nature covering the colonial period should be noted. For Nigeria there is C. R. Niven's *A Short History of Nigeria* (London, 1949), and Sir Alan Burns' *History of Nigeria*, 4th ed. (London, 1951). Both are lamentably inadequate as histories, and both have a strong official flavor: Mr. Niven, a former provincial Resident, is now President of the Northern House of Assembly; and Sir Alan, permanent

United Kingdom delegate to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, was formerly Chief Secretary and Governor of Nigeria. Indeed, Sir Alan's autobiography, entitled *Colonial Civil Servant* (London, 1949), provides a very interesting insight into both his own personality and outlook and the many problems of a colonial governor. A far more critical work, containing a wealth of information not otherwise obtainable, but unfortunately limited to the early phase of the colonial period, is Sir William Geary's *Nigeria under British Rule* (London, 1927). Another critical appraisal written by a former Nigerian official is W. R. Crocker's *Nigeria: A Critique of British Colonial Administration* (London, 1936). In general, however, Nigeria lacks an up-to-date and balanced account of its history.

With the qualified exception of F. M. Bourret's *The Gold Coast*, which has become the standard history, the same observation holds true for Nigeria's smaller neighbor, although two prewar accounts may be noted: P. Redmayne's *The Gold Coast Yesterday and Today* (London, 1938), and J. Eyre Smith's *A Brief Review of the History and Social Organization of the Peoples of the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1938). For Sierra Leone, there is nothing in print which even attempts to cover recent history. The standard work, J. J. Crook's *History of Sierra Leone*, ends at the turn of the century; and the only supplement is a schoolboy's history by F. A. J. Utting, *The Story of Sierra Leone* (London, 1931). The Gambia is only slightly better off with Lady Southorn's *The Gambia*, previously cited.

In addition to the historical accounts, there are various sources from which more general background data are obtainable. Lord Hailey's monumental *An African Survey* (London, 1938) is still the most comprehensive work on sub-Sahara Africa. A veritable mine of information on the prewar period, this study is now lamentably out-of-date in most respects, although fortunately it is being revised. Not the least of the *Survey's* shortcomings are its official slant and its avoidance of anything smacking of political dynamics or criticism of colonial governments. In this respect, Buell's *The Native Problem in Africa* is an indispensable supplement.

At the official level, there are several helpful summaries, obtainable from the efficient and obliging British Information Service. The annual report of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament entitled *The Colonial Territories*, issued each year as a command paper, provides a brief summary of developments in all fields. The Colonial Office has also published a short background pamphlet, *Introducing West Africa*, rev. ed. (London, 1953). Finally, there are the *Colonial Reports* published annually by the Colonial Office for each of the territories. These are detailed factual surveys of developments during the year under review. The Nigerian government has recently published *The Nigeria Handbook* (Lagos, 1953), a somewhat more elaborate compilation of basic background data, including a series of very useful maps. Another territorial survey, somewhat more attractive and personalized, is Roy Lewis' *Sierra Leone: A Modern Portrait* (London, 1954).

In a less official vein, F. J. Pedler's *West Africa* (London, 1951) is a competent descriptive account of selected aspects of the West African scene. An earlier

but still useful study is Professor William Bascom's "West and Central Africa," in Ralph Linton (ed.), *Most of the World* (New York, 1949). In another category are six recent and forthcoming works by persons less well-grounded in the West African cultural background who have recorded observations made during recent brief trips to the area. Elspeth Huxley's *Four Guineas* (London, 1954) is a set of West Coast impressions by the well-known author from Kenya. They reflect her settler outlook, her penchant for dwelling on the sordid and bizarre, and the fact that her contacts were primarily official. At the opposite extreme is Richard Wright's *Black Power* (New York, 1954), a record of observations during his recent tour of the Gold Coast which ends with an admonition to Africans to seek transformation through authoritarianism. Other current impressionistic accounts by less biased observers include Vernon Bartlett's *Struggle for Africa*, rev. ed. (New York, 1954), Alexander Campbell's *The Heart of Africa* (New York, 1954), and Oden Meeker's *Report on Africa* (New York, 1954). Each of these has sections devoted to West African political developments which are balanced and reasonable accounts, although brief and spotty. Of the three, Meeker's work is the most useful. The most recent journalistic appraisal of the West African scene is that of John Gunther in his *Inside Africa* (New York, 1955). Although his observations are fair and his descriptions interesting, the few chapters devoted to West Africa are far too brief and superficial to have any significant value for the serious student of African political problems.

III. TRADITIONAL AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

In view of the very considerable modern political development which has occurred in West Africa, it could be argued that at this stage scant attention need be given by political scientists to traditional systems of government. In French areas such might be the case, but in the territories of British West Africa a knowledge of indigenous political structures is very relevant for a comprehension of current problems. Except for such artificial urban centers as Freetown, Sierra Leone, or Port Harcourt, Nigeria, varying forms of "indirect rule" (i. e., imperial rule through traditional authorities) have characterized British policy since the establishment of formal political control. Furthermore, democratization and modernization of the traditional structures have been among the major preoccupations of British officialdom in the postwar period. Moreover, in contemporary West Africa some of the most crucial political and constitutional issues, such as tribal separatism and the role of chiefs, directly involve the traditional system.

Published studies on the indigenous forms of government in West Africa are of varying quality and usefulness. A few works—for example, Professor Kofi A. Busia's *The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti* (London, 1951)—are focused specifically upon political structures, as distinguished from other aspects of traditional culture. Most of the literature, however, consists of ethnographic studies made by anthropologists—professional and amateur—in which tribal cultures are approached as integrated and going concerns.

This total cultural orientation is perhaps fortunate in view of the interrelatedness of cultural attributes and the difficulty—if not the danger—of attempting to abstract the purely "political" aspects in terms of our Western categories or modes of analysis.

The introduction to *African Political Systems* (London, 1940) by its editors, Professors Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, provides a splendid starting point and conceptual framework for the study of the traditional structures. Paula Brown's "Patterns of Authority in West Africa" in *Africa*, Vol. 21, pp. 261–78 (Oct., 1951), is a very informative essay. Though less scientific and more official, the most useful recent summary of traditional systems as remodeled by the British authorities is Part 3 (West Africa) of Lord Hailey's *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, 4 vols. (London, 1950–51). Of reasonably available published works on specific cultural groups or areas, those discussed below are among the most useful for the political scientist.

Nigeria. Following the 1921 census, the first general ethnographic survey of Nigerian tribal groupings appeared in P. A. Talbot, *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria*, 4 vols. (London, 1930). For the Yoruba peoples of the Western Region, the most recent survey is Professor Daryll Forde's *The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples of South-Western Nigeria* (London, 1951). This short and highly condensed summary contains an exhaustive 18-page bibliography dealing with African literature, and is one of the better of the series of separate, self-contained studies forming part of the long awaited Ethnographic Survey of Africa sponsored by the International African Institute (referred to hereafter as the Ethnographic Survey). A similar volume on the Edo-speaking (Bini) peoples of the Western Region is now in preparation. In the Eastern Region the Ibo peoples have been the subject of several studies, the most relevant of which are C. K. Meek, *Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe* (London, 1937); M. M. Green, *Ibo Village Affairs* (London, 1948), which advances some intriguing psycho-cultural propositions; and Daryll Forde and G. I. Jones, *The Ibo and Ibo-Speaking Peoples of Southeastern Nigeria* (London, 1950), which forms Part 3 of the Ethnographic Survey. A valuable supplement to the latter is Simon Ottenberg, "Supplementary Bibliography on the Ibo-Speaking Peoples of Southeastern Nigeria," *African Studies*, Vol. 14, pp. 63–85 (No. 2, 1955).

We know somewhat less about the over sixteen million peoples of the vast Northern Region of Nigeria. Older and not very systematic, but still helpful, descriptions include Sir Richard Palmer's *The Bornu Sahara and Sudan* (London, 1936), for the Kanuri peoples; C. K. Meek's *A Sudanese Kingdom* (London, 1931), and *Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria*, 2 vols. (London, 1931), for the Jukun and other selected minor groups; and S. J. Hogben's *The Muhammadan Emirates of Nigeria* (London, 1930), which is largely historical in character. More recent specialist studies are two new additions to the Ethnographic Survey: H. D. Gunn's *Peoples of the Plateau Area of Northern Nigeria* (London, 1953) and Paul and Laura Bohannan's *The Tiv of Central Nigeria* (London, 1953). The latter is exceptionally good on Tiv political structure. A most illu-

minating study of the impact of Islam on the Hausa peoples of Kano Emirate is set forth in Joseph Greenberg's *The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion* (New York, 1946). Perhaps the most comprehensive—and for the political scientist the most rewarding—study of any Northern Nigerian cultural group is S. F. Nadel's *A Black Byzantium* (London, 1942) on the Nupe people. The most readable general survey of the political history and structure of selected Nigerian groups is Margery Perham's *Native Administration in Nigeria* (London, 1938). Background material useful for an understanding of traditional legal systems is contained in two recent works by the Nigerian scholar, T. O. Elias: *Nigerian Land Law and Custom*, 2nd ed. (London, 1953) and *The Nature of African Customary Law* (Manchester, 1955) as well as a recent survey by J. N. D. Anderson entitled *Islamic Law in Africa* (London, H.M.S.O., 1954).

Gold Coast. Thus far three parts of the Ethnographic Survey dealing with the peoples of the Gold Coast have been published. By the same author, Madeline Manoukian, they are *Akan and Ga-Adangme Peoples of the Gold Coast* (London, 1950), *The Ewe-Speaking People of Togoland and the Gold Coast* (London, 1952), and *Tribes of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast* (London, 1952). Like the other parts of the series, these provide helpful summaries of existing knowledge as well as bibliographies, but they do not supersede many of the older works. For the Northern Territories, these earlier studies include Captain R. S. Rattray's *The Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland*, 2 vols. (London, 1932) and A. W. Cardinall's *The Natives of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast* (London, 1925). In a more technical and detailed vein are Professor Meyer Fortes' *The Dynamics of Clanship among the Tallensi* (London, 1945) and *The Web of Kinship among the Tallensi* (London, 1949). Another special study having a definite political orientation is Duncan Johnstone's *Enquiry into the Constitution and Organisation of the Dagbon Kingdom* (Accra, 1952).

The major work on the Ashanti is R. S. Rattray's *Ashanti Law and Constitution* (London, 1929), still a minor classic. The previously cited study by Professor Busia on Ashanti chieftaincy serves to correct and bring Rattray up to date. Other recent studies on the political aspects of Ashanti society include Eva L. R. Meyerowitz's, *The Sacred State of Akan* (London, 1951); S. N. Matson's *A Digest of the Minutes of the Ashanti Confederacy Council and Warrington's Notes on Ashanti Custom* (Cape Coast, 1951); M. J. Field's *Akim-Kotoku: an "Oman" of the Gold Coast* (London, 1948); as well as the several studies by the *doyen* of Gold Coast scholarship, Dr. J. B. Danquah, including particularly his *Akan Laws and Customs and the Akim Abuakwa Constitution* (London, 1928). An interesting comparative study on the Ashanti is contained in E. A. Hoebel's *The Law of Primitive Man* (Cambridge, 1954).

Sierra Leone. The second part of the Ethnographic Survey by M. McCulloch and Daryll Forde, entitled *The Peoples of the Sierra Leone Protectorate* (London, 1950), summarizes most available ethnographic data on the peoples of this area, including the wealth of information on the several tribal groups published irregularly in the prewar series of *Sierra Leone Studies.* Professor Kenneth Little's *The Mende of Sierra Leone* (London, 1952) is the most recent and com-

prehensive modern study of any of these cultures, and includes an interesting analysis of the Mende chieftaincy system. A new edition of J. S. Fenton's *Outline of Native Law in Sierra Leone* (Freetown, 1952) serves as a general reference work. A series of short articles in *West Africa* (commencing with the March 22, 1952 issue) by E. M. Richardson and G. C. Collins entitled "The Rural Creoles of the Colony" are informative on the historical and sociological background of this interesting group not otherwise covered in existing literature.

Some of the more significant changes that have occurred in the traditional systems as a consequence of the Western impact and the colonial experience are described in the studies cited above. Other studies are specifically focused upon the processes of acculturation. Two of the more general works of this nature are W. M. Macmillan's *Africa Emergent*, rev. ed. (Penguin Books, 1949), and C. K. Meek *et al.*, *Europe and West Africa* (London, 1940). A masterful summary, unexcelled as an introductory piece, is Professor Daryll Forde's short essay, "The Conditions of Social Development in West Africa," *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 471–85 (No. 4, 1953). In addition to these descriptive surveys, three works of a theoretical nature provide a framework for the study of these changes. One is Bronislaw Malinowski's *The Dynamics of Culture Change* (New York, 1945), which is specifically focused upon acculturation in Africa. Another is a short volume by Godfrey and Monica Wilson, *The Analysis of Social Change* (Cambridge, 1945). A third study, David Apter's *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton, 1955), is a highly suggestive partial application of structural-functional analysis to changes in political institutions in the Gold Coast.

IV. MODERN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. *Nationalism and the New African Leadership.* Political power in the emergent West African states is rapidly passing into the hands of the new nationalist-minded African elites. A knowledge of the character of these elites, their social background, and the type of movements they lead, is essential to a full understanding of the political developments in the area. Although organized nationalist movements are a relatively recent phenomenon, expressions of nationalism, in the sense of a desire for self-government and freedom from alien rule, have a rather long history. The writings of the scholar-statesman, the late Dr. Edward W. Blyden, especially his *Christianity, Islam, and the Negro Race* (London, 1888), are among the first. Another important early figure with a literary bent was the late Joseph Casely Hayford, the author of several polemical works. A selection of his public speeches has been compiled by Magnus J. Sampson and published under the title *West African Leadership* (Ilfacombe, 1951). The thoughts and aspirations of the first generation of West African university students in the United Kingdom find expression in I. W. de Graft-Johnson's *Towards Nationhood in West Africa* (London, 1928). The beginnings of militant nationalist thought are marked by the publication of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's *Renascent Africa* (Lagos, 1937), which became what one of his dis-

ciples has called "the Bible of West African Youth." During and after the Second World War several nationalist works appeared, prominent among which were the writings of West Africans studying in the United States: Mazi Mbono Ojike's *My Africa*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1955); K. Ozuombe Mbadiwe's *British and Axis Aims in Africa* (New York, 1943); A. A. Nwafor Orizu, *Without Bitterness* (New York, 1944). Perhaps the most penetrating, mature, and objective book written by an African nationalist is Obafemi Awolowo's *Path to Nigerian Freedom* (London, 1947). The author is now a Yoruba chief and Premier of the Western Region of Nigeria.

The history of nationalism on the West Coast is briefly traced by George Padmore in his *Africa: Britain's Third Empire* (London, 1949). A more intensive study of the development of a nationalist movement is contained in his *The Gold Coast Revolution* (London, 1953). These two books, like Padmore's other writings, are highly polemical and very representative of nationalist mentality. An appraisal of West Coast nationalism by a former colonial officer appears in W. R. Crocker, *Self-Government for the Colonies* (London, 1949). Other detailed and recent accounts are Thomas Hodgkin's essay "Towards Self-Government in British West Africa," in Basil Davidson and Adenekan Ademola (eds.), *The New West Africa* (London, 1953), and Marjorie Nicholson's *West African Ferment* (London, 1950). The Communist influence upon nationalism during the interwar period is reflected in Nancy Cunard (ed.), *Negro Anthology* (London, 1936), and more recently, in Amanke Okafor's *Nigeria, Why We Fight for Freedom* (London, 1950). The poetic expression of nationalist sentiment is recorded in D. C. Osadebay's *Africa Sings* (Ilfracombe, 1952). A recent example of the "colonial hangover" characteristic of nationalism among West African students away from home is a small book by Nana Ya Twum Duah Agyeman, *West Africa on the March* (New York, 1952). For an analytical study of African nationalism see my article, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 404–26 (June, 1954).

2. *Postwar Developments at the Local Level.* Since the end of the Second World War the peoples and officials of British West Africa have been deeply involved in a continuous process of constitutional change. This dynamic situation has been the product of an interaction between insatiable nationalist forces and responsive British officials pursuing a policy of imperial retreat. The nationalists have compelled the colonial officials to revise drastically their assumptions and aims. The crux of the change in policy has been the abandonment of "native administrations" (remodeled local tribal systems) as the units destined for "self-government" according to the imperial scheme of things, and the acceptance of the artificial "territory" (i.e., Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria) as the ultimate self-governing unit. The focus of published literature reflects this revolution in political assumptions and objectives. Prior to 1948 the unit of political relevance and the focus of most official publications was the "native authority," whereas since 1948 the latter has been relegated to the status of a "local government" unit within the emerging territorial political systems, whose problems have increasingly become the subject of inquiry and analysis.

Despite this change certain prewar works are indispensable for general background knowledge. Lord Lugard's *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London, 1923) set the tone and provided the rationale for prewar British policy, though significant departures or revisions were made by Governor Cameron in Nigeria and Governor Guggisberg in the Gold Coast. The chapter on the prescribed role and future of the "educated African" is most illuminating in the light of subsequent developments. Another general work, comparative in its approach and remarkably prescient regarding the role of the "educated African," is Dr. L. P. Mair's *Native Policies in Africa* (London, 1936). For Nigeria, Sir Donald Cameron's *The Principles of Native Administration and their Application* (Lagos, 1934) and *My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria* (London, 1939), and especially Margery Perham's *Native Administration in Nigeria*, previously cited, are useful supplements.

Since 1948 "native administration," as noted above, has become known as "local government" and in this field there is considerable published material. The factual survey contained in Part 3 (West Africa) of Lord Hailey's *Native Administration in the British African Territories* records the situation as it existed around 1948. Since then there have been revolutionary changes at the local level by way of democratized local councils as well as the development of new relationships between local units of government and the central machinery of government. These changes are summarized in a highly condensed but extremely useful report by the African Studies Branch of the Colonial Office, "A Survey of the Development of Local Government in the African Territories since 1947," *Journal of African Administration*, Vol. 4, pp. 52–83 (Oct., 1952). They were first instituted in the Eastern Region of Nigeria and spread progressively to the Western and Northern Regions. The basic documents tracing this development are E. J. Gibbons' *African Local Government Reform* (Lagos, 1949); the *Memorandum on Local Government Policy in the Eastern Provinces* (Enugu, 1949); *Local Government in the Western Provinces of Nigeria* (Ibadan, 1951); K. P. Maddocks and D. A. Pott, *Report on Local Government in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria* (Kaduna, 1951), and D. A. Pott, *Progress Report on Local Government in the Northern Region of Nigeria* (Kaduna, 1953). For the Gold Coast the relevant documents include the so-called "Coussey Report" (Colonial No. 248, 1949 [H.M.S.O., London, 1949]); the *Report by the Select Committee on Local Government (Colony)* (Accra, 1951); *Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council Appointed to Make Recommendations Concerning Local Government in Ashanti* (Accra, 1951); *A Report of a Committee of the Territorial Council of the Northern Territories Appointed to Make Recommendations Concerning Local Government in the Northern Territories* (Accra, 1951); *The Local Government Ordinance, 1951* (Supplement to the *Gold Coast Gazette* No. 76, 22 October 1951); and *Report on Local Government Finance* (Accra, 1952). The *Protectorate Handbook* (Freetown, 1954) is indispensable for the study of the structure of local government in the Sierra Leone Protectorate. This should be supplemented by the *Report on the Functions and Finances of District Councils in Sierra Leone* (Freetown, 1953).

Another aspect of development at the local level has concerned the native court system. During the past five years the system as it exists in most areas of the several territories has been under intensive review and the results are now available in a series of official reports. For Nigeria these include *Report of the Native Courts (Northern Provinces) Commission of Enquiry* (Kaduna, 1952); *Report of the Native Courts (Western Provinces) Commission of Inquiry* (Ibadan, 1952); and the *Report of the Native Courts Commissions of Inquiry, 1949 to 1952* (Lagos, 1953). For the Gold Coast, see the *Report of the Commission on Native Courts* (Accra, 1951); and for Sierra Leone, *Report on the Native Court System in Sierra Leone* by N. J. Brooke (Sierra Leone, 1953).

Finally there is a third set of problems at the local level which center around urban administration. A selected reading list by J. Comhaire, entitled *Urban Conditions in Africa* (London, 1952), and his *Aspects of Urban Administration in Tropical and Southern Africa* (Capetown, 1953) provide an introduction to the literature. A more detailed examination of the problem of municipal government in Lagos, the federal capital of Nigeria, is made in the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Lagos Town Council* (Lagos, 1953). For the Northern Region of Nigeria, a new policy has been outlined in the *Report of the Committee on the Future Administration of Urban Areas* (Zaria, 1954).

There are a few interpretive studies in the field of local developments that assist in giving perspective. In Part 4 of his *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, Lord Hailey presents a general survey of developments and trends in "native administration." A comparative study, somewhat dated and including only the Gold Coast, is contained in Rita Hinden's *Local Government in the Colonies* (London, 1950). A short but useful critique of "The Role of Local Government" is set forth in the Hansard Society's *Problems of Parliamentary Government in Colonies* (London, 1953). A recent book by two colonial administrators, I. D. Cameron and B. K. Cooper, *The West African Councillor* (London, 1954), provides insight into the contemporary objectives of British administrators at the local level. A work of greater value is Ronald E. Wraith's *Local Government* (London, 1953).

3. *Postwar Developments at the Central Level.* As already noted, it has been at the territorial or regional level that postwar political and constitutional developments have been the most unexpected and, in terms of transfer and restructuring of political power, the most consequential. For the prewar period until 1928, Volume 1 of R. L. Buell's *Native Problem in Africa*, previously cited, is by far the most objective and complete. S. D. Bailey's small pamphlet *Constitutions of the British Colonies* (London, 1950) is now out of date, as is Martin Wight's *British Colonial Constitutions* (London, 1952). The latter contains a very suggestive introduction, and his *The Development of the Legislative Council* (London, 1947) is helpful for historical background. A brief comparative survey by Muriel Horell will be found in an article entitled "An Outline of the Systems of Government and Political Status of Non-European People in Africa South of the Sahara," in *Race Relations Journal*, Vol. 20, pp. 1–32 (No. 4, 1953).

Nigeria. The only published study of modern political development at the central level in Nigeria is Joan Wheare's *The Nigerian Legislative Council* (London, 1950), which ends with the introduction of the so-called Richards Constitution (1947). It is therefore mainly of historical significance. Since 1947 there have been two far-reaching revisions in Nigeria's constitution. The record and the results of these revisions will be found in the following official publications, all obtainable from either the Government Printer, Lagos (G.P.L.) or Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London (H.M.S.O.), as indicated in chronological order: *Review of the Constitution—Regional Recommendations* (G.P.L., 1949); *Proceedings of the General Conference on the Constitution* (G.P.L., 1950); *Report of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution* (G.P.L., 1950); *Review of the Constitution of Nigeria.* Dispatch from the Secretary of State dated July 15, 1950 (G.P.L., 1950); *Handbook of Constitutional Instruments* (G.P.L., 1950); *Report by the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution held in London in July and August 1953* (Cmd. 8934) (H.M.S.O., 1953); *Report by the Resumed Conference on the Nigerian Constitution held in Lagos in January and February, 1954* (Cmd. 9059) (H.M.S.O., 1954); and *Statutory Instruments:* Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954, and Nigeria (Offices of Governor-General and Governors) Order in Council, 1954, No. 1147 (G.P.L., 1954).

While these formal documents are important as the stepping stones to Nigerian self-government, they provide little insight into political dynamics and the play of forces which produced them. This void is partly filled by the following published debates and proceedings of the several Nigerian representative assemblies since 1947: *Legislative Council Debates,* March 1947–August 1951; *House of Representatives Debates,* January 1952–; *Western House of Assembly Debates,* March 1947–; *Western House of Chiefs Debates,* January 1952–; *Eastern House of Assembly Debates,* March 1947–; *Northern House of Assembly Debates,* March 1947–; *Northern House of Chiefs Debates,* March 1947–.

These dramatic constitutional changes have had fiscal implications that have posed many difficult problems, particularly as regards the allocation of central revenue to the units of what has now become a Nigerian federal system, as well as the distribution of the proceeds of taxation between the native administration-cum-local government units and the new regional governments. These problems have been examined in detail in a series of important reports: Sir Sydney Phillipson, *Administrative and Financial Procedure under the New Constitution* (Lagos, 1946); *Report of the Commission on Revenue Allocation* (Lagos, 1951); and Sir Louis Chick, *Report of the Fiscal Commissioner on the Financial Effects of the Proposed New Constitutional Arrangements* (Cmd. 9026) (London, 1953).

Gold Coast. Martin Wight's *The Gold Coast Legislative Council* (London, 1950) provides the historical background and a starting point for the study of postwar constitutional developments at the center. As in the case of Nigeria, the story since 1947 must be reconstructed from a study of the debates in the Gold Coast Legislative Council (since 1951, known as the Legislative Assembly) and the following constitutional documents and instruments pul lished, as indicated,

by the Government Printer, Accra (G.P.A.) or Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London (H.M.S.O.): *Report of the* [Watson] *Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948*, Colonial No. 231, 1948 (H.M.S.O., London, 1948); *Statement by His Majesty's Government on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948*, Colonial No. 232, 1948 (H.M.S.O., London, 1948); *Report to His Excellency the Governor by the* [Coussey] *Committee on Constitutional Reform*, Colonial No. 248, 1949 (H.M.S.O., London, 1949); *Statement by His Majesty's Government on the Report of the Constitutional Committee*, Colonial No. 250, 1949 (H.M.S.O., London, 1949); *Letters Patent Passed under the Great Seal of the Realm Constituting the Office of Governor and Commander in Chief of the Gold Coast Government and Ashanti and Making Provision for the Government Thereof* (H.M.S.O., London, 1950); *The Government's Proposals for Constitutional Reform* (Accra, 1953); Sir Sydney Phillipson, *Regional Administration* (Accra, 1951); *Report from the Select Committee on Federal System of Government and Second Chamber for the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1955).

There are as yet very few interpretive or analytical studies on this period of political change. A good short report is John R. E. Carr-Gregg's "Self-rule in Africa," *International Conciliation*, pp. 319–82 (Sept., 1951). George Padmore's *The Gold Coast Revolution*, previously cited, provides another view (that of the African nationalists). A recent appraisal by a prominent participant, one of the Gold Coast's leading scholars, is Dr. Kofi A. Busia's "The Gold Coast and Nigeria on the Road to Self-Government," in *Africa Today* (Baltimore, 1955). Critical analysis by an American scholar will be found in David E. Apter's "Political Democracy in the Gold Coast," in *Africa in the Modern World* (Chicago, in press); *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton, 1955); and "British West Africa: Patterns of Self-Government," *The Annals*, pp. 117–29 (March, 1955). A legal study of the development of the new Gold Coast Constitution by Professor P. F. Gonidec, Director of the School of Law of the Institute of Higher Studies in Dakar, has been published under the title *Vers la Création de Dominions Noirs* (Dakar, 1953). For an analysis of political movements and parties see my article "Current Political Movements in Africa," *The Annals*, pp. 95–108 (March, 1955), and also "The Emergence of African Political Parties" in *Africa Today* (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 225–56.

Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Constitutional development in these two smaller territories has been much less spectacular, partly because of their history and size, but mainly because of the absence of a militant and claimant nationalist movement. Indeed, in Sierra Leone one finds a very curious situation, for here the most acculturated elements (Creoles of Freetown) have resisted constitutional changes aimed at greater autonomy. The principal reason is their fear of being swamped and dominated by the peoples of the Protectorate. The relevant official publications on constitutional development at the center are: *Reconstitution of the Legislative Council in Sierra Leone, 1948*, (Freetown, 1948); *Reconstitution of the Legislative Council of Sierra Leone, 1950* (Freetown, 1950); *Report of the Electoral Reform Commission* (Freetown,

1954); the *Gambia* [*Constitution*] *Order in Council*, No. 1145, 1954; and *Colony Elections Ordinance No. 1 of 1954* (Bathurst, 1954). These should be supplemented by a study of the published Legislative Council Debates, as well as the proceedings of the Protectorate Assembly at Bo, in the case of Sierra Leone. Two brief commentaries will also be found useful as summaries: Central Office of Information, *Constitutional Progress in Sierra Leone* (London, 1953), and J. D. Hargreaves, *Problems of Constitutional Development in West Africa* (Freetown, 1954).

4. *Other Developments.* In addition to the problems of developing institutions appropriate for self-governing states, there are other problems of a political nature which have commanded no little attention. In general terms some of these have been examined by D. and H. Kimble in *The Machinery of Self-Government* (London, 1953). One of the most critical of these problems is that concerned with the "Africanization" of the public service, that is, the replacement of Europeans, or other "aliens," by Africans—especially in the senior ranks. Because of the obvious relationship of such a program to the availability of facilities for higher education, the *Report of the Commission on Higher Education in West Africa* (Cmd. 6655, 1945) is essential by way of background. Apprehension among Africans about the rapidity and sincerity of "Africanization" has increased *pari passu* with the granting of successive increments of autonomy. As a consequence of this concern and pressure there now exists a considerable body of official literature reflecting activity in this direction. The more important reports and documents on this subject are, for Nigeria, the *Report of the Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor to make recommendations about the recruitment and training of Nigerians for Senior Posts in the Government Service of Nigeria, 1948* (Lagos, 1948); Sir Sydney Phillipson and S. O. Adebo, *The Nigerianization of the Civil Service* (Lagos, 1954); and *Report of the (Gorsuch) Commission on the Public Services of the Governments in the Federation of Nigeria, 1954–55* (Lagos, 1955). For the Gold Coast, there are the *Report of the* [Lidbury] *Commission on the Civil Service of the Gold Coast, 1950–1951*, 2 vols. (Accra, 1951), and the *Statement on the Programme of the Africanization of the Public Service* (Accra, 1954). For Sierra Leone and Gambia these are the *Report of the Committee set up to Consider the Appointment of Africans to the Senior Service of Government* (Freetown, 1949), the *Report of the Commission on the Civil Service of Sierra Leone 1952–3* (Freetown, 1953), and the *Report of the Commission on the Civil Service of the Gambia* (Bathurst, 1954).

A second range of problems relates to the broad field of economic and social development—areas of activity which are politically relevant because of the increasingly statist nature of the West African economies as well as the political implications of economic prosperity and stability and the role of extraterritorial capital and enterprise. An official appraisal is contained in the third volume, "The West African Territories," of *An Economic Survey of the Colonial Territories, 1951*, Colonial No. 281–3, 1952. A United Nations study, *Enlargement of the Exchange Economy of Tropical Africa* (London, 1954), provides data on the degree of commercialization and industrialization. Another area study,

somewhat more specialized, is P. T. Bauer's *West African Trade: A Study of Competition, Oligopoly and Monopoly in a Changing Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 1954). A description and appraisal of the financial systems of the Gold Coast and Nigeria is contained in Newlyn and Rowan, *Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa* (Cambridge, 1954). A very readable general survey of the economic factor in West African developments is F. J. Pedler's *Economic Geography of West Africa* (London, 1955).

At the territorial level, there are several very important economic surveys which are invaluable for an understanding of contemporary West African societies. Nigeria has been fortunate in this regard, particularly with the published report of the mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: *The Economic Development of Nigeria* (Baltimore, 1955). Other helpful studies include the earlier two-volume work edited by Margery Perham on the *Economics of a Tropical Dependency* (London, 1948), and A. R. Prest and I. G. Stewart, *The National Income of Nigeria, 1950–1951* (London, 1953). Studies on the Gold Coast have tended to be more specialized: *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Swollen Shoot Disease of Cacao in the Gold Coast* (Colonial No. 236, 1949); J. R. Raeburn, *Preliminary Economic Survey of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1950); G. MacDonald, *Report on Conditions of Mining Labor in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast* (London, 1952); and the *Volta River Aluminum Scheme* (Cmd. 8702, 1952). A more general survey is contained in Dudley Sears and C. R. Ross, *Report on Financial and Physical Problems of Development in the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1953) and the *Economic Survey of the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1955). The close relationship between economics and politics in the Gold Coast is analyzed by David Apter in "Some Economic Factors in the Political Development of the Gold Coast," *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 14, pp. 409–27 (Dec., 1954). The administrative and policy implications of Gold Coast industrialization are covered in the report by Professor W. A. Lewis, *Report on Industrialization in the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1953). The possibilities of institutional transfer in the field of social welfare are examined by R. K. Gardiner and H. O. Judd in *The Development of Social Administration* (London, 1954). General economic objectives for the Gold Coast are set forth in *The Development Plan: Unity of Development* (Accra, 1951), and for Sierra Leone, *Plan of Economic Development for Sierra Leone* (Freetown, 1950). Certain aspects of the much-neglected economy of the Gambia are examined by D. P. Gamble in *Contributions to a Socio-economic Survey of the Gambia* (London, 1949). A wealth of statistical information and interpretive comment is contained in the annual reports of the various departments of the territorial and regional governments (e.g., Agriculture, Labor, Mines, Commerce).

V. PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS

One of the characteristics of a colonial situation is the absence of conventional political activity. It is to be expected, therefore, that in situations of rapid transition from colonialism to self-government there will be a time lag

in the appearance of a body of conventional political literature. During the interim, published materials that might conceivably come under the rubric of "political" consist of perfunctory official reports and studies which tend to ignore political dynamics (as in the striking unreality of Lord Hailey's 1950 study on *Native Administration in British Tropical Africa*) on the one hand, and highly tendentious nationalist publications on the other. In practical terms this has meant, and to some extent continues to mean, a necessarily heavy reliance upon short descriptive and interpretive accounts appearing in periodical literature. Fortunately, political developments in British West Africa have received fairly competent coverage in several journals.

Serial publications of special interest to students of government and politics in West Africa can be grouped roughly into four categories: official, popular, technical, and newspapers.

Official. Commonwealth Survey, a fortnightly prepared by the Central Office of Information, presents a useful factual summary of developments in British territories in general. *Corona* is a monthly prepared by the Colonial Office for "British administrators overseas"; it quite frequently contains very informative articles on special political topics. By far the most valuable official publication is the quarterly *Journal of African Administration*, previously cited. It is an invaluable source for documentation and interpretation of African political developments, particularly at the local level. *The Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, published by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, contains helpful summaries of debates in the United Kingdom Parliament, which are frequently occasions for the restatement of policy or the disclosure of information not otherwise obtainable. *Parliamentary Affairs*, another serial of the same type, has followed Gold Coast developments closely.

Popular. There are two Commonwealth-wide journals in each issue of which there is normally one or more significant articles on West African political questions: the bimonthly *United Empire*, journal of the Royal Empire Society, and the fortnightly *New Commonwealth*. Two other important serials—Africa-wide in scope—are the monthly *African World* and the quarterly *African Affairs*. The latter is the journal of the Royal African Society; under the heading "quarterly notes" there is a useful summary in each issue of the most important political developments on the continent. Two other journals, focused exclusively upon West Africa, stand by themselves not only because of their areal focus but also because they are about the only media available through which one can obtain continuous and reasonably objective political commentary. These two indispensable journals—the weekly *West Africa* and the monthly *West African Review*—are published in London by an editor who since 1950 has endeavored to recognize West African political realities and work with and not against the new African leadership. One of the most useful features of *West Africa* in particular is the frequent serial publication of articles written by competent observers. For example, in a series of nine articles commencing with the issue of August 7, 1954, Mr. Okoi Arikpo, a former central Nigerian minister, recorded his observations under the title, "On Being a

Minister." Again, in a series of nine articles commencing with the issue of March 1, 1952, Asa Briggs critically appraised political developments in the Gold Coast under the title, "People and Constitution in the Gold Coast."

Another distinct category of serials includes four which have consistently tended to have what might be called a pro-African orientation: *The Anti-Slavery Reporter and Aborigines' Friend*, journal of the Anti-Slavery Society; *Venture*, a monthly journal of the Fabian Colonial Bureau; *Africa Digest*, bi-monthly journal of The Africa Bureau; and *The African and Colonial World*, a monthly edited by an Indian resident in the United Kingdom. These four periodicals are particularly helpful in their presentation of the viewpoint of African nationalists.

Technical. Africa, the quarterly journal of the International African Institute, is the principal scholarly journal on developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Heavily biased in favor of anthropology, it is an invaluable source of information regarding traditional cultures, including particularly their political structures. Recently there have appeared an increasing number of scholarly articles on modernist political thought and activity. *African Abstracts*, a companion quarterly, also published by the International African Institute, is a review of periodical literature, particularly useful for its coverage of non-English journals. Finally, there are the published proceedings of the annual conferences of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College, Ibadan, Nigeria. These normally embody the scholarly contributions of all social scientists engaged in field research in West Africa. Many of these are extremely valuable for political analysis.

Newspapers. The African-owned press has been one of the principal instruments in the growth of political consciousness and the drive for self-government. The control over or the strong support of a newspaper is in most instances a prerequisite for any serious claim to political leadership in the West African territories. The West African press is of interest, therefore, not only as one of the means of acquiring and maintaining power, but also as a body of literature content analysis of which will provide a deeper insight into the ideas, symbols, and issues which have assumed political relevance. The principal papers in the West African "political" press (W = weekly; D = daily) are as follows:

Territory	*Title*	*City*	*Political Party Supported*
Sierra Leone	*Sierra Leone Observer* (W)	Bo	Sierra Leone People's Party
	The African Vanguard (D)	Freetown	Sierra Leone People's Party
	The Evening Dispatch (D)	Freetown	National Council
	West African Standard (D)	Freetown	United Sierra Leone Progressive Party
Gold Coast	*Ashanti Sentinel* (D)	Kumasi	Convention People's Party
	Ghana Evening News (D)	Accra	Convention People's Party
	Ashanti Pioneer (D)	Kumasi	National Liberation Movement
	Daily Echo (D)	Accra	Ghana Congress Party
	Spectator Daily (D)	Accra	Opposition to CPP in Accra

Nigeria	*Western African Pilot* (D)	Lagos	National Council (NCNC)
	The Daily Service (D)	Lagos	Action Group
Western Region	*The Nigerian Tribune* (D)	Ibadan	Action Group
	Southern Nigerian Defender (D)	Ibadan	National Council (NCNC)
Eastern Region	*Eastern Nigerian Guardian* (D)	Port Harcourt	National Council (NCNC)
	Eastern States Express (D)	Aba	United National Independence Party
Northern Region	*Daily Comet* (D)	Kano	Northern Elements Progressive Union
	Nigerian Citizen (W)	Zaria	Pro-Northern Peoples Congress

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BOOK REVIEWS

A Study of History. Vols. VII–X. By Arnold J. Toynbee. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. xxx, 772, ix, 732, viii, 759, vi, 422. $35.00.)

The last four volumes of Toynbee's *A Study of History* fulfill the promise of the first six. A comparative study of the grand episodes in the development of mankind, which Toynbee terms civilizations, supplies the author with a wealth of opinions concerning the ways of man, regarded as a political animal, which may often be highly controversial, but do not fail to be also provocative and stimulating. Toynbee's opinions, whether or not they meet with the approval of the reader, are supported by a prodigious erudition, which ensures to the author a conspicuous and enduring place in the long line of scholars who have devoted themselves to the study of what Toynbee likes to call "Man-in-Process-of-Civilization." Toynbee disclaims membership in that school of historians who profess to deal only with facts, preferring the role of a venturesome social scientist bent on extracting from the facts the maximum amount of wisdom. Our author may not be as dispassionate and objective as he thinks he is, but such a massive study of history as he has succeeded in completing after more than a third of a century of preparation and writing, even if infused with a large measure of the attitudes and spirit of a late Victorian Englishman, will surely be recognized as the major contribution to modern knowledge by the philosophers of history.

The scope of this *Study* is conveniently indicated by the subjects of the eight parts into which these four stout volumes are divided. They deal respectively with "Universal States," "Universal Churches," "Heroic Ages," "Contacts between Civilizations in Space" and in "Time," "Law and Freedom in History," "The Prospects of Western Civilization," and "The Inspirations of Historians." These topics were all included in Toynbee's original plan of a quarter-century ago, but the treatment of several of them has been greatly affected by his subsequent experiences, above all the impact of the Second World War. One of the most attractive features of the work is the author's candid intellectual autobiography, which explains how he came to set less store by politics and more by religion than had been his original intention. The *Study* therefore may seem to be professionally less interesting to political scientists, particularly American political scientists with their traditional propensity to separate political and ecclesiastical affairs, than might have been anticipated by readers of the first six volumes, but for that very reason should be more instructive to them.

What in fact Toynbee has finally given us is a religious interpretation of history. In an age distinguished by its predilection for economic interpretations of politics this will be disappointing to many political scientists. But the growing number of American political scientists who have wearied of a traditional liberalism, spread too far and wide and thin, thereby acquiring a fresh curiosity concerning the nature and potentialities of conservatism, will find this *Study* extraordinarily rewarding. For those of them who cannot spare the time to

read four such stout volumes, there is the promise of another authorized summary in a single volume by Professor Somervell. Toynbee's interpretation of history will be hard to ignore even by those who will not like it.

Americans will at first be shocked by the little attention bestowed upon American history and politics in the study of modern Western civilization. Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and FDR are barely mentioned. Theodore Roosevelt and Andrew Jackson are not mentioned at all. Of the great nineteenth-century trinity, Clay, Webster and Calhoun, only the last is noticed, and he only in connection with public land policy and the treatment of the Indians. Jefferson Davis, who is mentioned in the same connection, actually gets more space than Lincoln. Ben Franklin receives passing notice in an obscure footnote, Edison is unnoticed, and Carnegie and Rockefeller escape oblivion only because of their Foundations. Woodrow Wilson, who is more frequently mentioned, rates higher in Toynbee's esteem as a historian than as a statesman. If there were nothing for Americans in this work except the study of their own country's contribution to modern civilization, the subsidies which the author received from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, in order that the work might be completed, would be inexplicable.

For the edification of readers whose interest in history is chiefly pragmatic there is near the end a treatment of "The Prospects of Western Civilization" which is much more extensive than Toynbee originally intended. He seems almost excessively apologetic when he explains how he came to devote so much space to a topic which had occupied only a peripheral position in the original notes for his *Study*. The course and political consequences of the Second World War, together with the implications for the future of the new military technology, manifestly disturbed his earlier scholastic serenity. Two years ago he sought to prepare the reader for this significant change of plan by a series of radio talks over a B.B.C. network, published under the title, *The World and the West*. For the nonprofessional student of politics this may well be the best introduction to Toynbee.

Toynbee's treatment of the political problems of the Cold War will inevitably cause some readers to doubt the value of historical studies regarded as guides to political action. His conclusions doubtless supply a salutary corrective to the false hopes aroused by Marx's dialectical materialism, but they avoid the errors of an imprudent dogmatism by the acceptance of a negative attitude which offers little comfort to ordinary working politicians and worried voters. "What happened to Greeks and Romans"—in Toynbee's opinion one of the greatest catastrophes of history—"may happen to the Western world," he opines. But he is not positive about it. "We cannot say," he concludes, "since we cannot foretell the future." He concedes that the future universal state of modern Western civilization may be the fruit of world conquest by the Soviet Union, or of world conquest by the United States, or even possibly of a great creative act of political imagination and practical sagacity like the formation of the More Perfect Union in 1787. No one, he thinks, can be sure. What is sure, in his opinion, is the destruction of the national sovereign state and the end of

what we have too long been pleased to call modern times.

Toynbee's hatred of the Nazi version of the sovereign national state leads him to what seems to be an unbalanced condemnation of modern nationalism in all its various forms. The Republic of Israel, which he terms in one place a fossil of the Syriac civilization, he compares unfavorably and unfortunately with Hitler's Third Reich. Modern nationalism may well be destined to go the way of all things that have served their proper purpose and no longer suit the needs of altered times. Indeed Toynbee's argument on this point is very impressive. But indiscriminate condemnation of a political phenomenon whose existence upon his own theories must be regarded as a valid response to an authentic challenge, tends to confuse rather than enlighten the casual reader.

After all, the ancient Greek and Roman city-states, political products of a civilization which Toynbee greatly admires, were analogues of the modern national state. If the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, and of the Hellenic Civilization as well, which Toynbee dates from the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, was a calamity, because thereby classical Athens was denied the full fruition of its cultural promise, what is to be said concerning the effect of the two world wars of our time upon the eventual fate of modern Western civilization? Toynbee is certain that the future of Western civilization is bound up with the development of a corresponding universal state, but he is now no great admirer of universal states. When he began the publication of his great work, it seemed that the culmination of Western civilization in a universal state might be recognized as a rational end of the political process. But now the universal state is no longer acceptable as an end in itself. Toynbee can accept it only as a means to some greater end.

A remark of his in his little book, *The World and the West*, is in this connection highly significant. "After the Greeks and Romans had conquered the world by force of arms, the world took its conquerors captive by converting them to new religions which addressed their message to all human souls without discriminating between rulers and subjects or between Greeks, Orientals, and barbarians." This quotation is the key to Toynbee's philosophy of history. The future to which he looks forward with happy anticipation is that of a world dominated by a universal religion. But this universal religion, as he sees it, will have to be a new religion, a blend of the best in Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. This view will not set well with modern ecclesiastics in any part of the world. So Toynbee becomes a prophet who cannot expect to be held in high honor by most contemporary statesmen and churchmen, preoccupied with efforts to maintain institutions which he has tried in the court of world history and found wanting. Nevertheless, whether honored or not, there can be no doubt that he has written his name into the list of the major prophets.

American political scientists need not regret that Toynbee has found little of interest in the annals of American domestic politics. Our grand topics, the separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, the role of partisanship in the governmental process, the reconciliation of what we believe to be democracy with our great fetish of efficiency: these are topics on which in any case he would have had little to say. With our growing interest in the more intelligent

organization of international institutions we may lament his failure to concern himself deeply with the principles of international administration. A historian who knew more than Toynbee about the political history of the Sinic civilization, particularly the organization and administration of the Celestial Empire, might have given us a valuable comparison of public administration on a great scale by lawyers at Rome and Constantinople and by scholars and students of political ethics at Sian, Loyang, Kaifeng, and Peking. But Toynbee, though the possessor of prodigious knowledge about emperors and kings and lesser statesmen in many parts of the world, does not know the various parts equally well. His heart lies in the civilizations which he learned to know best in his early years, the Hellenic and its off-shoots. Like Erasmus, with whom it would be interesting to compare him, his great contribution to learning is a better understanding of our cultural traditions rather than deeper insight into contemporary political problems. He can hold contemporary political leaders to a high standard of performance, but he cannot tell them what to do in their daily task of working the political institutions which happen to be entrusted to their hands.

American political scientists, however, will serve themselves badly if they do not profit from Toynbee's enlightened treatment of the favorite political ideas of our time. The meaning of democracy for example, may be discussed in the framework of a particular political state, such as either the United States or the Soviet Union. But it cannot be discussed adequately without taking a broader view. Toynbee does this, and his synthesis of the particular American and Russian viewpoints offers a lesson in political philosophy which would be helpful, not only to McCarthyites and other thoughtless heresy-hunters, if they were capable of understanding it, but also to all who believe that the American political tradition supplies a solid foundation for the development of political ideas suitable for an atomic age. For Toynbee is not only a late Victorian Englishman, but also a timeless cosmopolitan, a genuine citizen of our world.

The ultimate test of Toynbee's contribution to the study of history is his handling of the perennnial controversy between those who believe in the freedom of the will and those who bow to the imperious rule of necessity in human affairs. Fate, Luck or Pluck: which is it that dominates the course of human events? Toynbee had apparently planned to deal with such questions in a part of his work originally called, "Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations." Further reflection, stimulated particularly by the Second World War, brought greater depth to his thinking and caused him to change the title of this part of the *Study* to "Law and Freedom in History." In the end, he thinks, law and freedom will cease to be distinguishable in a universal state in which mankind seeks its highest good in the fellowship of a universal religion. This "liberating truth," as he calls it, certainly involves a definite rejection of the political science of the Russian Marxists, but where it leaves American political science is not so clear. In closing Volume X Toynbee promises to continue his study of history, which it may be hoped he will be enabled to do.

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE.

Harvard University.

The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution. By Louis Hartz. (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co. 1955. Pp. ix, 309. $4.75.)

This brilliant book should provoke much discussion. Reacting against the Smith-Beard-Parrington analysis, Mr. Hartz finds the clue to an understanding of the American tradition not in perpetual conflict but in underlying American agreement about basic norms. The book is a continuous argument against trying to adopt European concepts that simply do not fit the American scene, and a continuous demonstration that the meaning of the American experience cannot be completely grasped except in terms of European contrasts. Thus Mr. Hartz looks to Europe not for "sources" and "influences," but for parallels and distinguishing differences.

He traces the unique quality of American politics and political thought to the original reception of Locke by a "non-feudal," classless society. Locke's "basic social norm, the concept of free individuals in a state of nature," was taken by Americans as a simple description of fact. Lacking a "genuine revolutionary tradition," since the Americans in 1776 were defending what already existed, and lacking a "tradition of reaction," since few Americans had vested interests in an obsolete social order, America had need for neither a Robespierre nor a Maistre. The basic American norms have been social freedom, social equality, and a bourgeois concern for property—the equality reflecting a classless society, and the American view of liberty pointing toward suspicion of state power. Throughout American history, Mr. Hartz finds a common acceptance of this "Lockian" tradition underlying all debates. But, in the absence of genuine extremes, the middle was often artificially fragmented, Federalists and Whigs appearing to their opponents as aristocratic reactionaries, early democrats as dangerous demagogues, and later Progressives as "socialists." Confusions have plagued both the theoretical debates and the history of them, because of failure fully to realize the implications of the unique American situation. Untutored by a European experience of class differences, American liberalism has been an irrational "submerged faith," stressing equality at the expense of variety and always including "the inarticulate premise of conformity" (p. 57); Americanism became a self-evident, compulsive, absolute creed.

Mr. Hartz develops his thesis most convincingly in his chapter on the Whigs, who sacrificed their liberal heritage in futile opposition to the democracy with which they might readily and profitably have allied, and in his chapters on the liberal character of early American democracy and on the triumph of "the new Whiggery" in the post-Civil War era. The American Whigs were frustrated by "the absence of an aristocracy to fight, the absence of an aristocracy to ally with, and the absence of a mob to denounce" (p. 96). Their victory came only after they had "discovered America" and converted American Lockism into the Alger myth. In his analysis of the "Feudal Dream of the South," which sharpens the main theme by contrast, Mr. Hartz finds the tracks of Locke crossing the trail of the defenders of a slave society. A few sharp pages on Cal-

houn reduce that "profoundly disintegrated political theorist" to his proper dimensions. Distinguishing between the Progressive politicians and the Progressive historians, Mr. Hartz finds that the former "compulsively embraced the Alger ethos" (p. 235), while the latter betrayed the Progressive movement by misinterpreting it as a phase of a perennial American class struggle. Enslaved by Algerism, Progressives joined in the "fanatical rejection" of un-American socialism. The New Deal appears as a series of pragmatic policies; the New Dealers' freedom to act was made possible by their refusal to discuss the continuous, irrational liberal faith. The need to transcend the irrational tradition, Mr. Hartz concludes, appears most urgently in the problems forced upon America by involvement in world affairs. An understanding of the uniqueness of the American experience is necessary to the substitution of intelligence for messianic democratic chauvinism abroad and for "redscares" (*sic*) at home.

Mr. Hartz's thesis throws new light on many topics. For example, it gives an explanation of the voluntary submission of the American people to cumbersome constitutional checks against a nonexistent popular radicalism, and an explanation of that premium on conformity which recurrently evokes hysterical reactions to unintelligible alien challenges. His analysis also answers those who lament the absence of conservative principles in America: for, as he shows in detail, the only American tradition to which American conservatives can appeal is the liberal tradition.

Mr. Hartz's epigrammatic style and shorthand references leave many specific questions in their wake. Some general questions also arise.

Some difficulties accompany the virtues of his comparative analysis: "Europe" becomes, in effect, England and France; the differences between French and British experience, which often emerge sharply in detail, are obscure in the general pattern of analysis; did England have a "genuine revolutionary tradition"? Also, does not Mr. Hartz overemphasize the "Hobbesian cosmos" of the Federalists, even while acknowledging their statesmanship? The Federalists certainly talked, and presumably thought, in terms of general interest as well as in terms of conflict (as Beard himself in his mellow age observed). And should not Mr. Hartz's exposure of the fallacy of Hamilton's fear of the mob be balanced by some consideration of the validity of Madison's factional analysis? Moreover, is it correct to suggest that those Americans who were disturbed by the American trend toward conformity found no solution except some sort of expatriation? Would not the book be improved by more consideration of the thin but persistent stream of American thought—represented by people as diverse as Jefferson, Emerson, Thoreau, the Adamses, and Justice Holmes—which attempted to relate the principle of variety to the American Lockian tradition, either through insisting on the moral autonomy of the individual or through exploring the possible relations between democracy and "natural aristocracy"?

Were the Progressive reformers enslaved by "the Alger dream of democratic capitalism"? True, they reasserted their belief in individualism and in a classless society at a time when Mr. Hartz thinks they should have recognized "the

irreversible rise of a proletariat" (p. 231). But they explicitly rejected the Sumner-Carnegie confidence in the beneficence of uncontrolled economic forces. In seeking to use public power as a means to individual liberty, were they not moving in the direction represented in England by Green and Hobhouse? This suggests a more fundamental question. In making Locke a comprehensive symbol of the American creed, does not Mr. Hartz obscure the importance of the shifting pattern of the component elements of Lockism? Equality, liberty, property, the minimized state—this pattern, as Mr. Hartz recognized, has produced varying practical results; but the different results have depended upon the dominance of one or another component element or combination of elements. Would not a more systematic tracing of the several strands qualify Mr. Hartz's picture of a general American agreement?

The America of the income tax, the Federal Reserve, the SEC, TVA, social security, and price supports is clearly a very different America from that of Mr. Carnegie. Can one properly describe the Progressive component of these changes as enslavement to Algerism, or attribute the New Deal component merely to "amoral" "free-wheeling inventiveness"? Is it true that the ideology of the New Deal was merely pragmatism resting on a submerged Lockism, or rather that under the long-continued impact of various critics—including the socialists, who had by no means been ignored—an old tradition had been rather thoroughly, if roughly, reinterpreted? If we are not merely to understand our past but also to transcend it, must we not recognize that above the submerged area of irrational faith there has also been a significant area of rational effort to define and reconstruct? Might we not even suggest that, after the Whigs' discovery of America, America has been gradually rediscovered by reformist liberals?

JOHN D. LEWIS.

Oberlin College.

Politics in America. BY D. W. BROGAN. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1954. Pp. 467. $5.00.)

From several standpoints, this book is of unusual interest. As the work of a British observer, it is an extraordinarily perceptive report on the nature of American politics. (Would that we were better able to repay in like coin the excellent studies of American life that this visitor from abroad and a few others have made in recent years!)

American readers can count themselves fortunate in having so well-informed, so entertaining, and so basically sympathetic an observer to discourse upon both the fundamentals and the foibles of our political life. The volume makes good sense consistently and good fun deservedly over a wide range of political phenomena. The author writes with skill and with the sophistication based upon wide reading and direct personal knowledge.

The book is perhaps of greater interest to political scientists if viewed, not as a notable addition to the many volumes written by British visitors, but as a contribution to political science. In these terms, it serves to illustrate problems

of method and of political analysis and interpretation. The author is alert to the need for a conscious awareness of his assumptions about what is relevant and significant in ordering data on so broad a topic as "Politics in America." As he summarizes this point, the European observer "must be willing to notice the extraordinary phenomena he is studying, without reacting like the farmer who saw the giraffe and said 'Impossible.'" Professor Brogan states in the preface that his book "has no thesis except that the [American political] system has its own logic, its own justification and is, in general, a success. . . . This system, too, should be studied in its own terms; its successes and failures seen in their American context." When we recall the tendency, not so many years ago, of some writers both foreign and domestic to pass judgment on American institutions against an alien context, frequently British, Brogan's achievement of his professed aim warrants emphasis. In terms, then, of the task set by the author, his goal is attained in attractive and persuasive fashion.

The book is comprised of nine essays on the following topics: "The Character of the American Polity," "The Party System," "Race and Politics," "Machines and Bosses," "Politics and Morals," "The National Convention," "The Campaign," "President and Congress," "Politics and Law." The first two essays and the two concluding the volume strike this reviewer as the most closely reasoned and enlightening. At his best, Professor Brogan has the insightful qualities of de Tocqueville. The middle portions of the volume lack this degree of profundity. How, for example, is the reader to regard the conclusion reached in the chapter on "Race and Politics" that "the chief makers" of a more perfect union in race relations have been the politicians (p. 122)? To sustain this generalization, a rigorous comparative analysis of a great mass of evidence would be required. It is better taken, perhaps, as an editorial point rather than as an empirical finding. As a literary production, the book as a whole lacks the cumulative impact of a closely-reasoned treatise. It is loosely organized and nonsystematic. From the standpoint of method, it is perhaps most fairly judged by the standards applicable to the essayist. It has both the charms and the personal quirks of discursive, impressionistic writing.

To this reviewer, the volume was quite rewarding when treated as a companion piece to *Government of the People*, written by Professor Brogan in 1933. A comparison serves to point up changes in outlook, by no means confined to this author, that have occurred in the interpretation of American politics during the past generation. As pictured over two decades ago, the capacity of our institutions to cope with the problems of those times and with the prospects of the future was not good. Professor Brogan, along with many other critics closer to the scene than he, clearly underestimated both the forces for stability in American politics and the capacity for adjustment of our political structure.

In his analysis of American politics this time there is much less tendency to suggest governmental alterations without analyzing thoroughly their full implications. The author in his first volume advocated a number of specific reforms such as the abolition of the Electoral College and senatorial courtesy, and urged "that the sections of the population who believe in giving the rich

their head, should be on one side and those who disagree should be on the other" (p. 384). He reached the general conclusion that "The American government is so organized that it is difficult to do anything at all, impossible to do some things and difficult or impossible to undo things once they have been done, without what may very well be disastrous delay" (p. 381). The general spirit of his present commentary is well reflected when he concludes his discussion of "The President and Congress" as follows: "And the American voter, politician, publicist, professor is far more soaked in the presuppositions of the present system, far more broken into its ways than, perhaps, he realizes. Good political habits—and American habits are, on the whole, good (no more can be said of British habits)—are too rare a thing to be thrown away in the world of today. The American people are right not to let the best be the enemy, not only of the good, but even of the slight improvements that the system is capable of without changing its basic character."

On balance, he shows that he has read and pondered much of the extensive writing of American political scientists and put these materials to thoughtful use.

PENDLETON HERRING.

Social Science Research Council.

Justice William Johnson, The First Dissenter: The Career and Constitutional Philosophy of a Jeffersonian Judge. By DONALD G. MORGAN. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1954. Pp. xv, 326. $6.50.)

Professor Morgan has given us a judicial biography of meticulous and perceptive scholarship, firmly grounded in original sources, and organized around an analysis of the leading controversies that arose on the Marshall Court. Without resort to trivia or a fictionalized style he develops a full-bodied account of Justice William Johnson's character and constitutional philosophy, linking the past to the present in demonstrating the relevance of many of Johnson's decisions to contemporary problems of national-state relations.

The subtitles of this work may occasion preliminary surprise, since Johnson was not strictly speaking the first dissenter, Justice Iredell for one having an earlier claim, and since Jefferson himself pretty clearly had doubts about Johnson's Jeffersonianism, for example when he wrote in 1811 to Judge Tyler that not one "milk-and-water Associate" was able to stand up to that "one Judge, in whose hands the law is nothing more than an ambiguous text, to be explained by his sophistry into any meaning which may subserve his personal malice."

However, the author is aware that a major point of interest to the student of Johnson's career on the bench (1805–1833) is the remarkable course of this Justice in apparently repudiating the principles of the President who appointed him. Johnson never failed to acknowledge, publicly and in private correspondence, his admiration for Jefferson. Yet he rebuffed the President in the *Embargo Mandamus Case* (1808), denying the executive power to implement statutory intent; summoned natural law to the defense of vested property

rights in *Fletcher* v. *Peck* (1810); concurred in the further stretch of the contract clause in *Dartmouth College* v. *Woodward* (1819); asserted a broad definition of implied powers in *Anderson* v. *Dunn* (1821); and out-Marshalled Marshall in arguing an exclusive national authority over commerce in *Gibbons* v. *Ogden* (1824). Was he, to borrow a phrase from Tom Paine, an "apostate or an imposter"?

Professor Morgan's position is that he was neither. "If his conclusions on national powers were unorthodox, his major premise was Jeffersonian" (p. 206). That premise was trust in the will of the people expressed through representative assemblies, supported by the practice of judicial restraint and respect for positive law. Johnson's lapse in *Fletcher* v. *Peck* is explained by his abhorrence of retrospective laws, which he regarded as intrinsically unjust. As for his nationalism, the author shows that it was derived from a conviction that Congress should be trusted as the primary agency for improving the lot of individuals and promoting national unity, but that it was supplemented by a consistent belief that the states should be granted leeway in experimenting with economic legislation, such as bankruptcy and taxing laws, designed to alleviate social ills. In short, Johnson transcended the national versus states rights debate of his day, and adopted an essentially modern perspective toward the problems of federalism, a perspective formed by the realization that these problems required political realism and judicial flexibility rather than doctrinaire constitutional interpretation for their solution. This conclusion is reinforced by Professor Morgan's colorful account of Johnson's role in first attempting to conciliate and then in resisting the extremists in his own state of South Carolina during the turbulent controversy over the Ordinance of Nullification.

Intermixed with this central theme, the author provides intriguing insights into the personal and political lives of the judges. Marshall confides his fears to Joseph Story that "a revolutionary spirit" had appeared on the Court, as exemplified by the desire of certain Justices (including Johnson) to find living quarters apart from the boarding house in Washington where the Chief Justice held dinner table court (pp. 174–87). Johnson corresponds with Jefferson in a long and subtle dialogue on the true principles of Republicanism (Ch. 9). Johnson chafes against the restraints of the bench, issues anonymous polemics to the press, and for a time considers resignation in obvious discontent at frustrated political ambitions (Ch. 6). The picture Professor Morgan draws is of a man who lacked that complex of characteristics called "judicial temperament," but who nonetheless through independence of spirit and restless intellectual activity made substantive contributions to the formative period of American law.

ARNAUD B. LEAVELLE.

Stanford University.

Regulating Business by Independent Commission. By MARVER H. BERNSTEIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1955. Pp. xi, 306. $5.00.)

The importance of this book consists in the frankness with which the author,

one of our best-informed students of the independent regulatory commissions, has written the most critical analysis of their political role and administrative operations to be found outside the literature advocating public enterprise. The only positive count in Bernstein's indictment of the commissions (his study is ostensibly based upon the work of the ICC, FTC, FPC, FCC, SEC, NLRB, and CAB) is that "their record is good with respect to the achievement of fairness and equity in administrative adjudication," but even here they have a "tendency to overjudicialize procedures." In general, both administratively and politically they "have not been satisfactory instruments of governmental regulation of business. They have been founded on a basically undemocratic concept of the political process and have helped to perpetuate naive notions about regulation of business, the virtues of group decision, and the uses of expertness" (p. 294). Claims on their behalf for the values of expertness have in practice degenerated into narrow professionalism; arguments urging the desirability of insulation from popular and partisan influences have in fact increased the commissions' sensitivity and exposure to the pressures of the regulated groups; their broad discretionary powers have not been controlled by firm lines of political responsibility; in policy formulation their performance has been characterized not by adaptability and consistency but by apathy and passiveness. "They have lacked an affirmative concept of the public interest. . . . As a method for ordering economic relations in society short of governmental ownership and operation, it [regulation by commission] has not proved itself" (p. 296).

The author has performed a signal service by systematically reviewing 70 years' experience and 20 years' research with the independent regulatory commission. His approach is not descriptively analytical, like Herring's *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, or historical, like Cushman's *Independent Regulatory Commissions*, but avowedly critical and evaluative. His criteria are those of the professional administrator, not in the narrow sense of a technician, but of the trained student of government who has a keen sense of the politics of administration. He has deliberately chosen to take a general view of the performance of the independent commission as a political and administrative instrument, separate and distinct from considerations that might seem important to economists or to specialists interested in the substantive policies or effects of specific regulatory programs. As such, he has increased our understanding of what may be called the "administrative policy" viewpoint. By no means least significant is his definitive demonstration of the administrative shortcomings of independent commissions, and their institutional transformation in political reality away from the goals visualized by their proponents.

Reformers and students of public administration who look at the regulatory process from the standpoint of the Chief Executive will find much to applaud and agree with in this book. So will extremists of both Right and Left. On the other side, professional students of public policy in particular fields of regulation, responsible leaders of group organizations with vital stakes in regulatory policy and administration, politicians faced with the duty of sacrificing the best as the price for getting something better, perhaps even some nonspecialist

elements of the general public, will feel that the author's analysis is general rather than discriminating, and that he has been more interested in arriving at judgments based upon ambiguous, ethical standards than in proving out a series of limited hypothetical propositions about the nature of commission regulation as it actually functions in the political process. The latter point is ironic, because one of the author's avowed objectives is "to develop a more realistic concept of the process of governmental regulation," and in his ninth chapter he suggests no less than five quite realistic views of administrative regulation, based upon the postulate that regulation cannot be understood apart from its social and political context, and is itself "an intensely political process."

The paradox comes about because the author does not employ his "realistic" concepts to analyze the data in the main body of his study. His basic procedure is to expose the discrepancies between "the facts" of commission regulation and selected standards of evaluation. Among the latter are: the beliefs and myths that were used to rationalize the creation and expansion of regulatory commissions (Chs. 1–2); the values of expertness (Ch. 4); "independence," "responsibility" and "the public interest" (Ch. 5); "policy integration," "impartiality," "organizational planning and management," "ethical codes" (Ch. 6); "creativeness in offering incentives for compliance" (Ch. 8). Chapter 3 is an exception: it attempts to test the life-cycle or stages theory of administrative regulation suggested by Graham, Davis, and Redford. Chapter 7 is a useful, but quite separate study of the effects of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 upon the operations of independent commissions. In the large, therefore, Bernstein's "realistic concept of the regulatory process" turns out to mean not an operational idea but a *perspective*, from which the author seeks to persuade the reader that the problems of administrative regulation will be more readily solved if he (1) accepts the insight that regulation is unavoidably political, (2) recognizes the failure of the independent commission to measure up to specified requirements of effective regulation (Ch. 10).

The author refrains from making specific recommendations, but he takes the general position that "there must be progressive revision of regulatory goals, policies, and methods in order to keep pace with technological and industrial developments and changes in democratic goals" (p. 291). It is difficult to pinpoint the meaning of this formulation of the values involved, beyond the general desirability of change and improvement. However, this reviewer would suggest that the following considerations preclude immediate acceptance of certain policy implications that may be inferred from the general argument of the book:

1. The conception of regulation "as political" is admittedly ambiguous, indeterminate, and has not been worked out rigorously to avoid the possibility that conflicting consequences (to his own position) may properly be inferred therefrom.

2. The author accepts a criterion of "political responsibility in a democratic society" which denies legitimacy to the efforts of Congress and regulated groups to establish direct lines of communication and consultation with the

commissions; at the same time he implicitly assumes that controls exercised through the Chief Executive and central staff agencies are "democratic" and untainted by selfish, private, or nonpublic official interests.

3. The author rigidly separates his politico-administrative analysis of regulatory commissions from consideration of the substantive effects, intended or unintended, of the statutes administered by the commissions; the result is that any positive policy values achieved by the commissions have been systematically excluded from the data of the study.

4. The selected sample of seven independent commissions (which arbitrarily excludes the Federal Reserve Board) excludes any cases of regulation by executive departments, so that it is impossible to compare the degree to which the author's conclusions are applicable or inapplicable to other forms of regulation than the independent commission.

5. Neither the procedure nor the presentation of the analysis permits the reader to determine the factual differences between the commissions with respect to which the findings are more or less applicable. Thus considerable doubt is thrown upon the validity of the author's conclusions as "findings of fact" with respect to any particular agency.

6. The author's discussion of the distinction between "regulatory" and "executive" functions does not penetrate to the central problem of the relation between the "judicial" and "managerial" roles of the administrator.

AVERY LEISERSON.

Vanderbilt University.

The TVA: An Approach to the Development of a Region. By GORDON R. CLAPP. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1955. Pp. xiii, 206. $3.50.)

Personnel Policy in a Public Agency: The TVA Experience. By HARRY L. CASE. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1955. Pp. xii, 176. $3.00.)

Experiment in Management: Personnel Decentralization in the Tennessee Valley Authority. By ROBERT S. AVERY. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press. 1954. Pp. xi, 212. $4.50.)

The Tennessee Valley Authority, created after a decade and a half of debate and controversy, is still, after 22 years, a focus of great attention and debate. Its unique characteristics, its accomplishments, and its symbolism make it well worth all the attention it has received.

Only one of the books reviewed here deals with the TVA in general; the other two describe the agency's personnel policies, which have probably been as unique and pioneering in the field of personnel administration as have its general structure and program in the area of governmental organization and function.

Gordon Clapp left TVA in 1954, 21 years after he joined the Authority. The central part of his life had been devoted to it, as assistant personnel director, personnel director, general manager, and chairman of the board of directors. It would be too much to expect a detached and unbiased evaluation of the TVA

record from him. His deep emotional attachment to the institution and its goals are obvious. The TVA case is a good case, however, and Mr. Clapp states it eloquently and well without being dogmatic or doctrinaire.

While the TVA has never been a general purpose government, its multiple purpose operation constitutes one of its special characteristics. Mr. Clapp discusses many of these interrelated purposes and programs—forestry, fertilizers, flood control, navigation, and power, among them. While there are evidences of significant accomplishments in all these areas, it is in the engineering and development of the power resources, among the end purposes, and in the building and management of a magnificant administrative organization that the TVA story is most impressive.

More than a fourth of *The TVA* is devoted to a discussion of a national power policy. Mr. Clapp feels that a rapidly growing supply and reserve of electric power is of such basic importance that the nation should provide assistance to private power concerns in the form of government guarantees of investments and government provision of low cost investment capital and, in addition, foster some strongly competitive public power systems.

Clear to those who read any of these books, and even more so to those who have had contacts with TVA personnel, is the fact that, whatever the other merits and demerits of this particular administrative device, an institutional tool of the highest quality has been fashioned. A remarkable degree of *esprit de corps* and high competence are evident in the undertakings of the agency. Much of this attitude must be related to a set of personnel policies which differ very considerably from those considered orthodox among public personnel practitioners.

Mr. Case, who has been with TVA nearly as long as Mr. Clapp, and has been its personnel director longer than any other man, describes the personnel policies of TVA lucidly, persuasively, and with great economy of words. These personnel policies do not conform to many of the traditional approaches in civil service administration. The original act provided for appointments and promotions "without regard to the provisions of Civil Service laws . . . but all such appointments and promotions shall be given and made on the basis of merit and efficiency. . . . " TVA has used selective recruiting rather than published announcements of vacancies; there has been small reliance on tests and little use of numerical ratings; open registers have been standard for many years; there is no rule of three; there is little concern for minimum job requirements; the concept of training has included broadly-based efforts at community education; there has been a strong and continuously developing positive effort to decentralize nearly all personnel activities to operating supervisors. Most interesting, perhaps, has been the TVA experience in favoring and assisting the development of employee unions and collective bargaining.

Professor Avery's book is directed primarily at a single facet of TVA personnel management—the policy of personnel decentralization, although many aspects of the personnel program inevitably enter into this examination. It is a much more detailed analysis than the one presented in the Case volume, and is

accompanied by much more academic and scholarly paraphernalia of the type found in doctors' dissertations, which this was in first draft.

Professor Avery, a former TVA personnel division staff member, finds some things in the TVA personnel program to criticize. Generally, however, he accepts without question all of the chief distinguishing features of the system, and some of his criticisms seem to be suggestions that the agency go even further in its departures from traditional public personnel policy. Most of his critical comments—for example, that there is insufficient participation in personnel policy-making by middle and lower management, that supervisory training was slow in starting and is still insufficient, that not enough time has been devoted to central office review and appraisal of divisional personnel activities, or to research—are of the nature of small improvements which conscientious staff members would be continually turning over in their minds. In some cases, developments reported in the Case book have occurred since the Avery manuscript was completed, and lead in the directions which he has suggested.

All three volumes contribute overwhelming evidence that the building of the social institution which is the TVA organization and staff is at least as significant an achievement as the building of dams or the production of power, important though these are. Many may question the wisdom of certain portions of the TVA program, but few can deny the intelligence, carefulness, or dedication of its staff. There has been developed an attitude and a spirit that, as Mr. Clapp says, "brings rewards beyond calculation. . . . Money will not buy it; high salaries cannot command it. Integrity and a practice of high expectations must be among the ingredients to produce that result" (p. 45). The challenge of the work to be done, the peculiar organization of the agency and its relationships, the inspiration and leadership of a few key individuals, have combined to produce this result. The TVA experiment in the application of democracy to public administration has helped some of its staff members "to find and use the inner wellsprings of propulsion that produce a graceful and effective life of thought and decision lifted above the cheap and degrading influence of fear" (*The TVA*, p. vi).

With regard to the personnel program, Mr. Case's slim volume of thoughtful comment should be required reading of all students of public personnel administration, and greatly rewarding for all students of public affairs. On the more general matters concerning which TVA is still a controversial symbol, Mr. Clapp's lectures state the case for TVA and for a positive national power policy in a persuasive, even compelling, fashion.

York Willbern.

University of Alabama.

Great Cities of the World: Their Government, Politics and Planning. Edited by William A. Robson. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1955. Pp. 693. $10.00.)

In its recent report, the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations stated that "the metropolitan areas of the United States are the most important focal

points for intergovernmental relations." This, of course, is not a new development. It was noted long ago by Frank J. Goodnow in his *Municipal Problems* (1897) and has been discussed by succeeding generations of American political scientists. It is of concern not only to political scientists but to social scientists in general, as the Columbia University Bicentennial Conference volume, *The Metropolis in Modern Life*, so well indicates.

The problem of metropolitan government is obviously not peculiar to the United States but is found in many other countries. However, it has hitherto not been thoroughly examined on a broad, comparative basis. *Great Cities of the World* aims to fill this gap. Its editor, William A. Robson, is a distinguished British political scientist, who has taught for many years at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and who was elected President of the International Political Science Association in 1952. The book begins with a lengthy general analysis of "The Great City of Today," written by the editor. It is followed by 18 chapters dealing with 20 cities in 15 countries.

In view of his previous publications on the subject, it is not surprising that the excellent chapter on London is by Professor Robson himself. Americans will read with interest Rexford Guy Tugwell on New York, Robert A. Walker on Chicago, and Winston W. Crouch and Dean E. McHenry on Los Angeles. There is a fine treatment of Paris by Brian Chapman, whose *Introduction to French Local Government* is a "must" for students of local institutions. While the usual chapter pattern centers on a single city, Bombay and Calcutta are discussed together and the same is true of Montreal and Toronto. This affords an opportunity for enlightening comparisons and contrasts within the framework of the chapter.

The volume is handsomely produced with numerous full-page photographs as well as maps, diagrams, a select bibliography on each of the cities covered, and an index. In the preface Professor Robson refers to the nearly five years of labor which went into the undertaking. One can sympathize with the editor in his endeavors to secure uniformity of analysis and presentation among diverse contributors and among cities as different as Moscow, Buenos Aires, Wellington, and Zürich. He may not have reached all of his original goals but he has pioneered in "a somewhat new type of multi-national research project" on a topic of universal importance.

In his general analysis, Professor Robson summarizes metropolitan governmental problems under five interconnected headings: (1) organization of areas and authorities; (2) popular interest and democratic participation; (3) efficiency of the municipal services; (4) finance, "the Achilles heel of the metropolis"; and (5) planning the metropolitan region. Under the first point, the editor argues for "federalism" or, as he puts it, "a two-tier system of local government." He writes: "There are substantial advantages in establishing a major authority for the planning, co-ordination and administration of large-scale functions, while leaving all the purely local services to a lower tier of minor authorities" (p. 63). The general metropolitan government should absorb the many *ad hoc* authorities and thus end the "Divide and Misrule" maxim "which

legislators have hitherto followed in devising the constitutional organization of many great cities" (p. 99). "Metropolitan government cannot rest entirely on indirect election if it is to be satisfactory from a democratic standpoint, although a combination of direct and indirect election may have certain advantages" (p. 38). In addition to what he has to say about local representative bodies, there is a full discussion of possible types of executive organization.

Space does not permit consideration of the other four points, each of which is given an incisive analysis. For example, under planning, the editor states: "It is now clear that effective planning of a metropolis is impossible unless a limit is placed on its maximum size and population. The essential instrument for enforcing this limit is control over the location of industry" (p. 103).

Unlike Lewis Mumford and other critics, Professor Robson is a friend of the great city of the present and of the future, particularly as the future may be shaped by intelligent human action. Twenty-five years ago in *The Government of Metropolitan Areas in the United States*, Paul Studenski observed that "the government of metropolitan areas constitutes a sturdy challenge to American political ingenuity." Robson's book shows that the challenge is not limited to one country but is world-wide in character. The editor and his collaborators are to be congratulated for their stimulating and scholarly contributions to the needed political ingenuity.

ROGER H. WELLS.

Bryn Mawr College.

Representative Government in Greek and Roman History. BY J. A. O. LARSEN. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1955. Pp. vi, 249. $4.00.)

Recently there has been considerable revival of interest in the history, and above all in the theory, of representation. That interest lends timeliness to this work of Professor Larsen, which is the culmination of a lifetime of research and reflection on its title theme, a topic that already became his central scholarly concern as a young man.

The work is therefore one of thorough scholarship. It reveals careful and informed judgment on controversial questions. While it is reliable and thorough, it is primarily a work in classical archeology and history, even though its topic is in the realm of political science. It may therefore prove unduly technical for the political scientist whose interest in representation is in its general theory or its contemporary institutional reflections. Indeed, even for the historian of political theory, unless he has a major concern with Greek thought and its background in the practice of classical and pre-classical Greek government, this book cannot be deemed compulsory reading.

What is more, especially for the early Greek tribal period, the inscriptions available are few, and often have to be construed without context or further knowledge about the relevant governmental practices which would make the task of interpretation easier. Indeed, Professor Larsen emphasizes these difficulties, the range of our ignorance, and the dangerous imperative of intelligent guesswork by those learned in his craft. For the whole period, moreover, records

are so incomplete as to make full and certain descriptions of the total practice of representation and an assessment of its position and role in the general scheme of things less than sure. Even judgments as to the role of assemblies in the late Roman Empire, their relation to imperial absolutism, and the reasons for their relative failure, are necessarily tentative. For the early Greek period, the job, which Professor Larsen manfully tackles, is to build bricks with very little straw, which leads only to very tentative, conjectural, and not completely convincing results.

Nevertheless, Professor Larsen's work does have real significance for the political scientist, and particularly the theorist and historian of theory, by reason of certain points he makes. First of all, his book should dispose once and for all of that generalization, long known to have been untrue yet never fully scotched and still repeated in some texts, that the early Greeks knew nothing of representation. What is clear from Professor Larsen's researches is that some of the possibilities of representation were known and utilized very early, indeed well before the classical period and the great philosophers; and that, though its practice underwent a period of decline and partial abandonment, representation had a fairly continuous history through classical times.

Secondly, the major enemy of representative institutions in classical Greece, Professor Larsen argues, was direct democracy. Its spread, and attachment to it as ideal, proved inimical to earlier established and promising practices, and was not inconceivably responsible for the failure of representative government to grow and spread and achieve new uses, and so to become a foundation for a different and more rapid development of popular government than later history actually records.

Thirdly, Professor Larsen's book shows the degree to which the theory and practice of representation emerged from the problems of interrelations between Greek peoples, between tribes and cities, and was found especially useful as a device for creating participation and control either in permanent alliances or in federations. Indeed, with the Greeks representation was especially relevant to federal states. It should, however, be noted that the federal states to which Larsen refers differ very considerably from contemporary definitions of what constitute federal unions. He distinguishes, to be sure, between different situations and arrangements which in a very loose way seem to correspond to our modern concepts of confederation and federation, but it is hard to avoid the impression that even the most thorough-going of these lasting alliances in pursuit of shared interest through common institutions was closer to confederation than to a federal state. In the late Hellenistic period and in the service of Roman imperial policy under the Republic and Empire such federations continued to function, apparently in large part as administrative conveniences from the point of view of the imperial power: they diminished the number, and increased the range, of areas and subordinate governments to be dealt with. In the late Empire, too, federations played a different, and partly independent though distinctly subordinate, role at the circumference of the Empire.

But, fourthly, the vital point is that throughout these so-called federal un-

dertakings there was participation by the members in governing and policy-making assemblies of one sort or another. Usually there were regular meetings; and these assemblies were based on representation which was something more and other than representation of individual governments as units. The memberships of aristocracies or democracies were represented.

Larsen indeed emphasizes that representation did not always mean, and does not necessarily mean, popular representation. Often early representation was on a much more limited base. Sometimes it was deliberately devised to prevent, or to offer an alternative to, democracy; and sometimes, as in its later role in Roman provincial municipalities, it was a technique by which the local aristocracy assured continuous control of local government, to be operated in its interest. Such assemblies might, of course, have been both less efficient and less serviceable to the town and surrounding country and their welfare than would have been bureaucratic control from the center.

In any event, Professor Larsen insists, the ancient world failed fully to adopt and develop representative government, which might have been a road to its salvation, by which he presumably means its stability and endurance. For in the end the strong man was more successful as a ruler and did more for the effective development of administration. Only in small states did representative government ever really flourish. Nevertheless, Professor Larsen argues that the miracle is that representative government was tried at all, particularly in view of the difficulties in communication and in creation of an effective popular opinion. Moreover, given institutional developments and social forces differing but slightly in content, strength, and interplay from what we know or can guess actually happened, it might have revived and flourished.

With these general propositions I fully agree, and Professor Larsen's work partly illustrates the ultimate usefulness of what was on the surface initially useless knowledge consequent on researches pursued solely from scholarly curiosity. Nevertheless, I question whether his interpretations are as significant as they might have been. Manifestly, he could not and should not have written a hypothetical history of what might have happened had representation proved more successful and become the dominant basis of political institutions in the ancient world. Yet one is left uncertain as to what he thinks would have been the consequences for our own time and for the intervening centuries of such success. Would it have prevented the decline and fall of Rome? How would it have affected the impact of Christianity? Would it have made a difference in the institutional life of the so-called Dark Ages and of the high Middle Ages? Would a royal absolutist state have been avoided? Perhaps these questions, as the question of what song the siren sang, are beyond answering. But if they are, I would, for one, argue that we must therefore uncritically upset the history that was as necessary.

Rather more seriously Professor Larsen, though clear in his ardent commitment to representative government, at no point makes fully explicit his concept of its values and its functions, nor yet again of its limitations. Hence his final assessment is somewhat lacking in force and precision, and does not provide

us, quite apart from the limitation of the evidence, with effective bases for a broader perspective and a less parochial approach. We gain new information, which by its inescapable incompleteness is inevitably irritating; we do not gain much fundamental insight into lasting or recurring problems or into the significance of the theory and practice of representation in the whole sweep of Western culture, and the fault does not lie entirely with the available records.

THOMAS I. COOK.

Johns Hopkins University.

Britain—Uneasy Ally. BY LEON D. EPSTEIN. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1954. Pp. viii, 279. $4.00.)

Perhaps at no time in our history has it been more important for Americans to understand the British response to our foreign policy. Mr. Epstein has performed a useful service in surveying the unofficial attitudes expressed by various groups in Britain with respect to our stand on international affairs in the postwar years 1945–52.

The author is not concerned to determine the opinion of the man in the street on American policy, but the opinion of the more articulate sectors of British life. His sources are parliamentary debates, party and trade union conferences, partisan books, pamphlets, newspapers, and magazines. He has also consulted politicians, journalists, and scholars who were interested in his field of inquiry.

The author finds, of course, that the British have been greatly disturbed over our policy in the Far East, and are fearful that we may precipitate a Third World War by our support of Chiang against Red China, or by our sheer lack of experience in world leadership. He points out, too, that the British naturally feel especially sensitive to any actions of ours which seem provocative, in view of their vulnerability to the hydrogen bomb. But he also shows that the men who make up the great middle ground in British policies, above all the leaders and the rank and file of most trade unions, are thoroughly aware that Britain must support America on the crucial issues of Western defense, for otherwise Britain stands in grave peril from Soviet power.

Mr. Epstein demonstrates that the articulate objections to American foreign policy increase as one moves from right to left in British politics, and are strongest in the Bevanite movement. The author is most effective in revealing how outmoded socialist stereotypes of capitalism blind Bevan and his followers to the realities of American economic and political life, and impair their grasp of American policy.

The future historian will find that Mr. Epstein has provided him with valuable data for writing the story of Anglo-American relations in the postwar period. The Soviet foreign ministry will undoubtedly read Mr. Epstein with care, as will the British section of our own State Department, and the American desk of the British Foreign Office.

It is to be hoped, however, that his book will reach a wider audience than the specialist in diplomacy who is interested in British and American policy. It is to be hoped that Mr. Epstein will be read by opinion makers in both

Britain and the United States. For it is most essential that men in both nations come to a better understanding of each other, and one of the best ways to achieve this is to see how those in one nation react to the policy of the other. What we need now is a work of equal scholarship to complement Mr. Epstein's book, a work which will show the response of the American public to British foreign policy since the end of the Second World War.

BENJAMIN E. LIPPINCOTT.

University of Minnesota.

The Australian Federal Labour Party, 1901–1951. By L. F. CRISP. (New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1955. Pp. viii, 341.)

Communism and Democracy in Australia: A Survey of the 1951 Referendum. By LEICESTER WEBB. (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire. 1954. Pp. viii, 214. 25/–)

Both of these books deal with important aspects of Australian politics. But their approach is very different. Mr. Crisp is purely factual, historically descriptive, allows himself evaluation only at rare moments, and severely limits the scope of his subject. Mr. Webb, on a limited subject, is analytical, interpretive, evaluative as well as descriptive, and covers almost every relevant aspect.

The result is, for the Crisp study, that it provides an incomplete picture of the party. It gives a very thorough—sometimes too thorough for readability—historical survey of each of the essentially structural and institutional facets of the party. The party machine, the party's parliamentary instruments, the organization for political warfare, and the formal definition of the program and some attitudes on basic issues are described in their historical evolution. For anyone who wants to be informed on the history and formal aspects of these facets of the party, this book is a complete and excellent source. But for the Labor party of all parties this is an incomplete portrayal. With its explosiveness, factionalism, jealousies, colorful personalities, idealism, progressivism, reactionism, and many other contradictions, the Australian Labor party is a fascinating institution. Yet an insight into this is denied the reader of this book. Crises and struggles within the party—if they appear at all—are dryly reported in the numerical terms of a vote. To a reader who obtained his knowledge of the party from this book, the recent upheaval in the Labor party must have come as a shock and surprise, when he should have been prepared for it. For, even though the story in the book ends in 1951, such crisis periods as the present have occurred in the party's history before. An author is free, of course, to choose his own subject. But the point here is that the institutional and organizational history of the party cannot be fully understood without reference to the events which gave birth to it.

Webb's book is a study of the referendum in 1951 on whether the Constitution should be changed so that the Federal government would obtain powers denied to it by the High Court decision to deal in a variety of ways with the Communist party and communism.

Even though the referendum was on a limited issue, it was a highly signifi-

cant one because it involved most of the pleasant and not so pleasant, but always lively, aspects of Australian political life. This study of it is "of a political system in motion" and not intended as a study in depth. It follows, in general, the manner of election surveys which have been published recently in England and the United States. After giving the background—the history of the Communist party in Australia and parliamentary attempts to deal with it—the book provides full details on the referendum issue, the campaign by the parties, the churches, and other interested groups, the role of the public opinion agencies, and the results. It ends with a careful and balanced evaluation of the whole process from two viewpoints: the significance of the referendum as a political instrument and the problems for a democracy in dealing with an undemocratic movement.

Mr. Webb has taken full advantage of his opportunities. That some of his conclusions are debatable adds to the interest of the book. That little attention is paid to the possible influence upon voting behavior of the tense world situation and precedents in other countries are minor blemishes. The book is written in a lively style. And even though centered around a single issue, it gives an instructive picture of Australian politics.

WERNER LEVI.

Canberra, Australia.

Studies in Federalism. DIRECTED AND EDITED BY ROBERT R. BOWIE AND CARL J. FRIEDRICH. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1954. Pp. xlii, 887. $15.00.)

The material contained in this volume was written under great pressure during July, August, and early September, 1952 so that the *Comité d'Études pour la Constitution Européenne* might have before it in handy form an analysis of the working of federal systems throughout the world. It was hoped that the data presented might be of some use in the preparation of a constitution for the European political community. By agreement, the American experts confined themselves to an analysis of past experience and made no effort to work out particular solutions to the specific problems which confronted the Committee. The studies were consequently in no way polemic. One can readily understand therefore the real appreciation with which they were received by the Working Committee of the *Comité d'Études* and the fact that they became "an integral part of the deliberations of the Committee, serving as source material on the practice of federal states."

Divided into 16 chapters dealing with the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, defense, foreign affairs, commerce, transportation and customs, public finance, federal powers over currency, banking credits and foreign exchange, agriculture, labor and social security, personal rights, citizenship and immigration, defense of the constitutional order, overseas territories, admission of new states, and constitutional amendments, the volume is unquestionably one of the most comprehensive surveys of federal systems of government in recent years. It served as source material for the Working Committee of the

Comité d'Études. It will also serve as source material for many a lecture in many an American university.

The editors are to be congratulated upon their perception of a very real need, upon what they were able to accomplish under difficulties, and upon their optimism.

SCHUYLER C. WALLACE.

Columbia University.

The Third Reich. EDITED BY MAURICE BAUMONT, JOHN H. E. FRIED, AND EDMOND VERMEIL. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1955. Pp. xv, 910. $9.00.)

Late in 1948 the General Conference of UNESCO resolved that an authoritative study should be made of "the methods and procedures used to propagate Fascism and Nazism" in order to "make possible the identification of similar movements in the future, from the first moment of their appearance." Dr. Torres Bodet later asked Jacques Rueff (who writes the Introduction), member of the *Institut de France* and President of the International Council of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, whether the Council would supervise the project. It did, with committees upon committees and *rapporteurs* after *rapporteurs*. "Owing to unforeseen circumstances," Fascism in its Italian matrix was omitted. The Council grappled manfully with the task of dissecting the German variant. The result is, without question, the most comprehensive, erudite, and stimulating symposium on "National Socialism" thus far published—in fact a treasure-trove of obscure facts, forgotten lore, illuminating analyses, able documentation, and, occasionally, brilliant thinking and writing.

So much said, I am moved—reluctantly, because this is in many ways a magnificent work—to carping criticisms and reservations, for this is also a singularly befuddled, incomplete, and unsatisfying volume. Twenty-seven historians and social scientists are the contributors. Eight of them present in Part One the ideological content and "background" of Naziism. Six others in Part Two deal with the party and the seizure of power. Thirteen in Part Three discuss selected aspects of the domestic and foreign policies of the Third Reich. Of this goodly company, eight are Germans (Grenzmann, Ritter, Lütge, Litt, Schokking, Kramer, Paetel, Betz), nine are Frenchmen (Vermeil, Anstett, Réal, David, Baumont, Franck, Gregoire, Harcourt, Poliakov), three are Britishers (Pascal, Taylor, and Alan Bullock, who contributes two articles), four are Americans (Schweitzer, Pachter, Fried, Klineberg), one is Dutch (Louis de Jong), and one (Birgir Forrell) is unidentified. All are competent scholars. Some are richly talented in learning and insight. Yet the knowledgeable reader will regret that a few are here who ought not to be here, and that many others who know much of Naziism are not here.

This compilation of monographs suffers from two major defects. One is that the contributors include no sociologists or psychiatrists. Fascism was and is, far more than communism, a social disease (call it "anomie," "schism of the soul," or what you will), conducive to mass neuroses, hallucinations, hysteria,

and homicidal insanity. Few psychiatrists or sociologists have adequately diagnosed the disorder. Yet their efforts deserve inclusion in so ambitious a volume as this. The other defect is that the historians, economists, psychologists, *literati*, and other ideational intellectuals here assembled all tend to overintellectualize a movement which was a revolt against intellect. On the false principle of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, they seek the "roots" or "causes" of Naziism in such alleged "precursors" as Hegel, Fichte, Jahn Constantin Frantz, Paul de Lagarde, Nietzsche, Stefan George, *et al.* These essays in what is usually called "intellectual history" are useful and even fascinating. But the premise is questionable insofar as it postulates that these writers somehow "produced" National Socialism instead of noting that the Nazi psychopaths, brought to power by the sickness of a whole civilization, merely seized upon whatever fragments of ideological respectability they could steal from the past to rationalize their criminal purposes.

This error was pointed out in the first systematic effort in America to describe the ideology of Naziism, published in this REVIEW in April, 1934. I subsequently wrote: "The gospel of the NSDAP is intelligible not in terms of the history of political ideas, but only as a manifestation of widespread emotional maladjustments in post-war German society." With few exceptions, the authors of *The Third Reich* have still got the cart before the horse. Even so, every student of Germany, of contemporary fanaticisms, and of the more dangerous of the disorders afflicting Western culture will learn much from these 900 pages.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN.

Williams College.

The Federal Government Service: Its Character, Prestige, and Problems. PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY. (New York: Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. 1954. Pp. 189.)

This report provides us with the first major non-official study of the federal civil service since the 1935 report of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel. The same general topics have been dealt with in officially sponsored reports by the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937 and the first and second Hoover Commissions in 1949 and early 1955. Examined chronologically, these studies reflect by their emphasis and the content of their recommendations the extent of our reorientation in both the theory and practice of public personnel management during the last 20 years.

The American Assembly report itself consists of two parts. The first is a series of fairly long background papers prepared for participants in the Sixth American Assembly held in October, 1954. The second is a brief final report of this meeting prepared by participants at the end of the conference. Linked though these documents naturally are, the background papers and the conference report differ in purpose and effect.

The common approach of the research papers, as given by Wallace S. Sayre who served as Technical Director for the Assembly, is that the federal service

"should be considered primarily and fundamentally from the perspective of the citizen, but . . . should be comprehensively viewed in terms of all the elements and values which the informed and effective citizen must take into account." The five research papers, designed to explore relevant topics from this point of view, deal with: the growth of the federal personnel system (Herbert Kaufman); the President, Congress, and the federal service (Herman M. Somers); political parties, patronage, and the federal service (Harvey C. Mansfield); distinguishing marks of the service (Frederick and Edith Mosher); and "modern personnel management" and the federal service (Everett Reimer). As a group, these papers are comprehensive, provocative, well-written, and up to date. They undoubtedly served their purpose in facilitating the conference; they will have a continuing value to a much wider public.

The final conference report itself is a brief but significant document, reflecting the points of agreement of about 50 participants from business, government, and the universities. One of the clearest features of this report is its emphasis on the leadership role of the President in federal personnel management, with a consequent need for more presidential staff help, less congressional intervention in details of personnel management, and opportunity for appointment of enough key officials to give firm policy control.

Other suggestions are either more novel, more controversial, or less apt to be accepted. These include recognition of an executive group in the higher civil service, with rank and compensation attached to the man rather than the job; modification of veterans' preference provisions; appointment of a citizen commission to review the loyalty-security program (since authorized by Congress); increased interchange of skilled personnel, both within the service and between the service and other governmental and nongovernmental units; and more attention to improved management of human resources in the federal service. If followed, these recommendations should contribute, as the conferees hope, "to better public understanding and to the greater prestige of public employment."

FERREL HEADY.

University of Michigan.

Freedom in Agricultural Education. By CHARLES M. HARDIN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1955. Pp. xviii, 275. $4.50.)

Can researchers and educators on the public payroll safely work on controversial political issues? That is the general question posed by this study. To find an answer it turns to the land-grant colleges, a good place to begin inasmuch as most education and research in agriculture in this country are government-sponsored. The author, a distinguished student of agricultural politics, was asked by the Commission on Financing Higher Education to study the question "whether federal grants to states for agricultural research and Extension had been accompanied by federal control of personnel or policy in these fields . . . for the light it would throw on the prudence and wisdom of extending federal aid to higher education generally." The study was broadened at the

author's request to include all other pressures, from whatever source, and the political role of the agricultural agencies themselves. The data were obtained primarily from interviews and discussions carried out in the course of field trips in 1950 and 1951.

It is good that the study's scope was extended; the primary question is answered so quickly and emphatically. The author's answer, amply supported, is: "Federal grants-in-aid for agricultural research and Extension have not been the means of federal political control. On the contrary, federal grants have sometimes enabled agricultural colleges to resist state and local pressure." Agricultural experience suggests to the author that "the principle of federal grants could be safely extended to assist general education."

Perhaps the lack of federal domination can be attributed to the alliance of the colleges of agriculture with those farm groups which have bitterly opposed centralization of any agricultural program. A consequence of successful decentralization has been, of course, to expose the colleges to all winds that blow from state and local quarters. But the colleges are by no means defenseless. Professor Hardin sees them as political agents themselves, vulnerable to politics but able to get much from politics. With their network of alliances the colleges protect their programs, get state appropriations, and furnish scope for the personal ambitions of their leaders. In return they support their allies—generally groups representing more prosperous farmers—against Washington, against organized labor, and even against other farm groups.

But trouble comes when research strays away from the traditional business of "making two blades of grass grow where one grew before" into controversial subjects, usually but not always in the social sciences. Sometimes group pressures are successfully resisted. More often they are forestalled by guiding research in other directions. The list of problems largely or wholly avoided is impressive: the level of price supports; farm labor problems, especially those concerning migratory labor; farm tenure; valley authorities; fertilizer politics; the relative merits of margarine and butter. And the leaders of agricultural education themselves have often decried the failure of their institutions to develop policy-oriented research.

Professor Hardin believes nevertheless that such problems can be safely investigated. The single most important condition is a qualified president. A small board that understands its role and the function of a university, an able staff, and clear policies supporting academic freedom would complete the requirements. Even a college that misses the ideal in many ways has more potential strength than it thinks. But institutional arrangements, the author is sure, never are a substitute for personal courage and integrity.

The reader may not be altogether satisfied that the agricultural college can freely conduct research on controversial problems. The author has described its political role too well for that. It is not hard to see why farm groups allied with the college should fail to comprehend pleas for freedom of research that comes out adversely to their interests; their reaction must be not unlike that of a man

whose wife suddenly claims the right to date freely. Professors never will find it easy to play in social controversy the dual roles of protagonist and objective researcher; it is a lot to expect friend and foe alike to accept both roles and keep them straight. The scholar historically has occupied the ivory tower not because he shrinks from life but because that is a way to assure the community that he is nobody's man. It is significant that the study under review was carried out by a man on the payroll of a private university.

This book is an impressive job, both for its realistic treatment of a crucial problem and its sophisticated comprehension of the complex web of state politics.

RALPH K. HUITT.

The University of Wisconsin.

Behind the President: A Study of Executive Office Agencies. By EDWARD H. HOBBS. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1954. Pp. vi, 248. $4.50.)

It may be arguable whether the evolution of the President's Executive Office can be better described as the unfolding of a grand design or as a series of pragmatic responses to particular needs. But there can be no doubt that the Office has become a major component of our political system; and under the influence of President Eisenhower, a distinguished alumnus of the Operations Division of the Army General Staff, its formal organization and procedures, as well as those of the Cabinet, have been developed to a very fine point indeed.

Accordingly, it is high time for a full-dress, comprehensive study of the Executive Office. Such a study, ideally, would be informed not only by conventional administrative knowledge but by a sensitive feeling for the high drama of recent history. Still more important, it would be guided by some sophisticated theory of government, stated either in analytical terms (e. g., differential access to policy-making centers) or in moral terms (e. g., the need to impose longer perspectives and wider loyalties on pressure-ridden institutions).

This book does not quite attain that mark. It begins with an account of the events that led to Executive Order 8248 of 1939. Six chapters portray the origins, functions, and relationships of the Bureau of the Budget, the National Resources Planning Board, the White House Office, the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Council, and the National Security Resources Board. There is also a discussion of emergency mobilization agencies. The final chapter, called "The Machinery under Eisenhower," is actually devoted to the author's own recommendations. He suggests that the present overhead structure be supplemented by a number of cabinet-level committees based on "major policy nuclei, e.g. fiscal, public works and conservation, national security, welfare. . . ." The committees would neither conduct nor supervise operating programs, but would develop and analyze legislative proposals and serve as clearing houses for information. Their members would include staff and line officials and "appropriate representatives of the legislative branch." Their

secretariats would be headed by staff officers operating out of the White House and reporting to a chief of staff. The latter would also serve as executive secretary of the Cabinet and, possibly, as Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

The author has compiled much useful historical data. He appreciates the relevance of industrial, military, and foreign administrative experience. He is more aware than many professional students of administration that Congress, too, is a part of the machinery of government. Indeed, he carries this point quite far. Thus, the Senate should confirm the nomination of the Budget Director; "several key Congressmen and Senators" may well serve on the National Security Council; "representatives" of Congress should participate in the "policy nuclei" committees; and it would be "appropriate" for Congress to give these committees statutory authorization.

Although some officials were interviewed in the course of the study, major parts of the work appear to have been based largely on official reports, orders, and other documents, with some loss in realism. Thus, for example, the treatment of ODM's Labor-Management Manpower Policy Committee conveys little sense of the important political struggle that actually took place over its creation. It is also a pity that one of the jobs that most needed to be done—an analysis of the White House Office—was compressed to seven pages, a third of which were devoted to the "anonymous assistants." There is no systematic analysis of its peculiar relationships with other Executive Office agencies or for that matter, of the relationship of these agencies to the President. It is noted that the Bureau of the Budget is "near or even in the line of authority from the President to the operation units." But this point is dropped quickly and there are few observations on the interaction of the Bureau and the regular departments.

The author's prescriptions, which reflect in part the views of W. Y. Elliott, are certainly provocative. But they appear to have been appended as an afterthought, since they are not wholly in keeping with the somewhat mechanistic diagnosis with which the book begins (i.e., the President's administrative "burden" must be lightened). Indeed, a more full-bodied theoretical framework at the start might have obviated the final suggestion that "someone" should "clarify Presidential staff concepts." In short, this book will make a place for itself as a reference volume, but the real story of the Executive Office is yet to be written.

LAURENCE I. RADWAY.

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The History of the New York City Legislature. By FREDERICK SHAW. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1954. Pp. vi, 300.)

Dr. Frederick Shaw's excellent study of the legislature of New York City, combining admirable and painstaking scholarship with a readable style, demonstrates vividly many of the problems of legislatures in American government. The book concentrates on the legislative body of the city since the consolidation of New York and Brooklyn and outlying sections into Greater New York

in 1898. Between 1851, when the first trolley franchise was granted by the Board of Aldermen of the old city, and 1898, the Board of Aldermen had become thoroughly discredited; its widely recognized corruption won it the titles "Boodle Board" and "The Forty Thieves." Neither the new charter at the time of the consolidation nor a home rule law enacted by the state legislature in 1924 improved the quality of the Board's membership or work. According to Dr. Shaw, it was not until the charter of 1937, which abolished the Board of Aldermen and created a smaller city council elected by proportional representation, that a municipal legislature worthy of the great metropolis was established. PR, he argues, not only achieved much more equitable distribution of political strength in the legislature relative to the electorate; more important, it provided a minority of sufficient size and stature to prod the continuing Tammany majority to action and to prevent the outright corruption that had been the hallmark of previous city legislatures. He musters impressive evidence to substantiate his claims.

If proportional representation is Dr. Shaw's angel, Tammany is his devil. His description and analysis of the operation of a county machine in a one-party metropolitan area will interest every student of politics, and his report on the ways in which this party controls the city legislature is revealing indeed. Yet these topics are handled with sophistication, not with the naïve and self-righteous missionary zeal of some reformers; the author recognizes, for example, the value of the neighborhood services performed by the old aldermen working for their party, and he readily admits that the void left by the disappearance of this institution under PR was never completely filled. These insights make his judgment on the desirability of PR all the more convincing; he mourns the passing of PR from New York in 1949, and his grief is understandable.

Fundamentally, however, a real problem persisted even under PR. As Dr. Shaw observes, the legislative body has steadily been losing power to the mayor and to an elected executive body, the Board of Estimate. In these institutions resides the real governmental authority in New York City. PR probably did give the city better legislators, but they were installed in an exceedingly weak chamber. We are perhaps able to improve legislatures, but we do not seem to know what role we want them to play in the shaping of governmental decisions. This dilemma emerges dramatically from Dr. Shaw's history.

One might quarrel with Dr. Shaw's basic assumption that "there is not much legislative work to do, even in a big city like New York." But it is not essential to agree with Dr. Shaw in every detail or even in his grand design to conclude that he has made a significant contribution to the literature on the legislative process and political parties, and to the still unwritten definitive history of New York City. Even those who would dispute some of his points will commend what he has done, and will refer to it many times in the years to come.

HERBERT KAUFMAN.

Yale University.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Government by Investigation. By Alan Barth. (New York: The Viking Press. 1955. Pp. 231. $3.00.)

This small volume first sketches the historical background in the United States of the investigating power in the context of our constitutional system of countervailing power. It then presents in lucid and balanced fashion the current problem of congressional investigating power and practices in relation to the executive and judicial branches and the special problem of self-incrimination.

The best part of the book is a series of short studies of the congressional attack through investigations on foundations, the church, universities, and the press. By quoting extensively from transcripts of recent investigations Barth, a Washington *Post* editorial writer and author of the admirable study *The Loyalty of Free Men*, is able to impart to his book a remarkable vividness and sense of urgency. By putting his studies in a general historical context he is able to present the problem as a continuing one that arose long before and will last long after the McCarthys and the Jenners. In Barth's perspective the resistance put up by men like Oxnam, Lattimore, and Wechsler to the inquisitors stands out like a beacon light on a threatening night. The position of the Association of American Universities on invocation of the Fifth Amendment by faculty members does not so stand out, especially when compared to Harvard's position on three of its faculty who resorted to this right.

The author concludes with a plea for congressional self-restraint. He has little to offer here beyond what has been proposed many times, most notably by Will Maslow in a searching article in the *Columbia Law Review* (June, 1954). Some political scientists will not share Barth's hope that Congress will be able to restrain itself. The problem, as the author himself points out, is not simply congressional irresponsibility in general, but the tendency of a small number of inquisitorial zealots to exploit the investigating power for their own political purposes. The incapacity of Congress to restrain its own members is not a result of chance or laxness but is one more example of the failure of Congress as a whole to put its own house in order. This failure in turn reflects the disintegrate nature of our whole political system, which Barth praises rather uncritically. Still, he is entirely right in saying that a more informed public opinion can help keep the inquisitors in check, and his book will contribute significantly to such an end.—James MacGregor Burns, *Williams College.*

The American Legion and American Foreign Policy. By Roscoe Baker. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1954. Pp. 329. $4.75.)

The American Legion is topped in membership by only a few organizations in this country. Although by declaration "nonpolitical," it maintains lobbies which can whiplash state legislatures and the Congress. In recent years, its national program—ranging from veterans' benefits to foreign affairs—has been supported by more than $100,000 annually, a sum which has placed the Legion among the most lavish spenders of the Washington lobbies.

Roscoe Baker treats the foreign policy program of the Legion under a number of topics—Americanization, immigration and naturalization, anti-communism, defense, isolation and neutrality, South America, and international cooperation—and records chronologically the official policy on each. He describes the Legion's attitudes and lobbying activities in the period between the wars and in the postwar years, with passing references to American official policy. He documents the constructive program of citizenship and attempts to set up something like a boxscore of successes and failures in making Legion policy U. S. policy.

While the author has done a thorough piece of research in the documents and publications of the Legion and has combed newspapers and congressional hearings, he has written only a partial account of the Legion as a pressure group in foreign policy. He has made no use of unpublished Legion archives or of the papers of its leaders or of interviews with Legion officers. His account of organization, for example, sketches merely the formal structure. Except for an occasional reference to national convention scenes when differences in policy aroused controversy, there is little about how Legion policy was reached, who was responsible for its genesis, or what factors underlay its formulation. Little is presented to show the

interplay between the Legion's leadership and the national executive or how Washington officialdom tried to utilize the Legion as a channel for the propagation of administration policy or how the administrative officials sought to modify Legion policy.

In spite of the author's goal of impartiality, his failure to present his materials in the proper frame of reference or to relate his subject fully to the times results in a lack of objectivity. This is especially true of his discussion of the Legion's stand on communism. For example, he avoids evaluation of the threat to civil liberties posed by Legion policies. He does give a more balanced account of the Legion's stand on neutrality, disarmament, international cooperation, and defense.

The work is useful for reference. Furthermore, it illustrates the potential for constructive action by a citizen organization on the problem of U. S. involvement in world affairs. —Victoria Schuck, *Mount Holyoke College.*

The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Representative Selections. Edited with an Introduction by Edward Dumbauld. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1955. Pp. xlii, 204. Paper 90¢, Cloth $2.25.)

This volume in the American Heritage Series contains a carefully selected and integrated set of writings of Thomas Jefferson. The material is arranged under six headings: (1) "The Fundamentals of Rightful Government"; (2) "The Blessings of a Free Government"; (3) "Government Founded on the Will of the People"; (4) "The Value of Constitutions"; (5) "The True Principles of the United States Constitution"; and (6) "The Great Family of Mankind." The following documents and writings listed under the first heading illustrate the character and adequacy of the sources used: The Declaration of Independence; Jefferson's Draft Constitution for Virginia; A Summary View of the Rights of British America; Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom as Drafted by Jefferson; Jefferson's Views on Freedom of Religion; Ordinance of 1784 as Reported by Jefferson; First Inaugural Address; and four significant letters.

As a whole the volume presents the most available and useful material for the study of Jefferson's political philosophy to be found in print. It does what Jefferson never did himself. It integrates his philosophy into a complete and systematic basis for a governmental system.

In addition to the source material, which is the primary feature of the volume, there are a 30-page introduction, several pages of bibliography, and notes on the text which contain interesting and illuminating comments and suggestions of the author, who by previous writings had established himself as an authority on Jefferson's philosophy of government. The volume merits an extensive use in the study of the political and constitutional principles of the greatest of our American Founders. As a matter of fact, Jefferson's philosophy is broader than the basis for a governmental system. It is the foundation of the American way of life.—C. Perry Patterson, *University of Texas.*

Notes on the State of Virginia. By Thomas Jefferson. Edited by William Peden. (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press. 1955. Pp. xxv, 315. $5.00.)

A carefully edited edition of Jefferson's famous work, first published in English in 1787, with his later handwritten insertions included either in the text or as footnotes. The editor's explanatory notes are helpful in interpretation of the text. This is the first modern edition, separately printed, which is available to the general reader.

Preliminary Check-List of Tennessee Legislative Documents. By the State Library Division, Tennessee State Library and Archives. (Nashville. 1954. Pp. [26].)

The check-list is in three sections (session laws, legislative journals, and collected public documents). Each section has the convenient feature of the assignment of a serial number. In the final edition, it is hoped that the original manuscript records in the Tennessee Archives can be included. While the thought is expressed that the check-list might stimulate "the publication of more definitive works on Tennessee legislative history," the check-list is in itself an expression of the increasing interest in basic state documents, and points the way to this and similar work that needs to be done to identify the basic state documents, and make them more readily available for use.—J.B.C.

The County Court in North Carolina before 1750. By Paul M. McCain. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1954. Pp. vi, 163. $2.50.)

A study of the jurisdiction and administrative powers of the county court, the principal institution of local government in North

Carolina until 1868, "from its inception under the Proprietors as a precinct court down to 1750, when its organization and powers had become relatively fixed and stable."

Church & State: The Struggle for Separation in New Hampshire, 1630–1900. By Charles B. Kinney, Jr. (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University. 1955. Pp. vii, 198.)

An historical account of the efforts in New Hampshire to separate church and state. Among the subjects discussed are the struggle between the Puritan theocracy and other religious sects, the movement toward toleration, the struggle for constitutional change, and the conflicts with respect to public education.

Our Yankee Heritage: New England's Contribution to American Civilization. By Carleton Beals. (New York: David McKay Co., Inc. 1955. Pp. 311. $4.00.)

An enthusiastic account by a well-known writer of New England's contribution to American civilization, told in terms of the men who represented or largely shaped this contribution.

Valley of Democracy: The Frontier versus the Plantation in the Ohio Valley, 1775–1818. By John D. Barnhart. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1953. Pp. x, 338. $5.00.)

An analysis and defense of Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis with illustrations drawn from the early history of the Ohio Valley.

U. S. Military Doctrine: A Study and Appraisal. By Dale O. Smith. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce; Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. 1955. Pp. xiii, 256. $3.50.)

General Smith attempts in this book a summarization of military doctrine based on historic experience and the present position of the United States. The author maintains that despite the necessity for improvisation and elasticity in the application of military concepts, there are four basic doctrines which in combination insure a firm foundation for our national defense. General Smith feels that the recognition of these principles is now being evidenced by the executive branch of our government and that the military are at long last being accorded proper recognition. The book is favorable to the Air Force point of view and is informative as an explanation and defense of that position.

The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume VI: Men and Planes. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1955. Pp. lii, 807. $8.50.)

The first five volumes of this series dealt with combat activities of the Army Air Force in World War II. This volume deals with the internal organization and administration of the Army Air Force and specifically with such problems as logistics, procurement, training, and bases.

Defending "The Bill" against Metal Houses. By William K. Muir, Jr. (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press. 1955. Pp. ii, 35.)

In this latest case in the Inter-University Case Program series the move to transfer surplus, pre-fabricated, cheaply constructed, and rapidly deteriorating housing units into a section of New Haven populated by skilled and unskilled workers of varied racial origins produces protest which is revealed in personal political activity and community organization that win a majority of the aldermen and a reversal of administrative position.

The Government of Dallas County, Texas. By John M. Claunch. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press. 1954. Pp. xii, 201. $4.00.)

A descriptive study of the establishment, organization, and functioning of the government of Dallas County, Texas, with a summary discussion of the trends in the reconstruction of county government in the United States.

Introduction to the Study of Public Administration. By Leonard D. White. (New York: Macmillan. 4th ed. 1955. Pp. xx, 531. $6.00.)

A general revision of this text within the framework of previous editions. It contains no startling innovations, but it does represent the results of a continuous refinement of patterns and ideas by Professor White over a period of more than 30 years.

American Democracy in Theory and Practice: The National Government. By Robert K. Carr, Marver H. Bernstein, Donald H. Morrison, Richard C. Snyder, and Joseph E. McLean. (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc. Rev. ed. 1955. Pp. xxix, 917. $6.00.)

A thorough revision and rewriting of a basic text in American Government.

American State Government and Administration. By Austin F. Macdonald. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 5th ed. 1955. Pp. xv, 653. $6.00.)

An extensive revision of this text.

State and Local Government in the United States. By Austin F. Macdonald. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1955. Pp. xvi, 621. $6.00.)

A new textbook which seeks to balance the treatment of state and local problems.

Problems in Freedom. By Peter Bachrach. (Harrisburg, Penn.: The Stackpole Co. 1954. Pp. 468. $5.00.)

A useful text for undergraduate courses on civil rights, built mainly around leading cases but with inclusion also of some other materials and of topical introductions. There is some coverage of most of the issues debated in recent years.

National Security and Individual Freedom. By John Lord O'Brian. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. 84. $2.00.)

These two Godkin Lectures are a brief appeal for preservation of traditional liberties in a period of concern for national security.

The Big Business Executive: The Factors that Made Him, 1900–1950. By Mabel Newcomer. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 164. $4.00.)

A study of the top management of the largest corporations from 1898 to 1953, giving data on their selection but more largely on "the training, experience, and family background of the chief executives, and how they rose to the top." There are 62 tables of statistical data and much perceptive comment about trends and the nature of modern business management.

Labor Disputes and Their Settlement. By Kurt Braun. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1955. Pp. xvi, 343. $6.00.)

An analysis of mediation and arbitration in the United States, considered against the background of the development of labor conflict and supplemented by a brief discussion of the German labor courts system.

Minimum Price Fixing in the Bituminous Coal Industry. By Waldo E. Fisher and Charles M. James. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1955. Pp. xxxi, 523. $10.00.)

An exhaustive analysis of experience with price fixing under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, with approximately one-third of the text given to appraisal. A postscript on recent developments is added.

Public Policies toward Business. By Clair Wilcox. (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1955. Pp. xix, 898.)

Designed as a text for "courses in economics and political science dealing with public policy toward business enterprise." It purposely excludes fiscal, monetary, international trade, and labor policies, but includes exceedingly comprehensive and thorough treatment of "maintaining," "supplementing," and "moderating" competition, substitutions of regulation for competition, and public enterprise. Very complete in its citation and use of economics sources, less complete in its use of sources and analysis of problems from the political and administrative side.

CURRENT RESEARCH ON JOSEPH STORY

There has been a significant revival of interest in the United States, and elsewhere, in the life and writings of Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story. A number of independent research studies involving the Story manuscripts and other materials have been undertaken recently at Columbia University, Harvard University, the Supreme Court Library in Washington, the University of Brazil, and the University of California (both in Berkeley and in Los Angeles). The purpose of these studies has been to construct a statement of Justice Story's life and work, to compile an exhaustive bibliography of his writings, to translate into English his foreign language articles on American law, to identify and to reproduce his anonymous law articles, and to summarize the influence of his ideas on American and foreign law.

Professor Henry Steele Commager at Columbia is writing a biography; Professor Kurt H. Nadelmann, formerly at the University of California at Berkeley and now at Harvard, has published the translations of Story's German and French articles on American law;[1]

[1] See, Nadelmann, "Joseph Story's Sketch of American Law," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. 3, pp. 3 ff. (Winter, 1954);

Supreme Court Librarian Helen Newman, as a part of her manuscript bibliography of Supreme Court Justices, has prepared the list of over 150 items written by or about Story;[2] Professor Haroldo Vallado at the University of Brazil has published the study of Story's influence on the development of conflict of laws in the Latin American countries;[3] and the writer, using the materials available at the University of California at Los Angeles, has compiled and edited Story's anonymous law articles from the first edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana* (1829–1833). These law articles, which are known as THE JOSEPH STORY SERIES, are being published in various law reviews and legal journals in the United States.[4] These are the principal investigations of the Joseph Story materials which are either underway or for which results were disclosed during the past year.[5]

It has been more than 100 years since a biography was written on the life and work of Joseph Story. The two-volume work entitled *The Life and Letters of Joseph Story*, published in 1851 by William Wetmore Story, is insufficient—it consists, for the most part, of a chronological arrangement and printing of Justice Story's correspondence, but many important letters are omitted and there are a number of significant gaps in the other materials.[6] The volume known as *The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story*, published in 1852 also by William Wetmore Story, is simply a collection of speeches and writings published elsewhere. Most of the papers contained in this volume are also reprinted in a previous collection which was prepared in 1835 by Justice Story himself.[7] The law review articles deal mostly with Story's contributions to specialized areas of the law. An adequate account of the life and work of Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story has, therefore, never been written.

A large part of Justice Story's life was devoted to writing about the law. His son, William Wetmore Story, declared:

"In quantity, all other authors in the English Law, and Judges, must yield to him the palm. The labors of Coke, Eldon, and Mansfield, among Judges, are not to be compared to his in amount. And no jurist, in the common law, can be measured with him, in extent and variety of labor."[8]

Justice Story's most productive period, insofar as legal treatise writing is concerned, was the years from about 1830 until his death in 1845. In these 15 years, he published nine

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Nadelmann, "De l'organisation et de la jurisprudence des Cours de Justice aux États-Unis d'Amerique, par M. Joseph Story," *Boston University Law Review*, Vol. 30, pp. 382–94 (June, 1950).

[2] Typewritten list entitled *Joseph Story, 1779–1845*, 6 pp.

[3] See Vallado, "The Influence of Joseph Story on Latin American Rules of Conflict of Laws," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. 3, pp. 27 ff. (Winter, 1954).

[4] Published already are: "Joseph Story's Anonymous Law Articles," *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 52, pp. 869–84 (April, 1954); "Three Essays on the Law by Joseph Story," *Southern California Law Review*, Vol. 28, pp. 19–32 (Dec., 1954); "Joseph Story's Essay on Natural Law," *Oregon Law Review*, Vol. 34, pp. 88–105 (Feb., 1955); "Joseph Story on Capital Punishment," *California Law Review*, Vol. 43, pp. 76–84 (March, 1955); "Joseph Story's Essay on Domicil," *Boston University Law Review*, Vol. 35, pp. 215–24 (April, 1955); "Joseph Story's *Encyclopedia Americana* Law Articles," *Law Library Journal*, Vol. 48, pp. 117–35 (May, 1955); "Joseph Story on the Common Law Rules of Evidence," *Vanderbilt Law Review* (Dec., 1955). All of the remaining articles in THE JOSEPH STORY SERIES are in manuscript form and will appear in various issues of the *Law Library Journal* during the coming years.

[5] A comparative study of the views of Lord Mansfield and Justice Story on the conflict of laws is being prepared by Professor William R. Leslie at the University of Michigan. Note also William R. Leslie, "The Influence of Joseph Story's Theory of the Conflict of Laws on Constitutional Nationalism," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 35, pp. 203–20 (Sept., 1948).

[6] Only four of the 46 Joseph Story letters deposited in the Francis Lieber Manuscript Collection, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California, are included in this work. These unpublished Story letters are being edited by the writer and Professor Mortimer Schwartz of the University of Oklahoma. They will be published shortly in a small volume entitled *The Story-Lieber Letters* (1829–1845).

[7] See, Joseph Story, *Miscellaneous Writings, Literary, Critical, Juridical, and Practical* (Boston, 1835).

[8] *The Life and Letters of Joseph Story* (Boston, 1851), Vol. 2, p. 567.

major treatises or commentaries on the law[9] and a series of 18 anonymous law articles in the first edition of the *Encylcopedia Americana*. Some of the latter have been found to contain material outside the scope of Justice Story's best-known writings; others are in the nature of restatements or interpretations of Blackstone's discussion of the same topics; all are of value in completing the record of Joseph Story's influence on law and political thought. —JOHN C. HOGAN, *The RAND Corporation*.

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The Prefects and Provincial France. By Brian Chapman. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1955. Pp. 246. $4.25.)

The English author of the *Introduction to French Local Government* has followed up his earlier work with a book explaining "in outline the law and practice of the prefectoral system as it now exists." The subject is treated comprehensively for the first time; while students of France have a passing acquaintance with the familiar figure of the prefect, relatively little has been known about his exact position and still less has been known about the lower ranks of the prefectoral corps.

The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is an historical summary of the role of the corps. The second chapter briefly describes the prefect's formal powers, functions, and relations to other officials. The next three chapters deal in turn with the three ranks of the corps, the chef de cabinet, the sub-prefect, and the prefect, a procedure designed successfully to present a cumulative picture of the administrative machinery the prefect directs.

In the last and longest chapter, Mr. Chapman shows that the tasks of the prefect are varied, difficult, sometimes conflicting, and often unpredictable. The prefect occupies a unique position at the crossroads of politics and administration and of local and national government, and he deals with elected and administrative officials on the communal, departmental, and national levels, as well as with the public. Consequently, he not only exercises power and influence in his own right, but is subject to a variety of interests and pressures which necessarily affect the conduct

of his office. These and other aspects of the prefect's position are skillfully analyzed, and the reader will find much interesting information about such matters as the appointment of prefects, the composition of the corps, and the part that the prefect can play in settling industrial disputes and in "calculating" elections.

Mr. Chapman concludes on two notes. The first is that "an observer might think that the Prefectoral Corps is a body of men of which the French could, with one or two reasonable reservations, be justifiably proud." The second is that because of the prefectoral system there may be less administrative centralization in France than is often believed. Mr. Chapman states that in Great Britain the growth of national services has resulted in a transfer of powers from local to national authorities because of the lack of adequate administrative machinery at the local level, while France may be able to avoid extreme centralization because it has such machinery in the prefecture.

The accumulation of powers by a national official operating locally is not in itself a virtue, of course; it becomes one only if those powers are exercised in accordance with local needs and desires. Mr. Chapman rightly makes no claim that the French system fully displays this virtue. His book suggests, however, that some measure of local control over the prefect is achieved through informal methods. The prefect is not legally responsible to any local elected body, but he lives among the people of his administrative area, he cannot assume the anonymity of the ordinary bureaucrat, and it contributes to the successful conduct of his office if he maintains good relations with the elected local authorities and the members of Parliament from his department. It would be interesting and useful to have more information on the extent to which the prefect responds to local desires in his administrative capacity. One hopes that Mr. Chapman is preparing the book on the French administrative system to which his excellent work seems to be leading him next.—Roy Pierce, *Smith College.*

European and Comparative Government. By Robert G. Neumann. (New York, Toronto, and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 2nd ed. 1955. Pp. xiii, 818. $6.50.)

This widely used textbook retains the form and structure of the first edition, which was issued in 1951; it includes Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and a fifth section devoted to a functional or comparative analysis. But the work has been brought up to date and many parts have been re-written; within the sections this has meant some important shifts of emphasis. The historical introductions have been retained but have been somewhat shortened to compensate for the more detailed treatment of political parties.

Annuaire Européen, Vol. 1. Publié sous les auspices du Conseil de l'Europe. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff. 1955. Pp. xxv, 584.)

The work is jointly edited by B. Landheer and A. H. Robertson, partly in English and partly in French. In the main the first volume covers the period 1948–1953, with the second volume to cover 1954. The material relates particularly to the O.E.E.C., the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community, the Brussels Treaty Organization, and the Northern Council, and to the following specialized organizations: Conference of Ministers of Transport, Conference on Agricultural Markets, and the Organization for Nuclear Research. There is a considerable bibliographical section.—J.B.C.

Australian Government and Politics: An Introductory Survey. By J. D. B. Miller. (London: Gerald Duckworth & Company, Ltd. 1954. Pp. 249. 15s.)

Here is a long-needed volume designed to acquaint the student with the structure and working of Australian government as a whole. Although a number of specialized studies have been made of various elements of the Australian system, this is the first effort to encompass the entire system in a single work. Not that the whole story is told; obviously much has had to be omitted. But here at least is an effort to see and describe the entire system and to present it in usable form to the conscientious but busy reader. The volume is of modest size, which is a pity and which has made the author's task the more difficult. But he has performed it well and the result is highly useful. Indeed, it is surprising how much he has managed to include—the cultural and historical background, the federal system, parliament and parties, politics and administration, local government, even foreign affairs. Well written, temperate, and scholarly, Mr. Miller's book deserves a place on the "required" list.—W.S.L.

British Government, 1914–1953: Select Docu-

ments. By G. H. L. Le May. (London: Methuen & Company, Ltd. 1955. Pp. xvi, 416. 25s.)

Here is a worthy attempt to do for the recent years of British politics what others have done for the past. The collection includes more than 100 documents—statutes, white papers, excerpts from Hansard, court decisions, party conferences, and more besides. It represents a prodigious effort by the editor and will be both interesting and highly useful to all students of modern British governmental affairs.

General Election, May 26, 1955: List of Candidates. (London: The Press Association, 1955. Pp. 120. 17s./6d.)

The 630 constituencies for England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland are arranged in alphabetical order. Five have been added under the redistribution scheme approved in 1955; 410 constituencies have not been changed. There are about 34,880,968 names on the electoral rolls.—J.B.C.

France Against Herself: A Perceptive Study of France's Past, Her Politics, and Her Unending Crises. By Herbert Luethy. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1955. Pp. xi, 476. $6.50.)

The publisher has served the English-reading students of French politics well in providing them with an English version of this book which had been first published in German in Switzerland under the expressive title *Frankreich's Uhren gehen anders.* Combining a well-rounded erudition in French history with 10 years of his own observations in France proper, the author, a Swiss political commentator, unfolds the massive panorama, complex and often distressing, of France's society, her politics and economics to the end of 1953. Although he finds France to be rather a "confusing and unintelligible jumble of contradictions," he searches again and again for reasons for the French political and economic stagnation and *immobilisme.* He seems to find the chief explanation in the French personality which "clings with the greatest cunning and tenacity to its habits, including its bad habits." Despite a definite pessimistic overtone, Mr. Luethey does find that since 1954 "forces of a slow, organic regeneration . . . have been at work beneath the stagnant surface."—E.T.

Le Régime Politique Français. By François Goguel. (Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 1955. Pp. 138.)

After briefly summarizing the basic features of the parliamentary régime of the Third Republic, the author describes in a series of short chapters the governmental system of the Fourth Republic, in terms both of its constitutional framework and of actual practice as affected by various extra-constitutional factors, such as pressure groups and French political and economic habits. In a concluding chapter he suggests three main ways in which the system could be improved: (1) the abandonment of the proportional electoral system in favor of a majority system permitting electoral associations of parties in the run-off election; (2) unconditional power to dissolve the National Assembly; and (3) certain changes in the parliamentary procedure, in particular with regard to the committee system.

Le Travail Parlementaire: En France et à L'Étranger. By Francois Goguel, with the aid of Georges Galichon, Dorothy Pickles, Murray S. Stedman, and P.-H. Coeytaux. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1955. Pp. 200.)

A series of reports presented to a round-table conference organized by the French Political Science Association in July, 1954, together with a summary of the discussions that followed. The papers deal with parliamentary methods and procedures in France, Britain, Switzerland, Italy, and the United States and are introduced by a general synthetic essay by M. Goguel.

German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism. By Carl E. Schorske. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. xiii, 358. $5.50.)

A competent and painstaking analysis of the internal conflicts which developed within the German Social Democratic party during the period 1905 to 1917. The disputes over the questions of nationalism and imperialism, pacifism and "defense of the fatherland," the use or nonuse of the general strike, the attitude to be taken on the suffrage question are discussed by the author and related to the positions assumed in regard to them by the various factions and leaders within the party. Emerging from the study is the conclusion that the German Social Democratic party was fundamentally revisionary in practice and dominated by the Conservative Trade Union organizations. For the Marxist revolutionaries the party proved a disappointment and they were ultimately forced to withdraw from it,

thus creating the schism expressed in the appearance of the Independent Socialist party. A useful bibliography is appended. The work merits attention from those who tend to lump together loosely Social Democracy, revolutionary Marxism, and Russian communism, thus completely misinterpreting the significance and nature of the Social Democratic movement.

Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia. By Jozo Tomasevich. (Stanford: Stanford University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 743. $7.50.)

After reviewing the main economic and political developments of the area prior to 1918, the author devotes the bulk of this book to an exhaustive analysis of the conditions of the Yugoslav peasantry between the two world wars. The study is based on both Yugoslav and non-Yugoslav sources and a thorough bibliography is appended.

Iberoamerica: su evolución política, socio-económica, cultural e internacional. By Jesus de Galindez. (New York: La Americas Publishing Co. 1954. Pp. xv, 620. $10.00.)

The contents of the volume on the historic evolution of "Iberoamerican" (i.e., Latin American) civilization are encyclopedic in scope and reflect a deep understanding of the peoples and problems of Latin America.

Derecho Constitucional. Segunda Edición. By Ramon Infiesta. (La Habana, Cuba: Impreso de Editorial Lex. 1954. Pp. xvii, 456.)

This volume, intended as a textbook in Cuban constitutional law, is composed roughly of two parts: part one deals with the general theories of constitutionalism, and part two with Cuban constitutionalism. The latter contains a running commentary on the Cuban Constitution (1940), article by article.

Reglamento de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación. (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nación. 1955. Pp. 78.)

The present edition of the rules of the Argentine Senate was approved in the session of September 28, 1954, replacing the edition approved on May 19, 1949. The new edition has 186 articles as compared with 199 in the previous edition. Among the changes noted are the reduction in the number of the standing committees from 22 to 16 and the provision for the formation of bicameral, or joint, congressional committees.—J.B.C.

Catálogo de las Memórias de Ministros de Estado del Perú. By the Departamento de Publicaciones Oficiales of the Biblioteca Nacional. (Lima, Peru: Boletín de la Biblioteca Nacional, no. 15, for Dec. 1952. Printed 1954. Pp. 29–64.)

This catalog of the "memorias" of the ministries of Peru from the time of independence to the present is arranged by ministry and has at the end an index to the names of those presenting the "memorias." The catalog will not only be a help to those wishing to use these important publications, but may well prove to be the forerunner of a much-needed check list or catalog of all Peruvian official publications.—J.B.C.

O Sistema do Veto nos Estados Unidos: A Receptividade Brasileira. By Octacilio Alecrim. (Rio de Janeiro, Braxil: Jornal Do Commercio. 1954. Pp. 200.)

This is a rather detailed discussion of the exercise of the executive veto of congressional acts in the United States. Although most of the study is confined to the origins, nature, and use of the veto power in the United States, the author frequently alludes to the operation of the veto power under the various constitutions of Brazil.

Roman Civilization: Selected Readings. Volume II. The Empire. Edited with Introduction and Notes by Naphtali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 652. $7.50.)

A book of readings covering Roman history from the Augustan Age to that of Constantine. Excerpts are included from Roman public documents and the writings of classic authors. Areas covered include administration, economic life, social, cultural, religious, and legal problems, military organization, and governmental structures.

Report of the Congress Village Panchayat Committee. (New Delhi: All India Congress Committee. 1954. Pp. 60, lxxxviii. Rs. 1-8-0.)

The Village Panchayat Committee was appointed by the Congress Working Committee on May 23, 1954, and the report was submitted on July 20, 1954. S. N. Agarwal was the convener of the Committee. The first point of the summary of recommendations is as follows: "The Panchayat system provides a

sound basis for the establishment of healthy democratic traditions in India. Its development should be encouraged and fostered by the State to enable the masses of our people to participate in the business of administration and other aspects of community life, social, economic, and judicial."—J.B.C.

The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East. EDITED BY HARVEY P. HALL. (Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute. 1955. Pp. 118. $2.00.)

A collection of 12 addresses delivered at the 1955 Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs; contributors include T. Cuyler Young, George Lenczowski, George V. Allen, and Jefferson Caffrey.

Les Partis Politiques Marocains. BY ROBERT RÉZETTE. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1955. Pp. xviii, 409.)

A study of Moroccan parties and of Moroccan government in general with some attention to the economic, social, and other factors that have led to the present crisis.

The African Awakening. BY BASIL DAVIDSON. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1955. Pp. 262. $2.50.)

By way of a close examination of the Congo and Angola, the author here seeks an explanation for the general malaise of Africans throughout the continent. A summary of his own observations and the problems they disclosed by a seasoned traveler and student of Africa south of the Sahara.

The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy. TRANSLATED BY EDEN AND CEDAR PAUL. ADDITIONAL CHAPTERS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES BY JAN SLAVIK. TRANSLATED BY W. R. AND Z. LEE. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co. 1955. Pp. xxii, 480. $14.00.)

A new edition of a book which has for a long time been considered as a classic on Russian thought of the pre-Communist era. Incorporated in the new edition are materials on the 1917 Revolution, added previously to the Czech editions of the book by Jan Slavik, a noted Czech student of Russian history and philosophy.

Soviet Military Law and Administration. BY HAROLD J. BERMAN AND MIROSLAV KERNER. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. xiv, 208. $4.00.)

This is a thorough analysis of the internal administrative structure of the Soviet military establishment and its relation to the Soviet state, and of the detailed operations of Soviet military law and tribunals. The authors have based their study upon Russian documentary sources and cases heard before the military tribunals. While primarily a legal study the book has implications for the political and social scientist. As to use to which military law has been put by the government, the authors conclude "Instead of giving law to the people, it uses law to transform the people. The transforming power of the law which it uses is seriously diminished, however, by the fact that the leadership remains the master, rather than the servant, of the legal order."

Documents on Soviet Military Law and Administration. EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY HAROLD J. BERMAN AND MIROSLAV KERNER. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. vii, 164.)

A collection of laws governing the Soviet armed forces, military courts and their procedure, and other matters pertinent to military discipline and military administration. Added are reports on several cases tried in Soviet military courts.

Satellite Generals: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere. BY ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL WITH COLLABORATION OF GEORGE K. SCHUELLER, ROBERT H. BILLIGMEIER, CARY FISHER, PAUL KATONA, CHENG YUAN, JANUSZ K. ZAWODNY. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1955. Pp. vi, 165. $1.75.)

This is a study in elite analysis applied to the general officers of the Soviet satellite states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Roumania, Hungary, and China. The study is useful in that it makes available biographical materials not generally accessible and because it points up the problems confronting the Soviet leaders in regard to the building up of the satellite armies. Not the least of these difficulties is the one of assuring that commanding officers are both competent and loyal. The conclusions drawn by the authors will interest students concerned with analyzing trends and future potentials behind the iron curtain.

Economic Planning in Communist China. BY RONALD HSIA. (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1955. Pp. vi, 89. $1.25.)

A short summary based almost entirely on materials from Chinese Communist sources, and consequently not as specific as might be desired, although through no fault of the author's. This study was originally undertaken at M.I.T., and is a successor to an earlier short work on Chinese Communist price control.

The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society. By Chung-li Chang, with Introduction by Franz Michael. (Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1955. Pp. xxi, 250. $5.75.)

A new study of the role of the gentry class in imperial China's last century, with considerable use of statistics to indicate the size of the class and its internal gradations, and with much attention to the examination system.

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WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS*

Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs: Volume I, Articles 1–22 of the Charter. PREPARED BY THE UNITED NATIONS. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Pp. xi, 742. $3.50.)

Here is the first of a series of five volumes (of tremendous size and limitless utility) devoted to an analysis of the meaning and working of the United Nations Charter. Authorized by the General Assembly in 1953, the repertory has been produced by the secretariat, in part for general information and in part as preparation for a charter review conference. If, as is suggested by the preface, the work can be supplemented annually, students of the United Nations will have an extremely valuable reference work on all phases of U.N. affairs. Meanwhile we have an exhaustive commentary and a rich source of auxiliary materials on the first 10 years. This first huge volume covers only the first 22 articles of the Charter; the other four volumes are promised for late 1955.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1938. Volume I: General. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1955. Pp. viii, 1009.)

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1938. Volume II: The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1955. Pp. vii, 1136.)

Initial volumes covering the last "peaceful" years (Volumes III and IV on the Far East already have been released). The first surveys general political developments in Europe with special attention to the closing months of the Spanish Civil War, the annexation of Austria, the growing crisis over German demands upon Czechoslovakia, and the fateful meeting at Munich. The second is a potpourri dealing with aspects of U. S. relations with over 30 different states and territories, many entries reflecting the developing tension and unrest.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1939. Volume III. The Far East. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1955. Pp. iii, 883. $4.00.)

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1939. Volume IV. The Far East, The Near East and Africa. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1955. Pp. v, 905. $3.50.)

All of Volume III and the bulk of Volume IV are concerned with the undeclared war of Japan against China, political developments within Japan, internal Chinese affairs, and the continuing interest of the United States in the fate of China.

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. *Tratados internacionales. Tomo 1.* (Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Imprenta Calderón. 1954. Pp. 526.)

The first volume of the new official treaty collection of Honduras includes treaties and related documents of the colonial period affecting Honduras, treaties of the Federal Republic of Central America, and bilateral treaties of Honduras with Costa Rica. According to the final note signed by Ernesto Alvarado García, "jefe de la Sección de Tratados y Organismos Internacionales," and dated October 15, 1954, the orthography of the original documents has been preserved, and all the treaties in this volume have only a historical value. Plans are made for the publication of the other treaties of Honduras in six more volumes. The last previous official treaty collection of Honduras had been published by the Foreign Office in 1913–1915 in two volumes, and had included only the treaties in force relating to Central America and to North and South America.—J.B.C.

Toward Our Common American Destiny. BY JOHN M. CABOT. (Medford, Massachusetts: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Pp. xvii, 214. $3.50.)

This is a volume of speeches and interviews by Ambassador John Moors Cabot, career diplomat, while Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1953–1954. The belief is expressed that the unsolved problems of inter-American relations have shifted from the political to the economic and trade field. Although the United States must step up both economic assistance and technical assistance, Ambassador Cabot believes that "our primary contribution to the development of our sister republics must come through trade."

Carlos de Alvear, Man of Revolution: The Diplomatic Career of Argentina's First Minister to

* The review of FELIX GROSS, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, in the September, 1955 issue of THIS REVIEW, Vol. 49, p. 902, was written by Frederick H. Hartmann, University of Florida.

the United States. By Thomas B. Davis, Jr. (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 1955. Pp. vii, 305. $5.75.)

General Carlos de Alvear, a veteran of the Argentine War of Independence, served as his country's diplomatic representative to the United States during the period 1824–1852. Despite his long residence here, he became convinced that the great enemy of his people was the United States. This biographer believes that the ill-founded warnings of Alvear laid the basis for the traditional Argentine antipathy for the United States.

Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars–28 juin). Notes de l'Officier Interprete, Paul Mantoux. Vols. I and II. (Paris: Centre National de la Récherche Scientifique. 1955. Pp. 521, 579. 1800 frs. per vol.)

Interpreter's notes of the conversations among the Big Four during the crucial final three months of the World War I peace negotiations—not verbatim but rather complete. Mantoux presents this as a more complete summary than that published earlier by Sir Maurice Hankey but has supplemented his notes with some of the latter's. The first volume covers the period to the delivery of the peace terms to the German delegation; the second covers the period to the signature of the Versailles treaty.

Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg. By Whitney R. Harris. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press. 1954. Pp. xxxvii, 608. $6.00.)

Nuremberg: German Views of the War Trials. Edited by Wilbourn E. Benton and Georg Grimm. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press. 1955. Pp. vii, 211. $4.00.)

Although both books deal with the Nuremberg trial, they are utterly different. Mr. Harris, who had served as counsel on Mr. Justice Jackson's staff at Nuremberg, uses the evidence brought out in the trial to piece together a detailed, well-documented, but ghastly story of Nazi crimes. Only a relatively small part of his book, though by no means an unimportant one, deals with the legal evaluation of the trial. The 12 essays which constitute the bulk of the second book are devoted, on the other hand, to a legal analysis of the trials by various German authorities, including a number of defense counsel for the convicted Nazi War criminals.

Modern Far Eastern International Relations. By Harley Farnsworth Macnair and Donald F. Lach. (Toronto, New York, and London: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 2nd ed. 1955. Pp. xiii, 777. $10.00.)

A considerably reorganized and rewritten new edition of a well-known text, the final section of which devotes almost 200 pages to Japan, China, and Southeast Asia since World War II.

Promoting Economic Development: The United States and Southern Asia. By Edward S. Mason. (Claremont, Cal.: Claremont College. 1955. Pp. 83. $2.75.)

Three short chapters (the first two were prepared as lectures) by the Dean of Harvard's School of Public Administration, who served during 1954 as a consultant to the Planning Board of the government of Pakistan.

South-East Asia between Two Worlds. By Tibor Mende. (New York: Library Publishers. 1955. Pp. viii, 338. $3.95.)

Personal journalism, delightful style, heavy on economic problems and policies, and devoted in the main to Indonesia, Burma, and Pakistan; an eloquent concluding section, "Southeast Asia: People against the Past," is a summary of what really goes on in Asia and what—if anything—others can do about it.

The Boxer Catastrophe. By Chester C. Tan. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. ix, 276. $4.50.)

A new study of the Boxer Rebellion, set against an examination of China's internal situation, and with an attempt to trace its international implications and repercussions; based in the main on Chinese sources.

International Migrations. By Donald R. Taft and Richard Robbins. (New York: The Ronald Press Company. 1955. Pp. viii, 670.)

This book undertakes, primarily, to present an historical account of all human migration in the entire world during the modern period. Secondarily, it attempts to explain and evaluate these movements from the standpoint of sociology.

Atomic Weapons and Armies. By F. O. Miksche. (New York. Frederich A. Praeger. 1955. Pp. 222. $5.00.)

Speculation on the possible tactical uses of atomic weapons, and probable effects of such weapons on the organization of armies and on

the methods of modern war. The author holds strongly to the view that the early days of atomic war will be decisive, and further suggests that even if atomic weapons are not used the nature of modern warfare will change to cope with the possibility of the use of such weapons.

Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities. Edited by F. Bowen Evans. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1955. Pp. xiii, 222. $3.00.)

A handbook and summary of Communist propaganda activities in various regions throughout the world. An analysis and identification of Communist front organizations, publications, and broadcast activities is given and an attempt is made to indicate the dominant themes of Soviet propaganda at various stages in its development.

The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace. By J. L. Brierly. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 5th ed. 1955. Pp. ix, 331. $3.00.)

This is a revised edition of Brierly's well-known short introduction to international law.

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. By Peter M. Blau. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1955. Pp. ix, 269. $5.00.)

The thumping title that the publisher has bestowed upon this book is unjust to its modest claims. Mr. Blau, a sociologist disciple of Robert Merton, was afforded the opportunity to observe "interpersonal relationships of civil servants" first in a unit of 24 persons: a division of a state employment service serving the clothing industry in a large city; then in a district office, with 18 members, of an unnamed federal enforcement agency, presumably the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. He spent about three months in each office, was apparently well enough received to elicit frank statements, and was able to apply "interlocking research procedures," using direct observation, documents, and interviews.

Mr. Blau's two case studies reveal sensitive observation. He discovers freshly that rules do not always work out as expected, that the rank-and-file worker can subtly modify or subvert them. He was particularly struck by the introduction of statistical performance controls in the Employment Service just before the period of his observation. In the jargon of his patron saint, this had the "functional" effect of minimizing scoldings by the supervisor, because "the facts speak for themselves"; the knowledge that the supervisor had the statistics led to self-improvement of output. But it had various "dysfunctional" effects, such as overemphasizing quick placements at the cost of time-consuming job counseling and stressing competitiveness at the cost of social cohesion. It impressed him particularly that the performance control had an indirect, unanticipated effect of minimizing racial discrimination in the reception of clients —more effectively, probably, than any direct order against discrimination.

He noted the widespread tendency in the enforcement agency to violate the explicit rule not to discuss cases with peers, but only with the supervisor. He describes in detail the "office parties" and their role in strengthening social cohesion.

Mr. Blau's observations convince him that there are factors in bureaucracy that favor changes in methods, goals, and structure. He outlines five of them. This finding is not consistent with the views of Max Weber and Mises with which he starts; by page 202 he is ready to question whether principles based on the Germany of Weber's time are applicable in the United States today.

Students of public administration will welcome fresh insights into human relations from well-trained, sensitive students from other social sciences. But it is distressing to find only five references to works by political scientists in a bibliography of 60 items that is rich in anthropology and psychoanalysis, as well as sociology. Mary Parker Follett wrote on "The Illusion of Final Authority" in 1926; introductory textbooks in public administration and in management traverse much of the material in Mr. Blau's chapter on "The Exercise of Authority." One can applaud the emergence of political sociology and still wish that there were a little more political science in it.—Charles S. Ascher, *Brooklyn College.*

Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic Setting.

By Dwaine Marvick. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1954. Pp. viii, 150. $2.25.)

This monograph, based on data obtained from a survey of some 200 higher-level employees of one federal agency conducted in 1950 by the Survey Research Center, Human Relations Program, University of Michigan, is concerned with the career perspectives of "institutionalists, hybrids, and specialists" composing the personnel interviewed. Limited in scope, this exploratory study points toward the need for further research into the basic problem of reconciling organizational and individual interests and the specific dangers to the former which may arise from the subjective attitudes of different career types.

Reflections on the Failure of Socialism. By Max Eastman. (New York: The Devin-Adair Company. 1955. Pp. 127. $2.75.)

This is a collection of essays by Max Eastman published after his break with Marxism in the 1930's. The introductory chapter summarizes the author's intellectual pilgrimage from Marx to Hayek and constitutes the most interesting portion of the book. The remaining chapters, written in the easy style for which the author is famous, deal with specific problems and exemplify the socio-economic philosophy which now characterizes Eastman's thinking. The book is an illuminating contribution to the literature of the disillusioned Left and merits serious consideration.

In the Twilight of Socialism: A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria. By Joseph Buttinger. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1953. Pp. x, 577.)

Joseph Buttinger, whose party name was Gustav Richter, was chairman of the Central Committee of the Austrian Revolutionary Socialists and later of the Foreign Board of Austrian Socialists. In the above work, which was roundly criticized by Buttinger's German and Austrian Socialist friends when he circulated it among them in manuscript form, the author gives a history of the Austrian socialist movement between 1934 and 1938 and discusses the ideological conflicts and the rivalries between the various Socialist leaders in Austria and between the Austrian Socialists and the Socialist Foreign Bureau at Brno. It is the most important volume on the Austrian Revolutionary Socialist movement which has thus far been published.—J.R.

Theses in the Social Sciences: An International Analytical Catalogue of Unpublished Doctorate Theses, 1940–50. (New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. 236. $1.25.)

Describes—in English and French—3215 unpublished theses prepared since 1940 in more than 20 countries. The preface gives information, by country, about requirements for doctorates and in some cases, references to national lists of unpublished theses. Each entry includes the author's name, the title, university, degree, language in which written, and number of pages. The entries are grouped under the following headings (with the number of these described given in parentheses): sociology (110); social psychology (63); population, demography and human geography (73); political science (228); economics (1278); law (797); international law and relations (294); administrative sciences (219); education (100); and cultural anthropology and ethnology (53). The volume includes a number of tables and indices, showing subject, author, and language.

The Tyranny of Progress: Reflections on the Origins of Sociology. By Albert Salomon. (New York: The Noonday Press. 1955. Pp. 115. $3.00.)

A provocative essay, the thesis of which is that Saint Simon and the early French sociologists are the intellectual and emotional precursors of totalitarianism. Through insistence on application of scientific objectivity and on messianic hope for the future, these men influenced Hegel, Marx, and others to draw plans for a regimented society, the argument runs.

Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations. By Georg Simmel. Translated by Kurt W. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1955. Pp. 195. $3.50.)

Translations of two important sections of the German Philosopher's *Soziologie* by two scholars from Germany. The work argues that conflict is the primary organizing force, and that change is the normal state of human society.

Debates with Historians. By Pieter Geyl. (Groningen and Djakarta: J. B. Wolters; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1955. Pp. viii, 241. $12.40.)

Thirteen essays, eleven printed heretofore in English, on historiography, including—

among others—chapters on Ranke, Macaulay, Carlyle, Michelet, Sorokin, and Toynbee.

Studying Your Community. By Roland L. Warren. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1955. Pp. xii, 385. $3.00.)

A comprehensive working manual for those interested in the study and understanding of a particular community; a practical and suggestive guide for lay individuals and groups and possibly of value to professional people attracted into areas outside their special competence.

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NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

1956 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION

The 1956 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association will be held September 6–8, 1956, in Washington, D.C. The Chairman of the Program Committee is Professor Earl Latham of Amherst College; the Chairman of the Committee on Local Arrangements is The Reverend James B. Horigan, S.J., of Georgetown University.

Fifty-first Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association: Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of The American Political Science Association met at 9:30 A.M., September 6, 1955 at the University Memorial Center, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. President Charles McKinley called the meeting to order. The following officers and members of the Council were present: Charles McKinley, President; Harold D. Lasswell, President Elect; Charles S. Hyneman, Vice President; Harvey C. Mansfield, Secretary; Edward H. Litchfield, Treasurer; Hugh L. Elsbree, Managing Editor, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW; Manning J. Dauer, Arnaud Leavelle, Dayton D. McKean, J. Roland Pennock, C. Herman Pritchett, Gabriel A. Almond, Stephen K. Bailey, Gwendolen M. Carter, Samuel J. Eldersveld, Avery Leiserson, Norman Palmer; Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director; Ken Hechler, Associate Director; and the following Past Presidents of the Association: Pendleton Herring, Peter H. Odegard, James K. Pollock, Arthur W. Macmahon, John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, and William Anderson. Also present at the Council Meeting were the new nominees for the Council and the nominees for Vice President and President Elect.

The Council commended the Committee on Local Arrangements for the extensive work which it had done in making the Boulder Meeting a success. A resolution of thanks to the Local Arrangements Committee received unanimous approval.

The Executive Director reported that the name of the Congressional Interne Program had been changed to the Program of Congressional Fellowships. Five journalists and five teachers or graduate students in political science, comprising the group, will report to the Association on November 1, 1955. The work of the Congressional Fellows has been so superior that there has been a widespread desire by members of Congress to hire the Fellows after the completion of the program; four out of ten of the Congressional Fellows from last year's group have secured positions and will remain on Capitol Hill with Senators and members of the House with whom they worked during the program.

The Executive Director reported that the long efforts of the Association to establish a program for more adequate reporting of election statistics had finally come to fruition. A project was designed by the Association and received a grant from the Edgar B. Stern Family Fund, to be administered by the Governmental Affairs Institute under the direction of Richard M. Scammon. It is expected that the first volume will be published in the spring of 1956, after which a biennial volume is contemplated.

The Edgar B. Stern Family Fund has also made a grant to the Governmental Affairs Institute for a study of the problems of Metropolitan Areas, following the submission of a project design by a special committee of the Association. The study of Metropolitan Areas will be under the direction of Luther Gulick.

The Executive Director reported on the meeting of the Third World Congress of Political Science held in Stockholm, August 21–27, at which he and James K. Pollock had represented the Association. The International

Political Science Association elected James K. Pollock as its next President for the term 1955–1958. Considerable support was voiced in the meeting of the IPSA Executive Committee for a round table to be held in the United States just before or after the 1956 Annual Meeting of the Association.

The Executive Director reported that as of the time of the Annual Meeting there were 5,526 members—the lowest point which will probably be reached after ruthlessly "separating" people from the Association rolls when their dues became delinquent. The Executive Director mentioned that there was a heavy concentration of Association membership along the East Coast, and it was hoped that during the coming year steps could be taken to increase the membership in areas where it is low.

The Executive Director reported that an Association committee of political scientists and journalists (including Ernest K. Lindley, Roscoe Drummond, and Ralph Casey), with the assistance of a grant by the Poynter Fund, had developed a proposal for a series of awards to young journalists for distinguished reporting in state and local public affairs. The proposal includes a summer seminar for approximately 12 young newspaper men and women from the midwestern area, who will be selected on the basis of the best newspaper accounts of some aspect of state or local public affairs. The seminar, if funds are available, will be conducted by Ralph Casey, Director of the Minnesota School of Journalism.

In the period from October 1, 1954 to the time of the Annual Meeting, the Executive Director reported that the Personnel Placement Service had filled 42 positions out of 68 academic, research, and governmental positions reported to the Association. A number of new contacts were developed with government agencies and private research institutions, particularly with the U.S.I.A. and the International Cooperation Administration. During the past year, the Executive Committee voted to institute a $2.00 registration fee, to go into effect after the Boulder Meeting, for members of the Personnel Placement Service. This fee will partially defray the cost of the Personnel Newsletters, postage and handling costs, and other expenses of the Personnel Placement Service. Exclusive of the cost of the staff devoted to the Placement Service, it has been estimated that the expense of this service to the Association is approximately $500 annually.

The Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Hugh L. Elsbree, reported on the work of the REVIEW during the past year. He indicated that the REVIEW receives about 5 or 6 articles for every one that it is possible to publish. This means that a good backlog of articles has been accumulated, particularly during the past few months, which will aid the transition to a new Editor.

President McKinley reported on the work of a Search Committee to select a new editor for the REVIEW, because of the resignation of Mr. Elsbree to assume new responsibilities in the Legislative Reference Service. The Search Committee, including President McKinley, President Elect Lasswell, E. E. Schattschneider, Arthur Macmahon, and C. Herman Pritchett, unanimously recommended that Harvey Mansfield be asked to serve as Editor for a term of not less than three nor more than five years, commencing approximately April 1, 1956. By motion of Mr. Bailey, seconded by Miss Carter, the Council then unanimously approved Mr. Mansfield as the next Editor of the REVIEW.

The Chairman of the Board of the Governmental Affairs Institute, Edward H. Litchfield, presented a written report on the activities of the Institute. He reported that Ralph Bunche and General Otto Nelson had been elected to Board membership during the year, and that the Executive Director and President Elect of the Association, Messrs. Kirkpatrick and Lasswell, were ex-officio members of the Board. Effective October 1, Mr. Litchfield will become Chairman of the Board, and will be replaced as President of the Institute by Luther Gulick. As thus reconstituted, the Board of Directors for 1955–1956 includes: Ralph Bunche, Taylor Cole, Luther Gulick, Evron Kirkpatrick, E. E. Schattschneider, Edward H. Litchfield, H. Philip Mettger, General Otto Nelson, Peter H. Odegard, James K. Pollock, and Roger H. Wells. During the calendar year 1955, approximately 350 individuals (governmental, political, legal, and political journalists) from 45 countries will have been programmed under the exchange of leaders contract with the Department of State. Well over 100 political scientists have cooperated in these study trips and these foreign guests have visited more than 100 colleges and universities. The Institute's analysis of the Marshall Plan, prepared by Harry Price, was published on July 11, 1955 under the title *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning*. In the early summer, the Presi-

dent's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations also published the Institute's study of the impact of grants in-aid on the political structure of the states, prepared by a group of 40 political scientists headed by Roger Wells; this study covers 25 states. As noted by the Executive Director, the Institute received grants from the Edgar B. Stern Family Fund for the development of a central election statistics service and for an exploratory study in the field of urban government. The Institute and the Association continued their efforts to raise funds for a Political Science Building to house the Association and the Institute, and succeeded in raising $34,000 for this purpose. The Institute then invested an additional $24,000 of its own funds, a building at 1726 Massachusetts Avenue was purchased, and both organizations are now occupying this building. This move has given the Association more space (at a lower total cost) than it occupied in the American Council on Education Building at 1785 Massachusetts Ave. Included in the Institute's budget for next year is a contemplated contribution to the Association of $4,500 in return for professional help and advice provided by the Association's Washington Office.

Mr. Dauer moved that a written statement be presented at the next Council Meeting clarifying the relationships between the Association and the Governmental Affairs Institute. Mr. Kirkpatrick reviewed the preliminary work which had been done by a joint committee of the Association and the Institute to work out such a statement of relationships. Mr. Litchfield then seconded Mr. Dauer's motion, which received the unanimous approval of the Council.

Copies of the auditor's report on the financial condition of the Association were distributed to all members of the Council prior to the Treasurer's report. The Treasurer noted particularly that expenses were over $10,000 less than the 1955 budget adopted at the Chicago Annual Meeting in 1954; and that although the 1955 budget had contemplated a deficit of expenditures over income totaling somewhat over $4,500, actual income in 1955 had exceeded expenditures by more than $2,900. The Treasurer noted that a Finance Committee had been established, consisting of Beardsley Ruml, Grayson Kirk, Robert Calkins, Luther Gulick, and Mr. Litchfield as Chairman. The final report of the Committee will not be made prior to December, 1955. The Council unanimously approved the report of the auditor, and also unanimously adopted a budget for 1955–1956 with the understanding that shifts in funds from one item to another might be made by the Executive Director with approval of the Executive Committee.

Mr. Litchfield moved, Mr. Odegard seconded the motion, and the Council unanimously recommended that the staff of the National Office be given an opportunity to participate in the TIAA or such other retirement plan as was found most feasible.

The Executive Director reported on developments since the passage of the resolution at the 1954 Council Meeting "that the study of the national nominating conventions be repeated in 1956 if possible and that the Executive Director be instructed to see that planning and other necessary action to that end is undertaken." Subsequent to the 1954 meeting, the Association established a committee, chaired by Arthur Holcombe, which recommended that the study be undertaken in cooperation with The Brookings Institution. The President of The Brookings Institution at the end of the summer informed the Association that it would be impossible to undertake the study because of other commitments. Mr. Calkins advised that it would be valuable for the Association to undertake the project if the administrative and financial problems could be solved. Mr. David suggested that the Council might reaffirm its action of a year ago, might prepare for a full study of Presidential Nominating Politics in 1960, might concentrate on a state by state review of the same type as done in 1952, or might abandon the study for the time being. On a motion by Mr. Odegard, seconded by Mr. Leiserson, and unanimously adopted by the Council, the Council expressed its continuing interest in presidential nominating politics and authorized the President and Executive Committee of the Council, subject to the necessary administrative and financial resources being available, to proceed with a further study of presidential nominating politics in 1956 with such changes of design both as to scope and method as may seem feasible and desirable.

The Executive Director reported on the background of the Committee on National Security and Civil Liberties which was created following the action of the Council and Business Meeting in 1954. Mr. Anderson, the chairman of the Committee on National Security and Civil Liberties, indicated that he had had considerable correspondence with the members

of the Committee, that it had not been possible to hold a Committee meeting. Mr. Anderson reported that there was a choice which the Committee faced between taking a positive stand or indicating that this was primarily a problem for research. He read a draft resolution, and suggested that if the Council approved the resolution in principle it would furnish a basis for consideration by the Business Meeting. Some members of the Council felt there was need for change in the wording of the resolution. After considerable discussion, it was unanimously voted by the Council that the Committee on National Security and Civil Liberties be empowered to reword the draft for presentation to the Business Meeting, with the hope that sufficient copies of the revised draft could be distributed to the members at the Business Meeting.

Following the report of the Chairman of the Program Committee, President McKinley circulated a draft statement for the establishment of ground rules for the selection of readers of panel papers at the annual meeting. The President indicated that the Executive Committee had discussed the draft and there had been considerable disagreement about giving up the past practice of having the Program Committee assume full responsibility for the program content. The Council unanimously voted that this question be referred to the Executive Committee for further consideration.

The Executive Director reported that the 1956 Annual Meeting would be held in Washington D.C., in accordance with the practice of holding a meeting in Washington every three years. He further reported that the Council in 1954 had voted that the 1957 meeting be held in either New York, Philadelphia, or Cleveland.

After some discussion of the advantages of holding a meeting in some Southern city, Mr. Litchfield moved, Mr. Odegard seconded, and the Council by majority vote adopted the motion that the 1957 Annual Meeting be held in either New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, or New Orleans.

Reporting on the Woodrow Wilson Award, Mr. David Fellman indicated that 36 volumes were submitted by 29 publishers, and that the Woodrow Wilson Award Committee had met at the office of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation in New York to reach its final decision. The Woodrow Wilson Award was voted to the volume *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* by tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson. Two volumes were mentioned as warranting special mention by the Woodrow Wilson Award Committee: Leonard White, "The Jacksonians," and Don K. Price, "Government and Science."

The Executive Director reported that the Executive Committee had approved the granting of a $500 annual award in commemoration of The Reverend Leon H. Birkhead, to be presented to the author of the doctoral dissertation which has made the greatest contribution toward the understanding of the traditions, institutions or methods of democracy, or the forces threatening them. The late Reverend Birkhead was for many years the director of Friends of Democracy. The award will be presented each year at the annual meeting of the Association, and the Executive Committee recommended that no more than one dissertation could be recommended from each university for consideration by the Birkhead Award Committee. The Council voted its unanimous approval of the Birkhead Award.

The Chairman of the Committee on Nominations, Norman J. Padelford, read his report, copies of which had been distributed to all members of the Council. Mr. Padelford reported that twice as many letters were received this year in answer to appeals for nominees, as compared to last year. Forty-seven people were suggested for President Elect, 83 for Vice President and 44 as members of the Council. The Nominating Committee felt that in some respects the nominating procedure was undemocratic and gave the Association membership little feeling of participation. The Council unanimously voted to adopt the following recommendations of the Committee on Nominations: that provision be made for a meeting of the Committee on Nominations during the spring and that an item for this purpose be included in the budget; that the Association call on all departments of political science to take a more active part in proposing nominees for Association offices, by placing this item on the agenda of departmental meetings; that the constitution be amended to empower the President, in the event that an elective office holder may be unable to accept or continue in office, to fill the vacancy by appointment. By majority vote, the Council referred three other recommendations of the Committee on Nominations to the Executive Committee without prejudice: that the constitution be amended to provide dual nominations for offices other than those of President Elect and Treasurer; that the constitution be amended to provide for conducting annual election of officers by

mail ballot; and that a provision be made for the write-in of names on the ballot in the election of officers.

On motion of Mr. Pritchett, seconded by Mr. McKean, the Council unanimously approved the reappointment of Taylor Cole as a representative of the Association on the board of directors of the Social Science Research Council.

The Council discussed proposals by ex-Senator William Benton and Nelson Poynter, editor and publisher of *Congressional Quarterly* and *The St. Petersburg Times*, that the Association sponsor four annual awards to members of Congress for distinguished public service. The proposal contemplated two awards for members of the Senate and two for members of the House of Representatives—to one Republican and one Democrat in each House of Congress. Mr. Dauer commented on the effectiveness of the annual awards sponsored by *The St. Petersburg Times* to outstanding members of the Florida House and Senate. Several members of the Council raised questions about the danger of carrying forward such a proposal without a sound administrative procedure and clear criteria for selection. By motion of Mr. Hyneman, seconded by Miss Carter, the Council unanimously referred the proposals for Congressional Awards for further consideration by the Executive Committee, with the suggestion that prior to the meeting of the Executive Committee the staff of the Association furnish Senator Benton and Mr. Poynter with such advice and assistance as they may need in carrying forward this proposal.

Ralph Goldman presented a report prepared by himself and James Burns recommending that the Association proceed to secure financing for a study of the reapportionment of Congress and state legislatures. Mr. Litchfield moved that the proposal be considered by the Executive Committee with a view to designing a project, following which there should be consultation with the Executive Committee, solicitation of funds, and then a determination of how to administer the proposal. Mr. Litchfield's motion was seconded by Mr. Pritchett and received the unanimous approval of the Council.

A proposal was made by Mr. Pennock to establish an Institute of Political Research, whose major purpose would be to secure an overall view of developments in political science, spotting areas where additional research needed to be undertaken, and devising means for stimulating additional needed research. Mr. Pennock moved that his proposal be referred to the Executive Committee for consideration, Mr. Pritchett seconded the motion, and it received unanimous approval of the Council.

Mr. Odegard noted that the Executive Committee had passed a resolution to "express its deep appreciation to Dean Edward H. Litchfield for his bold and constructive leadership in securing a Political Science Building to serve as a focal point for the Political Science profession." Mr. Odegard moved that the Council take note of this resolution and record itself as in support of it, the motion was seconded by Mr. Palmer, and the Council unanimously approved.

The meeting of the Council ajourned at 6:10 P.M.

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of The American Political Science Association was held at 1:30 P.M., Friday, September 9, 1955 in the Center Ball Room of the University Memorial Center, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. The meeting was called to order by President Charles McKinley. Mr. Harvey C. Mansfield, Secretary of the Association, summarized the decisions taken by the Council at its meeting on September 6; the report was approved unanimously.

In the absence of the Treasurer, the Secretary made the financial report. At the request of Mr. Harvey Walker, the Secretary reported on the condition of the trust funds of the Association. The Business Meeting voted unanimous approval of the financial report.

Mr. William Anderson reported on the work of the Committee on National Security and Civil Liberties and asked for comments on the statement on this subject which had been mimeographed and distributed to all members attending the Business Meeting. In response to several comments concerning the statement, Mr. Anderson indicated that the Committee had been asked not only to prepare a statement of civil liberties but also to indicate the research which could be undertaken in this field. The Business Meeting then voted to table the pending statement and to authorize the Executive Committee to investigate possibilities for research in this area. The President expressed his appreciation to Mr. Anderson and the members of his committee for the

excellent work which they had done on this question.

Mr. Norman Padelford, Chairman of the Committee on Nominations, reported that his Committee had unanimously agreed on the following nominees as officers of the Association for 1955–56: President Elect: E. E. Schattschneider (Wesleyan University); Vice Presidents: Joseph P. Harris (University of California at Berkeley), Harold S. Quigley (University of Minnesota), Emmette S. Redford (University of Texas); Secretary, Harvey C. Mansfield (The Ohio State University); Treasurer, Edward H. Litchfield (Cornell University); members of the Council for two years: Weldon Cooper (University of Virginia), Paul T. David (Brookings Institution), Herbert Emmerich (Public Administration Clearing House), Claude E. Hawley (U. S. Information Agency), Norman L. Hill (University of Nebraska), Thomas P. Jenkins (University of California at Los Angeles), Louise Overacker (Wellesley College), Charles B. Robson (University of North Carolina). The Business Meeting voted unanimous approval of the officers nominated by the Committee on Nominations.

The President asked the new President Elect, Mr. Schattschneider, to come to the platform, following which he turned the gavel over to the incoming President, Mr. Lasswell.

The Annual Business Meeting was adjourned at 3:30 P.M.

The International Committee of Comparative Law has amended its charter to change its name to the International Association of Legal Science and to broaden the scope of its work. The Executive Bureau of the Association met at Istanbul, September 5–10, 1955, to prepare the colloquium planned for Barcelona in mid-September, 1956. The impact of a Western system of law upon the culture of an underdeveloped country will be the major theme of discussion at Barcelona. Turkey has been chosen as the case study. The Faculty of Law of the University of Istanbul will cooperate in this study. Another theme planned for discussion at Barcelona will be "Audi Alteram Partem," and a third will be a consideration of the factors involved in the selection of a desirable system of legal education by those countries not now having well developed systems. The International Association of Legal Science now unites 27 national committees, representing legal scholars of the following countries: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, India, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua, The Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Two international institutes have adhered, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law and the Institute for the Comparison and Reconciling of European Law having its seat in the Saar. Germany, Turkey, and Sweden have just taken their places with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the Executive Bureau to fill the places left vacant by the expiration of the terms of Denmark, Greece, and Egypt.—JOHN N. HAZARD.

The Western Political Science Association held its ninth annual meeting at the University Memorial Center, University of Colorado, on September 6, 1955. Six round tables were conducted on the following subjects: National Policy and Western Resources, Status of Citizenship Clearing House Programs in the West, Political Loyalty and Political Obligation, American Policy and the Permanent Crisis in Asia, State and Local Government, and Trends in Public Administration. Harold D. Lasswell, President Elect of the American Political Science Association, addressed the group at the luncheon meeting on the subject, "Political Science and the Work of the New Center for Advanced Study." At the dinner meeting James E. Murray, United States Senator from Montana, addressed the Association on the general subject of Western resources.

Utah State Agricultural College was selected as the place for the next annual meeting. Newly elected officers are: President, Curtis W. Martin, University of Colorado; Vice President, Russell H. Fitzgibbon, University of California (Los Angeles); Secretary-treasurer, Ross A. Gomez, University of Arizona. Newly elected members to the Executive Council for two-year terms are: A. Freeman Holmer, Willamette University; Howard J. McMurray, University of New Mexico; and John A. Vieg, Pomona College. The retiring president, Herman H. Trachsel of the University of Wyoming, serves *ex officio* on the council for a one-year term.

The New England Seminar on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was held at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, June 18–21, 1955. The sponsors were the Fletcher School, the Foreign Policy Association, the World Affairs Council of Boston, and the

World Peace Foundation. Professor Donald McKay, trustee of the World Peace Foundation, and Dean Robert B. Stewart of the Fletcher School served as co-chairmen. Eighty people, largely from New England, took part. Roughly two-thirds were civic leaders of various sorts, while about one-third were specialists on Russia and eastern Europe.

The seminar as a whole heard lectures by Nicholas S. Timasheff of Fordham ("Social and Political Change in the USSR since the Death of Stalin"), Colonel G. A. Lincoln of the U. S. Military Academy ("Strategic Problems Presented by the Soviet Bloc"), Merle Fainsod of Harvard ("The Communist Party, Soviet Society, and Government since Stalin's Death"), Henry Shapiro of the United Press ("Problems of News Coverage of the Soviet Bloc"), Alexander Eckstein of Harvard University ("Economic Aspects of the Soviet Bloc"), and John Campbell of the Department of State ("The European Satellites"). The four round tables which met for discussion after each lecture were guided by Frederick C. Barghoorn of Yale University (assisted by Frank Rounds of Harvard), Marshall D. Shulman of Harvard University, Andrew Gyorgy of Boston University and the Fletcher School, and Nicholas S. Timasheff. J. Harris Proctor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, George Fischer of Brandeis University, John S. Gibson of the World Affairs Council of Boston, and William Trainor of the American Foundation for Political Education served as rapporteurs for the round tables, while Ralph T. Fisher of Yale was the rapporteur for the seminar as a whole. At a general meeting on the closing day, the rapporteurs summarized the areas of agreement and disagreement found in the round tables, and Mrs. Henry Shapiro, Frederick C. Barghoorn, Robert C. Tucker of Rand, and Andrew Gyorgy added comments on specific topics. John W. Nason of the Foreign Policy Association led a concluding discussion of the problem of educating the American public in the realm of foreign affairs.

Arrangements for the seminar were made by a committee composed of Alfred O. Hero (of the World Peace Foundation) as chairman, John S. Gibson, Andrew Gyorgy, and Haydn Williams (of the Fletcher School), with particular assistance from Marshall D. Shulman and Robert B. Stewart.—RALPH T. FISHER, JR.

On November 10–12, 1955, the University of Chicago invited a number of distinguished American and foreign scholars to participate in a program of round tables and conferences commemorating the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of its Social Science Research Building. The opening of this building marked an important step in the development and recognition of the social sciences in the United States. Leonard D. White was chairman of the committee in charge of arrangements for the celebration, which was widely attended by former graduates and guests. On Friday, November 11, there were 10 round tables running concurrently. Sessions of particular interest to political scientists were those on "Psychoanalytic Thought and the Social Sciences," addressed by Harold D. Lasswell, and "The Study of Public Opinion," addressed by Bernard R. Berelson, Ford Foundation, with Leo Rosten of *Look* Magazine and Gabriel Almond of Princeton as commentators. Seven conferences were held on Saturday. The conference on "The Social Scientist and the Administrative Art" had Herman Finer, University of Chicago, as chairman, and Herbert Emmerich, Public Administration Clearing House, and Gordon Clapp as speakers, with Charles Hyneman of Northwestern University as a commentator. The conference on "The Art of Diplomatic Negotiation" was chaired by Quincy Wright, University of Chicago, and the addresses were given by John Nuveen and Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago. Leo Strauss of the University of Chicago spoke at the conference on "Humanism and the Social Sciences," and Andre Siegfried was a commentator. The conference on "Civil Liberty" with C. Herman Pritchett of the University of Chicago as chairman, had Robert E. Cushman of Cornell as the speaker and Morton Grodzins of the University of Chicago as one of the commentators. A special convocation was held Friday afternoon, at which Walter Lippmann was the speaker and received an honary degree. Other distinguished participants who received honorary degrees were Arnold J. Toynbee, Andre Siegfried, Harold Hotelling, William Ogburn, and Jacob Viner. Beardsley Ruml presided at the Friday evening dinner, at which Chancellor Lawrence A. Kimpton was the speaker. David Riesman and Louis Gottschalk were speakers at the two luncheons.—C. HERMAN PRITCHETT.

A grant from the Ford Foundation permitted the department of political science at the State University of Iowa to sponsor an eight-weeks' seminar during the summer of 1955 on

the teaching of international relations. Vernon Van Dyke served as director, and James Murray as assistant director. Schuyler Wallace of Columbia University and Richard C. Snyder of Princeton University served as advisers in planning the program and selecting the participants. Fellowships permitting participation were awarded to the following professors, all teaching in the international relations field: Winston W. Benson, Mankato State Teachers College; Frank R. Brandenburg, University of Pennsylvania; Henry C. Bush, Hunter College; John L. Chase, Louisiana State University; Michael J. Flack, Vassar College; Wallace B. Graves, DePauw University; Clifford P. Ketzel, University of Kansas; John H. McDonough, Georgetown University; Keith S. Petersen, University of Arkansas; John W. Schwada, University of Missouri; Fred A. Sondermann, Colorado College; and Urban G. Whitaker, San Francisco State College.

The general purpose of the seminar was to give the members an opportunity to improve their teaching of international relations. The group focused on the general international politics course. Seminar sessions were devoted to (1) an analysis and appraisal of various approaches to the field, (2) an examination of the meaning and usefulness of various concepts, (3) the appraisal of various texts, (4) an examination of the contributions of various disciplines to the study of international relations, and (5) the development of course outlines. Many of the seminar sessions were led by visiting consultants, including Oliver Benson of the University of Oklahoma, John Gange of the University of Virginia, Harold Guetzkow of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, Klaus Knorr of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, Hans Morgenthau of the University on Chicago, Philip E. Mosely of the Council of Foreign Relations, Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College, Richard C. Snyder of Princeton University, and Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago.

On June 14, 1955, the department of political science of the University of Oregon conducted the Third Institute on Management in Government and Business at the Portland Extension Center. This institute examined some of the major problems affecting business and governmental enterprises in the region. Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, formerly chairman, Council of Economic Advisors, delivered the principal address in the institute.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Contracts for work in public administration in Latin America have recently been signed by the University of Tennessee. One such contract has been entered into by the University of Tennessee and the Universidad Mayor de San Andres of La Paz, Bolivia, under the sponsorship of the International Cooperation Administration, whereby the Bureau of Public Administration of the University of Tennessee will establish in La Paz a Center for Public Administration. The center will provide in-service training for public officials, develop a library, and offer research and consultative service. Six technicians from the United States will be sent to La Paz, and San Andres University will provide additional personnel. Bolivian officials will be sent to the United States for periods of training. A separate contract between the University of Tennessee and the International Cooperation Administration provides that the Bureau of Public Administration will maintain a team of three technicians in Panama to provide consultative service in cooperation with the U. S. Mission to Panama. Professor Robert S. Avery will head the party to Bolivia and Mr. Edmund Meisenhelder will head the Panama group. Professor Salo Engel will go to Panama to prepare a Panamanian code. Professor Nelson Robinson will go to Bolivia early in January, 1956. Professor Lee S. Greene will serve as coordinator of both contracts at the University of Tennessee.

A short-term Research Program on the History of the CPSU has been inaugurated by an inter-university committee of scholars, consisting of Merle Fainsod (Harvard University), Harold H. Fisher (The Hoover Institute and Library), Philip E. Mosely (New York City), and Geroid T. Robinson (Columbia University), with the financial support of the Ford Foundation.

In order to promote the systematic and expeditous completion of studies relevant to the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the committee is now able to offer modest grants in aid of research along the following lines: (1) a limited number of full-time fellowships, pre-doctoral and post-

doctoral, on a one-year basis, particularly to facilitate the completion of pertinent research projects which are already well underway (as a rule, the program will not be able to support research projects in their beginning stage); (2) grants for a semester, relieving recipients completely of their academic duties for that period and enabling them to devote the period to the completion of research work that was previously well advanced; (3) assistance in securing access to otherwise inaccessible research materials; (4) a limited number of summer grants for subsistence and travel to facilitate access to sources and completion of manuscripts already in an advanced stage.

Applications will be considered from academically trained persons and from other persons who, by their previous research, have demonstrated a high level of competence in this field of investigation. Each applicant should sumbit a detailed statement on (a) the purpose, scope, and original contributions of his study, together with (b) a realistic estimate of the amount of work and support needed to complete it, and also (c) the names of persons best qualified to comment on his competence and on his projects. Requests for application forms and any other correspondence should be addressed to: Research Program on the History of the CPSU, 401 West 118th Street, New York 27, New York.

The government department at the University of Miami has entered into relations with the City of Miami and Dr. John Miklos, Director of Employee Training, to conduct special courses in public personnel administration for the city department heads. A more comprehensive training program has been planned covering other aspects of administration, including courses in management, public relations, effective speaking, and others.

A team of four members of the department of government at the University of Miami, Professors Larson, Serino, Sofen, and Wood, are conducting an impact study for the Miami Municipal Board.

The department of political science at Emory University announces the inauguration of its Ph.D. program in September, 1956.

In September the first 14 graduate students from Thailand arrived at Indiana University under the Indiana University-Thammasat University Public Administration Program financed jointly by the governments of the United States and Thailand. This is the first of several groups to be sent from Thailand in the course of a three-year period. These students are enrolled in a two-year M.A. program designed to prepare them for teaching and research postions in the newly established Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University. In residence at the Institute of Public Administration in Bangkok this year are the following members of the Indiana University department of government: Joseph L. Sutton, chief of party and director of research; Joseph B. Kingsbury, professor of public administration; and John W. Ryan, research associate. Both the Minister of Education, H. E. General Promyothi, and the new director of the institute, Dean Malai Huvanandana, visited Indiana University during September and October to discuss program plans.

The National Association of County Officials has granted Indiana University's department of government $1,250 as a fellowship to study rural road administration. The fellowship has been awarded to Mr. Robert Adang, a graduate student in government.

The political science department of the State University of Iowa is continuing its experiment with the use of closed circuit television. Following a successful "trial run" with a course in comparative government last spring (see this REVIEW, Vol. 49, pp. 932–33, Sept., 1955), a group of 85 students in the beginning course in American government are now being taught with the use of television by Professor James N. Murray, Jr. The test scores of this class will be compared with the scores of students in a large class of about 200 and those of two smaller classes of 15 or 20 students each to be taught without television during the spring semester of the current year.

As a part of the experiment in teaching political science through the use of mass media at the State University of Iowa, Donald Bruce Johnson is broadcasting the course in American government over radio station WSUI during the fall semester.

The University of Massachusetts announces the establishment of a Bureau of Government Research. This agency, for which legislative authorization was made at the last session of the General Court, will conduct studies of

local and state government and will carry on other activities usually associated with such organizations.

At Ohio Wesleyan University, the Institute of Practical Politics has been named the "Ben A. Arneson Institute of Practical Politics" in honor of its founder and director, who retired in 1953. Professor Earl Warner of the department of political science has been appointed director, and Mr. William H. Eells is serving as executive officer. Financial support for the institute has been obtained from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation.

The department of political science of Ohio Wesleyan University, aided by a grant from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation to its Arneson Institute of Practical Politics, conducted a summer workshop on the problem of the introductory course. Participants included Professors Earl Warner, Robert Lorish, Victor Walter, and William Strachan (emeritus) of the department, Professor Lloyd Easton (philosophy), and Professor Chester Mathews (education). Professor E. Allen Helms of Ohio State University served as a consultant. The resulting course, called "Introduction to Government and Politics," is designed to introduce the student to the fundamental principles of political science, to provide a broad understanding of the American and other systems of government, to develop political intelligence and tolerance, and to stimulate interest in politics. Recognizing the difficulties in attempting to attain these objectives in the traditional three class periods per week, the course is so organized that the student is required to fill in much of the content by means of individual term projects outside the classroom. To aid in this task, two undergraduate assistants have been assigned to each section to guide, tutor, or offer remedial services to the students and to supervise the term projects. Class discussions are based primarily on materials taken from Wit's *Comparative Political Institutions* and Ebenstein's *Today's Isms*. Appointments to the assistantships were made not only on the basis of demonstrated ability in the field, but also with reference to the students' interest in the possibility of becoming college teachers. It is hoped that an important by-product of the program will be the encouragement of a larger proportion of the abler political science majors to prepare for the college teaching profession.

The Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, sponsored an address by Adlai Stevenson on November 11, 1955. This address was a preliminary function for the Woodrow Wilson Centennial which begins December 28, 1955 and extends to December 28, 1956.

The Bureau of Government at the University of Wisconsin has been asked by the Legislative Council to make a study of the alternative forms of county and local government that might be suitable for the Menominee Indian Reservation when it comes under state control on January 1, 1959. The study will explore the governmental arrangements now existing in the area and will analyze the feasibility of the other kinds of arrangements. The study is being done for the bureau by Professor Lloyd W. Woodruff, assistant director of the bureau.

Ralph Braibanti, of Duke University, gave a series of four lectures on Japanese government at the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State in August. In October Professor Braibanti lectured on Asian international relations to branches of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Sherbrooke, Fredericton, and Halifax.

George Catlin will deliver a series of lectures at Hamline University, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota, on the Hill Memorial Foundation bequest.

Taylor Cole, of Duke University, spent the past summer visiting universities in Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa in connection with the Duke University Commonwealth Studies Center.

James C. Coleman, University of California at Los Angeles, participated in the Twenty-Ninth Study Session of the International Institute of Differing Civilisations, held in London, England, September 13-16. The theme of the session was "The Development of a Middle Class in Tropical Countries."

Andrew Gyorgy, professor of government at Boston University, lectured on "Soviet Foreign Policy" at the Universities of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, October 1-6,

1955, under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Relations.

During the past summer Rodney L. Mott, director of the division of social sciences and professor of political science at Colgate University, served as a public member of a State Department Ninth Selection Board. These boards are established under the Foreign Service Act to review the performance of Foreign Service Officers in American embassies and consulates and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for promotions.

James K. Pollock, chairman of the department of political science at the University of Michigan, was elected President of the International Political Science Association at the 1955 conference held in Stockholm.

Robert S. Rankin, of Duke University, spent part of the past summer in Canada doing research on the administration of Canadian grants-in-aid.

Clinton Rossiter, professor of government at Cornell University, delivered the principal address at the Sixty-Eighth Founders Day Convocation at Pomona College on October 13, 1955. His subject was "The Liberal Arts College in American Society." During his visit to Pomona College, Professor Rossiter made two other addresses on "The Origin of the American Tradition" and "The Age of Eisenhower."

Robert Scalapino, of the University of California (Berkeley), spent the summer months in Japan and Southeast Asia engaged in area research.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Milton C. Abrams, who is serving as librarian in the Institute of Government at the University of Utah while working toward a Ph.D. degree, has been appointed Director of Libraries at Utah State Agricultural College, Logan, Utah. He will assume his duties there next year.

Robert E. Agger, who spent last year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University, has returned to the University of North Carolina.

Ethan P. Allen, chairman of the department of political science at the University of Kansas, has been appointed to the Governor's Advisory Committee on Revenue and Taxation. Professor Allen has also been named to the Executive Committee of the Missouri Basin Research and Development Council.

Paul S. Bachman has been appointed President of the University of Hawaii, effective September 1, 1955.

Chester W. Bain has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Virginia. He will continue to serve as research assistant in the Bureau of Public Administration.

Richard C. Baker, formerly of Drake University, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Harding College.

Edward Banfield, formerly assistant professor in the Planning Committee at the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at that institution.

Ernest R. Bartley of the department of political science at the University of Florida, has been promoted to full professor. Professor Bartley was a consultant to the Public Administration Service of Chicago and the Alaska Statehood Committee while on leave from July to September 15, 1955. He is serving as director of research for the Florida Constitution Advisory Commission in Tallahassee, in addition to his teaching duties.

George A. Bell, who received his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan, has been appointed research associate in the Bureau of Governmental Research at the Univeristy of Maryland, effective September 1.

Frederick T. Bent, who recently returned to the United States after four years at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

Charles Blitzer, assistant professor of political science, Yale University, has returned after a year's leave of absence in England.

Rosalind L. Branning has been promoted to

the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Gary Brazier, formerly of Ohio State University, has accepted an assistant professorship in political science at Western Reserve University and will assume the responsibilities as executive director of the Graduate Program in Local Government Administration.

John Cotton Brown, formerly of Brandeis University, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science and public administration at Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Iowa.

J. Cudd Brown has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Oregon.

Edwin C. Buell, who has been teaching at Davidson College for the past two years, is now teaching at Lamar State College of Technology, Beaumont, Texas. He was awarded the Ph.D. at the University of North Carolina in June.

Franklin L. Burdette has been granted a leave of absence from the University of Maryland for a second year to serve as Director of the Information Center Service of the United States Information Agency.

Fred V. Cahill, Jr., formerly professor of government, has been appointed Dean of the College of Arts and Science at the University of Massachusetts and was recently named by the Governor to be chairman of a special commission established by the General Court to study state and local interrelations in government.

Holbert N. Carroll has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Homer C. Chandler, formerly a graduate student in political science at the University of Utah, has been appointed city manager of the City of South Salt Lake.

Asher N. Christensen has returned to the University of Minnesota after serving as a Fulbright lecturer in American government at University College in Aberystwyth, Wales, during 1954–55.

Dorothy I. Cline, assistant professor of government, is on leave from the University of New Mexico for a second semester to serve as Director of Health, Welfare and Recreation for the New Mexico State Department of Public Instruction.

Edward F. Cooke, assistant professor of political science at Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, is a visiting member of the department of political science at the University of Pittsburgh. He will serve as associate director of the Citizenship Clearing House for Western Pennsylvania.

L. Gray Cowan has returned to Columbia University as assistant professor of government after spending two years of study in Africa. He will serve as departmental representative in the School of General Studies.

Richard F. Crabbs has been appointed to the faculty of the department of government at Indiana University as a lecturer. He will also serve as assistant to the coordinator of the Thailand Public Administration Program.

Margaret Cram has been appointed research assistant in the Governmental Research Center at the University of Kansas.

Claude B. Cross is visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Idaho during the current academic year.

Winston S. Crouch has resumed his duties at the University of California at Los Angeles after a year in India under the Fulbright Program.

Emmett Davidson has been promoted to professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (Duluth Branch).

H. E. Dean, on sabbatical leave from the University of Oregon, is spending the year 1955–56 at Harvard University on a fellowship from the Fund for the Advancement of Education.

John T. Dempsey returned to the University of Detroit in September, 1955, after completing his year in Washington, D.C. as a congressional interne.

Alfred Diamant is on leave from the University of Florida during 1955–56 to complete his

doctorate at Yale University under an award from the Danforth Foundation.

Allan Dionisopoulos, doctoral candidate at the University of California (Los Angeles), has been appointed lecturer in political science at Indiana University.

J. E. Dovell, of the department of political science at the University of Florida, has been promoted to a full professorship.

James W. Drury has returned to the University of Kansas from a sabbatical leave during which he held a Fulbright lectureship at Sendai, Japan.

Paul S. Dull has been advanced to a full professorship in political science at the University of Oregon.

Leslie W. Dunbar, who served previously at Emory University and with the Atomic Energy Commission, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Mount Holyoke College.

Chester B. Earle has been appointed to the rank of assistant professor in the department of government and public administration at the American University.

Valerie Earle, formerly of the University of Alabama, has been appointed assistant professor of public administration at Georgetown University.

Jack Eaves, who had a Ford Foundation fellowship for two years of study in India, has returned to Columbia University as assistant to the director of the School of International Affairs.

Henry W. Ehrmann, of the University of Colorado, has recently been named chairman of the National Selection Committee for Fulbright Awards to Germany. Professor Ehrmann has accepted a visiting professorship for the spring semester with the department of political science at the University of California (Berkeley). He has been granted a leave of absence from the University of Colorado.

Robert E. Elder, associate professor of political science at Colgate University, has been awarded a Ford Foundation fellowship in international relations for study in Washington.

Samuel J. Eldersveld, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has returned from a year's leave of absence in Europe. While abroad on a sabbatical and a Fulbright research scholarship he taught for one semester at the Municipal University of Amsterdam and engaged in comparative research on political parties and elections in The Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. Professor Eldersveld is resuming direction of a political behavior project which is supported by a three-year grant from the Ford Foundation.

Lynn W. Eley, formerly organization and methods examiner with the Agricultural Research Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, has been appointed research associate in the Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, where he reported for duty in July.

Norris Ellertson, who has been associated with Professor Herbert McClosky in studies of political affiliation and participation, is giving the course in political behavior at the University of Minnesota this year during the latter's absence.

Donald L. Fairchild has been appointed assistant professor of political science at The Citadel.

John D. Fassett has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University for the academic year 1955–56.

John H. Fenton, recently a Social Science Research Council Fellow and a graduate student at Harvard University, has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at Tulane University.

William Fleming, chairman of the department of political science at Ripon College, Ripon, Wisconsin, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

John L. Fletcher, assistant professor of government at Boston University, received a grant from the Graduate School of Boston University to conduct research on public housing during the summer of 1955.

Edwin J. Forsythe, formerly with the Institute of Government of the University of Michigan, has accepted a position in the de-

partment of political science at the University of Detroit, beginning in September, 1955.

Charles N. Fortenberry, professor of political science at the University of Mississippi, has recently been appointed director of the Bureau of Public Administration at that institution.

Paul O. Foss has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Oregon.

Robert S. Friedman has joined the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland as an instructor.

Carl J. Friedrich has been appointed Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard, succeeding Arthur N. Holcombe, who took over this chair from Charles H. MacIlwain. Professor Friedrich is this term serving as Bacon Professor at the University of Paris, where he is giving courses at the Faculté de Droit and at the Institut d'Études Politiques, dealing with the history of political thought and with totalitarian dictatorship and constitutionalism. Professor André Siegfried is serving at Harvard in exchange, lecturing on French government and politics.

Robert Lee Galvin, who took his graduate work at West Virginia University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Fairmont State College, Fairmont, West Virginia.

Stephen P. Gibert, having completed his studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, has been appointed instructor in government at Georgetown University.

Edward B. Glick, who received his doctorate in June from the University of Florida, has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at that university for the 1955–56 academic year.

Reverdy T. Gliddon has been appointed to the faculty of the department of government at Indiana University as a lecturer.

W. Leon Godshall, of Lehigh University, has been elected president of the social science honorary fraternity Pi Gamma Mu.

Merrill R. Goodall is serving as visiting associate professor of public administration at Claremont Graduate School during the current year. (Editor's note: The item on Professor Goodall in the last issue of this REVIEW (page 939) erroneously reported that he was a visiting professor at Pomona College.)

James W. Gould, formerly of the Foreign Service, has been appointed assistant professor of international relations at Claremont Men's College.

George A. Graham is on leave of absence from Princeton University to spend a year at the University of Hawaii. He did research during the fall term and will teach during the spring term.

Paul S. Greenlaw, who recently received his doctorate from Syracuse University, has joined the department of political science at Duke University with the rank of instructor.

Morton Grodzins has been named chairman of the political science department at the University of Chicago, succeeding C. Herman Pritchett who resigned as chairman after serving for seven years in that position.

Werner Grunbaum has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Houston.

Joseph Hajda has been appointed instructor in government at the Indiana University South Bend Center.

Louis Halle is serving for a second year as research professor in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia under a Rockfeller Foundation grant. (The source of the grant to Professor Halle was erroneously reported in the September issue of this REVIEW (page 939) as the Ford Foundation.—Ed.).

John H. Hallowell, of Duke University, served on the faculty of the American Studies Institute at Stetson University during the summer. He is spending this academic year as a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Munich.

William. H. Harbold has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at the University of Washington.

Henry C. Hart has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

Frederick Hartmann, of the department of political science at the University of Florida, has been appointed to the National Fulbright Selection Committee.

Rev. Robert C. Hartnett, S.J., will rejoin the faculty of the department of political science, University of Detroit, in February, 1956, after seven years' absence as editor-in-chief of the weekly *America*.

George Y. Harvey, who recently retired as staff director of the Committee on Appropriations of the U. S. House of Representatives, has been appointed lecturer in political science at the University of Missouri for the fall semester.

William C. Havard is on leave from the University of Florida during 1955-56 to complete his doctorate at the London School under a Southern Fellowships Fund award. Professor Havard organized the research activities of the Florida Constitution Advisory Commission and served as temporary director of research during August and September, 1955.

Dayton E. Heckman has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the Ohio State University; he continues to be secretary of the Arts College.

Arthur N. Holcombe is serving as Haynes Foundation Visiting Professor of Government at Claremont Men's College during the first semester of this year.

Robert E. Hosack, professor and chairman of political science, has been named head of the department of social sciences at the University of Idaho, effective July 1, 1955.

Harry N. Howard, of the State Department, has been named visiting professor at Columbia University to give a course in the Russian Institute during the winter season.

Ronald F. Howell, assistant professor of political science at Emory University, has been appointed to the Fulbright National Selection Committee of the Institute of International Education.

Karel Hulicka is visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Minnesota during the current academic year.

Lucretia Ilsley, of the department of political science at Hollins College, has been awarded a grant by the Duke University Commonwealth Studies Center for study in the Union of South Africa.

Eugene Wise Jones, who recently received his Ph. D. degree at the University of North Carolina, has accepted a position at Maryland Baptist College, Plainview, Texas.

Ralph G. Jones, of the University of Arkansas, is serving as visiting associate professor in political science at the University of Minnesota for 1955–56.

Robert Dale Judy, who has been teaching political science at Forman Christian College, Lahore, Pakistan, during the past five years, has returned to the United States to work toward his doctorate at the University of California (Berkeley).

Roy Jumper, who received his doctorate from Duke University last June, was in Saigon during the past year on a Ford Foundation fellowship studying the French civil service. Previously, Dr. Jumper spent a year in France as a Fulbright scholar doing research on the French bureaucracy.

Morton A. Kaplan, of the Brookings Institution, is spending a year as a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University.

Robert Kirch has been appointed instructor in government at the Indiana University Indianapolis Center.

Marshall Knappen has returned to the University of Michigan after a year's sabbatical leave. While on leave he visited the Far East, India, and the Near East. In those areas he consulted with officials engaged in Point Four work and cultural activities. Professor Knappen also spent some time in western Europe.

Kenneth Kofmehl has joined the staff of the department of political science at the University of Kansas as visiting instructor.

Lionel H. Laing has resumed his duties as professor of political science at the University of Michigan after a sabbatical year in New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa which

was spent in observing political and governmental processes in these Commonwealth countries.

Robert N. Larson, formerly of the University of Rhode Island and Boston University, has been appointed instructor in government at the University of Miami.

Harold D. Lasswell, professor of political science, Yale University, has returned after a year at the Center of Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University.

Ruth C. Lawson has been promoted to professor of political science at Mount Holyoke College.

Harry Lazer, formerly of Brooklyn College, has accepted a one-year appointment as instructor in political science at the University of Rhode Island.

Richard H. Leach has joined the staff of the political science department at Duke University as visiting lecturer.

M. Harry Lease, a candidate for the Ph. D. degree at Indiana University, has been appointed instructor in government at the University of Miami.

Nathan Leites has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University for the fall term, 1955–56.

T. J. Leonard, formerly at the University of Southern California, has joined the staff of the department of political science at the University of Florida as an interim instructor.

Murray B. Levin has been appointed instructor in government at Boston University.

Ernest M. Linton, retired professor of government at Indiana University, has rejoined the department of government to assist with the introductory course.

Benjamin E. Lippincott has returned to the University of Minnesota after a sabbatical leave of absence during which he was engaged in bringing to completion a study of totalitarian parties in a democracy.

George A. Lipsky has been appointed associate professor in the Human Relations Area Files, American University, Washington, D.C.

Leslie Lipson, of the University of California (Berkeley), has received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and sabbatical leave for the fall semester to conduct a comparative study of the party systems in Britain and Switzerland.

Hugh G. MacNiven has been appointed assistant professor of political science and supervisor of training for the Institute of Local Government at the University of Pittsburgh.

William Manger, the Assistant Secretary General of the Pan-American Union, has accepted an appointment as lecturer on Latin-American government and politics in the Graduate School of Georgetown University.

Harry S. Manley, who received his doctorate in political science from Duke University in June, has joined the faculty of Millsaps College in Mississippi.

Mavis Mann has returned to her duties at West Virginia University after a two-year leave of absence. During 1953–54 she was one of the American Political Science Association's congressional internes in Washington, D. C., and during 1954-55 she served as Fulbright lecturer at Keio University in Tokyo.

John A. Marcum, formerly of Stanford University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Colgate University.

John W. Masland has been named chairman of the department of government at Dartmouth College, succeeding Professor Elmer E. Smead.

Bruce Mason has been appointed acting director of the Public Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida.

John Brown Mason, formerly with the State Department and most recently stationed at Bangkok, Thailand, is visiting professor of political science at the University of Florida for the academic year 1955–56.

William I. Matthews, who taught last year at Valparaiso University, has been appointed acting assistant professor of political science at Drake University.

Daniel S. McHargue, assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan,

has returned to his regular duties after spending the academic year 1954–55 as liaison officer for the University of Michigan at the Institute of Public Administration of the University of the Philippines.

Dean E. McHenry, professor of political science, University of California at Los Angeles, has been appointed director of the Nevada Legislature's special group for conducting the legislative investigation of the faculty affairs, administration, and the academic operations of the University of Nevada. The Nevada Legislature at its 1955 session authorized the investigation and appropriated $25,000 for this purpose.

Edward McWhinney has resigned from Yale University to accept an associate professorship at the School of Law, University of Toronto, where he will teach and direct research in comparative law.

Marvin Meade has been promoted to assistant director in charge of the consultation service at the Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas.

Norman Meller has been appointed chairman of the department of government at the University of Hawaii, effective September 1, 1955.

Donald G. Morgan, chairman of the department of political science at Mount Holyoke College, has been promoted to the rank of professor.

Pedro Muños Amato, dean of the College of Social Sciences and director of the School of Public Administration, University of Peurto Rico, is spending 1955–56 in Europe where he is studying public administration practices in the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy. He is on sabbatical leave and has a grant from the Ford Foundation for research in comparative administration.

Robert G. Neumann has returned to the University of California (Los Angeles) after a year of research and lecturing in western Europe.

Mark Neuweld, after a year's leave of absence under a Ford Foundation grant at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, has returned to Western Reserve University as assistant professor.

Benjamin Nimer, formerly of the University of Chicago, is a visiting assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University during 1955-56.

Clarence H. Nixon, who has retired as professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, is serving as visiting professor at Hamilton College, Clinton, New York, during the academic year 1955–56.

Jack Northrup has been appointed research assistant in the Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas.

Alfred G. Obern has been appointed instructor in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Felix Oppenheim has returned to the University of Delaware after a year's leave of absence at Stanford University, where he was visiting associate professor of political science during the spring quarter, 1955.

Vincent Ostrom, associate professor of political science at the University of Oregon, has been appointed to a fellowship in the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for the year 1955–56.

Normal J. Padelford has been appointed chairman of the new political science section at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The section, which has been established within the department of economics and social science, will coordinate the work of professors in several M.I.T. departments for more effective undergraduate instruction in political science.

Ivan W. Parkins, formerly at the University of Akron, has joined the department of social sciences of the University of Florida as an assistant professor.

Robert J. Pitchell, who received his Ph. D. this year from the University of California (Berkeley), has been appointed assistant professor of government at Purdue University.

Ira Polley, formerly at Wayne University, has been appointed visiting associate professor of political science and acting associate direc-

tor of the Public Administration Center at the University of Minnesota for 1955-56.

Lyman Powell has been appointed assistant to the research director of the Local Government Survey Commission of the State of Utah.

Hyrum Plaas has been appointed research fellow in the Institute of Government at the University of Utah.

Lucian Pye, of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, is giving a winter session course in the East Asian Institute of Columbia University.

Harold S. Quigley, who retired from the political science faculty of the University of Minnesota in the fall of 1954, is spending the year in California. His friends may address him at: 6259 Girvin Drive, Oakland, California.

Felix Rackow, after several years at Brown University, has joined the Western Reserve University staff as assistant professor.

S. G. Rich, Jr. has returned from Europe to resume his duties at the University of Utah.

George Lee Robinson has been appointed instructor in political science at New York University; he will divide his time between the University College of Arts and Science and the Washington Square College of Arts and Science.

Ruth Roettinger, who served as an instructor in political science at the University of North Carolina last year, has been granted a fellowship by the Southern Fellowship Council and is continuing her graduate work at North Carolina.

George Romoser, teaching associate in government at Indiana University's Gary Center, has received a grant to study for a year in Germany.

C. Neale Ronning, formerly of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed instructor in the department of politics at Princeton University for the academic year 1955–56.

Edwin Rothman has been named director of research of the Bureau of Municipal Research and Pennsylvania Economy League (Eastern Division).

Dankwart A. Rustow has been appointed research associate in the Princeton University Center of International Studies, in addition to his regular duties as assistant professor of politics.

Allan F. Saunders, formerly chairman of the department of government at the University of Hawaii, has been named dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of that institution.

Steven E. Schanes has been appointed Director of the New Jersey State Division of Pensions by Governor Meyner.

Elmer E. Schattschneider, of Wesleyan University, is a visiting professor of government at Columbia University during the winter session of 1955–56.

F. B. Schick, who has been lecturing at the Law School of the University of Berlin, Germany, has returned to his regular duties at the University of Utah.

Charles P. Schleicher has returned to the University of Oregon from his sabbatical year and Fulbright assignment at Allahabad University in India. Professor Schleicher taught during the summer session at Lehigh University.

Jackson Selman, who recently completed his work for the doctorate at the University of North Carolina, is teaching at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Virginia.

Walter R. Sharp, professor of political science, Yale University, has returned from a year in Egypt, where, under UN auspices, he helped establish an Institute of Public Administration at Cairo.

Edgar L. Sherbenou has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Houston.

Kalman H. Silvert, associate professor of political science at Tulane University, has been granted a leave of absence to join the American Universities Field Staff organization. Professor Silvert's field of work with the A.U.F.S. is Latin America.

William Hays Simpson, of Duke University, is spending his sabbatical leave in England where he is making a study of the voting behavior of the textile industry in the last British elections.

John F. Sly has been appointed chairman of the Princeton University department of politics, effective in September, 1955.

Frederick C. Spiegel has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Missouri.

Robert J. Steamer, recently of Oglethorpe University, has joined the government department of the University of Massachusetts.

Murray S. Stedman, Jr., associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College, will be a member of the faculty of the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, Salzburg, Austria, during the session extending from January 8 to February 4, 1956.

Edwin O. Stene resumed his regular duties in September as professor of political science at the University of Kansas after a year's leave of absence in the Philippines where he served as research consultant to the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

Richard W. Sterling has been promoted to assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College.

James A. Storing, professor of political science at Colgate University, is a visiting professor in the University of Maryland's Overseas Program for the Armed Forces in Europe.

Leo Strauss has returned to the University of Chicago after a year's absence at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Oscar Svarlien, of the departments of history and political science at the University of Florida, has been promoted to a full professorship.

Thomas F. Thompson has been appointed academic counselor and teaching associate in government at Indiana University's Gary Center.

James F. Tierney has been appointed instructor in government at Dartmouth College.

Glenn E. Tinder, Jr. has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of government at the University of Massachusetts.

David B. Truman has received a Guggenheim fellowship and is on leave from Columbia University for the academic year 1955–56.

Donald S. Vaughan, formerly of the University of Alabama extension division and the department of political science, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of Mississippi, effective September, 1955.

William Verhage, professor of government at Boston University, has received a Fulbright grant for the academic year 1955–56 to lecture in Japan at the International Christian University, Tokyo.

Clement E. Vose has resigned his position as assistant professor of political science at Western Reserve University to become associate professor of government at Bowdoin College. He is also director of the Bureau for Research in Municipal Government at Bowdoin.

Eric Waldman, who recently received his doctorate at George Washington University, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Marquette University.

Lawrence C. Wanlass has resigned his position at Mount Holyoke College to accept a position in the State Department.

Paul S. Welty, formerly of the University of Chicago, has been appointed associate professor in the department of social sciences at the University of Florida.

Egbert S. Wengert, of the University of Oregon, taught during the summer session in the department of public law and government at Columbia University.

Dale Whipple has been appointed research assistant in the Institute of Government, University of Utah.

Catherine D. Williston has been appointed instructor in political science at Mount Holyoke College.

Fred H. Winkler has been appointed instructor in history and political science at the University of Idaho.

George Wolff is on leave from the University of Florida during 1955–56 to complete his doctorate at the University of North Carolina under a Southern Fellowships Fund award.

Julius F. Wolff, Jr. has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (Duluth Branch).

Edward J. Woodhouse, who retired in 1954 after 28 years at the University of North Carolina, in now President of the Coastal Carolina College at Conway, South Carolina. Dr. Woodhouse returned to the University of North Carolina to teach during the summer session, 1955.

Leon W. Wolcott is serving as visiting professor of government at the University of New Mexico during the first semester of 1955–56.

Joseph J. Zasloff, assistant professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, taught in the European Program of the University of Maryland College of Special and Continuation Studies.

Janusz K. Zawodny, formerly of Stanford University, has been appointed instructor in the department of politics at Princeton University for the academic year 1955–56.

IN MEMORIAM

J. Dayton Voorhees, associate professor of Politics Emeritus of Princeton University, died of a heart seizure September 28th. A graduate of Princeton in 1905, Mr. Voorhees returned nine years later for an A.M. Meantime, having been admitted to the Bar in 1908, he had practiced law in Camden, his birthplace. In 1917, however, he joined the Air Service, from which in 1919 he was mustered out a captain. This same year he again returned to Princeton, to accept an appointment as instructor in the tripod department of history, politics and economics. In 1922 he was made assistant professor of politics; in 1929, associate professor.

Most of Professor Voorhees' teaching was done in jurisprudence and municipal government. In the latter subject, in particular, he contrived to blend practice and teaching with notable success, and with marked benefit to his students and to the Borough of Princeton. At the time of his death he was just completing his 15th year as Borough Councilman, in which capacity he served at various times as Acting Mayor, President of the Council, and Police Commissioner, earning in all roles the esteem and affection of his constituents.

While not a contributor to the literature of his field, he read widely in it, as well as in related fields. Thanks to his breadth of information and practical experience, and to charm of personality, his success in the class room was outstanding. Perhaps his greatest contribution, however, to the department was the confidence which he instilled in his younger colleagues by his unassuming and direct approach to the problems they soon learned to bring to him. And by all who knew him he was admired as a master of good talk, sensible, unhackneyed, humorous. His loss will be felt deeply throughout the Princeton community —by fellow townsmen, classmates, former students, and by those with whom he shared for many years the Sisyphean labors of college teaching.—Edward S. Corwin.

1956 PROGRAM OF CONGRESSIONAL FELLOWSHIPS

Applications for the 1956 Program of Congressional Fellowships will close on January 15, 1956. This program, which has been operating since 1953, will continue with its objective of enabling young political scientists and journalists to gain the practical experience of working as staff members of congressional committees in the offices of House and Senate members. Next year 10 Fellowships will be awarded—five for those with graduate training and/or teaching experience in political science and five for journalists or young teachers in schools of journalism. The stipends are $4,000, plus travel expenses to and from Washington, D. C.

Several changes have been made in the selection process for next year. The age limit has been raised somewhat and preference will be given applicants in the age group 25–35. It will no longer be necessary to submit applications through the chairman of the department of political science. In former years, the chairman of each department of political science was asked to recommend only one candidate from each college or university. Henceforth, any number of applicants may apply directly to The American Political Science Association.

Preference will be given to applicants who have not had the opportunity to work or live in Washington, D. C. The following types of experience ar
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Applications for the 1956 Program of Congressional Fellowships will close on January 15, 1956. This program, which has been operating since 1953, will continue with its objective of enabling young political scientists and journalists to gain the practical experience of working as staff members of congressional committees in the offices of House and Senate members. Next year 10 Fellowships will be awarded—five for those with graduate training and/or teaching experience in political science and five for journalists or young teachers in schools of journalism. The stipends are $4,000, plus travel expenses to and from Washington, D. C.

Several changes have been made in the selection process for next year. The age limit has been raised somewhat and preference will be given applicants in the age group 25–35. It will no longer be necessary to submit applications through the chairman of the department of political science. In former years, the chairman of each department of political science was asked to recommend only one candidate from each college or university. Henceforth, any number of applicants may apply directly to The American Political Science Association.

Preference will be given to applicants who have not had the opportunity to work or live in Washington, D. C. The following types of experience and training are suggestive rather than binding:

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

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